franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/01/70)
[Not food.] In article <1726@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >Are you restraining me from looking away, or moving elsewhere? If so, then >you are harming me. If not, then I'll just go elsewhere. Unless of course, >you're on my property doing this, in which case you'll go elsewhere. How >are you being harmed by my wearing a red shirt, even if you don't like it? >Why are you out to introduce problems where none exist? Do you wish to exclude mental pain from the meaning of harm? I know it's hard to measure, but physical pain is hard to measure, too. >I just gave criteria. If someone is wearing a red shirt and I don't like >it, I can always not look. If someone is forcing me to stare into a bright >light that causes me physical harm (forcing, as in restraining me and leaving >me no choice, or shining the light on my property in my personal space, or >in a public thoroughfare traversed by many people, that is clearly an act >of interference. The assumption is that you are wearing the shirt *in public*, e.g., on a busy thoroughfare traversed by many people. Also, I can't "not look" before seeing it the first time -- and seeing it once may be bad enough. Please define what you mean by "interference". If the definition depends on the idea of "harm", please tell us what that means, as well. >Not nearly as complex as you seem to want to make it. >Personal dislike and inconvenience are NOT examples of deliberate interfering >harm by any stretch of the imagination. If this stretching the notion of >harm were taken to deliberate extremes (for the purpose of restricting >people's >freedom?), you could just as easily say that the car in front of you at the >intersection sitting there while you want to turn right on red is >"interfering" with you. Quite. >The way you seem to be treating the notion of minimal interference >is egocentric: "minimal interference with ME". The goal is minimal >interference to all. Why do you think you can compare the amount of interference with one person with the amount of interference with another? I ask this not because I think you can't, but because you reject the same kind of comparison in other contexts. "How do you know what is in my interests? You don't." (This quote may not be word for word, but I don't think it misrepresents your viewpoint.) How are the two cases different? >When you claim that the example I just gave (or the >red shirt example) is worth restricting, you are interfering in that person's >life. Why? Because someone is being harmed and interfered with? Or because >someone childishly doesn't like it? I don't really think you should be prevented from wearing a red shirt. I think there are such things as rights, and that you have a right to wear a red shirt. I just think you have things backwards -- you want to define morality in terms of rights, while I claim that rights are defined in terms of morality. >Since you're anxious to make the problem tough, let's make it so. Suppose >it wasn't a red shirt this guy wanted to wear. Suppose he wanted to wear a >red >dress. What then? In what way is he interfering with you? In what way do >you feel you should be able to interfere with him? Maybe this is meatier and >less hypothetical than "bright lights" versus "red shirts". I see no real difference between the two cases, except that the chance that someone actually *would* be harmed is higher in your example, *because of social attitudes*. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/01/70)
[Not food] In article <1732@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Can you give a real example of where such interference, even if, as you say, >>>it makes someone "better off", is justified? > >> All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a >> forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. >> In my opinion, this action is justified. > >If a person wishes to stay and burn, who are you to tell him not to? Would >you also forcibly prevent someone from committing suicide if you can't >reason them out of it? It's quite another thing if the person is forcing >others to die with him/her. > >> Also, a person stands on the top of building a threatens to jump. He is >> forcibly restrained. This I would also consider justified. > >Also, a person speaks out against our obviously good government and society. >Obviously this person is insane and should be taken away and helped for >his/her own "best interests". This I would consider justified. :-) No, in this case the person is *really* *not* better off, so it is not justified. I never said there are no hard decisions (not that *this* one is hard). >>>Any regulatory system you can think of that >>>has ever come about has eventually become a bureaucracy interested at least >>>as much in its own perpetuation as in its supposed intended purpose. > >> That does not imply that such systems do harm on balance. A bureacracy may >> spend 99% of its effort perpetuating itself, and still do enough good with >> the other 1% to justify their existence. > >But this is clearly not the case with regard to those facets of society >charged with lawmaking and enforcement. Ever wonder why speeding tickets >are impossible to beat? (Virtually) Because the real court is not in the >courtroom, it's out on the highway where you got the ticket. The townships >and such need the money, so the deck is stacked. "It was a police officer >who caught you, why would he lie? ... PSSST! Add one more to Officer >Jack's credit list..." The law is now enforced, not to protect the people, >but to protect the bureaucracy. Obviously not in all cases, but in enough >that the harm is more than just "significant". Yes, but would we better off with no speed limits? I don't think so. I think we would be significantly worse off. The additional traffic deaths would more than outweigh the kind of petty graft you are talking about. >> Also, one should judge by the total contribution over the life of the >> system, >> not by the final state. Chances are, in the final state, the system *is* >> doing more harm than good -- that is why such systems get abolished. Human >> institutions aren't static. > >And what contribution does interference offer or provide? There are many people who have been forcibly restrained from committing suicide, who are today very grateful for that "interference". >> In any event, this is a bit beside the point. If you justify non-interven- >> tionism on utilitarian grounds, then the morality is utilitarianism, and >> the rights are derived from the morality, as I stated. > >Is "utilitarianism" a morality? Can any morality or societal code afford >to be non-utilitarian? I hardly think so. Yes. Utilitaritarianism says that the morally correct action in any situation is that which maximizing the common good, defined as the total good of everyone. As such, it (theoretically) determines the correct action in any situation. (Note that your own desires are not to be excluded in this calculation.) Lots of people reject this. (Left undefined in the above is the question of what constitutes the "good" for any individual. The original proposal was the difference between the amount of pleasure and pain. This is widely rejected, but there is no consensus on what to replace it with.) Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/12/85)
There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with whom. Consider an example. Joe likes to go out in his back yard in the nude. Jim, who lives next door, finds this offensive -- not because he disapproves of nudity, but because he likes to sit in his backyard, and finds looking at Jim unappealing. Is Joe "interfering" with Jim? If Jim calls the police to get Joe arrested, is he "interfering"? The point here is not that such judgements cannot be made; of course they can. But the only bases for judgement are our physical nature and our social context. Ultimately, it is impossible to "not interfere" with our neighbors. It is in the nature of the universe that everything we do affects everyone else, if only slightly. And many of the things we do, or want to do, have very significant effects -- if we eliminate all such, there is very little left which can be done. For example, every power plant, of whatever type, generates pollution. Pollution undeniably interferes with others. Should we then prohibit all power plants? Obviously not; instead we limit how much pollution they can put out, and are all better off. But this solution is not derivable from the non-interference principle.
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/14/85)
> > There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis > for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where > there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not > clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with > whom. As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of another's freedoms. Padraig Houlahan.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/15/85)
In article <588@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Ultimately, it is impossible to "not interfere" with our neighbors. It >is in the nature of the universe that everything we do affects everyone >else, if only slightly. And many of the things we do, or want to do, >have very significant effects -- if we eliminate all such, there is very >little left which can be done. > >For example, every power plant, of whatever type, generates pollution. >Pollution undeniably interferes with others. Should we then prohibit >all power plants? Obviously not [...] You hit the nail right on the head, Frank! There is no such thing as a libertarian-compatible solution to pollution short of the ridiculous idea of banning all pollution -- despite flimsy libertarian arguments to the contrary. That is one of the prime reasons I have been such a persistent anti- libertarian, though I haven't discussed the issue since the Tom Craver era. Please post your original article to net.politics.theory, where it definitely also belongs. --Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-In-Chief
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/15/85)
In article <549@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >> for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where >> there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not >> clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with >> whom. >As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing >another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of >non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of >another's freedoms. In that case, though, all of the moral system is embedded in the evaluations one makes to decide which freedom to keep and which to curtail. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "The punkers-- for once, they were innocent victims!"
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/17/85)
> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis > for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where > there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not > clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with > whom. [ADAMS] Agreed. That's why there are courts and judges, because NO system can define everything and every situation. (Is that a fallout of Godel? :-) -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/19/85)
>>>There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >>>for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where >>>there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not >>>clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with >>>whom. [WINGATE] >>As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing >>another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of >>non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of >>another's freedoms. [HOULAHAN] > In that case, though, all of the moral system is embedded in the evaluations > one makes to decide which freedom to keep and which to curtail. [WINGATE] You got it! The most freedom availble while still protecting the interests of all people from non-interference is, in fact, the minimal morality of minimal necessary restrictions! (Thank you!) -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/20/85)
[Me] >> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >> for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where >> there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not >> clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with >> whom. [Padraig Houlahan] >As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing >another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of >non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of >another's freedoms. This really doesn't help. Which curtailings of freedoms are "less" than which other curtailments? Only within a moral system can this be answered. (For an individual, one can ask his or her preference. This doesn't work when more than one person is involved.) Thus the principle of non- interference cannot be the *basis* for a moral system. Inside a moral system, the principle is equivalent to a certain kind of consistency: it states that if person A has a right to perform action X, then person B has no right to prevent it (in the sense of directly interfering with the action).
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/22/85)
> >> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis > >> for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where > >> there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not > >> clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with > >> whom. > > [Padraig Houlahan] > >As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing > >another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of > >non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of > >another's freedoms. > > This really doesn't help. Which curtailings of freedoms are "less" than > which other curtailments? Only within a moral system can this be answered. > (For an individual, one can ask his or her preference. This doesn't work > when more than one person is involved.) Thus the principle of non- > interference cannot be the *basis* for a moral system. No one said that making the decisions would be easy. Fortunately, we have past experience to refer to. Also society can as a whole decide what is acceptable. If you are unhappy that there isn't someone ready to tell you unambiguously what's right, and what's wrong, then that's too bad. It does not invalidate the system though. Padraig Houlahan.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/23/85)
>[Padraig Houlahan] >>As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing >>another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of >>non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of >>another's freedoms. > >This really doesn't help. Which curtailings of freedoms are "less" than >which other curtailments? Only within a moral system can this be answered. >(For an individual, one can ask his or her preference. This doesn't work >when more than one person is involved.) Thus the principle of non- >interference cannot be the *basis* for a moral system. [ADAMS] Maybe not the entire basis, but the most viable starting point. The priorities you mention only have meaning in relation to that starting point. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) (08/27/85)
> > There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis > for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where > there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not > clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with > whom. > > Consider an example. Joe likes to go out in his back yard in the nude. > Jim, who lives next door, finds this offensive -- not because he disapproves > of nudity, but because he likes to sit in his backyard, and finds looking > at Jim unappealing. Is Joe "interfering" with Jim? If Jim calls the police > to get Joe arrested, is he "interfering"? > The example here is flawed. One may find looking at his mather-in-law unappealing, regardless whether nude or not. A better example would be the following. Imagine that Joe cuts his wrist in the same backyard. Shall Jim interfere and talk Joe to abandon his suicide? Or, is borrowing a lawn mower an interference? On the other hand, one may the following reasoning. If one proposes a moral principle, he/she has in mind a concept which is ethically appealing, at least to some people. The name of a concept by necessity is a mental shorthand. Thus to merely deduce a contradiction from the name of principle, and not from the broader explanation of underlying intentions and values is unfair. The way I would motivate the principle of not interference is that the freedom is one of the precious commodities a human may posess. Thus we should not UNNECESARILY restrict our freedom. By "do not interfere" I would mean "do not restrict freedom of thy neighbour". The fact that the principle is not sufficient is not necesserily a flow. It may be the case that it is impossible to reduce morality to a small collection of hierarchically ordered principles. The reason is that humans are social beings. Thus common good is a value. On the other hand, common good is a sum of individual well-beings. Even if the numerical values of each individual well-beings are clear (and they are not), the maximizing the sum (minimum, geometrical average?) of well- -beings would pose a difficult optimization problem. Thus inherently we will have a conflicts of values and gray areas of no clear choices. It seems that there is a trade off between clarity of a moral system and the range of gray areas. Of course, there may besome people do order their principles in strict hierarchies, thus resolving all the conflicts once for all. I personally do not believe in such an approach. P.B.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/27/85)
In article <1525@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >> for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where >> there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not >> clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with >> whom. > >Agreed. That's why there are courts and judges, because NO system can >define everything and every situation. (Is that a fallout of Godel? :-) The problem is that the principle of non-interference doesn't define ANYTHING. EVERYTHING interferes with other people.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/27/85)
In article <584@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> >> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >> >> for morality: it is insufficient. >> >> [Padraig Houlahan] >> >As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing >> >another's freedoms. the principle of non-interference is presented as one >> >of minimizing the curtailment of another's freedoms. >> >> This really doesn't help. Which curtailings of freedoms are "less" than >> which other curtailments? Only within a moral system can this be answered. >> (For an individual, one can ask his or her preference. This doesn't work >> when more than one person is involved.) Thus the principle of non- >> interference cannot be the *basis* for a moral system. > >No one said that making the decisions would be easy. Fortunately, we have >past experience to refer to. Also society can as a whole decide what >is acceptable. I didn't ask for it to be easy. I asked for it to *be derived from the principle*. The decisions of society as a whole form a basis for choice which is not so derived. Past experience is useful for making the decision making process easier, but it is not itself a *basis* for decisions. >If you are unhappy that there isn't someone ready to tell you unambiguously >what's right, and what's wrong, then that's too bad. It does not >invalidate the system though. Please try to avoid the ad hominem attacks.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/30/85)
>>> There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis >>> for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where >>> there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not >>> clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with >>> whom. >>Agreed. That's why there are courts and judges, because NO system can >>define everything and every situation. (Is that a fallout of Godel? :-) > The problem is that the principle of non-interference doesn't define > ANYTHING. EVERYTHING interferes with other people. Is my breathing "interfering" with your typing? It seems that you have as broad a definition of "interfere" as Wingate. If you have to see it or hear about it (horrors!!!) that's interference. I don't buy that for a second. Interference is preventing another person from doing what he/she likes that is not done at the expense of another person (through interference with that person). Yes, it's a self-referential, sort of recursive definition. I think we're all intelligent enough to fathom this notion. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/30/85)
>>>This really doesn't help. Which curtailings of freedoms are "less" than >>>which other curtailments? Only within a moral system can this be answered. >>>(For an individual, one can ask his or her preference. This doesn't work >>>when more than one person is involved.) Thus the principle of non- >>>interference cannot be the *basis* for a moral system. [ADAMS?] >>No one said that making the decisions would be easy. Fortunately, we have >>past experience to refer to. Also society can as a whole decide what >>is acceptable. [HOULAHAN] > I didn't ask for it to be easy. I asked for it to *be derived from the > principle*. The decisions of society as a whole form a basis for choice > which is not so derived. Past experience is useful for making the decision > making process easier, but it is not itself a *basis* for decisions. [ADAMS] The point is that it's NOT derived from the principle. The principle is the theory. If we were dealing with a non-interference morality on another planet with totally different terrain and totally different life forms, the results would be different. The principles are applied to the needs and desires of human beings on THIS planet. THEN you get the morality itself. >>If you are unhappy that there isn't someone ready to tell you unambiguously >>what's right, and what's wrong, then that's too bad. It does not >>invalidate the system though. > Please try to avoid the ad hominem attacks. It seems that not only do you have a broad definition of interference (see last article), you also have an equally broad definition of "ad hominem attacks". But then a lot of people on the net are of the opinion that anyone who expresses disagreement is engaging in ad hominem attacks... -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/06/85)
In article <1624@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> The problem is that the principle of non-interference doesn't define >> ANYTHING. EVERYTHING interferes with other people. > >Is my breathing "interfering" with your typing? It seems that you have >as broad a definition of "interfere" as Wingate. If you have to see it >or hear about it (horrors!!!) that's interference. I don't buy that >for a second. Interference is preventing another person from doing what >he/she likes that is not done at the expense of another person (through >interference with that person). Yes, it's a self-referential, sort of >recursive definition. I think we're all intelligent enough to fathom >this notion. All I can get out of this principle, taken alone, is that anything one person wishes to do, which does not interfere with *anything* that *anyone* else wants, is permissable. This has some content, but not very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. Your signatures indicate that you are very suspicious of actions undertaken with such reasons alleged. Well, surprise -- so am I. That doesn't mean that there aren't such cases. Particularly (but not exclusively) when dealing with children. Now if, as you seem to, you are arguing from a basically utilitarian point of view, you may argue that it is better off over all to apply the principle, at least to adults, since the errors of commision will override the errors of omission. This may be true, but it is far from obvious.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/10/85)
> All I can get out of this principle, taken alone, is that anything one > person wishes to do, which does not interfere with *anything* that > *anyone* else wants, is permissable. This has some content, but not > very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone > may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. [ADAMS] Is seeing something you don't like an act of interference? Do you have the right to destroy anything that "offends" your sensibilities? Of course not. Not liking something isn't an act of interference against you. You are free to continue living your life as you wish regardless of the presence of one person's religion, another person's sexual preference, or my red shirt. > Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and > someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- > existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use > the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. Nonsense. It would seem that you must first show how my shirt (or any of the other examples I offered) "interferes" with you. > While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is > possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person > B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests???? How do YOU know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. You don't. Can you give a real example of where such interference, even if, as you say, it makes someone "better off", is justified? > Now if, as you seem to, you are arguing from a basically utilitarian point > of view, you may argue that it is better off over all to apply the principle, > at least to adults, since the errors of commision will override the errors > of omission. This may be true, but it is far from obvious. What's not obvious about it? Any regulatory system you can think of that has ever come about has eventually become a bureaucracy interested at least as much in its own perpetuation as in its supposed intended purpose. With that in mind, clearly the less "regulation", the better. Until someone can show a solid benefit that increased restriction offers (Charley insists that it makes a morality "stronger"), I see no reason to hold any other position. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/14/85)
In article <1664@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> All I can get out of this principle, taken alone, is that anything one >> person wishes to do, which does not interfere with *anything* that >> *anyone* else wants, is permissable. This has some content, but not >> very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone >> may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. [ADAMS] > >Is seeing something you don't like an act of interference? Do you have the >right to destroy anything that "offends" your sensibilities? Of course not. >Not liking something isn't an act of interference against you. You are free >to continue living your life as you wish regardless of the presence of one >person's religion, another person's sexual preference, or my red shirt. > >> Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and >> someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- >> existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use >> the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. > >Nonsense. It would seem that you must first show how my shirt (or any of >the other examples I offered) "interferes" with you. It causes me to have experiences I do not wish to have, which I would not have had without your actions. How do you define interference? >> While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is >> possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person >> B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. > >"Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests???? I had hoped to forstall this response by making it obvious it was expected. Obviously, I failed. >How do YOU >know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. You don't. (I assume you mean I don't know what your best interests are, not I don't make it clear.) >Can you give a real example of where such interference, even if, as you say, >it makes someone "better off", is justified? All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. In my opinion, this action is justified. Also, a person stands on the top of building a threatens to jump. He is forcibly restrained. This I would also consider justified. >> Now if, as you seem to, you are arguing from a basically utilitarian point >> of view, you may argue that it is better off over all to apply the >> principle, >> at least to adults, since the errors of commision will override the errors >> of omission. This may be true, but it is far from obvious. > >What's not obvious about it? Well, if it's obvious, why does only a tiny minority of the human race believe it? >Any regulatory system you can think of that >has ever come about has eventually become a bureaucracy interested at least >as much in its own perpetuation as in its supposed intended purpose. That does not imply that such systems do harm on balance. A bureacracy may spend 99% of its effort perpetuating itself, and still do enough good with the other 1% to justify their existence. Also, one should judge by the total contribution over the life of the system, not by the final state. Chances are, in the final state, the system *is* doing more harm than good -- that is why such systems get abolished. Human institutions aren't static. In any event, this is a bit beside the point. If you justify non-interven- tionism on utilitarian grounds, then the morality is utilitarianism, and the rights are derived from the morality, as I stated. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/17/85)
In article <1664@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> ... This [principle, by itself] has some content, but not >> very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone >> may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. [ADAMS] > >Is seeing something you don't like an act of interference? Do you have the >right to destroy anything that "offends" your sensibilities? Of course not. >Not liking something isn't an act of interference against you. ... Frank Adams is right. As a first attempt to explain why, contrast an act that intuitively seems like unfair interference: inflicting severe pain. In the red shirt example, we have photons from my shirt entering your eyes and registering a sensation in your mind that you (for some reason) dislike. In the infliction of pain example, though, the physical description of what's going on might be almost the same -- only this time I'm shining a bright light into your eyes (almost, but not quite, bright enough to cause permanent vision impairment)! Presumably Rich will say that the very bright light in the eyes is inter- ference, but the red shirt isn't. But ON WHAT OBJECTIVIE BASIS can this distinction be drawn? The principle of non-interference cannot supply the criteria. Some other criteria must be at work. --The return of the iconoclast Paul V Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/18/85)
>>>... This [principle, by itself] has some content, but not >>>very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone >>>may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. [ADAMS] >>Is seeing something you don't like an act of interference? Do you have the >>right to destroy anything that "offends" your sensibilities? Of course not. >>Not liking something isn't an act of interference against you. ... [ROSEN] > Frank Adams is right. As a first attempt to explain why, contrast an act > that intuitively seems like unfair interference: inflicting severe pain. > In the red shirt example, we have photons from my shirt entering your eyes > and registering a sensation in your mind that you (for some reason) dislike. > In the infliction of pain example, though, the physical description of what's > going on might be almost the same -- only this time I'm shining a bright > light into your eyes (almost, but not quite, bright enough to cause permanent > vision impairment)! [TOREK] Are you restraining me from looking away, or moving elsewhere? If so, then you are harming me. If not, then I'll just go elsewhere. Unless of course, you're on my property doing this, in which case you'll go elsewhere. How are you being harmed by my wearing a red shirt, even if you don't like it? Why are you out to introduce problems where none exist? > Presumably Rich will say that the very bright light in the eyes is inter- > ference, but the red shirt isn't. But ON WHAT OBJECTIVIE BASIS can this > distinction be drawn? The principle of non-interference cannot supply the > criteria. Some other criteria must be at work. I just gave criteria. If someone is wearing a red shirt and I don't like it, I can always not look. If someone is forcing me to stare into a bright light that causes me physical harm (forcing, as in restraining me and leaving me no choice, or shining the light on my property in my personal space, or in a public thoroughfare traversed by many people, that is clearly an act of interference. Not nearly as complex as you seem to want to make it. Personal dislike and inconvenience are NOT examples of deliberate interfering harm by any stretch of the imagination. If this stretching the notion of harm were taken to deliberate extremes (for the purpose of restricting people's freedom?), you could just as easily say that the car in front of you at the intersection sitting there while you want to turn right on red is "interfering" with you. The way you seem to be treating the notion of minimal interference is egocentric: "minimal interference with ME". The goal is minimal interference to all. When you claim that the example I just gave (or the red shirt example) is worth restricting, you are interfering in that person's life. Why? Because someone is being harmed and interfered with? Or because someone childishly doesn't like it? Since you're anxious to make the problem tough, let's make it so. Suppose it wasn't a red shirt this guy wanted to wear. Suppose he wanted to wear a red dress. What then? In what way is he interfering with you? In what way do you feel you should be able to interfere with him? Maybe this is meatier and less hypothetical than "bright lights" versus "red shirts". -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/18/85)
>>>Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and >>>someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- >>>existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use >>>the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. [ADAMS] >>Nonsense. It would seem that you must first show how my shirt (or any of >>the other examples I offered) "interferes" with you. [ROSEN] > It causes me to have experiences I do not wish to have, which I would not > have had without your actions. How do you define interference? [ADAMS] Certainly not that way. To use THAT definition would mean that everything in the world is "interfering" with me all the time. As I mentioned in another article, the view of minimal morality/non-interference seems to be viewed by some people in an egocentric way. "Don't interfere with ME, meaning anything I deem as interfering should be interfered with!" All you have done is to move the "interference" to another person (where in this case it may be real deliberate intervening interference and not just (what I consider the very babyish) "They're doing something I don't like; make them stop, mommy!" You have minimized interference to YOU, but maximized it to someone else. In weighing the balance here, which is more interfering: some person wearing a red shirt that you don't like, or you stopping him/her from wearing it in front of you because you don't like it. Now, contrast this with the following: "Which is more interfering? Some person forcibly restraining you and making you do something against your will, or inflicting harm upon you against your will? Or you (or others) stopping that person from engaging in this act, not just because you don't like it, but because it is an act of interference and harm against some person?" And of the two, which has reduced unnecessary interference against "law-abiding" human beings who don't bother other people? Necessary interference can only mean that interference which prevents people from harming others. >>>While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is >>>possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person >>>B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. >>"Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests???? > I had hoped to forstall this response by making it obvious it was expected. > Obviously, I failed. Can you answer the questions that the singer asks in this song? (Including the subsequent "Who are you to decide what MY best interests are?" etc. If you can't (as I suspect from your desire not have to hear these dreadful questions), then they are definitely worth asking and reiterating. >>How do YOU >>know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. You don't. > (I assume you mean I don't know what your best interests are, not I don't > make it clear.) You got it. >>Can you give a real example of where such interference, even if, as you say, >>it makes someone "better off", is justified? > All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a > forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. > In my opinion, this action is justified. If a person wishes to stay and burn, who are you to tell him not to? Would you also forcibly prevent someone from committing suicide if you can't reason them out of it? It's quite another thing if the person is forcing others to die with him/her. > Also, a person stands on the top of building a threatens to jump. He is > forcibly restrained. This I would also consider justified. Also, a person speaks out against our obviously good government and society. Obviously this person is insane and should be taken away and helped for his/her own "best interests". This I would consider justified. :-) >>> Now if, as you seem to, you are arguing from a basically utilitarian point >>> of view, you may argue that it is better off over all to apply the >>> principle, >>> at least to adults, since the errors of commision will override the errors >>> of omission. This may be true, but it is far from obvious. >>What's not obvious about it? > Well, if it's obvious, why does only a tiny minority of the human race > believe it? Because a large majority of the human race has learned not to. Because they have been taught to fear any changes in society as being "dangerous" to their survival. (Who tells them this? Those "in charge" who benefit from the perpetuation of the societal "machine" as it is.) Because this indoctrination "teaches" people that it is better to be secure and interfere and "not take any chances" (i.e., increase the rigid security) than to allow personal freedom. Safer. Or so they tell you. And you wonder why people like Hitler and Nixon get elected? >>Any regulatory system you can think of that >>has ever come about has eventually become a bureaucracy interested at least >>as much in its own perpetuation as in its supposed intended purpose. > That does not imply that such systems do harm on balance. A bureacracy may > spend 99% of its effort perpetuating itself, and still do enough good with > the other 1% to justify their existence. But this is clearly not the case with regard to those facets of society charged with lawmaking and enforcement. Ever wonder why speeding tickets are impossible to beat? (Virtually) Because the real court is not in the courtroom, it's out on the highway where you got the ticket. The townships and such need the money, so the deck is stacked. "It was a police officer who caught you, why would he lie? ... PSSST! Add one more to Officer Jack's credit list..." The law is now enforced, not to protect the people, but to protect the bureaucracy. Obviously not in all cases, but in enough that the harm is more than just "significant". > Also, one should judge by the total contribution over the life of the system, > not by the final state. Chances are, in the final state, the system *is* > doing more harm than good -- that is why such systems get abolished. Human > institutions aren't static. And what contribution does interference offer or provide? > In any event, this is a bit beside the point. If you justify non-interven- > tionism on utilitarian grounds, then the morality is utilitarianism, and > the rights are derived from the morality, as I stated. Is "utilitarianism" a morality? Can any morality or societal code afford to be non-utilitarian? I hardly think so. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/21/85)
In article <1732@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>>Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and >>>>someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- >>>>existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use >>>>the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. [ADAMS] >>>Nonsense. It would seem that you must first show how my shirt (or any of >>>the other examples I offered) "interferes" with you. [ROSEN] >> It causes me to have experiences I do not wish to have, which I would not >> have had without your actions. How do you define interference? [ADAMS] >Certainly not that way. To use THAT definition would mean that everything >in the world is "interfering" with me all the time. I should point out that christian morals ARE based on pricisely this principle, on sound biblical authority. However, as for the defintion... > As I mentioned in another article, the view of minimal morality/ >non-interference seems to be viewed by some people in an egocentric way. >"Don't interfere with ME, meaning anything I deem as interfering should be >interfered with!" All you have done is to move the "interference" to >another person (where in this case it may be real deliberate intervening >interference and not just (what I consider the very babyish) "They're >doing something I don't like; make them stop, mommy!" You have minimized >interference to YOU, but maximized it to someone else. In weighing the >balance here, which is more interfering: some person wearing a red shirt >that you don't like, or you stopping him/her from wearing it in front of >you because you don't like it. Now, contrast this with the following: >"Which is more interfering? Some person forcibly restraining >you and making you do something against your will, or inflicting harm upon >you against your will? Or you (or others) stopping that person from engaging >in this act, not just because you don't like it, but because it is an act >of interference and harm against some person?" And of the two, which has >reduced unnecessary interference against "law-abiding" human beings who don't >bother other people? Necessary interference can only mean that interference >which prevents people from harming others. But but but there's no definition in there at all! And let's take the red shirt example to a more serious form of interference: should you drink in front of an alchoholic? Should you eat a slice of cake in front of someone on a diet? It's unclear to me whether or not Rich's system says yea or nay. >>>>While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is >>>>possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person >>>>B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. >>>know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. >>>You don't. Oh really. How do you know this? >> (I assume you mean I don't know what your best interests are, not I don't >> make it clear.) Well, in many cases this is quite obviously not true. People typically operate under some delusions about their state of well-being. Were there no such delusions, I could agree whole-heartedly with Rich's system. But in fact there are. To take an extreme case, consider a man, a farmer, who suffers a massive heart attack. Awakening in the hospital, he struggles to leave. Can it really be argued that he is competent to judge his condition? Are not the doctors justified in restraining him from killing himself as he acts out the delusion that he is well? Certainly, this example is extreme. The problem I see is that there is no clear-cut dividing line; situations run from this all the way down to where things are better let to go wrong, to where the good or badness of the situation is quite unclear. >> All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a >> forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. >> In my opinion, this action is justified. >If a person wishes to stay and burn, who are you to tell him not to? Would >you also forcibly prevent someone from committing suicide if you can't >reason them out of it? It's quite another thing if the person is forcing >others to die with him/her. Because they emotionally are not competent to decide. >> Also, a person stands on the top of building a threatens to jump. He is >> forcibly restrained. This I would also consider justified. >Also, a person speaks out against our obviously good government and society. >Obviously this person is insane and should be taken away and helped for >his/her own "best interests". This I would consider justified. :-) So what? All you've shown is that power can be abused. So what? >> Well, if it's obvious, why does only a tiny minority of the human race >> believe it? >Because a large majority of the human race has learned not to. Because they >have been taught to fear any changes in society as being "dangerous" to their >survival. (Who tells them this? Those "in charge" who benefit from the >perpetuation of the societal "machine" as it is.) Because this >indoctrination "teaches" people that it is better to be secure and >interfere and "not take any chances" (i.e., increase the rigid security) >than to allow personal freedom. Safer. Or so they tell you. And you >wonder why people like Hitler and Nixon get elected? Rich has made quite clear that his viewpoint on the world is quite different from the average. So is mine. I also get the strong impression that he believes that most everyone (including me) is massively deluded about the truth of the world. Everyone but him. Well, maybe this is true. But it seems to me that this is a bit proud. I am well aware of the fact that I quite often do not know what is best for me. In many cases in am not aware, but others are. Rich seems to be taking a fairly extreme position on what constitutes interference. As I see it, his principle would claim that it is immoral for a university to require certain courses, for a athletic coach to demand cooperation of his players, and a host of other minor interferences. It seems to me that, accepting Rich's principle (and I do think it is valid to some extent), the whole question of what consitutes interference is quite murky. And I think the principle itself is questionable in the light of some situations where the person being "interfered with" is clearly not capable of deciding what his best interests are. Charley Wingate
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (09/24/85)
In article <1652@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > >Well, in many cases this is quite obviously not true. People typically >operate under some delusions about their state of well-being. Were there no >such delusions, I could agree whole-heartedly with Rich's system. But in >fact there are. To take an extreme case, consider a man, a farmer, who >suffers a massive heart attack. Awakening in the hospital, he struggles to >leave. Can it really be argued that he is competent to judge his condition? >Are not the doctors justified in restraining him from killing himself as he >acts out the delusion that he is well? Certainly, this example is extreme. >The problem I see is that there is no clear-cut dividing line; situations >run from this all the way down to where things are better let to go wrong, >to where the good or badness of the situation is quite unclear. > Or there is my prefered class of examples. What if your 2-3 yr old child starts to run out into a busy street? Are you going to ignore it("don't interfere with him - it is bad to assume what is best for someone else"), try to *talk* him into coming back and hope you succedd in time, or physically grab the kid and forcibly place him back in the yard? I maintain that the last is the *only* reasonble course under the circumstances, but it is *clearly* a violation of non- interference! How is *this* justified in the non-interference morality? -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/25/85)
>>>>Nonsense. It would seem that you must first show how my shirt (or any of >>>>the other examples I offered) "interferes" with you. [ROSEN] >>> It causes me to have experiences I do not wish to have, which I would not >>> have had without your actions. How do you define interference? [ADAMS] >>Certainly not that way. To use THAT definition would mean that everything >>in the world is "interfering" with me all the time. [ROSEN] > I should point out that christian morals ARE based on pricisely this > principle, on sound biblical authority. [WINGATE] Charles, this is perhaps the most ridiculous statement I have ever seen you foist upon us. The supposedly fundamental tenet of Christianity may be based on this principle (which is something I have said more than once, if you were listening), but the body of Christian morality (with its numerous "thou shalt not"s chosen at whim from the Old Testament) is much more restrictive than you indicate. >>As I mentioned in another article, the view of minimal morality/ >>non-interference seems to be viewed by some people in an egocentric way. >>"Don't interfere with ME, meaning anything I deem as interfering should be >>interfered with!" All you have done is to move the "interference" to >>another person (where in this case it may be real deliberate intervening >>interference and not just (what I consider the very babyish) "They're >>doing something I don't like; make them stop, mommy!" You have minimized >>interference to YOU, but maximized it to someone else. >>Necessary interference can only mean that interference >>which prevents people from harming others. > But but but there's no definition in there at all! And let's take the red > shirt example to a more serious form of interference: should you drink in > front of an alchoholic? Should you eat a slice of cake in front of someone > on a diet? It's unclear to me whether or not Rich's system says yea or nay. Do alcoholics wear signs that warn other people not to drink in front of them? Let's get serious here. How can you dare to call an act of normal human living "interfering" with you, be it eating, drinking, shirtwearing, dresswearing, or anything else you care to bring up that does not cause harm to other people. Perhaps (just a suggestion) you might want to define "harm" rather than "interference", since I think we're agreed (at least in part) that the difference between a "legitimate" act and an interfering one is that the interfering one causes harm. >>>>know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. >>>>You don't. > Oh really. How do you know this? Please, oh, please, Charles, tell me what they are so I can live my life the "right" way? >:-| > Well, in many cases this is quite obviously not true. People typically > operate under some delusions about their state of well-being. Were there no > such delusions, I could agree whole-heartedly with Rich's system. But in > fact there are. To take an extreme case, consider a man, a farmer, who > suffers a massive heart attack. Awakening in the hospital, he struggles to > leave. Can it really be argued that he is competent to judge his condition? > Are not the doctors justified in restraining him from killing himself as he > acts out the delusion that he is well? Certainly, this example is extreme. > The problem I see is that there is no clear-cut dividing line; situations > run from this all the way down to where things are better let to go wrong, > to where the good or badness of the situation is quite unclear. This may be the crux of the difference of our opinions. Yes, there are certain unclear lines. Your opinion is clearly that erring on the side of excess is better despite any indiscretions and ill effects this might have. Obviously I would rather err on the side of liberty, as I think most thinking people would do rather than suffer the abuses of power we witness. It boils down once again to losing sight of goals: is the purpose of the society more to provide a framework for each person to live to their maximal capable potential and freedom, or to willy nilly restrict people in the interest of those extreme cases Wingate cites. >>> All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a >>> forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. >>> In my opinion, this action is justified. >>If a person wishes to stay and burn, who are you to tell him not to? Would >>you also forcibly prevent someone from committing suicide if you can't >>reason them out of it? It's quite another thing if the person is forcing >>others to die with him/her. > Because they emotionally are not competent to decide. My. I didn't know we had a degree in clairvoyant abnormal sociopathic psychology, Charles. How good of you to decide for them. I've witnessed you living out this philosophy right here on the net. You deliberately altered the Followup-to lines on your articles in various discussion-oriented newsgroups to cause followups to go to net.flame! Why? Because you "decided" for us that that was where they belonged. Perhaps we were not emotionally competent to decide this issue ourselves. Any article offering counteropinions to yours just HAD to be a flame, right? I dredge up this example for good reason. Because this is a perfect example of an implementation of the philosophy Charles espouses. People deciding for us what is best for us. Charles doesn't just think this is good in those "extreme" cases. Clearly it is "acceptable" and "useful" whereever and whenever power is available to do so. There is a lesson here. >>> Also, a person stands on the top of building a threatens to jump. He is >>> forcibly restrained. This I would also consider justified. >>Also, a person speaks out against our obviously good government and society. >>Obviously this person is insane and should be taken away and helped for >>his/her own "best interests". This I would consider justified. :-) > So what? All you've shown is that power can be abused. So what? "So what?" In the words of Richard Dawson, "Good answer!" You yourself are an example of how such power is abused AS A RULE. For this reason, constraints upon such power must be thorough, if such power is really necessary at all. Hell, you're willing to restrict the freedom of billions of people, why not also restrict those who would exercise such restrictive power? By not giving it to them in the first place. > Rich has made quite clear that his viewpoint on the world is quite different > from the average. So is mine. I also get the strong impression that he > believes that most everyone (including me) is massively deluded about the > truth of the world. Everyone but him. (This sort of abusive statement has become the status quo with Wingate of late. For now, it's best to let it pass.) > Well, maybe this is true. But it seems to me that this is a bit proud. This coming from the man who, a few lines ago, without a hint of pride (?), deemed other people not "emotionally competent to make decisions". > I am well aware of the fact that I quite often do not know what is best for > me. In many cases in am not aware, but others are. Then you *would* know what is best for you, knowing that you don't know it for sure yourself. What you are talking about is the very thing you dread when it comes to certain other discussions we've been having: objectivity. Third party disinterested analysis of the situation. It's funny because when I make statements about subjective belief, you (among others) jump on me and claim to know the truth as it sits inside of you. You, who, when accused of anti-Semitism for making a boldly anti-Semitic statement, denied it all and covered it up at all cost. Yet you claim you are "aware of the fact" that you may not know what's best, what's right, given your subjective make-up. Frankly, Charles, I wouldn't want you on the "Objective Third Party Police Force" deciding who is and isn't emotionally competent to decide. And you know what? I wouldn't want me on it either. I wouldn't want ANYBODY on it. > Rich seems to be taking a fairly extreme position on what > constitutes interference. As I see it, his principle would claim that it is > immoral for a university to require certain courses, for a athletic coach to > demand cooperation of his players, and a host of other minor interferences. > It seems to me that, accepting Rich's principle (and I do think it is > valid to some extent), the whole question of what consitutes interference > is quite murky. And I think the principle itself is questionable in the > light of some situations where the person being "interfered with" is clearly > not capable of deciding what his best interests are. The exact definition of "interference" may indeed be murky. Perhaps we are making headway here in defining it. But remember that I have always been speaking in terms of goals, goals we often seem to have lost sight of in the quagmire of making the bureaucracy (supposedly designed to reach that goal) a goal in and of itself. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/27/85)
In article <1782@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Necessary interference can only mean that interference >>>which prevents people from harming others. >> But but but there's no definition in there at all! And let's take the red >> shirt example to a more serious form of interference: should you drink in >> front of an alchoholic? Should you eat a slice of cake in front of someone >> on a diet? It's unclear to me whether or not Rich's system says yea or >> nay. >Do alcoholics wear signs that warn other people not to drink in front of >them? Let's get serious here. I am deadly serious. Your flip, rather callous remark about wearing signs I find rather offensive. From a man who is constantly stating how people are totally controlled by their desires, I find this crack rather heartless. Do you really believe that it is perfectly all right to tempt a person whom you know to be an alcoholic to drink, so that he can continue to destroy his life, and others with it? >How can you dare to call an act of normal human living "interfering" >with you, be it eating, drinking, shirtwearing, dresswearing, or anything >else you care to bring up that does not cause harm to other people. Since we are all disputing that no harm is done, this remark is quite out of bounds. We dare to examine anything. No element of human behavior should be exempt from moral examination. No behavior should be presupposed to be harmless. While we're at it, could you give a precise definition of what constitutes harm, and what is normal behavior? > Perhaps (just a suggestion) you might want to define >"harm" rather than "interference", since I think we're agreed (at least in >part) that the difference between a "legitimate" act and an interfering one >is that the interfering one causes harm. I'm in doubt that it can be defined objectively, since it is bound up in the notion of pain, and nothing is less objective than pain. I'll have to think about this somewhat. >>>>>know what my best interests are?" Just thought I'd make it clear. >>>>>You don't. >> Oh really. How do you know this? >Please, oh, please, Charles, tell me what they are so I can live my life >the "right" way? >:-| I didn't claim that I did. I merely claimed that you don't know whether or not I do. >> Well, in many cases this is quite obviously not true. People typically >> operate under some delusions about their state of well-being. Were there >> no such delusions, I could agree whole-heartedly with Rich's system. >> But in fact there are. To take an extreme case, consider a man, >> a farmer, who suffers a massive heart attack. Awakening in the hospital, >> he struggles to leave. Can it really be argued that he is competent to >> judge his condition? Are not the doctors justified in restraining him >> from killing himself as he acts out the delusion that he is well? >> Certainly, this example is extreme. The problem I see is that there >> is no clear-cut dividing line; situations run from this all the way >> down to where things are better let to go wrong, to where the good or >> badness of the situation is quite unclear. >This may be the crux of the difference of our opinions. Yes, there are >certain unclear lines. Your opinion is clearly that erring on the side of >excess is better despite any indiscretions and ill effects this might have. My opinion is not clear at all, since it is not well-formed. This case is obviously rather extreme. In cases in the middle I would rather operate situationally rather than blindly apply some principle. >Obviously I would rather err on the side of liberty, as I think most thinking >people would do rather than suffer the abuses of power we witness. It boils >down once again to losing sight of goals: is the purpose of the society >more to provide a framework for each person to live to their maximal >capable potential and freedom, or to willy nilly restrict people in the >interest of those extreme cases Wingate cites. Society doesn't have a purpose. It simply is. And once again Rich has erected a false dichotomy. The question is not liberty or security; the question is whose liberty, and how much. The true availability of liberty in this world is severely restricted by a number of processes, even in the absence of overt deliberate coercion. For starters, we live in an economic world. Resources to do things are relatively scarce, and possession by one generally procludes use by another. The second is that almost every action, even trivial ones, has moral repercussions. Ever action you take has some influence, however small, over another. Finally, human beings are quite suceptible to delusion. People quite often act against what even they perceive to be their own interests. >>>> All right. A family lives in a house which is about to be destroyed by a >>>> forest fire. They do not wish to leave. The police forcibly evict them. >>>> In my opinion, this action is justified. >>>If a person wishes to stay and burn, who are you to tell him not to? Would >>>you also forcibly prevent someone from committing suicide if you can't >>>reason them out of it? It's quite another thing if the person is forcing >>>others to die with him/her. >> Because they emotionally are not competent to decide. >My. I didn't know we had a degree in clairvoyant abnormal sociopathic >psychology, Charles. How good of you to decide for them. I've witnessed >you living out this philosophy right here on the net. You deliberately >altered the Followup-to lines on your articles in various discussion- >oriented newsgroups to cause followups to go to net.flame! Why? >Because you "decided" for us that that was where they belonged. Perhaps >we were not emotionally competent to decide this issue ourselves. >Any article offering counteropinions to yours just HAD to be a flame, >right? I dredge up this example for good reason. Because this is a >perfect example of an implementation of the philosophy Charles espouses. >People deciding for us what is best for us. >Charles doesn't just think this is good in those "extreme" cases. Clearly >it is "acceptable" and "useful" whereever and whenever power is available to >do so. There is a lesson here. Well the only lesson I find is that you are extremely paranoid. And it's quite relevant to demand a justification for your posting this to net.religion, presumably because you think that we should be forced to read it there, when religion is not even remotely involved. Once again, having run out of arguments, Rich resorts to personal attacks. There's an element of convenience in Rich's morality. It's OK for him to preach anti-christianity in the schools, but not OK for parents to protect their children from it. It's OK to do any destructive thing to yourself, regardless of its implication for others. This same convenience shows up it Rich's fanatical defense of this thing he imporperly labels science; denegration of criticism of his system on the basis of "wishful thinking" are quite OK, but for some reason his own motivations are above consideration. Rich in fact shows all the signs of the "True Believer" atheist. >>>Also, a person speaks out against our obviously good government and >>>society. Obviously this person is insane and should be taken away >>>and helped for his/her own "best interests". This I would consider >>>justified. :-) >> So what? All you've shown is that power can be abused. So what? >"So what?" In the words of Richard Dawson, "Good answer!" You yourself are >an example of how such power is abused AS A RULE. My power in the universe is negligible. I am flattered that Rich vests me with the political power of (say) J. Edgar Hoover or Josef Stalin, but I must protest that he overestimates me. > For this reason, constraints >upon such power must be thorough, if such power is really necessary at all. >Hell, you're willing to restrict the freedom of billions of people, why not >also restrict those who would exercise such restrictive power? By not giving >it to them in the first place. You can't give it or take it away. It exists trough the situation. >> Rich has made quite clear that his viewpoint on the world is quite >> different from the average. So is mine. I also get the strong >> impression that he believes that most everyone (including me) is >> massively deluded about the truth of the world. Everyone but him. >(This sort of abusive statement has become the status quo with Wingate of >late. For now, it's best to let it pass.) How sanctimonious! Rich, I haven't heard you ONCE agree with anyone else! Even I, the great and powerful Mangoe, have conceded error. (Well, maybe just once.) >> Well, maybe this is true. But it seems to me that this is a bit proud. >This coming from the man who, a few lines ago, without a hint of pride (?), >deemed other people not "emotionally competent to make decisions". Pride or not, some people aren't. >> I am well aware of the fact that I quite often do not know what is best for >> me. In many cases in am not aware, but others are. >Then you *would* know what is best for you, knowing that you don't know it >for sure yourself. What you are talking about is the very thing you dread >when it comes to certain other discussions we've been having: objectivity. >Third party disinterested analysis of the situation. It's funny because when >I make statements about subjective belief, you (among others) jump on me and >claim to know the truth as it sits inside of you. Fine. But unlike you, O angel of non-est, I live in time. My opinions and knowledge change. It is really hard for me to believe that Rich has never ever in his life realized that he was wrong about something. And I was wondering how long it was before Rich was going to start in on some of the mistakes I made early on on the net. >> Rich seems to be taking a fairly extreme position on what >> constitutes interference. As I see it, his principle would claim that it >> is immoral for a university to require certain courses, for a athletic >> coach to >> demand cooperation of his players, and a host of other minor interferences. >> It seems to me that, accepting Rich's principle (and I do think it is >> valid to some extent), the whole question of what consitutes interference >> is quite murky. And I think the principle itself is questionable in the >> light of some situations where the person being "interfered with" is >> clearly not capable of deciding what his best interests are. >The exact definition of "interference" may indeed be murky. Perhaps we are >making headway here in defining it. But remember that I have always been >speaking in terms of goals, goals we often seem to have lost sight of in >the quagmire of making the bureaucracy (supposedly designed to reach that >goal) a goal in and of itself. I don't think it IS definable, except existentially. C Wingate
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/29/85)
In article <749@psivax.UUCP> friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes: >> > Or there is my prefered class of examples. What if your 2-3 yr >old child starts to run out into a busy street? Are you going to >ignore it("don't interfere with him - it is bad to assume what is best >for someone else"), try to *talk* him into coming back and hope you >succedd in time, or physically grab the kid and forcibly place him >back in the yard? I maintain that the last is the *only* reasonble >course under the circumstances, but it is *clearly* a violation of non- >interference! How is *this* justified in the non-interference morality? Ah, I don't know how Rich is going to answer this one, but I know how I do. Not-interference is a right which I ascribe to (for want of a better word) citizens. Children are not citizens under this model. This means that they do not have the rights or the responsibilities of citizens. (They would, of course, have the rights of living things, and the rights of human beings, though.) Please don't construe this to mean that I condone any amount of interference with children or that I condone any sort of interference to other sorts of non-citizens (for instance, tourists). If you like this model, I suggest that you do not try to select for citizenship on the basis of having someone else decide that this person is competant to be a citizen. Included are such arbitrary rules as ``you must be over 18 to be a citizen'' or other such. Since citizenship will entail responsibilities I believe that it is better to let people demonstrate that they can fulfil those responsibilities and then confer citizenship upon them. If this means that some 15 year olds are citizens and some 45 year olds who do not want the responsibilities of citizenship are not, then this outcome is fair to me. I think that to use this model we will need a lot more categories than citizen. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
>>But this is clearly not the case with regard to those facets of society >>charged with lawmaking and enforcement. Ever wonder why speeding tickets >>are impossible to beat? (Virtually) Because the real court is not in the >>courtroom, it's out on the highway where you got the ticket. The townships >>and such need the money, so the deck is stacked. "It was a police officer >>who caught you, why would he lie? ... PSSST! Add one more to Officer >>Jack's credit list..." The law is now enforced, not to protect the people, >>but to protect the bureaucracy. Obviously not in all cases, but in enough >>that the harm is more than just "significant". > Yes, but would we better off with no speed limits? I don't think so. I > think we would be significantly worse off. The additional traffic deaths > would more than outweigh the kind of petty graft you are talking about. First, speed limit laws were but one example of the phenomenon I describe, which is manifested throughout our so-called law enforcement system. Its goal is less law enforcement than it is its own self-perpetuation. Second, this fact alone means that the goals have been subverted. >>And what contribution does interference offer or provide? > There are many people who have been forcibly restrained from committing > suicide, who are today very grateful for that "interference". And many more who are stuck in prisons/hospitals/etc. for not towing the line of social "norms". The whole issue boils down to "do you draw the line on the far side of restriction (to be "protective") or on the near side (to allow freedom)? >>> In any event, this is a bit beside the point. If you justify non-interven- >>> tionism on utilitarian grounds, then the morality is utilitarianism, and >>> the rights are derived from the morality, as I stated. >>Is "utilitarianism" a morality? Can any morality or societal code afford >>to be non-utilitarian? I hardly think so. > Yes. Utilitaritarianism says that the morally correct action in any > situation is that which maximizing the common good, defined as the total > good of everyone. As such, it (theoretically) determines the correct > action in any situation. (Note that your own desires are not to be > excluded in this calculation.) Lots of people reject this. Sure, lots of people are not interested in good or benefits to people in general. Actually, that is not the definition of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism merely states that the goal for a choice should rest in its usefulness, its "utility". Again, can any morality or societal code afford to be non-utilitarian? -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
>>Are you restraining me from looking away, or moving elsewhere? If so, then >>you are harming me. If not, then I'll just go elsewhere. Unless of course, >>you're on my property doing this, in which case you'll go elsewhere. How >>are you being harmed by my wearing a red shirt, even if you don't like it? >>Why are you out to introduce problems where none exist? > Do you wish to exclude mental pain from the meaning of harm? I know it's > hard to measure, but physical pain is hard to measure, too. Indeed I do, precisely because what you call mental pain is not only immeasureable, it merely represents "I don't like this" as "mental pain". >>I just gave criteria. If someone is wearing a red shirt and I don't like >>it, I can always not look. If someone is forcing me to stare into a bright >>light that causes me physical harm (forcing, as in restraining me and leaving >>me no choice, or shining the light on my property in my personal space, or >>in a public thoroughfare traversed by many people, that is clearly an act >>of interference. > The assumption is that you are wearing the shirt *in public*, e.g., on a > busy thoroughfare traversed by many people. Also, I can't "not look" before > seeing it the first time -- and seeing it once may be bad enough. Bad enough? God, how awful! Imagine this: you don't like seeing fat, skinny, or otherwise "unattractive" people on the street either. You find their fatness/skinniness/whatever revolting, and find it "painful" to see them on the street. What then? Let's try something more productive. Pretend we've got a whole group of people together to build a consensus for a morality. For simplicity, let's take persons A, B, & C. Let's see what laws each comes up with: A: No one should be allowed to wear shirts that are a single solid color, because it is too stark and damages my sensibilities. Also, B should not be allowed to have any rights, because I don't like his/her "kind", and allowing him/her to exercise rights of free speech/action would hurt me mentally. B: No one should be allowed to wear shirts that are not solid in color, because patterns of any non-unicolor sort hurt my brain. Also, A should not have any rights, because I say so, my Bible says that A-types should not have rights. C: I think I should have the right to take anyone's property that I like, because not being able to do so would harm me and prevent me from living out my individuality. Now, we could take the union or maximalization of all the requests. By that reasoning, neither A's nor B's would have rights, no one would ever be allowed to wear shirts of any kind, and C would be free to pillage at will. Sound good? Now let's take the minimalization of the requests. Does C have the right to steal? Of course not, that is an act of direct interference in other people's lives. What about the "shirt rules"? It seems clear to me that both sets are bogus, neither A nor B would have their lives interfered with by allowing any sort of shirt that anyone likes, provided it doesn't provide a "clear and present danger". And (the crux) should any group of people be able to restrict the actions of another group of people solely at whim, solely because of personal taste? Clearly not. Can other people doing what they want where you are not harmed by it ever be the basis of a restriction? Clearly not, not in this scheme. > Please define what you mean by "interference". If the definition depends on > the idea of "harm", please tell us what that means, as well. Obviously it does, and I think I said this in an earlier article that may not have gotten out there yet. In any case, I think the above paragraph makes things at least a little clearer. >>Not nearly as complex as you seem to want to make it. >>Personal dislike and inconvenience are NOT examples of deliberate interfering >>harm by any stretch of the imagination. If this stretching the notion of >>harm were taken to deliberate extremes (for the purpose of restricting >>people's freedom?), you could just as easily say that the car in front of >>you at the intersection sitting there while you want to turn right on red is >>"interfering" with you. > Quite. Then what are we arguing about? >>The way you seem to be treating the notion of minimal interference >>is egocentric: "minimal interference with ME". The goal is minimal >>interference to all. > Why do you think you can compare the amount of interference with one person > with the amount of interference with another? I ask this not because I > think you can't, but because you reject the same kind of comparison in > other contexts. "How do you know what is in my interests? You don't." > (This quote may not be word for word, but I don't think it misrepresents > your viewpoint.) How are the two cases different? I don't see any similarity in the first place. Is it ever to be considered a person's RIGHT to interfere in another person's life, such that restriction from doing this is interpreted as harm? I would certainly hope not. >>When you claim that the example I just gave (or the >>red shirt example) is worth restricting, you are interfering in that person's >>life. Why? Because someone is being harmed and interfered with? Or because >>someone childishly doesn't like it? > I don't really think you should be prevented from wearing a red shirt. I > think there are such things as rights, and that you have a right to wear a > red shirt. I just think you have things backwards -- you want to define > morality in terms of rights, while I claim that rights are defined in terms > of morality. And I think you have it backwards. Morality is a code for the society. To claim that the societal code comes before the individual human needs and rights strikes me as preposterous. Morality must of necessity be built from people's needs and wants, not the other way around. >>Since you're anxious to make the problem tough, let's make it so. Suppose >>it wasn't a red shirt this guy wanted to wear. Suppose he wanted to wear a >>red dress. What then? In what way is he interfering with you? In what way >>do you feel you should be able to interfere with him? Maybe this is meatier >>and less hypothetical than "bright lights" versus "red shirts". > I see no real difference between the two cases, except that the chance that > someone actually *would* be harmed is higher in your example, *because of > social attitudes*. Ah, here we go. Because other people have an irrational morality that says that interfering in another person's life because you don't like it is "OK", something should be restricted. Hmmm.... The individual who seeks personal freedom should be restricted, not those who irrationally seek to restrict and/or harm. Does that make sense to you? -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
walker@oberon.UUCP (Mike Walker) (10/06/85)
> >>>There is a problem with the principle of non-interference as a basis > >>>for morality: it is insufficient. There are a great many cases where > >>>there is an interaction between two or more people, where it is not > >>>clear whether interference has taken place, or who has interfered with > >>>whom. [WINGATE] > > >>As I understand it, "interference" in recent discussions means curtailing > >>another's freedoms. Since no man is an island, the principle of > >>non-interference is presented as one of minimizing the curtailment of > >>another's freedoms. [HOULAHAN] > > > In that case, though, all of the moral system is embedded in the evaluations > > one makes to decide which freedom to keep and which to curtail. [WINGATE] > > You got it! The most freedom availble while still protecting the interests > of all people from non-interference is, in fact, the minimal morality of > minimal necessary restrictions! (Thank you!) > -- > Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in > Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... > Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr *** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE *** yet another late posting from mike walker.... Rich, how do derive that all people have a right to be protected? That is an active right, which others must work (read slave) supply, not a passive right, which only limits the behavior of others. -- Michael D. Walker (Mike) Arpa: walker@oberon.ARPA Uucp: {the (mostly unknown) world}!ihnp4!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker {several select chunks}!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/12/85)
>>You got it! The most freedom availble while still protecting the interests >>of all people from non-interference is, in fact, the minimal morality of >>minimal necessary restrictions! (Thank you!) > Rich, how do derive that all people have a right to be protected? > That is an active right, which others must work (read slave) supply, > not a passive right, which only limits the behavior of others. Pardon me, but where did I say ANYTHING about a right to be protected? I was talking about the designation of rights in a minimal moralty, which is the most freedom available while still protecting the interests of others BY not allowing as "rights" acts of interference. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/20/85)
>>You got it! The most freedom availble while still protecting the interests >>of all people from non-interference is, in fact, the minimal morality of >>minimal necessary restrictions! (Thank you!) > Rich, how do derive that all people have a right to be protected? > That is an active right, which others must work (read slave) supply, > not a passive right, which only limits the behavior of others. Pardon me, but where did I say ANYTHING about a right to be protected? I was talking about the designation of rights in a minimal moralty, which is the most freedom available while still protecting the interests of others BY not allowing as "rights" acts of interference. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr