torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/19/85)
Even number of >'s = me, torek, Odd number = Nat Howard (nrh@inmet): >Shall I take it that we agree that your choice of words was wrong? Provisionally -- until I check *my* dictionary. [lots of quotes omitted -- I can't help it -- why am I so concise? I'll *never* make the top 25 at his rate. Why can't I be more like Rich Rosen? :->] >Right! But these only give her theoretical grounds for making HER >decision, not empirical ones. To quote myself: >>Taking "empirical" as your dictionary defines it, I'll accept that. [on a different issue -- again, some quoted stuff omitted] >I didn't claim that it was "contrary to reason", or, if I did, I did >so wrongly and here apologize: what I meant was that no such set of >weightings can have a basis in reason, because they precede reason. Sorry, I misinterpreted you. I still disagree though: >Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER >weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to >be reasonable (as opposed to being guided by emotion or by zen-like >inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason. This is one for net.philosophy, but: being reasonable is the only CHOICE that can be made! In other, less flip, words: if one "chooses" the other "alternatives" one has not made a CHOICE. The very representation of unreason and reason as alternatives is itself a rational act governed by the norms of reason; reason will be represented as the correct choice. It is therefore incorrect to say, as norm-nihilists like Sartre say, that it is possible and necessary to make a pre-rational arbitrary choice of reason or unreason. >I make no claim that libertarianism, or any other "ism" has a "basis" >in fact or reason, merely that no other set of fundamental beliefs >did, so that criticizing libertarianism on this ground is uninteresting, >as any position my be criticized on this grounds. Yes, I understand your position quite well (which is not to say I agree, however). >Let's have no wriggling here: you state above: >>>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>>>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. > >Well? Defend it! I would argue that you are not allowed to use such >concepts as "other people's lives have importance" without establishing >them BY REASON. Again, let me quote myself: >>A fair challenge, I must admit. OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy... >>"coming soon to a theater near you!" [By the way, I don't quote myself to make you look bad for not reading what I wrote -- really, I should have emphasized it more. I just want to show I haven't "wriggled". Stay tuned! (there will be a delay however)] >>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>... >>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >> >>... I think such a preference is not just >>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. > >What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. Not only that, but the bad feelings associated with being coerced to do one's share in the free-rider problem will disappear once one sees that the coercion is not wrong. In a clear sense, the negative reaction one has there is "extrinsic" -- not part of human nature. Whereas, even though the mere existence of a mutilated body is not wrong either, one's negative reaction to it MAY be "intrinsic" -- i.e., hardwired. >>Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone >>prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the >>free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the >>means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove >>of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that >>involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? > >Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with >meat, instead of screwdrivers. Let's not. Let's have you answer the screwdrivers example -- NO WRIGGLING! I'll answer the "kosher" example -- but not INSTEAD of the screwdrivers one, rather, IN ADDITION to it. >Does it make sense for some people >to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination >is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews). No, it does not. (How's that for a straightforward answer! Flame away, religious people -- not just people who keep kosher, but anyone who follows any comparable religious rule, be it Islamic, Christian, or Ubizmatist.) Turn up those flames -- I hate cold weather! >It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these >people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there >is no obvious material benefit to them? YES, it must -- BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE. The issue is does it make sense. Even though it does not, it must be respected, DUE TO THE CONSEQUENCES that would follow if it were not respected. "Aha", you are thinking, "but if preferences for kosher must be respected, then so must preferences for non-coercion -- after all, how can Torek separate the two cases?" Straightforward answer: simple -- the consequences of disrespecting the libertarian preference are overwhelmingly good, whereas the consequences of disrespecting kosher preferences are overwhelmingly bad. [Notable exception: when religious rules would prevent saving a child's life, they may be overruled -- cf. the court case that was in the news a while back.] >>If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any >>reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." >>I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of >>screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of >>the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in >>contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some >>preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other >>preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on >>their own account. > > In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork, (say >that everyone were starving and it were the only high-energy food >available, and their strength was desirable), should they be forced to >eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be weak? No, because this *isn't* a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork -- unless they could be *convinced* that it was OK to eat. (And if we care about them, we should certainly make some effort to convince.) Now, Nat, no wriggling -- what do you say about screwdrivers? --Paul V Torek, upping the ante torek@umich