mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (10/18/85)
In article <298@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >In article <2379@sjuvax.UUCP> tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) writes: >> Free will is >>primarily a subjective phenomenon. It is, roughly, one's feeling of >>being the author of one's behavior (or, at least, certain ranges of it). >I have to disagree with this. The primary *evidence* for free will is >the subjective phenomenon, but it goes beyond that, I think. One could >IN PRINCIPLE be mistaken in thinking that one was the author of a certain >behavior. For example, suppose that the motion of my fingers now is >actually caused by Dr. Nefarious Neurosurgeon, who has implanted electonic >devices in my arms and is manipulating my motor nerves by a remote control >device. Even though I experience the subjective phenomenon of being in >control of my typing, I'm not. (But it is noteworthy that one has to >dream up a science-fiction (repeat: FICTION) example to make this point.) I think that this doesn't hold up without an important distinction. If Dr N. has electrodes implanted in your ARMS, then in fact you WILL have an experience of not-free-will. There will be an obvious descrepancy between the motions you will and the motions which actually occur. This is evidenced by disorders which generate involuntary movement (such as tremors) and by the effects of electric shock. One could, however, conceivably interfere with the mind at a much deeper leve; rather than interfering with the carrying out of its commands, on could somehow interfere directly with whatever it is that generates the commands. It's unclear to me whether this is detectable as not-free-will or not; it certainly occurs in some psychological disorders, but what I've read tends to show that perception of free-will-ness tends to change as (presumably) the disorder is relieved. It's also unclear to me what such a deep-rooted feeling of not-free-will could be like. Charley Wingate