tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (10/14/85)
[]
It occurred to me that I might clarify the "definition" aspect of
the free will debate by means of an analogy. In particular, I want to
show what it means to undertake a philosophical inquiry into the
meaning of a concept.
The analogy is simple. Dreams are a phenomenon experienced by
most, if not all, people on this planet at one time or another. They
are, paradigmatically, a *subjective* experience. Their existence and
content is not publicly verifiable in any direct way (I take testimony
to be an indirect form of verification, since it interposes the
assumption of truthfulness).
For a long time, and in many cultures, it was believed that
dreams are messages from supernatural beings: gods, demons, angels,
demiurges, etc. This explanation of dreams has, at certain historical
periods, been so well entrenched that one could legitimately say that
dreams were *defined* as messages from supernatural beings.
Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that no one believes
this account of the nature of dreams anymore. Still, there are
dreams, and they are an important part of the human experience. It is
therefore proper to seek a new "definition" of "dream". That is, it
is entirely appropriate to launch an inquiry and to call it an inquiry
into the nature of DREAMS. It is appropriate because the subjective
experience is what it is, and it is the primary referent of the word
"dream."
Somebody might object that there *are* no supernatural beings,
and that therefore "dream" is an example of "outdated and erroneous
terminology." Since there are no supernatural beings, the objector
would insist, there are no dreams either. And anyone who might wish
to formulate a NEW account of the nature of dreams would be guilty of
wishful thinking, working backward from conclusions, and linguistic
Humpty-Dumptyism.
Of course, anybody who actually raised this objection would
simply be wrong. Dreams remain there to be understood.
In my view, the analogy is rather precise. Free will is
primarily a subjective phenomenon. It is, roughly, one's feeling of
being the author of one's behavior (or, at least, certain ranges of
it). Some philosophers, such as Descartes, have indeed concluded that
this phenomenon is only possible given a non-corporeal soul capable of
interaction with physical systems (through the pineal gland, he
thought). Let's suppose -- again, for the sake of simplicity -- that
Descartes was just wrong about that. Does it follow that there is no
such phenomenon as free will, or that any attempts to come up with a
new definition are wishful thinking, or Humpty-Dumptyish? Of course
not. It simply means that the supernaturalistic explanation of the
phenomenon is blocked.
It is precisely in recognition of these simple facts that
philosophers since Descartes (long before him, really, but I shall
confine my remarks to modern philosophy) have continued to work on
this problem. Where does this phenomenon called "free will"
originate? Why is it so central to the human experience? Precisely
what categories of behavior does it subsume? What are the conditions
of its defeasibility? Does it presuppose indeterminism at any level
of description? These strike me as legitimate and important
questions. It would be a mistake to assert that since free will does
not appear to be what Descartes said, there is no such thing to be
explained at all.
Reply to objection:
-- Since we now know that there are no small magical equines with
a single helical horn, why don't we go and seek a new definition of
"unicorn"?
Answer: "Unicorn" does not denote a phenomenon whose nature we seek to
understand. It is a more or less univocal term whose extension we
know to be the null set. This puts it in a different logical category
from things whose reality is widely apprehended, somehow, but whose
precise nature is obscure to us. In the latter category belong a
large number of subjective phenomena, such as beliefs, sensations, and
intentionality, and some physical phenomena, such as space, time, and
substance.
Todd Moody | {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department |
St. Joseph's U. | "I couldn't fail to
Philadelphia, PA 19131 | disagree with you less."torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (10/16/85)
In article <2379@sjuvax.UUCP> tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) writes: > Somebody might object that there *are* no supernatural beings, >and that therefore "dream" is an example of "outdated and erroneous >terminology." Since there are no supernatural beings, the objector >would insist, there are no dreams either. And anyone who might wish >to formulate a NEW account of the nature of dreams would be guilty of >wishful thinking, working backward from conclusions, and linguistic >Humpty-Dumptyism. > Of course, anybody who actually raised this objection would >simply be wrong. Dreams remain there to be understood. PRE-cisely. Your point here sounds a lot like what I said about the change in the definition of mass after Einstein -- did you see my article? (Nobody replied to my article, was it swallowed by the bug?) Your analogy is probably better than mine, I must admit. > In my view, the analogy is rather precise. Free will is >primarily a subjective phenomenon. It is, roughly, one's feeling of >being the author of one's behavior (or, at least, certain ranges of it). I have to disagree with this. The primary *evidence* for free will is the subjective phenomenon, but it goes beyond that, I think. One could IN PRINCIPLE be mistaken in thinking that one was the author of a certain behavior. For example, suppose that the motion of my fingers now is actually caused by Dr. Nefarious Neurosurgeon, who has implanted electonic devices in my arms and is manipulating my motor nerves by a remote control device. Even though I experience the subjective phenomenon of being in control of my typing, I'm not. (But it is noteworthy that one has to dream up a science-fiction (repeat: FICTION) example to make this point.) Otherwise an excellent article. --Paul V Torek torek@umich
tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (10/19/85)
In article <298@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >> Of course, anybody who actually raised this objection would >>simply be wrong. Dreams remain there to be understood. > >PRE-cisely. Your point here sounds a lot like what I said about the >change in the definition of mass after Einstein -- did you see my >article? (Nobody replied to my article, was it swallowed by the bug?) It was not swallowed by the bug. It was, in fact, right on the money. I was only looking for an analogy that would map the subjective/objective aspect a bit more vividly. >> In my view, the analogy is rather precise. Free will is >>primarily a subjective phenomenon. It is, roughly, one's feeling of >>being the author of one's behavior (or, at least, certain ranges of it). > >I have to disagree with this. The primary *evidence* for free will is >the subjective phenomenon, but it goes beyond that, I think. One could >IN PRINCIPLE be mistaken in thinking that one was the author of a certain >behavior. Good point. It seems to me that one of the main problems here is just sorting the subjective and objective conditions for the application of the expression 'free will'. Todd Moody | {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody Philosophy Department | St. Joseph's U. | "I couldn't fail to Philadelphia, PA 19131 | disagree with you less."