torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (01/01/70)
In article <5953@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >In article <241@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >>[...] Now all of the above merits more detail; but I would rather recommend >>a few good books on the subjects than type all year. But it should at least >>be crystal clear that if others don't follow at least a "minimally decent" >>(specific examples: no rape or murder allowed) behavior-pattern toward >>others, you and I will suffer. [...] [This] IS >>ALREADY SUFFICIENT REASON to compel others to obey a moral code. > >You are right in that it merits more detail and you can recommend books if >you like. But, concerning point (b) above, what is the basis for the belief >that certain norms are valid for all rational agents? It is implied by the idea that there is a fact of the matter about what we ought to do; an idea that can be rejected only at the price of reductio ad absurdum. See S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason*, and C. I. Lewis (that's "I" as in "Irving"), *Values and Imperatives*. >Fine, we may compel others to obey a certain moral code because we may [...] >get hurt if we don't. But why is our perspective more important >than the perspective than the one we are constraining to obey? So we may be >hurt; that is sufficeint reason for self defense, but not for legislation. >The one we are trying to constrain has a different perspective, and I don't >think sympathy is sufficient to enforce ours upon him. Sure it is. As long as our preferences as to the outcome, including the coercion of the aggressor, are rational -- and they are -- we have every reason and right to act on them. We have no obligation to respect "his perspective" when he is disrespecting the "perspective" of his victim. >>To quote a famous philosopher: "Yes, that's my implication. But you've >>shifted the burden of proof ...". The burden's on YOU to show how >>religious codes "do provide the transcendent authority" i.e. provide >>reasons for an individual to be moral *over and above* the reasons ("if >>any", if you insist there are none) human reason provides. Prove that >>you're not "in the same boat" as we agnostics are in! >> >My point is not that religious codes can supply independent reasons. I >fully agree that they only provide answers within their own framwork. That's not my point. It's not just that we have no compelling evidence for the religious framework itself -- true as that is -- but that *even after we accept a religious framework* we have *no more (and no less) justification for morality than we had before.* >This is the way the score looks to me: Religiously based moral codes >cannot produce independent reasons for obeying them, but can produce >dependant reasons. Areligious moral codes can produce neither independant >or dependant reasons. You haven't given evidence for either of these assertions. (You at least made an ATTEMPT at demonstrating your point about areligious codes -- the remark about "enforcing our perspective" -- but the attempt fails.) > So, Paul, I think it is up to you agnostics to >prove that you *are* in the same boat with us religious believers. No, it's up to you to show that we're not in the same boat, by showing how a religious framework provides "dependent reasons". >... the argument that the public implications of a religious moral code >may be ignored solely on the basis of it's being religious is unfounded. Whoa there, don't get me confused with Sonntag. I don't argue that religious codes should be barred from expression in public laws (the old "imposing morality" or "imposing religious morality" argument). In my idea of a democracy, laws don't get ruled unconstitutional just because they agree with a religious morality. I just hope the public wouldn't *vote* for those laws in the first place unless (like laws against murder) they can (also) be justified from an areligious perspective. --Paul V Torek, throwing back the red herrings. torek@umich
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/20/85)
Paul Dubuc's discourse on his opinion of the necessity for a religious basis for morality falls flat on its face for one very good reason. If Paul claims the basis for his morality stems from god, and that we must adhere to it because a deity says this is the law, he's effectively thrown out the whole code. Why? Well, ask Paul if he can prove the existence of god. (Let alone that this god is of the form that he assumes it to be---who knows, maybe the other other Paul (Zimmerman) has a more accurate depiction!) Look at the so-called "decay of moral values" in modern society. Could it possibly be that a major part of the reason for this "decay" (often just a shirking of unnecessary restrictive values that serve no purpose, but also manifested in disrespect for other human beings) is that people no longer believe the veracity of the claims behind its "meaning" and "purpose"? "Hey, there's no god to punish me for this. Look at all the punishing god does to all those other evil people---none. And what rewards do I get from believing---zilch. Hell, might as well rip off that old woman..." Thus, just the opposite of what Paul claims is what is really true. NO morality can sustain itself claiming that "it is the will of god" as long as thinking people come to the reasonable conclusion that there is no god. So what's the solution? Force everyone to believe? Go back in time to indoctrinating the "old values" to make sure everyone believes and doesn't question that belief? Or, maybe, just maybe, build a minimal morality that restricts only from interference/harm to other people's lives in order to fill the needs of all people, and explain the reasoning behind such a morality? -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (09/22/85)
In article <241@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >>>Ahem. The reason for morality is that lack of it causes harm to >>>individuals such as myself. I think it becomes crystal clear why the >>>areligious person ought to support an enforced public morality. (Reasons >>>to be moral as an individual are a little more complex, but just as >>>explainable under areligous assumptions as under religious ones.) >> >>OK, then explain them. Also you should give examples of what particular >>moral codes should be enforced and what binds the individual to obey >>them. It doesn't necessarily follow that I will be harmed by not obeying >>moral codes. How do you know I will? [I didn't say that; see below --pvt] > >Non-religious reasons to be moral derive from (a) sympathy for others as >part of a normal human psyche, which can seen to be rational from the facts >(a1) that humans are similar in ways relevant to concern about our own and >others' welfare, and (a2) sympathy is part and parcel of a set of dispositions >and affections which enrich our lives, in part by enabling us to feel joy or >sadness at our own fortune or plight; (b) the way a rational being acts in >accordance with norms because those norms are (believed to be) valid for >all rational agents, which commits one to a certain sort of impartiality >(e.g., "Everyone should serve *me* because I'm *me*" is ruled out). > >Whew. Now all of the above merits more detail; but I would rather recommend >a few good books on the subjects than type all year. But it should at least >be crystal clear that if others don't follow at least a "minimally decent" >(specific examples: no rape or murder allowed) behavior-pattern toward >others, you and I will suffer. That is what I meant when I said "lack of >it [morality] causes harm to individuals such as [you and] myself": not that >you'll be harmed by *your* immorality, but by *others'*. THE LATTER IS >ALREADY SUFFICIENT REASON to compel others to obey a moral code. You are right in that it merits more detail and you can recommend books if you like. But, concerning point (b) above, what is the basis for the belief that certain norms are valid for all rational agents? Fine, we may compel others to obey a certain moral code because we may (although not necessarily, think of the ones who watch street crimes take place and don't want to get involved. Do the really believe they will be hurt if they don't intervene?) get hurt if we don't. But why is our perspective more important than the perspective than the one we are constraining to obey? So we may be hurt; that is sufficeint reason for self defense, but not for legislation. The one we are trying to constrain has a different perspective, and I don't think sympathy is sufficient to enforce ours upon him. >>>>Religious codes do provide the transcendent authority. >>> >>>Wrong! (I take you to mean that religious codes do supply valid reasons >>>for a moral code, over and above any reasons that might be supplied >>>without religion. If you did not mean this, your statement does not >>>address Sonntag's point.) [...] >> >>You are just saying I am wrong without showing me how I am wrong. [...] > >To quote a famous philosopher: "Yes, that's my implication. But you've >shifted the burden of proof ...". The burden's on YOU to show how >religious codes "do provide the transcendent authority" i.e. provide >reasons for an individual to be moral *over and above* the reasons ("if >any", if you insist there are none) human reason provides. Prove that >you're not "in the same boat" as we agnostics are in! > >But since you asked: religious codes can't supply any independent reasons >because, as Socrates rhetorically queried Euthyphro: > Is a thing good because the gods approve it, or do the > gods approve it because it is good? >Two millenia later, the score remains: Socrates 1, Euthyphro 0. Too bad Socrates didn't read Dostoyevsky. :-). Really now, Paul, is it only you that gets to play iconoclast? My point is not that religious codes can supply independent reasons. I fully agree that they only provide answers within their own framwork. But that is a transcendent framework, and so the compulsion to obey moral codes makes sense from within it. But, I contend that that compulsion does not make sencse even from within the agnostic's or atheist's own framework. This is the way the score looks to me: Religiously based moral codes cannot produce independent reasons for obeying them, but can produce dependant reasons. Areligious moral codes can produce neither independant or dependant reasons. So, Paul, I think it is up to you agnostics to prove that you *are* in the same boat with us religious believers. My conviction is that the authority of any moral code must be dependant on a transcendent religious belief. Since neither areligious or religious moral codes can produce independant reasons for obedience, and only religious ones can produce dependent reasons, the argument that the public implications of a religious moral code may be ignored solely on the basis of it's being religious is unfounded. may -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) (09/27/85)
I want to say to Mr. Torek that I don't apreciate you sucking this discussion into net.philosophy so automatically and with out stating it explicitly (With your Followup-To line). Do you think you own this discussion? I had unsubscribed to net.philosophy for a long time since it seemed like a "Rich Rosen vs. everyone else debate on any subject you care to discuss" forum. If you want to move the discussion to another group, ASK first, OK? This is going to be my last effort anyway. Torek seems not to be putting much into it himself, and the character of this newsgroup hasn't changed since I last unsubscribed. In article <244@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >In article <5953@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >>In article <241@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >>>[...] Now all of the above merits more detail; but I would rather recommend >>>a few good books on the subjects than type all year. But it should at least >>>be crystal clear that if others don't follow at least a "minimally decent" >>>(specific examples: no rape or murder allowed) behavior-pattern toward >>>others, you and I will suffer. [...] [This] IS >>>ALREADY SUFFICIENT REASON to compel others to obey a moral code. >> >>You are right in that it merits more detail and you can recommend books if >>you like. But, concerning point (b) above, what is the basis for the belief >>that certain norms are valid for all rational agents? > >It is implied by the idea that there is a fact of the matter about what we >ought to do; an idea that can be rejected only at the price of reductio ad >absurdum. See S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason*, and C. I. Lewis (that's "I" as >in "Irving"), *Values and Imperatives*. Maybe I'm just dense, or maybe you are being too vague (I'll give you your pick of reasons), but what is the "fact of the matter" you are talking about? >>Fine, we may compel others to obey a certain moral code because we may [...] >>get hurt if we don't. But why is our perspective more important >>than the perspective than the one we are constraining to obey? So we may be >>hurt; that is sufficeint reason for self defense, but not for legislation. >>The one we are trying to constrain has a different perspective, and I don't >>think sympathy is sufficient to enforce ours upon him. > >Sure it is. As long as our preferences as to the outcome, including the >coercion of the aggressor, are rational -- and they are -- we have every >reason and right to act on them. We have no obligation to respect "his >perspective" when he is disrespecting the "perspective" of his victim. So, is there no moral evil when a sadist inflicts his fancy on a masochist? Anyway, you have implicitly taken sides without really justifying which side should be taken. Suppose it is the victim who is not honoring the aggressor's perspective (by resisting, perhaps). >>>To quote a famous philosopher: "Yes, that's my implication. But you've >>>shifted the burden of proof ...". The burden's on YOU to show how >>>religious codes "do provide the transcendent authority" i.e. provide >>>reasons for an individual to be moral *over and above* the reasons ("if >>>any", if you insist there are none) human reason provides. Prove that >>>you're not "in the same boat" as we agnostics are in! >>> >>My point is not that religious codes can supply independent reasons. I >>fully agree that they only provide answers within their own framwork. > >That's not my point. It's not just that we have no compelling evidence >for the religious framework itself -- true as that is -- but that *even >after we accept a religious framework* we have *no more (and no less) >justification for morality than we had before.* The morality is inherent in the religious code obseved within it's own framework. You have side-stepped my point. I am talking about the ground for authority which is invested in a moral code, the transcendence by which we are justified in compelling others to stand under that code. >>This is the way the score looks to me: Religiously based moral codes >>cannot produce independent reasons for obeying them, but can produce >>dependant reasons. Areligious moral codes can produce neither independant >>or dependant reasons. > >You haven't given evidence for either of these assertions. (You at least >made an ATTEMPT at demonstrating your point about areligious codes -- the >remark about "enforcing our perspective" -- but the attempt fails.) (You keep telling me this while making little attempt at showing me how). >> So, Paul, I think it is up to you agnostics to >>prove that you *are* in the same boat with us religious believers. > >No, it's up to you to show that we're not in the same boat, by showing how >a religious framework provides "dependent reasons". How can you divorce any moral code from the framework in which it exists. Religions do have moral codes, I think that should be obvious. Accepting the religious framework brings that moral code along with it. Moral codes do not have to be derived (though they may be expounded upon and applied differently) within a religious framework, they are part of that framework itself. The transcendent quality of these code means that we can have a law that is above human authority. >>... the argument that the public implications of a religious moral code >>may be ignored solely on the basis of it's being religious is unfounded. > >Whoa there, don't get me confused with Sonntag. I don't argue that >religious codes should be barred from expression in public laws (the old >"imposing morality" or "imposing religious morality" argument). In my >idea of a democracy, laws don't get ruled unconstitutional just because >they agree with a religious morality. I just hope the public wouldn't >*vote* for those laws in the first place unless (like laws against murder) >they can (also) be justified from an areligious perspective. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ... which you haven't really done. >--Paul V Torek, throwing back the red herrings. torek@umich ... His own, I think. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/05/85)
In article <5999@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >I want to say to Mr. Torek that I don't apreciate you sucking this >discussion into net.philosophy so automatically and with out stating it Sorry. I thought my "Followup-To" line would be obvious, and I like to minimize the number of lines of text. >This is going to be my last effort anyway. Torek seems not to be >putting much into it himself, and the character of this newsgroup >hasn't changed since I last unsubscribed. Oh boy, I get the last word! >>>[...] what is the basis for the belief >>>that certain norms are valid for all rational agents? >> >>It is implied by the idea that there is a fact of the matter about what we >>ought to do; an idea that can be rejected only at the price of reductio ad >>absurdum. See S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason*, and C. I. Lewis (that's "I" as >>in "Irving"), *Values and Imperatives*. > >Maybe I'm just dense, or maybe you are being too vague (I'll give you >your pick of reasons), but what is the "fact of the matter" you are >talking about? Whatever it is that makes for truth in "ought" statements (I think what makes for truth is that the agent *would* do what it is said he ought to do, if he considered it rationally and with all relevant information). >>[...] As long as our preferences as to the outcome, including the >>coercion of the aggressor, are rational -- and they are -- we have every >>reason and right to act on them. We have no obligation to respect "his >>perspective" when he is disrespecting the "perspective" of his victim. > >So, is there no moral evil when a sadist inflicts his fancy on a masochist? As far as I can tell, both their preferences are irrational, so the resulting action would not be right. (Which is not to say it should be outlawed.) >Anyway, you have implicitly taken sides without really justifying which >side should be taken. Suppose it is the victim who is not honoring the >aggressor's perspective (by resisting, perhaps). We should take the victim's side because we rationally prefer that such cases of aggression not occur. WHAT MORE DO YOU WANT??! >>That's not my point. It's not just that we have no compelling evidence >>for the religious framework itself -- true as that is -- but that *even >>after we accept a religious framework* we have *no more (and no less) >>justification for morality than we had before.* > >The morality is inherent in the religious code obseved within it's own >framework. You have side-stepped my point. I am talking about the ground >for authority which is invested in a moral code, the transcendence by >which we are justified in compelling others to stand under that code. I find your words utterly impenetrable. What does "transcendence" or "authority" mean, and why is it significant? >>No, it's up to you to show that we're not in the same boat, by showing how >>a religious framework provides "dependent reasons". > >How can you divorce any moral code from the framework in which it exists. >Religions do have moral codes, I think that should be obvious. Accepting >the religious framework brings that moral code along with it. Moral >codes do not have to be derived (though they may be expounded upon and >applied differently) within a religious framework, they are part of that >framework itself. OK, in other words, there's no *derivation* of the morality from, say, religious principles. Rather, it's a package deal: if you don't accept the moral framework then by definition you haven't accepted the religion. Two can play this game. Define "Secular Humanism" in such a way that, if you don't accept the Rich Rosen Code Of Non-Interference, then by definition you aren't a Secular Humanist. The Code is part of the framework itself (along with other doctrines, such as atheism). So an areligious system CAN provide "dependent reasons" for morality, contrary to your earlier claim. > The transcendent quality of these code means that >we can have a law that is above human authority. Same goes for Secular Humanism and its Rich Rosen Code (if not, why not?). >>my idea of a democracy, laws don't get ruled unconstitutional just because >>they agree with a religious morality. I just hope the public wouldn't >>*vote* for those laws in the first place unless (like laws against murder) >>they can (also) be justified from an areligious perspective. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > ... which you haven't really done. I've given evidence that it can be justified: to wit, it accords with both self-interest and sympathy to favor such laws, and both are rational motivations (i.e. are coherent with reason and experience). You've given no contrary evidence, and in the absence of contrary evidence we may conclude that the nonreligious person should favor such laws. --Paul V Torek, still "in the same boat" torek@umich
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/08/85)
I have to offer my admiration to Paul Torek. Though we have disagreed in the past about many things, the courage to take on someone as obstinately wishfully thinking as Paul Dubuc, who insists despite ALL evidence to the contrary (much of which was well presented by Torek) that moral codes MUST be rooted in religion, is admirable. Of course there are solid rational reasons (such as your fine example of why we "side with the victim"---simply because we don't want interfering aggressive acts around) for a very solid and well founded moral code, most of which even coincides with certain supposed tenets of Christianity (odd, that...). Some people, of course, want to impose MORE than the mininum necessary, for no other reason than to get rid of things they happen not to like. This is perhaps one of the single biggest things we have to fear in the years to come. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr