padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (01/01/70)
> > [Not food] > > In article <739@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least > >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as > >a statement of "selfness". > > No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with > the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is > the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it > maybe mean "having the same soul"? > > Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka > Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108 I thought this was made pretty clear in the "assembly line" analogy. I do not really want to get into deep definitions on "selfness" but I think the need to use it in the context of assigning unique identity to similar objects is evident for Charley's case. I say this because the alternative presents even more difficulties as indicated by the identical twin homicide story. What all this seems to point to, from my perspective, is that quantities like location, and time, serve to provide a working criterion for determining "selfness" in every-day problems. These quantities however are externals from the traditional set of aspects that define identity i.e. the statement "you will be resurrected" is meaningless since everything would have to be reconstructed so that the "externals" are satisfied. The matter transfer scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. I think it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and the same as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the same "selfness" as the original person. The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but are not "the" original. Destruction of the original by death does not make the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected. Padraig Houlahan.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (01/01/70)
[Not food] In article <755@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least >> >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as >> >a statement of "selfness". >> >> No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with >> the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is >> the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it >> maybe mean "having the same soul"? > >I thought this was made pretty clear in the "assembly line" analogy. I didn't see this analogy in any of the postings which got here. >I do >not really want to get into deep definitions on "selfness" but I think >the need to use it in the context of assigning unique identity to similar >objects is evident for Charley's case. I say this because the alternative >presents even more difficulties as indicated by the identical twin homicide >story. I think you have to get into "deep definitions on 'selfness'" if you want to defend your position. You seem to feel that uniqueness is a necessary characteristic of it. This is precisely what I dispute. There is no identical twin homicide problem. Identical twins are not the same people as each other. If you make perfect copies of a person, they are not the same person as each other, or as the still existing "original" (in the physical sense) (if there is one). Killing any of them is murder. Barring telepathy (in an extreme form), two bodies existing at the same time cannot be the same person as each other. They can all be the same person as a person who existed at an earlier time. >What all this seems to point to, from my perspective, is that >quantities like location, and time, serve to provide a working criterion for >determining "selfness" in every-day problems. These quantities however are >externals from the traditional set of aspects that define identity i.e. the >statement "you will be resurrected" is meaningless since everything would >have to be reconstructed so that the "externals" are satisfied. The way I read the first sentence above, it says that continuity is a useful guide to determining identity. The second sentence seems to support this in the first clause ("externals from the traditional set of aspects that define identity"), yet the second part implies that it is fundamental to identity. If continuity is only a useful guide, it may be violated in exceptional circumstances. If you truly wish to *define* identity in terms of continuity, I can do little but argue that that is not really how the term is used. You must, for such a definition, explain how my identity ceases when I die. Let me return to the music analogy. A piece of music may be performed by two different people, who will perform it differently. The *performances* are not the same thing -- the performance is the material component. The *piece of music* is exactly the same in both cases -- this is the information component. I am claiming that identity, or selfness, or mind, is the information component of us; while our bodies are the physical component. To push the analogy a bit further, suppose there are two songs with the same first verse, but different thereafter. That first verse shares identity (in the sense that it is part of) the second verse of both songs. But those second verses do not share identity at all. If you don't agree, ask yourself this question: if a person sings only the first verse, which song has she sung the first verse of? >The matter >transfer scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. >I think it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and >the same as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the >same "selfness" as the original person. I think it is garbage to claim they are not. They will certainly each think they are. They will interact with other people as if they are. They will have the same hopes and fears, the same loves and hates, as the original. How are they not the original? > The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but >are not "the" original. Destruction of the original by death does not make >the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course >one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected. There is a small point of agreement here. Destruction of the original does not make the copies the same as the original. They are either already the same, or they never are. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/26/85)
In article <599@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is >nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come >from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack >of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, >but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same >sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a bunch of ICs". The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission of minds from one body to another indicates that people do not really believe that a mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe that a chess program is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even more absurd level, a bunch of electrical charges). The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. The fact that people can talk seriously about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. It it certainly beyond contest that the information represented in the mind is an essential component of a person, so that "just a bag of chemicals" he ain't. >I have no idea why he >opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple >and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. Newtonian physics is also simple, and natural, and wrong. The point is not whether or not I "accept" an explanation. The point is that Padraig is demanding that this explanation be accpeted, AND NO OTHER. Since he has absolutely no objective evidence to work from, he has no basis to either assert or deny ANY hypothesis about "life after death", especially since the root idea comes out of a religious domain where we readily admit that we use the term without any precise notion of what we mean by it. I choose not to believe in souls, but on rather different grounds, which Padraig has already stated his lack of interest in. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe The wind blows where it pleases
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/26/85)
> In article <599@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > > >I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is > >nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come > >from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack > >of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, > >but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same > >sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. > > Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a bunch > of ICs". The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission of minds > from one body to another indicates that people do not really believe that a > mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe that a chess program > is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even more absurd level, a > bunch of electrical charges). Let's not forget the tooth fairy, santa claus, all legends, and why not throw in Velikovsky while we are at it. This is net.philosophy, not net.storytime. All of this is fascinating. Look how easy it is to produce something that is more than just an assemblage of chemicals. It has already been done to Charley's satisfaction in the case of robots; it is only a matter of degree to go from there to life itself. > ... The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that > Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the > ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. The fact that people can talk seriously > about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) > into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is NOT > just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is > immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. No. I think the organization is pretty important. Sorry if I mislead you there. > ... It it > certainly beyond contest that the information represented in the mind is an > essential component of a person, so that "just a bag of chemicals" he ain't. This is great! Each time a robot is built another is resurrected, even though its predecessors may not have already ended on the scrap heap. Imagine that. Multiple resurrections of the same object. How many times will you be resurrected Charley? Once? Twice? A hundred times? > >I have no idea why he > >opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple > >and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. > > Newtonian physics is also simple, and natural, and wrong. WRONG! Newtonian physics is not incorrect. Just like any other branch of physics it is valid only over a finite domain. It is more than sufficient to place men on the moon. > ...The point is not > whether or not I "accept" an explanation. The point is that Padraig is > demanding that this explanation be accpeted, AND NO OTHER. Wrong again. I don't believe in a soul either. In fact I pretty much agree with you on what you said above. Where I disagree though is over your assertion that you will be resurrected. This I find to be inconsistent with what you have said, and leads to many exotic consequences. So there is another explanation: no soul, no resurrection. > ... Since he has > absolutely no objective evidence to work from, he has no basis to either > assert or deny ANY hypothesis about "life after death", especially since the > root idea comes out of a religious domain where we readily admit that we use > the term without any precise notion of what we mean by it. I choose not to > believe in souls, but on rather different grounds, which Padraig has already > stated his lack of interest in. > > Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe Again. I am not asserting anything. You are the one claiming that the soul does not exist, while at the same time claiming that you will be resurrected. I haven't been swamped with objective evidence from you though. Padraig Houlahan.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/27/85)
>>I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is >>nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come >>from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack >>of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, >>but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same >>sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. > Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a bunch > of ICs". The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission of minds > from one body to another indicates that people do not really believe that a > mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe that a chess program > is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even more absurd level, a > bunch of electrical charges). I wasn't aware that science fiction stories of varying quality can now join the Bible on the list of "books that tell the truth about the universe". What people do or do not want to "really believe" is irrelevant. This huge volume of stories is fictional, Charles. But you've missed the whole point. Most people I know DO think a chess playing program is "just a bunch of circuits", and thus unable to "think" (or whatever), while on the other hand claiming "But WE aren't just a bunch of chemicals and stuff; We're human!!! We're different!!!" Do you know what hexasyllabical word describes that? (Hint: it's not "hexasyllabical", and it begins with "anthropo-" and ends with "-centrism" ...) > The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that > Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the > ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. I didn't see any pejorative that intimated that at all. On the contrary. > The fact that people can talk seriously > about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) > into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is > NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is > immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. Seriously? Oh, I agree that many of those stories are serious in the sense that they are speculatively scientific and not wishful thinking fantasy, but they are far from "serious" in the sense of being thought of as a serious implementation possibility based on what happens in the story. Furthermore, most of the stories I've come across are NOT serious, but merely a wishywashy fantasy with little bearing on reality and even less rigorous basis behind the modeling in the story. It makes for fun reading (if you're into it), but not a viable description of reality. >>I have no idea why he >>opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple >>and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. > Newtonian physics is also simple, and natural, and wrong. The point is not > whether or not I "accept" an explanation. The point is that Padraig is > demanding that this explanation be accpeted, AND NO OTHER. Since he has > absolutely no objective evidence to work from, he has no basis to either > assert or deny ANY hypothesis about "life after death", especially since the > root idea comes out of a religious domain where we readily admit that we use > the term without any precise notion of what we mean by it. I choose not to > believe in souls, but on rather different grounds, which Padraig has already > stated his lack of interest in. Padraig is saying that your non-belief in souls is self-contradictory, in that you need a point of connection between the two "lives" that makes the earlier life the same "person" (?) as the later life. I realize you are saying that you are saying that god reincarnates/resurrects/rebuilds us at some later point in time without need for a referential soul. But what makes this rebuilt person the same person as you? For that to be true, there must be some connecting factor between the two. -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/28/85)
> ---------- "More Atheistic Wishful Thinking" ---------- The thinking being criticized is reductionism, not atheism. While I would be quite offended to be called a reductionist, I have no problem with sharing the religious views of Einstein, Russell, and most other great modern thinkers. >Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a bunch >of ICs". Right, the robot is a *well-organized* bunch of ICs, not *just*. "Just" is a fundamentally dishonest, misdirecting word that no self-respecting philosopher should ever use, but behaviorists and other reductionists love it. >The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission of minds >from one body to another indicates that people do not really believe that a >mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe that a chess program >is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even more absurd level, a >bunch of electrical charges). But they *do* believe that the mind is a bunch of chemicals, *with* structure; the structure is necessary and cannot legitimately be ignored, but there is no reason to suspect anything *other* than the chemicals (or charges or probability waves) *plus* the structure. >The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that >Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the >ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. I think he made this error, but not in the intentional or misdirective way you imply. >The fact that people can talk seriously >about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) >into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is NOT >just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is >immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. It it >certainly beyond contest that the information represented in the mind is an >essential component of a person, so that "just a bag of chemicals" he ain't. But it is reasonable to think of a personality and set of memories as a bag of chemicals in a particular state. As for "essential person", I think it is somewhat phrenomorphic (Oh, boy! I coined a word!) to think of it as excluding the body, its age, its hormones, its physical state, etc., which is why I find the whole concept of afterlife incredibly juvenile. >>I have no idea why he >>opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple >>and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. > >Newtonian physics is also simple, and natural, and wrong. The point is not >whether or not I "accept" an explanation. The point is that Padraig is >demanding that this explanation be accpeted, AND NO OTHER. Since he has >absolutely no objective evidence to work from, he has no basis to either >assert or deny ANY hypothesis about "life after death", especially since the >root idea comes out of a religious domain where we readily admit that we use >the term without any precise notion of what we mean by it. I choose not to >believe in souls, but on rather different grounds, which Padraig has already >stated his lack of interest in. I love Charley's willingness to talk about terms that he admits he has no notion of what he means by. I know, that wasn't honest because you say "precise notion", but I believe my stronger statement, given your rather perverse use of language. If I can die and then live again later, there must be some way of identifying the two me's as being the same. Since there is something *other* than mere continuity of the physical body that the two me's have in common, we must give the something a name. Traditionally it has been called the soul. Of course, I must wonder whether the new me will be senile, or depressed, or in incredible pain, dependent upon the state I was in at the time of my death. And if you say that the new me is my "essential person" in some "exalted" painless and perfected form, then I know for sure you have no notion of what you are talking about. Note that Padraig made no demand, he just asked a question. We believe Newtonian physics to be wrong due to a series of directed observations. Einsteinian explanations in the 17th century would have been quite justifiably rejected because there was no evidence or cause to support them, just as the mere fact that Democritus was right in many ways is not notable or complimentary to him, since it was often for the wrong reasons. Ockham says we *do* have a basis for *rejecting* (not denying; Padraig never did any such thing) hypotheses about undemonstrated phenomena such as life after death. *You* may feel that Biblical accounts of the resurrection of Jesus are demonstration of the phenomena, but there are plenty who do not, and in any case his resurrection is no demonstration of the possible resurrection of anyone else, and no statement of one religious figure recorded in one particular book, regardless of how many people believe the statements of that book (which belief can be reasonably be explained in sociological and historical terms), can be considered to be evidence, so please leave this stuff in net.religion. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/29/85)
In article <1598@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is >>>nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come >>>from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack >>>of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, >>>but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same >>>sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. >> Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a >> bunch of ICs". The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission >> of minds from one body to another indicates that people do not really >> believe that a mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe >> that a chess program is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even >> more absurd level, a bunch of electrical charges). >I wasn't aware that science fiction stories of varying quality can now >join the Bible on the list of "books that tell the truth about the universe". >What people do or do not want to "really believe" is irrelevant. This >huge volume of stories is fictional, Charles. But you've missed the whole >point. Most people I know DO think a chess playing program is "just a >bunch of circuits", and thus unable to "think" (or whatever), while on >the other hand claiming "But WE aren't just a bunch of chemicals and stuff; >We're human!!! We're different!!!" Do you know what hexasyllabical word >describes that? (Hint: it's not "hexasyllabical", and it begins with >"anthropo-" and ends with "-centrism" ...) Bullshit, Rich. Utter bullshit. A chess playing robot with an accounting program in it doesn't play chess, does it? A brain-dead human doesn't think, does it? A dog is obviously unlike a human isn't it? To say that men are "just chemicals" is nothing more than a cop-out. Whether or not transmission of minds around is possible is quite irrelevant; the fact that people will talk about it, even in the realm of fiction, indicates that it can be conceptualized. If we're just chemicals, then obviously a dead person is qualitatively identical to the same person alive. After all, we can just ignore all that organization, those memories and thoughts, the consciousness, the emotions-- none of them are chemicals, so they must not matter. >> The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that >> Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the >> ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. >I didn't see any pejorative that intimated that at all. On the contrary. Obviously Rich is the only person in America who doesn't view the phrase "just a <whatever>" as a pejorative statement. >> The fact that people can talk seriously >> about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) >> into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is >> NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is >> immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. >Seriously? Oh, I agree that many of those stories are serious in the sense >that they are speculatively scientific and not wishful thinking fantasy, >but they are far from "serious" in the sense of being thought of as a >serious implementation possibility based on what happens in the story. >Furthermore, most of the stories I've come across are NOT serious, but >merely a wishywashy fantasy with little bearing on reality and even less >rigorous basis behind the modeling in the story. It makes for fun reading >(if you're into it), but not a viable description of reality. I see. Communications satellites are not real, since they were described in SF. This whole argument is tantemount to saying that one can play chess by keeping track of the number of pieces on each side, totally ignoring their positions. If Rich and Padraig are going to persist in this folly, then I shall (once again) drop out. Their views would then seem to be immune to reality. Charley Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/30/85)
>>>Wishful thinking: it's like saying that a robot chess player is "just a >>>bunch of ICs". The huge volume of stories concerning the transmission >>>of minds from one body to another indicates that people do not really >>>believe that a mind is a bunch of chemicals any more than they believe >>>that a chess program is a bunch of ICs (or take the reduction to an even >>>more absurd level, a bunch of electrical charges). [WINGATE] >>I wasn't aware that science fiction stories of varying quality can now >>join the Bible on the list of "books that tell the truth about the universe". >>What people do or do not want to "really believe" is irrelevant. This >>huge volume of stories is fictional, Charles. But you've missed the whole >>point. Most people I know DO think a chess playing program is "just a >>bunch of circuits", and thus unable to "think" (or whatever), while on >>the other hand claiming "But WE aren't just a bunch of chemicals and stuff; >>We're human!!! We're different!!!" Do you know what hexasyllabical word >>describes that? (Hint: it's not "hexasyllabical", and it begins with >>"anthropo-" and ends with "-centrism" ...) > Bullshit, Rich. Utter bullshit. Bullshit, my ass. This hits it right on the money, my friend. Are you denying that many people think of so-called "thinking machines" as "just a bunch of circuits" while saying "but we're not, we're human, we're different"? That most assuredly is anthropocentrism plain and simple. > A chess playing robot with an accounting program in it doesn't play chess, > does it? A brain-dead human doesn't think, does it? A dog is obviously > unlike a human isn't it? To say that men are "just chemicals" is nothing > more than a cop-out. No, Charles, it is YOU who is copping out. If we are more than a bunch of chemicals then, in the same way, the chess program is more than a bunch of circuits. In exactly the same way. In the nature of their organizations. Yet some people claim "that's just a bunch of circuits, not a thing engaging in real 'thinking', and they never will build such a thinking machine, because we glorious humans are innately different". You denied that people do this, but clearly they do. Even some scholars of AI have (erroneously) come to believe this. And their motivation for doing so is their fear that building a machine that models human thought will take away the difference that we perceive ourselves (erroneously) to have. > Whether or not transmission of minds around is possible > is quite irrelevant; the fact that people will talk about it, even in the > realm of fiction, indicates that it can be conceptualized. My dear Charles, YOU are the one who brought up the example you now call irrelevant. A lot of things can be conceptualized. A lot of things that do not or can not exist. So? > If we're just chemicals, then obviously a dead person is qualitatively > identical to the same person alive. After all, we can just ignore all that > organization, those memories and thoughts, the consciousness, the emotions-- > none of them are chemicals, so they must not matter. How you get from my statements to here is beyond me. (Wishful thinking that this MUST be the conclusion of my beliefs, in order that you can feel justified in not "liking" them?) No one said we had to ignore any of that. But to believe that such organization is somehow "special", that it is only possible in us, and that "machines" simply cannot be that way, ever, is anthropocentrism in its purest form. >>> The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that >>> Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the >>> ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. >>I didn't see any pejorative that intimated that at all. On the contrary. > Obviously Rich is the only person in America who doesn't view the phrase > "just a <whatever>" as a pejorative statement. I'm just a gigolo, and everywhere I go... Obviously Charles is the only one in America who assumes that everyone in America interprets words exactly the same way he does. (Actually, that's not true. It would be more accurate to say Charles is the only one in America who assumes that everyone in America interprets words exactly the same way Charles does.) Why don't you show us exactly what Padraig said that was so "pejorative" rather than a pseudo-quote with a <whatever> symbolic parameter thrown in. >>> The fact that people can talk seriously >>> about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) >>> into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is >>> NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is >>> immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. >>Seriously? Oh, I agree that many of those stories are serious in the sense >>that they are speculatively scientific and not wishful thinking fantasy, >>but they are far from "serious" in the sense of being thought of as a >>serious implementation possibility based on what happens in the story. >>Furthermore, most of the stories I've come across are NOT serious, but >>merely a wishywashy fantasy with little bearing on reality and even less >>rigorous basis behind the modeling in the story. It makes for fun reading >>(if you're into it), but not a viable description of reality. > I see. Communications satellites are not real, since they were described > in SF. You need a course in logic, Charles. You fouled that one up so bad, it smells. Where did I say "everything that has ever appeared in SF is not real"? On the contrary, I said that the way certain "mind-transference" stories are told involves pure fantasization rather than speculative thinking, examples of which included space travel and communications satellites in SF of years past. Why are you engaging in such vile verbal chicanery? I'm sure you're intelligent enough to know that that's not what I said at all. Why the need to smear like that? > This whole argument is tantemount to saying that one can play chess by > keeping track of the number of pieces on each side, totally ignoring their > positions. Huh? Care to explain that analogy? If you mean to say we are ignoring organization, we are not. It is you who are denying that similar organizations can be exist in things other than humans or even life-forms as we know them. > If Rich and Padraig are going to persist in this folly, then I > shall (once again) drop out. Their views would then seem to be immune to > reality. I think you're the one who had the reality vaccine. Your brain may have developed antibodies for reality, but fortunately mine hasn't. I'm sure this WILL be the point at which you drop out, because you only re-persist in repeating arguments of yours that people debunk so many times and then quit. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (09/02/85)
Charley Wingate writes: > A brain-dead human doesn't > think, does it? A dog is obviously unlike a human isn't it? To say that > men are "just chemicals" is nothing more than a cop-out. Whether or not > transmission of minds around is possible is quite irrelevant; the fact that > people will talk about it, even in the realm of fiction, indicates that it > can be conceptualized. If we're just chemicals, then obviously a dead > person is qualitatively identical to the same person alive. By this argument, a battery must be more than 'just chemicals', since there *is* a qualitative difference between dead ones and live ones. > After all, we > can just ignore all that organization, those memories and thoughts, the > consciousness, the emotions-- none of them are chemicals, so they must not > matter. Who said that the organization wasn't important? We are just *organized* chemicals, ok? (although *I'm* usually *not* very organized.) > > >> The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that > >> Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the > >> ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. > > >I didn't see any pejorative that intimated that at all. On the contrary. > > Obviously Rich is the only person in America who doesn't view the phrase > "just a <whatever>" as a pejorative statement. No, not the only one ... there's David Lee Roth (or however it's spelled.) "I'm just a gigalo..." Kidding aside, Charley, the *true* meaning behind the statement: "Man is just a bunch of chemicals." seems to me to be a denial of the existance of souls. A person who believes in a soul could never believe the idea that men are made up chemicals ('dust'?) and nothing else. > > >> The fact that people can talk seriously > >> about transferring people's minds (and one assumes, the essential person) > >> into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is > >> NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is > >> immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. > I'll buy that. Not the bit about 'the fact that people can talk about it means it's so', but that the essential nature of a person is information. That information is encoded in a material form. A bunch of chemicals. Why does this bother you? > > Charley Wingate -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j "Roads? Where we're going, we won't need any roads!"
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/04/85)
In article <1115@mhuxt.UUCP> js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) writes: > > A brain-dead human doesn't >> think, does it? A dog is obviously unlike a human isn't it? To say that >> men are "just chemicals" is nothing more than a cop-out. Whether or not >> transmission of minds around is possible is quite irrelevant; the fact that >> people will talk about it, even in the realm of fiction, indicates that it >> can be conceptualized. If we're just chemicals, then obviously a dead >> person is qualitatively identical to the same person alive. >> After all, we >> can just ignore all that organization, those memories and thoughts, the >> consciousness, the emotions-- none of them are chemicals, so they must not >> matter. > Who said that the organization wasn't important? We are just *organized* >chemicals, ok? (although *I'm* usually *not* very organized.) Well, maybe we are, and maybe we aren't. (Mustn't forget all those electrical impulses, after all.) I think it's quite reasonable to suggest that we are organizations which "just" happen to be expressed in neural chemistry and impulses. >> >> The pejorative phrasing clearly indicates that >> >> Padraig would rather have us overlook the absolute importance of the >> >> ORGANIZATION of those chemicals. >> >I didn't see any pejorative that intimated that at all. On the contrary. >> Obviously Rich is the only person in America who doesn't view the phrase >> "just a <whatever>" as a pejorative statement. > Kidding aside, Charley, the *true* meaning behind the statement: "Man is >just a bunch of chemicals." seems to me to be a denial of the existance of >souls. A person who believes in a soul could never believe the idea that men >are made up chemicals ('dust'?) and nothing else. So what? I don't believe in souls, in the supernatural sense which everone in this groups seems determined to use. >> >> The fact that people can talk seriously about transferring people's >> >> minds (and one assumes, the essential person) >> >> into computers indicates that, not only can in fact say that a person is >> >> NOT just chemicals, but even that the essential nature of a person is >> >> immaterial-- since it is information, and not matter or energy. > I'll buy that. Not the bit about 'the fact that people can talk about >it means it's so', but that the essential nature of a person is information. >That information is encoded in a material form. A bunch of chemicals. Why >does this bother you? I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their identity. I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally. I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity". If the Mind is the identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no souls either. SInce this hypothesis is quite viable, although unproven, the statement that "Man is just a bunch of chemicals" can only be taken as a statment of religious faith, unless it is recognized for the hypothesis that it is (and not fact at all). Charley Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/06/85)
> I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the > physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their > identity. I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of > in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the > assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and > therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally. > [WINGATE] Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized. But more importantly, when Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls. For what is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation that is a part of that person? I find it cute when people speak only of the conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to believe, rather than reasonable notions about reality. > I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather > too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity". If the Mind is the > identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some > other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without > altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no > souls either. SInce this hypothesis is quite viable, although unproven, the > statement that "Man is just a bunch of chemicals" can only be taken as a > statment of religious faith, unless it is recognized for the hypothesis that > it is (and not fact at all). If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are again talking souls. But if perchance you're not, what would it mean to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output devices (the rest of the body)? The experience would be completely different, it would be a different person. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/09/85)
In article <1648@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the >> physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their >> identity. I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of >> in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the >> assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and >> therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally. >> [WINGATE] >Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized. But more importantly, when >Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant >to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls. For what >is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation that >is a part of that person? I find it cute when people speak only of the >conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to believe, >rather than reasonable notions about reality. Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural. Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all supernatural. All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should admit its existence. For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural computer programs. And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for criticism of a hypothesis. Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of fairies. He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their existence. These photographs, examined by various sorts of experts, did not conclusively demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was concluded that there was no evidence. Note the language: not "don't exist" but "no evidence". In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for this claim, but right now, he has none. >> I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather >> too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity". If the Mind is the >> identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some >> other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without >> altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no >> souls either. >If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are >again talking souls. But if perchance you're not, what would it mean >to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output >devices (the rest of the body)? The experience would be completely >different, it would be a different person. Would it? How do you know? Have you been disembodied lately? Why wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person? Are physical sensations really so important to the mind? Is there any objective evidence on which to base the claim? Why is this paragraph composed entirely of questions? Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses? Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of consciousness? Does anyone really know anything? Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/10/85)
In article <1648@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are >again talking souls. But if perchance you're not, what would it mean >to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output >devices (the rest of the body)? The experience would be completely different, >it would be a different person. >-- The experience would be somewhat different, which would make a difference in the person. Does that make it a different person? Not necessarily. You are different, and your experiences are different, every day. Forty years from now your experiences will be very different. Suppose we make the input devices as much like the original body as possible. At some point it becomes impossible to tell the difference from the original body. Certainly at that point you will grant identity with the original person. At some point before that the differences are noticeable, but no more than the differences in our experience from day to day, or from year to year. I would find it very hard to deny identity in such case. Now, I could go on, and argue that the appropriate limit can be pushed out farther than that, but I don't think I need to in the current context. One can, *in principle*, transplant a brain into another body; and it is correct to identify that person with the person where the brain originated. Whether such a transplant is doable in practice is irrelevant.
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/10/85)
Rich, there is more than one way to parse ``the mind is separate from the physical brain and body''. One is a belief in the soul that goes to heaven. But there is another. UNIX runs on a great many hardware configurations without it being the case that UNIX can run without a hardware configuration, after all. The question is, can you port the ``mind of laura'' which already runs well on the squishy hardware that is typing this note to something that is a little more durable? Note that the idea of what a mind is is not the same thing as what a mind is. The idea of what UNIX is is not what UNIX is either. (Read net.unix-wizards. Some people have ideas about UNIX which have nothing to do with any UNIX I know...) -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/11/85)
>>*I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the >>*physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their >>*identity. I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of >>>in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the >>>assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and >>>therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally. >>> [WINGATE] >>Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized. But more importantly, when >>Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant >>to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls. For what >>is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation that >>is a part of that person? I find it cute when people speak only of the >>conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to believe, >>rather than reasonable notions about reality. > Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural. > Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to > assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all > supernatural. All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that > there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should > admit its existence. Are you claiming that all these things do not have their identity in their physical representation and organization? How so? What ARE you claiming? By your own reasoning, since the program in the computer is defined by how it is organized physically, so is the "mind" of your analogy. Thus you are not talking about things not represented physically. > For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural > computer programs. And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy > story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for > criticism of a hypothesis. Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur > Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of fairies. > He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their existence. These > photographs, examined by various sorts of experts, did not conclusively > demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was concluded that there was no > evidence. Note the language: not "don't exist" but "no evidence". So Charles believes in fairies now? It's no longer clear what you believe in. Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being wishful thinking. That IS most certainly an objective basis for criticism: absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired conclusion. > In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of > evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely > in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for > this claim, but right now, he has none. It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy analysis and wishful thinking. >>> I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather >>> too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity". If the Mind is the >>> identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some >>> other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without >>> altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no >>> souls either. >>If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are >>again talking souls. But if perchance you're not, what would it mean >>to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output >>devices (the rest of the body)? The experience would be completely >>different, it would be a different person. > Would it? How do you know? Have you been disembodied lately? Why wouldn't > it be the experience of a disembodied person? Are physical sensations > really so important to the mind? Is there any objective evidence on which > to base the claim? Why is this paragraph composed entirely of questions? > Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses? Or perhaps because we have > nothing but questions about the nature of consciousness? Does anyone really > know anything? I sometimes wonder. The point is, to assume that physical sensations are not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul", as it were. I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles' lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and contorting to reach a desired conclusion. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/11/85)
> > Rich, there is more than one way to parse ``the mind is separate from the > physical brain and body''. One is a belief in the soul that goes to heaven. > But there is another. UNIX runs on a great many hardware configurations without > it being the case that UNIX can run without a hardware configuration, after > all. The question is, can you port the ``mind of laura'' which already runs > well on the squishy hardware that is typing this note to something that is a > little more durable? > > Note that the idea of what a mind is is not the same thing as what a mind is. > The idea of what UNIX is is not what UNIX is either. (Read net.unix-wizards. > Some people have ideas about UNIX which have nothing to do with any UNIX I > know...) > > > -- > Laura Creighton (note new address!) > sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) > l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa Yes, but the point is that Charley rejects the notion of soul, while claiming that "he" will be resurrected. If the soul is not there to ensure continuity, then he cannot say for certain that it will be "him" that is resurrected, and not just a copy (of many copies perhaps). He must claim that either all copies are indeed Charley, which is absurd, or give up claims of identity on being resurrected. Padraig Houlahan.
rsl@ihnss.UUCP (09/11/85)
I vote to move theology to net.religion.
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/12/85)
In article <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized. But more importantly, when >>>Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant >>>to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls. For what >>>is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation >>>that is a part of that person? I find it cute when people speak only of >>>the conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to >>>believe, rather than reasonable notions about reality. >> Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural. >> Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to >> assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all >> supernatural. All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that >> there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should >> admit its existence. >Are you claiming that all these things do not have their identity in their >physical representation and organization? How so? What ARE you claiming? >By your own reasoning, since the program in the computer is defined by how >it is organized physically, so is the "mind" of your analogy. Thus you >are not talking about things not represented physically. No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape, it remains the same song. >> For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural >> computer programs. And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy >> story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for >> criticism of a hypothesis. Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur >> Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of >> fairies. He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their >> existence. These photographs, examined by various sorts of experts, >> did not conclusively demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was >> concluded that there was no evidence. Note the language: not "don't >> exist" but "no evidence". >So Charles believes in fairies now? It's no longer clear what you believe >in. Good. Maybe you can start defending your beliefs rather than attacking what you believe to be mine. > Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being >wishful thinking. That IS most certainly an objective basis for >criticism: absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept >bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a >series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and >evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired >conclusion. "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of >> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely >> in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for >> this claim, but right now, he has none. >It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That >mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your >conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, >despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or >provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy >analysis and wishful thinking. Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence neither confirms nor denies either. >>> But if perchance you're not, what would it mean to have a disembodied >>>mind or brain without exactly the same input and output devices (the rest >>>of the body)? The experience would be completely different, it would be >>>a different person. >> Would it? How do you know? Have you been disembodied lately? Why >> wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person? Are physical >> sensations really so important to the mind? Is there any objective >> evidence on which to base the claim? Why is this paragraph composed >> entirely of questions? Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses? >>> Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of >> consciousness? Does anyone really know anything? > >I sometimes wonder. The point is, to assume that physical sensations are >not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without >regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever >that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul", >as it were. I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of >declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles' >lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and >contorting to reach a desired conclusion. So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical inputs"-- no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What if you feed in other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind of processing to the brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, who now has a new sensory input to play with? One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a statement should be independent of its subjective significance. Rich is rather blatantly ignoring this in his attacks on "mind as information". Whether or not my hypothesis is true is utterly independent on whether or not it is useful for it to be true to anyone. If we deny this principle, on the other hand, then it works just as strongly against Rich, since his hypothesis is obviously useful to his emotional attacks upon religion, and since his competing hypothesis is similarly untested. Charley Wingate
westling@cvl.UUCP (Mark Westling) (09/12/85)
This message recently appeared in net.bizarre: >From: long@oliveb.UUCP (Dave Long) >Subject: Let's kill this newsgroup >Message-ID: <592@oliveb.UUCP> > >What could be more bizarre than having this newsgroup commit suicide? If we >all send out a 'rmgroup' message at some specified time, thus removing this >group, we will accomplish the most bizarre thing it net history. Not only >will a group have been removed, it will also have done so courtesy of its >most loyal readers. Let's kill net.bizarre, and see if we can find its soul within, say, a month. At that time we'll resurrect it and debate whether or not it's the same group. What a wonderful opportunity we have here to whip a little scientific method into this discussion. -- Mark Westling ARPA: westling@cvl CSNET: westling@cvl UUCP: ...!{seismo,allegra}!umcp-cs!cvl!westling
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/12/85)
In article <696@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >Yes, but the point is that Charley rejects the notion of soul, while claiming >that "he" will be resurrected. If the soul is not there to ensure continuity, >then he cannot say for certain that it will be "him" that is resurrected, >and not just a copy (of many copies perhaps). He must claim that either >all copies are indeed Charley, which is absurd, or give up claims of >identity on being resurrected. To be more precise, what I am rejecting is the notion of souls *in the form of* supernatural beings which are somehow linked to physical people. If you choose to identify the soul with the information comprising a person, then I have no objection-- but such a soul is obviously not supernatural, even though it isn't physical either. As for identity of copies, I've already discussed that in this group. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/12/85)
> > No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically > represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then > quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I > take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape, > it remains the same song. > Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected? (How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?) The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B? The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. > "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only proper > conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this room (which > has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking space is > blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the first parking > space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, one is not in a > position either to confirm or to deny my statement. The ONLY correct > response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the statement, because > to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no blue car in the first > parking space." Since this statement is not supported by evidence either, > the situation is quite symmetrical. Neither statement can be claimed to be > true; therefore neither can be claimed to be false. All that can be said is > "there is no evidence." This I find surprising. That you can claim resurrection and continuity of identity without a shred of evidence and at the same time write the above is incredible. > >> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of > >> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely > >> in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for > >> this claim, but right now, he has none. > How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that your identity resides in your body. > One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a statement > should be independent of its subjective significance... Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. Padraig Houlahan.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/13/85)
> Rich, there is more than one way to parse ``the mind is separate from the > physical brain and body''. One is a belief in the soul that goes to heaven. > But there is another. UNIX runs on a great many hardware configurations > without it being the case that UNIX can run without a hardware configuration, > after all. The question is, can you port the ``mind of laura'' which already > runs well on the squishy hardware that is typing this note to something that > is a little more durable? [LAURA] As long as you're using that analogy, may I show how it is incorrect? Sure, UNIX(*) can run on a great many machines, but UNIX alone is not analogous to an individual human mind. It is more analogous to the common set of reflexes and instincts (operating systems) that human minds may share. Now, let's talk about porting a WHOLE system: any databases that may be attached to it, any UUCP connections it may have made use of, specific disk drives, etc. NOW, and only now, are you talking about the SAME system being reproduced. Otherwise, if you try to run any QUEL queries or cross-system mail functions that you used to be able to do, you would bomb out miserably. So, not only must you copy the operating system, but the external ports and other elements of the physical configuration as well, in order to function properly as the "same" system. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/13/85)
In article <701@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically >> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then >> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I >> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette >> tape, it remains the same song. >Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to >exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected? >(How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?) >The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact >that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B? Back when I was talking about this subject, I never stated that the original after the copy and the copy itself were "the same" in any way; what I did say was that copy and the original BEFORE the copy were the same. >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. The confusion only arises because the song is a static thing. Suppose instead that I copy a computer program, and make changes to it; at the same time, someone is changing the original. Neither of these is an indentical copy of anything, yet both are the same program as the original, except changed. Do not humans mark identity in much the same way? And are you willing to argue that "matter transmission", were it possible, would kill a person? WHat do you call the person that arrives at the other end? >> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >> proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >> room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first >> parking space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car >> in the first parking space. If one does not actually examine the >> parking space, one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny >> my statement. The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one >> cannot DENY the statement, because to do so is to make the assertion >> that "there is no blue car in the first parking space." Since this >> statement is not supported by evidence either, the situation is quite >> symmetrical. Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore >> neither can be claimed to be false. All that can be said is >> "there is no evidence." >This I find surprising. That you can claim resurrection and continuity >of identity without a shred of evidence and at the same time write the above >is incredible. What is incredible is your curious statement that I am trying to scientifically demonstrate resurrection. I have never claimed that the claims of Christianity are scientifically verifiable; all I am claiming in this case is plausibility. I do expect you and Rich, however, to hew strictly to scientific procedure. >>>> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of >>>> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is >>>> purely in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some >>>> basis for this claim, but right now, he has none. >How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his >hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then >you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that >your identity resides in your body. Ah yes, but you are using resides in the sense of "lives in", while I am using it in the sense of "is to be identified with". >> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a >> statement should be independent of its subjective significance... >Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly >be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are >talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. Well, you and Rich have both expressed vast ignorance of Christianity before, and I see no reason to waste my time in futile effort to change that. Charley Wingate
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/14/85)
> >Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to > >exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected? > >(How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?) > >The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact > >that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B? > > Back when I was talking about this subject, I never stated that the original > after the copy and the copy itself were "the same" in any way; what I did > say was that copy and the original BEFORE the copy were the same. You claimed that "you" would be resurrected. That is a statement implying identity transfer. By all that you continue to say, you being resurrected is the same as you being generated from all the data that describes you, i.e. a copy is made of you. Therefore, by your own reasoning, identity is transferred through the copying process. The issue is not whether the copy has similar attributes, but whether it is "you"? You claim that it is, which is absurd since multiple copies can be made from the same data that the first one was made from. > >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" > >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". > >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. > > The confusion only arises because the song is a static thing. Suppose > instead that I copy a computer program, and make changes to it; at the same > time, someone is changing the original. Neither of these is an indentical > copy of anything, yet both are the same program as the original, except > changed. Do not humans mark identity in much the same way? And are you > willing to argue that "matter transmission", were it possible, would kill a > person? WHat do you call the person that arrives at the other end? I disagree totally with this. If you have problems justifying transferance of identity with things that look similar, your case falls apart completely when attempting to apply your arguments to dissimilar items. The programs can be called the same because the code for them always existed, either on disk, tape, paper, or in someone's head, but the thing that characterized it never went out of existence, it was always available somewhere if needed. You continue to refuse to face up to the problem that there is a sense of identity that has to be ascribed to each object produced by a template on an assembly line that allows one to refer to a particular one as "it"; To follow your matter transfer analogy a bit, would you say the guy at the other end was resurrected? What if the machine made copies? Which of the copies is "him"? > >This I find surprising. That you can claim resurrection and continuity > >of identity without a shred of evidence and at the same time write the above > >is incredible. > > What is incredible is your curious statement that I am trying to > scientifically demonstrate resurrection. I have never claimed that the > claims of Christianity are scientifically verifiable; all I am claiming in > this case is plausibility. I do expect you and Rich, however, to hew > strictly to scientific procedure. Yes, but here's the rub: you presumably used some type of semi logical reasoning to reject a conventional tenet of christianity - that there is a soul- but now when your conclusions are scrutinized in turn you say that your claims are not open to scientific examination. Well that's fine by me. You have gone to great pains to defend your point of view, present them as being the result of sound reasoning, criticized me for my lack of knowledge about modern christianity, but what it all boils down to is your views are protected justify in the same way as the rest of religious thought is. > >>>> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of > >>>> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is > >>>> purely in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some > >>>> basis for this claim, but right now, he has none. > > >How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his > >hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then > >you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that > >your identity resides in your body. > > Ah yes, but you are using resides in the sense of "lives in", while I am > using it in the sense of "is to be identified with". Wrong. My scenario still applies. People still identify "you" with your body, and not with the table. > >> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a > >> statement should be independent of its subjective significance... > > >Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly > >be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are > >talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. > > Well, you and Rich have both expressed vast ignorance of Christianity > before, and I see no reason to waste my time in futile effort to change that. > > Charley Wingate Why don't we take a poll on the net (which I will do immediately) to see who's in tune with christian thought on the issue? Padraig Houlahan. *** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE ***
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/14/85)
I wrote the following: > ... You have gone to great pains to defend your point of view, > present them as being the result of sound reasoning, criticized me for > my lack of knowledge about modern christianity, but what it all boils down > to is your views are protected justify in the same way as the rest ^^^^^^^ > of religious thought is. but meant to write: > ... You have gone to great pains to defend your point of view, > present them as being the result of sound reasoning, criticized me for > my lack of knowledge about modern christianity, but what it all boils down > to is your views are protected in the same way as the rest > of religious thought is. Padraig Houlahan.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/14/85)
>>Are you claiming that all these things do not have their identity in their >>physical representation and organization? How so? What ARE you claiming? >>By your own reasoning, since the program in the computer is defined by how >>it is organized physically, so is the "mind" of your analogy. Thus you >>are not talking about things not represented physically. [ROSEN] > No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically > represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then > quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I > take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape, > it remains the same song. [WINGATE] Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"? The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state" of the next page. This would include provisions for input and output to allow some sort of interaction. But it would be very important that the methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent! If you had Einstein's brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey, I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow? And, more importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way? Would a video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick? What if Einstein had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)? Would a different set of input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!) suffice? Would they work? Would they produce the same person? >>So Charles believes in fairies now? It's no longer clear what you believe >>in. > Good. Maybe you can start defending your beliefs rather than attacking what > you believe to be mine. I defend against any and all points that people might make claiming flaws that aren't there. I also make points about others' beliefs, that I would like to think pertain to flaws that are there. Unless shown otherwise. (Example: when you showed that you were speaking about carbon copying of the body/brain as equivalent to resurrection, you showed that you might be speaking in terms of souls. However, this has been contradicted by you more than once.) I find this reciprocal arrangement in discussion more than adequate, when not abused. >> Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being >>wishful thinking. That IS most certainly an objective basis for >>criticism: absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept >>bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a >>series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and >>evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired >>conclusion. > "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only proper > conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this room (which > has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking space is > blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the first parking > space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, one is not in a > position either to confirm or to deny my statement. The ONLY correct > response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the statement, because > to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no blue car in the first > parking space." Since this statement is not supported by evidence either, > the situation is quite symmetrical. Neither statement can be claimed to be > true; therefore neither can be claimed to be false. All that can be said is > "there is no evidence." What if there's no parking lot outside? Absence of evidence may not be evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a conclusion. How did that happen? >>It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That >>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your >>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, >>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or >>provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy >>analysis and wishful thinking. > Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no > evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in > the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing > hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly > capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the > other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence > neither confirms nor denies either. But the points I made above (Einstein's brain section) raise important points regarding the nature of the input/output interfaces of your reconstructed brain which you seem to blithely ignore. >>> Would it? How do you know? Have you been disembodied lately? Why >>> wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person? Are physical >>> sensations really so important to the mind? Is there any objective >>> evidence on which to base the claim? Why is this paragraph composed >>> entirely of questions? Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses? >>> Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of >>> consciousness? Does anyone really know anything? >>I sometimes wonder. The point is, to assume that physical sensations are >>not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without >>regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever >>that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul", >>as it were. I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of >>declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles' >>lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and >>contorting to reach a desired conclusion. > So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer > simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical inputs"-- > no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs to a person's > brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What if you feed in > other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind of processing to the > brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, who now has a new sensory > input to play with? Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"? I've only seen the film, but a quick summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort. He cannot hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer exist in his body. Can you imagine what that might be like? Just beginning to try to do so makes me shake. > One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a statement > should be independent of its subjective significance. Rich is rather > blatantly ignoring this in his attacks on "mind as information". Whether or > not my hypothesis is true is utterly independent on whether or not it is > useful for it to be true to anyone. If we deny this principle, on the other > hand, then it works just as strongly against Rich, since his hypothesis is > obviously useful to his emotional attacks upon religion, and since his > competing hypothesis is similarly untested. The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense. -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/15/85)
In article <1676@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> Rich, there is more than one way to parse ``the mind is separate from the >> physical brain and body''. One is a belief in the soul that goes to heaven. >> But there is another. UNIX runs on a great many hardware configurations >> without it being the case that UNIX can run without a hardware configuration, >> after all. The question is, can you port the ``mind of laura'' which already >> runs well on the squishy hardware that is typing this note to something that >> is a little more durable? [LAURA] > >As long as you're using that analogy, may I show how it is incorrect? > >Sure, UNIX(*) can run on a great many machines, but UNIX alone is not analogous >to an individual human mind. It is more analogous to the common set of >reflexes and instincts (operating systems) that human minds may share. Now, >let's talk about porting a WHOLE system: any databases that may be attached >to it, any UUCP connections it may have made use of, specific disk drives, etc. >NOW, and only now, are you talking about the SAME system being reproduced. >Otherwise, if you try to run any QUEL queries or cross-system mail functions >that you used to be able to do, you would bomb out miserably. So, not only >must you copy the operating system, but the external ports and other elements >of the physical configuration as well, in order to function properly as the >"same" system. I lost it. I do not know why you think that my mind (whatever that is) cannot be ported to another body. Clearly Laura and Laura-prime are not going to be identical and may develop along quite different lines henceforth, but I don't see why that should concern me. An easier task then porting me to silicon would be to make a clone of me and then stuff my clone with my memories. I'd like to deal with that one first -- is there any reason why you think that this cannot be done in principle? If the answer is no, I want to proceed to ``well then, what is so special about a human body that it cannot be simulated somewhere else?'' -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/15/85)
In article <714@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> Back when I was talking about this subject, I never stated that the >> original after the copy and the copy itself were "the same" in any way; >> what I did say was that copy and the original BEFORE the copy were >> the same. >You claimed that "you" would be resurrected. That is a statement implying >identity transfer. By all that you continue to say, you being resurrected >is the same as you being generated from all the data that describes you, i.e. >a copy is made of you. Therefore, by your own reasoning, identity is >transferred through the copying process. The issue is not whether the copy >has similar attributes, but whether it is "you"? You claim that it is, which >is absurd since multiple copies can be made from the same data that the >first one was made from. So what? What is absurd about it? What is this "you" thing, anyway? I thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist. All of a sudden there's this "you" which somehow makes one copy of me unlike another. And I don't recall God promising to raise up "exactly one" of me. >> >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" >> >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". >> >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. >> The confusion only arises because the song is a static thing. Suppose >> instead that I copy a computer program, and make changes to it; at the same >> time, someone is changing the original. Neither of these is an indentical >> copy of anything, yet both are the same program as the original, except >> changed. Do not humans mark identity in much the same way? And are you >> willing to argue that "matter transmission", were it possible, would kill a >> person? WHat do you call the person that arrives at the other end? >I disagree totally with this. If you have problems justifying transferance >of identity with things that look similar, your case falls apart completely >when attempting to apply your arguments to dissimilar items. The programs >can be called the same because the code for them always existed, either >on disk, tape, paper, or in someone's head, but the thing that characterized >it never went out of existence, it was always available somewhere if needed. I thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist; now you're talking like some sort of Platonist, since you have rather suddenly started arguing for the supernatural existence of things like numbers, programs, words, etc. If you are going to make that kind of argument, then you might as well express a belief in souls and be done with it. >You continue to refuse to face up to the problem that there is a sense >of identity that has to be ascribed to each object produced by a template >on an assembly line that allows one to refer to a particular one as "it"; Well, of course there is, and the fact that you raise this objection indicates that either you didn't read what I said or didn't understand it, as evidenced by the following: >To follow your matter transfer analogy a bit, would you say the >guy at the other end was resurrected? What if the machine made copies? >Which of the copies is "him"? Both of them are distinct "him"s. One is a "him" that was not matter-transmitted, and the other is the "him" that was. Each of them is the person that went to the matter transmitter, but they are not each other; they are distinct human beings, even though they are both the same person as "him" in the past. It is not a transitive relationship. >>>This I find surprising. That you can claim resurrection and continuity >>>of identity without a shred of evidence and at the same time write the >>>above is incredible. >> What is incredible is your curious statement that I am trying to >> scientifically demonstrate resurrection. I have never claimed that the >> claims of Christianity are scientifically verifiable; all I am claiming in >> this case is plausibility. I do expect you and Rich, however, to hew >> strictly to scientific procedure. >Yes, but here's the rub: you presumably used some type of semi logical >reasoning to reject a conventional tenet of christianity - that there >is a soul- but now when your conclusions are scrutinized in turn you >say that your claims are not open to scientific examination. Well that's >fine by me. You have gone to great pains to defend your point of view, >present them as being the result of sound reasoning, criticized me for >my lack of knowledge about modern christianity, but what it all boils down >to is your views are protected in the same way as the rest >of religious thought is. Again you have misrepresented my thoughts. I said it was NOT NECESSARY to believe in souls to be a Christian. THe fact that many (even most) christians do is of no relevance. >>>> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a >>>> statement should be independent of its subjective significance... >>>Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it >>>possibly be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course >>>not, y'all are talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. >> Well, you and Rich have both expressed vast ignorance of Christianity >> before, and I see no reason to waste my time in futile effort to change >> that. >Why don't we take a poll on the net (which I will do immediately) to >see who's in tune with christian thought on the issue? The fact that you think that in any way resolves the issue indicates that you have no appreciation of the diversity of views within Christianity. Charley Wingate
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/15/85)
In article <1696@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically >> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then >> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I >> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette >> tape, it remains the same song. [WINGATE] >Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"? >The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of >paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state" >of the next page. This would include provisions for input and output to >allow some sort of interaction. But it would be very important that the >methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent! If you had Einstein's >brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey, >I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow? And, more >importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way? Would a >video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick? What if Einstein >had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd >all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)? Would a different set of >input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!) >suffice? Would they work? Would they produce the same person? I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on. >>> Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being >>>wishful thinking. That IS most certainly an objective basis for >>>criticism: absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept >>>bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a >>>series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and >>>evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired >>>conclusion. >> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >> proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >> room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking >> space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the >> first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, >> one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. >> The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the >> statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no >> blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not >> supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. >> Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be >> claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >What if there's no parking lot outside? Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot outside. > Absence of evidence may not be >evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you >must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper >conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a >conclusion. How did that happen? Well, the first staement is simple nonsense. As for the second statement, this whole discussion taking place in the milieu of YOUR system. I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). My knowledge of resurrection is NOT objectively justified, as you claim, but since this is not what is disputed here by me, you have no reason to object. I, on the other hand, have plenty of reason to object when your claims are not backed up with solid evidence,as is quite the case here; I expect you to play by your own rules when you expect everyone else to play by them. >>>It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That >>>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your >>>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, >>>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or >>>provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy >>>analysis and wishful thinking. >> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no >> evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in >> the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing >> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly >> capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the >> other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence >> neither confirms nor denies either. >But the points I made above (Einstein's brain section) raise important points >regarding the nature of the input/output interfaces of your reconstructed >brain which you seem to blithely ignore. Well, the next section quite obviously deals with that very question, so the objection you raise is hardly valid. In any case, you are beginning to deal with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness. Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness. The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally) subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to. >>>> Would it? How do you know? Have you been disembodied lately? Why >>>> wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person? Are physical >>>> sensations really so important to the mind? Is there any objective >>>> evidence on which to base the claim? Why is this paragraph composed >>>> entirely of questions? Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses? >>>> Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of >>>> consciousness? Does anyone really know anything? >>>I sometimes wonder. The point is, to assume that physical sensations are >>>not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without >>>regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever >>>that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul", >>>as it were. I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of >>>declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles' >>>lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and >>>contorting to reach a desired conclusion. >> So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer >> simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical >> inputs"-- no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs >> to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What >> if you feed in other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind >> of processing to the brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, >> who now has a new sensory input to play with? >Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"? I've only seen the film, but a quick >summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're >eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort. He cannot >hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer >exist in his body. Can you imagine what that might be like? Just beginning >to try to do so makes me shake. You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person died, and was replaced by a new defective model. >> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a >> statement should be independent of its subjective significance. >> Rich is rather blatantly ignoring this in his attacks on "mind as >> information". Whether or not my hypothesis is true is utterly >> independent on whether or not it is useful for it to be true to anyone. >> If we deny this principle, on the other hand, then it works just as >> strongly against Rich, since his hypothesis is obviously useful to >> his emotional attacks upon religion, and since his >> competing hypothesis is similarly untested. >The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a >question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this >reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense. And the only possible answer is, "we don't know." Charley Wingate
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/16/85)
> In article <714@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > > >You claimed that "you" would be resurrected. That is a statement implying > >identity transfer. By all that you continue to say, you being resurrected > >is the same as you being generated from all the data that describes you, i.e. > >a copy is made of you. Therefore, by your own reasoning, identity is > >transferred through the copying process. The issue is not whether the copy > >has similar attributes, but whether it is "you"? You claim that it is, which > >is absurd since multiple copies can be made from the same data that the > >first one was made from. > > So what? What is absurd about it? What is this "you" thing, anyway? I > thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist. All of a sudden > there's this "you" which somehow makes one copy of me unlike another. And I > don't recall God promising to raise up "exactly one" of me. Now Charles, whether I am a strict materialist is beside the point, so stop digressing. As far as the absurdity is concerned, I will spell it out for you below. >>> ... > > >I disagree totally with this. If you have problems justifying transferance > >of identity with things that look similar, your case falls apart completely > >when attempting to apply your arguments to dissimilar items. The programs > >can be called the same because the code for them always existed, either > >on disk, tape, paper, or in someone's head, but the thing that characterized > >it never went out of existence, it was always available somewhere if needed. > > I thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist; now you're talking > like some sort of Platonist, since you have rather suddenly started arguing > for the supernatural existence of things like numbers, programs, words, etc. > If you are going to make that kind of argument, then you might as well > express a belief in souls and be done with it. What I believe has nothing to do with the internal consistency of your claims. To bring this up is just an attempt to change the topic. I am showing you that severe problems exist with your set of beliefs given the assumptions you make. > >You continue to refuse to face up to the problem that there is a sense > >of identity that has to be ascribed to each object produced by a template > >on an assembly line that allows one to refer to a particular one as "it"; > > Well, of course there is, and the fact that you raise this objection > indicates that either you didn't read what I said or didn't understand it, > as evidenced by the following: > > >To follow your matter transfer analogy a bit, would you say the > >guy at the other end was resurrected? What if the machine made copies? > >Which of the copies is "him"? > > Both of them are distinct "him"s. One is a "him" that was not > matter-transmitted, and the other is the "him" that was. Each of them is > the person that went to the matter transmitter, but they are not each other; > they are distinct human beings, even though they are both the same person as > "him" in the past. It is not a transitive relationship. Now here's the absurdity bit. Suppose your wife meets you after you have been resurrected into two identities say, which one does she identify as being her husband? > ... > > Again you have misrepresented my thoughts. I said it was NOT NECESSARY to > believe in souls to be a Christian. THe fact that many (even most) > christians do is of no relevance. Perhaps, but it is most unusual. Since Christ is supposed to have spent much time trying to "save" us, and "died for us", it does seem somewhat absurd for someone to call themselves christian and ignore all his references to salvation. > >> Well, you and Rich have both expressed vast ignorance of Christianity > >> before, and I see no reason to waste my time in futile effort to change > >> that. > > >Why don't we take a poll on the net (which I will do immediately) to > >see who's in tune with christian thought on the issue? > > The fact that you think that in any way resolves the issue indicates that > you have no appreciation of the diversity of views within Christianity. > > Charley Wingate Well look here, the recent Don Black also claimed to be christian; are christians to be associated with the likes of him just because he lays claim to the name? There has to be some set of criteria against which such claims are to be assessed. The set traditionaly has contained the existence of god and the existence of the soul. It has also included concepts such as salvation, sin, love etc. I suppose that there is little else to be said on this topic since it boils down to a matter of opinion on both sides. However I am still fascinated and am curious as to why the concept of soul has been dropped by you. Its explanatory power is tremendous, and is just as plausible, perhaps even more so than the resurrection. It does have the disadvantage of forcing the introduction of sin, punishment etc. into ones viewpoint. Padraig Houlahan
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/17/85)
In article <701@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> >> No, no, no. The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically >> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then >> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I >> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape, >> it remains the same song. >> >Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to >exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected? >(How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?) >The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact >that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B? I think you are making the mistake of assuming that "shares identity with" is an equivalence relation. Just because a copy of you shares identity with the you as of and before the copy was made (which the current you also shares identity with) does not mean that it shares identity with you. In order for a murder not to have taken place, the copy must have been made at or after the time of the murder. Again, a *perfect* copy is not required, since a perfect copy would be dead. The boundary between a copy good enough to share identity and one not good enough is fuzzy, like all real world boundaries. >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. If someone else sings the song, it is still the same song. >How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his >hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then >you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that >your identity resides in your body. Indeed, there are no reliable reported instances of people's identities being seperated from their bodies. People don't as a rule doubt that your identity, de facto, resides in your body. That doesn't mean that they believe that it necessarily resides in your body. >Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly >be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are >talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. I can't speak for Charley, but I for one do not believe in resurrection. I am an atheist, not in the sense that I believe there cannot be a god, but that I find the evidence insufficient. (Among more complex considerations, which this is not the place to go into.) I just think that the kind of resurrection he talks about is not a contradiction. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/17/85)
In article <726@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >>>You claimed that "you" would be resurrected. That is a statement implying >>>identity transfer. By all that you continue to say, you being resurrected >>>is the same as you being generated from all the data that describes you, >>>i.e., a copy is made of you. Therefore, by your own reasoning, identity is >>>transferred through the copying process. The issue is not whether the copy >>>has similar attributes, but whether it is "you"? You claim that it is, >>>which is absurd since multiple copies can be made from the same data that >>>the first one was made from. >> So what? What is absurd about it? What is this "you" thing, anyway? I >> thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist. All of a sudden >> there's this "you" which somehow makes one copy of me unlike another. >> And I don't recall God promising to raise up "exactly one" of me. >Now Charles, whether I am a strict materialist is beside the point, so >stop digressing. As far as the absurdity is concerned, I will spell it >out for you below. >> I thought you were supposed to be a strict materialist; now you're talking >> like some sort of Platonist, since you have rather suddenly started arguing >> for the supernatural existence of things like numbers, programs, words, >> etc. If you are going to make that kind of argument, then you might as well >> express a belief in souls and be done with it. >What I believe has nothing to do with the internal consistency of >your claims. To bring this up is just an attempt to change the topic. >I am showing you that severe problems exist with your set of beliefs given >the assumptions you make. So many promises..... >>>You continue to refuse to face up to the problem that there is a sense >>>of identity that has to be ascribed to each object produced by a template >>>on an assembly line that allows one to refer to a particular one as "it"; >> Well, of course there is, and the fact that you raise this objection >> indicates that either you didn't read what I said or didn't understand it, >> as evidenced by the following: >>>To follow your matter transfer analogy a bit, would you say the >>>guy at the other end was resurrected? What if the machine made copies? >>>Which of the copies is "him"? >> Both of them are distinct "him"s. One is a "him" that was not >> matter-transmitted, and the other is the "him" that was. Each of them is >> the person that went to the matter transmitter, but they are not each >> other; they are distinct human beings, even though they are both the same >> person as "him" in the past. It is not a transitive relationship. >Now here's the absurdity bit. Suppose your wife meets you after you >have been resurrected into two identities say, which one does she >identify as being her husband? Oddly enough, scripture has an answer for that. A Sadducee asked Jesus what happens when a woman marries 7 men, and then dies. Which is her husband in Heaven? Jesus replied that the question was ill-formed, that marriage didn't exist in Heaven in the form we know of. To make the question more difficult, let's go back to the copy model again. Unless you want to take a supernatural view of marriage, I think it's quite arguable that either (a) she is married to both, or (b) she can only be married to one, and therefore must choose. I think it is significant that both the copy and the original will identify her as being their wife; in fact, each will know her to be his wife. Sure, there appears to be absurdity here, but isn't it possible that the absurdity is in the notion of marriage instead? And since when has absurdity been a standard for truth? >> Again you have misrepresented my thoughts. I said it was NOT NECESSARY to >> believe in souls to be a Christian. THe fact that many (even most) >> christians do is of no relevance. >Perhaps, but it is most unusual. Since Christ is supposed to have spent >much time trying to "save" us, and "died for us", it does seem somewhat >absurd for someone to call themselves christian and ignore all his >references to salvation. Which is a quite irrelevant unless you can demonstrate that only souls can be saved (maintaining the definition of soul as you and Rich have all along). >>>Why don't we take a poll on the net (which I will do immediately) to >>>see who's in tune with christian thought on the issue? >> The fact that you think that in any way resolves the issue indicates that >> you have no appreciation of the diversity of views within Christianity. >Well look here, the recent Don Black also claimed to be christian; are >christians to be associated with the likes of him just because he lays >claim to the name? There has to be some set of criteria against which >such claims are to be assessed. The set traditionaly has contained >the existence of god and the existence of the soul. It has also >included concepts such as salvation, sin, love etc. The simplest definition of a christian is that he or she is a person who believes in eternal life given through Jesus Christ through the resurrection. THis even includes what are generally considered to be heretical sects. "Traditionally" is a word whose usage is quite dubious when a particular denomination is not being referred to; on questions of theology, differing denominations have held often quite contradictory views on almost every subject. The existence of souls is one of them. Various doctrines change too; the Episcopalians have just this past week struck the "filoque" clause from the Nicene Creed. So the fact that the RC church has asserted souls for 10 centuries does not in and of itself signify anything. >I suppose that there is little else to be said on this topic since >it boils down to a matter of opinion on both sides. However I am still >fascinated and am curious as to why the concept of soul has been dropped >by you. Its explanatory power is tremendous, and is just as plausible, >perhaps even more so than the resurrection. It does have the disadvantage >of forcing the introduction of sin, punishment etc. into ones viewpoint. I have my reasons. THey are not relevant to this argument. Charley Wingate
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (09/17/85)
In article <1560@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > >To be more precise, what I am rejecting is the notion of souls *in the form >of* supernatural beings which are somehow linked to physical people. If you >choose to identify the soul with the information comprising a person, then I >have no objection-- but such a soul is obviously not supernatural, even >though it isn't physical either. > As a matter of fact, *historically* speaking, this is very close to the older definitions of 'soul'. Certainly the modern concept of a *disembodied* soul is just that, relatively recent. Early Christian and Jewish writers had no such concept. It is interesting how easily we read occidental dualisitc interpretations into biblical language which really has no such sgnificance. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/17/85)
>>Sure, UNIX can run on a great many machines, but UNIX alone is not analogous >>to an individual human mind. It is more analogous to the common set of >>reflexes and instincts (operating systems) that human minds may share. Now, >>let's talk about porting a WHOLE system: any databases that may be attached >>to it, any UUCP connections it may have made use of, ... disk drives, etc. >>NOW, and only now, are you talking about the SAME system being reproduced. >>Otherwise, if you try to run any QUEL queries or cross-system mail functions >>that you used to be able to do, you would bomb out miserably. So, not only >>must you copy the operating system, but the external ports and other elements >>of the physical configuration as well, in order to function properly as the >>"same" system. [ROSEN] > I lost it. I do not know why you think that my mind (whatever that is) cannot > be ported to another body. Clearly Laura and Laura-prime are not going to be > identical and may develop along quite different lines henceforth, but I don't > see why that should concern me. An easier task then porting me to silicon > would be to make a clone of me and then stuff my clone with my memories. I'd > like to deal with that one first -- is there any reason why you think that > this cannot be done in principle? If the answer is no, I want to proceed to > ``well then, what is so special about a human body that it cannot be > simulated somewhere else?'' [CREIGHTON] I'll say it again. Sure, UNIX can run on many different machines, but a UNIX system is more than just its native operating system code. To copy only that would be analogous to copying *A* human mind, not a PARTICULAR individual human mind. It would be copying (effectively) the native instincts/reflexes of the so-called "tabula rasa". Your "mind" consists of more than just native instincts and reflexes; your mind consists of the way in which your brain has learned to interface with your sensory organs and voluntary (and involuntary) nervous system, plus all the data and knowledge you have acquired since birth. Can all that be ported in the manner you describe? Would it work at all? (I recommended Hofstadter's "Conversation with Einstein's Brain" in an earlier article as a good example of all the issues involved. It is one of his dialogues involving a speculation about Einstein's brain saved in a "book", where to have a conversation with it you supply input in a certain way and alter the content of the pages according to prescribed rules.) -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/17/85)
>Padraig >>Charley >> ..The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically >> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then >> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation. When I >> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette >> tape, it remains the same song. >Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to >exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected? >(How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?) >The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact >that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B? > >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. Agreed -- Charley's analogy between a person's identity and an easily copiable song or computer program has difficulties. Nonetheless I find his analogy most valuable anyway. One point which you have not addressed is that songs are indeed entities which are not strictly material -- rather, they are relationships that appear within any kind of lower level carrier whatsoever. Another point is that WE are the determiners of the identity of a song, regardless of the varying qualities of the reproduction equipment, instrumentation, performers -- even when another composer, intentionally or otherwise, steals the essence of someone else's original idea. >>..The only proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion... Neither >>statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be claimed to be >>false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >This I find surprising. That you can claim resurrection and continuity >of identity without a shred of evidence and at the same time write the above >is incredible. I agree that there is little or no scientific evidence for resurrection. For that matter, even the idea of physical identity between successive moments of time seems to disintegrate under scientific examination. But Charley has presented convincing and nonreligious arguments that identity does not require physical continuity [re -- reappearing quantum particles]. Whatever does it mean for an intelligence to perceive a deep sameness in things that on superficial examination appear to be different? Do identities have objective existence? Or are they subjective phantoms perceived only by intelligent awareness? If so, then a higher awareness than we possess is required to ascertain any identity that transcends our own subjective and objective knowledge of things. >>>> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of >>>> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is >>>> purely in the body. Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some >>>> basis for this claim, but right now, he has none. >How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his >hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then >you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that >your identity resides in your body. And how many times have you turned your ear closer to a loudspeaker so that you might more closely hear the song being played? Does that mean that the identity of the song physically resides IN THE PHYSICAL EQUIPMENT ITSELF? Personally, I think of the song as an abstraction that exists nowhere, but requiring a physical representation so that I may hear it. >> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a >> statement should be independent of its subjective significance... >Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly >be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are >talkin' 'bout religion here anyways. The subject strikes me as an investigation into the nature of identity of self, and it has brought many nonreligious comments into this newsgroup -- star-trek transporters, cloning, and so on. -michael What if there were a living agency beyond our everyday living world -- something more purposeful than electrons? Do we delude ourselves in thinking that we possess and control our own psyches, and that what science calls the "psyche" is not just a question mark arbitrarily confined within the skull, but rather a door that opens upon the human world from a world beyond, allowing unknown and mysterious powers to act upon man and carry him on the wings of night to a more than personal destiny? -- CG Jung
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/17/85)
>>Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"? >>The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of >>paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state" >>of the next page. This would include provisions for input and output to >>allow some sort of interaction. But it would be very important that the >>methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent! If you had Einstein's >>brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey, >>I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow? And, more >>importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way? Would a >>video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick? What if Einstein >>had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd >>all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)? Would a different set of >>input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!) >>suffice? Would they work? Would they produce the same person? [ROSEN] > I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that > I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on. > [WINGATE] What a curt all encompassing dismissal! It's not implying that at all. The "you" that we all know and love would be experiencing the world in a fixed set of ways: without glasses (with poor perception), with glasses (better perception but with the added sensation of glasses on his nose which affect field of vision), or even with contact lenses (perhaps less distractive but still within that fixed set). Moreover, we are not talking about such trivialities as wearing glasses. Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like? Objectively? I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective sense? Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct interpretation of what blue looks like? We can show scientifically that blue is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge of colors. But how do you know that sticking your brain into another body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"? And how will that affect you? We have no idea of the answers to any of these questions, but it seems very reasonable from the evidence to conclude the the individual nature of a person's input/output sensory system is important in determining "personhood". >>>"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >>>proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >>>room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking >>>space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the >>>first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, >>>one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. >>>The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the >>>statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no >>>blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not >>>supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. >>>Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be >>>claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >>What if there's no parking lot outside? > Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot outside. But why are you so sure that there is one out there at all, then? >> Absence of evidence may not be >>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you >>must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper >>conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a >>conclusion. How did that happen? > Well, the first staement is simple nonsense. The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense. If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every imaginable thing. > As for the second statement, this whole discussion taking place in the milieu > of YOUR system. I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or > rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing > that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no > counter-evidence). My knowledge of resurrection is NOT objectively justified, > as you claim, but since this is not what is disputed here by me, you have no > reason to object. I, on the other hand, have plenty of reason to object when > your claims are not backed up with solid evidence,as is quite the case > here; I expect you to play by your own rules when you expect everyone else > to play by them. That's a crock of shit. And here's why. (See how this works?) MY system? We are talking about evidence and proof here, Charles. If you cannot produce any, does that mean you back out and say "Well, I wasn't out to prove my point of view (perhaps because I know I can't), but I'm under no obligation to play under your rules because my rules don't require such things as evidence and proof". If you are interested in showing us the basic differences in criteria used to believe in a given system (like rules of evidence, analysis, etc.), perhaps one or the other of us can elaborate on those differences, and maybe one system of belief or the other can be shown to be flawed. But methinks that you are a grownup intelligent person and you normally use to same sets of criteria that the rest of us use (what you call "my" system). Which means you are making some special case for this particular belief, in order to "get" to a particular conclusion that you want. >>>>It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That >>>>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your >>>>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, >>>>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or >>>>provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy >>>>analysis and wishful thinking. >>> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no >>> evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in >>> the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing >>> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly >>> capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the >>> other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence >>> neither confirms nor denies either. >>But the points I made above (Einstein's brain section) raise important points >>regarding the nature of the input/output interfaces of your reconstructed >>brain which you seem to blithely ignore. > Well, the next section quite obviously deals with that very question, so the > objection you raise is hardly valid. In any case, you are beginning to deal > > with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness. > Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since > there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness. > The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about > subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally) > subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my > consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to. And which you are not necessarily right about. Do you deny that people often do or feel things contrary to the way they really are, even inside of them? It is for this reason that we cannot accpet something as shoddy as subjectivity here. >>>So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer >>>simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical >>>inputs"-- no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs >>>to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What >>>if you feed in other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind >>>of processing to the brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, >>>who now has a new sensory input to play with? >>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"? I've only seen the film, but a quick >>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're >>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort. He cannot >>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer >>exist in his body. Can you imagine what that might be like? Just beginning >>to try to do so makes me shake. > You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person > died, and was replaced by a new defective model. Your point was that you were claiming that sensations may not have any bearing on personhood. In the example above, the young soldier has lost ALL personhood, and exists only as a disembodied (practically) brain. How this "ratifies" your point is beyond me. >>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a >>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this >>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense. > And the only possible answer is, "we don't know." But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (09/19/85)
[rosen] Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like? Objectively? I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective sense? Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct interpretation of what blue looks like? We can show scientifically that blue is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge of colors. But how do you know that sticking your brain into another body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"? [balter] Rich, your own words answer your questions elsewhere: your knowledge of what blue looks like is subjective knowledge. It certainly isn't objective, and it certainly isn't mere belief. This "feeling" of blueness is not explainable mechanically. You may mess around in the brain and note when the feeling happens, but you won't find the feeling itself. That is located only within your personal experience. Before you start devising a response, think about whether you have a vested interest in contradicting what I have said. Is your response obvious, or do you have to hunt for it? Are you being objective and scientific? Note that I am not arguing against determinism or a mechanistic view of the universe or for souls; I am only arguing that subjective experience exists in a way that is not explained by the familiar mechanical view. I don't quite understand why subjective experience exists, but I have a feeling that it has something to do with the fuzzy nature of linguistics, description, and perception. I think our attempt to describe perception and self-awareness in language is a bit like trying to explain the nature of light or matter using particle or wave analogies. The reality, which is available to us only indirectly, is more complex than the directly available approximate analogs. As for [wingate] "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." [balter] Rich, I'm surprised you let Charles get away with this, and have dragged the argument out so far. Aside from the name dropping (was that Haldane the geneticist, or Haldane the revivalist evangelical?), as long as this conversation is going on in net.*philosophy*, as opposed to net.religion where it belongs, there is a most powerful argument for the rejection of souls, resurrection, and blue cars in parking lots. It is called ***Occam's Razor***. For the purposes of fruitful discussion, the situation is most certainly not symmetrical at all. Rather, the existence of a blue car in the parking lot should be rejected (not denied) barring evidence that can be more readily explained by positing such existence. I certainly won't *deny* the existence of Odin and Asgard, but I reject them as unnecessary to the explanation of the world as it is. It seems to me that almost all *logical* religious arguments involve ignoring Occam's Razor at some point. If you want to "argue" religion based on faith, that is, belief out of desire to believe, you are welcome to it, but in net.religion. >[rosen] >Absence of evidence may not be >evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you >must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper >conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a >conclusion. How did that happen? >[wingate] >Well, the first staement is simple nonsense. [rosen] The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense. If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every imaginable thing. [balter] Well, not quite; rather, every imaginable thing that isn't known is in a "maybe" state. Occam's Razor is a management tool for high efficiency. It urges you to assume that everything is false unless there is some reason to think it true. In my experience, it gets better results than the muddle I would expect from following Haldane's dictum. [wingate] I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). [balter] Charles, do you have any objective evidence that we don't all turn into mosquitoes with our souls buried in the right hind leg where they can't express themselves, when we die? *Who cares*? Philosophic inquiry is a game that requires analysis and evidence as part of the rules. The "anything is possible" game is stupid and childish; it is like playing dealer's choice and declaring all the cards wild. Intelligent people who have played the game for a while get tired and bored of yokels who come along with "you can't prove me wrong" like it was something *deep* and *original*. [wingate] Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence neither confirms nor denies either. [balter] Reasonableness certainly is part of science, as Occam's Razor. One could offer a "super-astro-observer theory", which says that distant objects wink into existence when being observed, but disappear or jump somewhere else when no one is looking; such a theory isn't *disprovable*, but it isn't *reasonable*. A model of the mind which says that it is not a direct result of the workings of a particular brain requires extra mechanism, for which there is no evidence (at least it can be argued that there is not; I haven't seen any arguments that the mind is not mechanical that are not easily refutable). To suggest that the mind can be expressed in other media says nothing about the nature of the mind; given a mechanical view, it simply suggests that the brain is simulatable. To say that the mind has an existence separate from the brain is misleading. The mind is different from the personality; it is the sum total of memory, mood, history, thought, as an evolving process. My mind now is quite different from what it was a minute ago. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/19/85)
In article <1722@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"? The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state" of the next page. This would include provisions for input and output to allow some sort of interaction. But it would be very important that the methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent! If you had Einstein's brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey, I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow? And, more importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way? Would a video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick? What if Einstein had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)? Would a different set of input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!) suffice? Would they work? Would they produce the same person? [ROSEN] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that >> I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on. >> [WINGATE] >What a curt all encompassing dismissal! It's not implying that at all. The >"you" that we all know and love would be experiencing the world in a fixed >set of ways: without glasses (with poor perception), with glasses (better >perception but with the added sensation of glasses on his nose which affect >field of vision), or even with contact lenses (perhaps less distractive >but still within that fixed set). Moreover, we are not talking about such >trivialities as wearing glasses. Ah, but on your own words it is. Above you speculated on Eistein having astigmatism. Well, I have astigmatism, which is fully corrected when I have my glasses on. I can modify my sensory inputs in lots of ways. In all of these, however, as far as I can determine there is no change in my "self" other than in the ordinary way that people change as a result of their perceptions through time. >>>>So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer >>>>simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical >>>>inputs"-- no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs >>>>to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What >>>>if you feed in other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind >>>>of processing to the brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, >>>>who now has a new sensory input to play with? >>>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"? I've only seen the film, but a quick >>>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're >>>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort. He cannot >>>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer >>>exist in his body. >> You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person >> died, and was replaced by a new defective model. >Your point was that you were claiming that sensations may not have any >bearing on personhood. In the example above, the young soldier has lost ALL >personhood, and exists only as a disembodied (practically) brain. How this >"ratifies" your point is beyond me. Because that is NOT what I said. My point is that modifications to the sensory inputs are not special. They do not instantly change the person; their effect occurs temporally in the same fashion that all other EXPERIENCE changes people. A person is changed by blindness, but maintains his identity. He is the same person as before, only now he is blind. Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like? >Objectively? I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of >light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective >sense? Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct >interpretation of what blue looks like? We can show scientifically that blue >is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge >of colors. But how do you know that sticking your brain into another >body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"? And how will that affect >you? We have no idea of the answers to any of these questions, but it >seems very reasonable from the evidence to conclude the the individual nature >of a person's input/output sensory system is important in determining >"personhood". Yes, but it does so in the same way that living in Paris rather than in Pittsburgh changes a person. If a person ceases to experience blue and starts to experience "grue" instead, it is still "he" that experiences it. Changes in sensory inputs can only manifest themselves as changes in experience, unless the senory apparatus is so intimately tied into the rest of the brain that one effects the other. But if you are modelling the whole brain, you have taken care of all that. >>>>"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >>>>proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >>>>room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking >>>>space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the >>>>first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, >>>>one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. >>>>The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the >>>>statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no >>>>blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not >>>>supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. >>>>Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be >>>>claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >>>What if there's no parking lot outside? >> Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot >> outside. >But why are you so sure that there is one out there at all, then? Have you been possessed by the ghost of Bunyan, that you can only talk in allegories? >>> Absence of evidence may not be >>>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you >>>must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only >>>proper conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a >>>conclusion. How did that happen? >> Well, the first staement is simple nonsense. >The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense. >If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's >existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every >imaginable thing. That's because you erroneously think that the only two possibilities on any topic are either total belief of total disbelief. >> As for the second statement, this whole discussion taking place in the >> milieu of YOUR system. I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes >> place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am >> simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that >> there is no counter-evidence). My knowledge of resurrection is NOT >> objectively justified, as you claim, but since this is not what >> is disputed here by me, you have no reason to object. I, on the other >> hand, have plenty of reason to object when your claims are not backed >> up with solid evidence,as is quite the case here; I expect you to play >> by your own rules when you expect everyone else to play by them. >That's a crock of shit. And here's why. (See how this works?) MY system? >We are talking about evidence and proof here, Charles. If you cannot produce >any, does that mean you back out and say "Well, I wasn't out to prove my >point of view (perhaps because I know I can't), but I'm under no obligation >to play under your rules because my rules don't require such things as >evidence and proof". If you are interested in showing us the basic >differences in criteria used to believe in a given system (like rules of >evidence, analysis, etc.), perhaps one or the other of us can elaborate >on those differences, and maybe one system of belief or the other can be >shown to be flawed. But methinks that you are a grownup intelligent >person and you normally use to same sets of criteria that the rest of >us use (what you call "my" system). Which means you are making some >special case for this particular belief, in order to "get" to a particular >conclusion that you want. Can you not distiguish between demonstrating that some thing is possible, and that it actually is? And by the way, your claim that everybody else uses your system (objective science, no?) for everything is so patently false that it is hard to begin criticizing it. In most everyday decisions, it is NECESSARY to guess, to draw conclusions on insufficient evidence. >>>>>It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? >>>> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have >>>> no evidence, >>>> so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in >>>> the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing >>>> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is >>>> possibly capable of expression in other media." The only reason to >>>> choose on or the other at this point is purely subjective convenience, >>>> since the evidence neither confirms nor denies either. >> In any case, you are beginning to deal >> with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness. >> Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since >> there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness. >> The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about >> subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally) >> subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my >> consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to. >And which you are not necessarily right about. Do you deny that people often >do or feel things contrary to the way they really are, even inside of them? >It is for this reason that we cannot accpet something as shoddy as >subjectivity here. Since you are talking about a subjective thing (namely personal identity) you have already accepted subjectivity. If Hofstadter's argument is correct, then there should be a discontinuity when I take off my glasses (or somebody blindfolds me, or whatever) which is plain and obvious. What I in fact observe is that my experiences are different. I don't see any good reason to accept his arguments, since the experiential explanation seems to work and there's no real reason to add on the the complication. >>>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a >>>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this >>>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense. >> And the only possible answer is, "we don't know." >But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a >reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do. As I have been asserting, it seems quite pratical to me. Charley Wingate
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (09/19/85)
> I think you are making the mistake of assuming that "shares identity with" > is an equivalence relation. Just because a copy of you shares identity with > the you as of and before the copy was made (which the current you also shares > identity with) does not mean that it shares identity with you. In order for a > murder not to have taken place, the copy must have been made at or after the > time of the murder. Again, a *perfect* copy is not required, since a perfect > copy would be dead. The boundary between a copy good enough to share > identity and one not good enough is fuzzy, like all real world boundaries. All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as a statement of "selfness". The copies are identical with the original in the former sense at least. I see a problem with the resurrection claim in that if multiple copies are allowed, and in principle they are if identity is defined only by structure and organization to the exclusion of the need for a soul, then there is no way that the copies can be identical with the original in the second sense. > > >The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same" > >in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity". > >Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction. > > If someone else sings the song, it is still the same song. Yes, in at least the first sense. The problem still remains that killing one of a set of identical twins is usually considered murder although by the song analogy his identity still exists. This is the absurdity. Padraig Houlahan.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/20/85)
In article <726@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > >Now here's the absurdity bit. Suppose your wife meets you after you >have been resurrected into two identities say, which one does she >identify as being her husband? That isn't an absurdity. It is a social problem, and one which has not been dealt with as yet (for the obvious reason that it has never happened). But to put the question a bit differently, suppose a perfect copy of you is made. Which does your wife identify as her husband, you or the copy? The answer is that she has no way of knowing. (Assume she does not witness the process; one of you walks into a room, and two walk out.) There are going to be real social problems when (not if -- an opinion) such technologies are developed, because our social system makes assumptions about the singularity of identity which do not stand up to close examination.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/20/85)
In article <1722@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a >reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do. You have given some good reasons for thinking such a reconstruction would be difficult. But surely no one expects it to be easy. Why do you think it is impossible? Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/21/85)
I know you don't like my unix analogy. i don't know *why* you think that my memories could not be transferred to a clone of me. The physical structure is the same, and you were the one who said that memories are ``just chemicals''. You get the chemicals in laura-prime to match the chemicals in laura and therby transfer all my stored memories and whatnot. why can't I do this? -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/22/85)
[Not food] In article <739@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as >a statement of "selfness". No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it maybe mean "having the same soul"? Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/25/85)
> I know you don't like my unix analogy. i don't know *why* you think that > my memories could not be transferred to a clone of me. The physical > structure is the same, and you were the one who said that memories are > ``just chemicals''. You get the chemicals in laura-prime to match the > chemicals in laura and therby transfer all my stored memories and whatnot. > why can't I do this? [LAURA] I'll go through it one last time (I hope). UNIX, as you describe it, does NOT include all the data (the knowledge/the catalogues of experiences that make you "you"). Porting UNIX is analogous to porting "a" brain, not a particular brain. Porting UNIX might involve tuning, configuration, system generation, in any desirable way at all, not caring about previously known device addresses or ports and the particular interface involved, or about previously loaded databases with significant information that is used continuously. What Wingate may be misconstruing in all our talk about input/output ports (he seems content to discuss re-"tuning" his input ports to understand the "new" version of "blue" that might be seen), is that (if we're to carry this analogy to its illogical conclusion) ALL device addresses, ports, pathways, locations of "initialization" data, etc. MUST be exactly the same or the "system won't come up". (Believe me, I've dealt with such migrations, these are worries.) The point is not that this is impossible, but that it's not just a matter of a brain dump/restore into ANY new body. -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/25/85)
[balter]
Well, not quite; rather, every imaginable thing that isn't known is in a
"maybe" state. Occam's Razor is a management tool for high efficiency.
It urges you to assume that everything is false unless there is some
reason to think it true. In my experience, it gets better results than
the muddle I would expect from following Haldane's dictum.
[ellis]
Jim, I'm surprised at you! Earlier you (correctly) say:
Rather, the existence of a blue car in the parking lot should be
rejected (not denied) barring evidence that can be more readily
explained by positing such existence. I certainly won't *deny* the
existence of Odin and Asgard, but I reject them as unnecessary to the
explanation of the world as it is.
Then you contradict yourself with:
It urges you to assume that everything is false unless there is some
reason to think it true. In my experience, it gets better results
than the muddle I would expect from following Haldane's dictum.
Haldane's dictum sounds like a clear warning on the use Occam, which
can be misapplied by assuming a statement like..
George Washington sneezed on August 13, 1773
..is false. Must we conclude that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze
on August 13, 1773?
Occam's razor does not mean that we shall assume the truth or falsity of
anything, because if we assume either way, we have created a new `fact'.
Rather, it asserts:
Entities shall not be multiplied without necessity.
..which means we shall leave unascertainables alone, indeterminate, in a maybe
state, which is as nonentity as an unknown fact can be.
Charles continues (logically, I might add):
[wingate]
I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not
arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are
no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence).
[balter]
Charles, do you have any objective evidence that we don't all turn into
mosquitoes with our souls buried in the right hind leg where they can't
express themselves, when we die? *Who cares*? Philosophic inquiry
is a game that requires analysis and evidence as part of the rules.
The "anything is possible" game is stupid and childish; it is like playing
dealer's choice and declaring all the cards wild. Intelligent people who
have played the game for a while get tired and bored of yokels who come along
with "you can't prove me wrong" like it was something *deep* and *original*.
[ellis]
Charles' treatment is quite unfair. He has not offered any dogmatic
assertions (although he has argued the heretical and logical point that
souls are not required). He is not insisting that reincarnation EXISTS. He
has admitted that whatever evidence there might be is not objective
evidence. He has argued against huge competition that reincarnation is not
inconsistent. Finally, he has made the point that it is consistent with
the notion of mind as information.
Now there is the issue of whether the commonly held belief in reincarnation
should be held in net.philosophy. If this were a point of interest to only
one particular faith, perhaps it should not be discussed here. But in fact,
positions on this issue are quite diverse both among members of the vanilla
faiths and among those who do not (BTW - I hold no view on this topic).
This point originally arose as philosophical speculation concerning the
identity of a person -- as brain, soul, mind, or information? -- and
included such hypothetical phenomena as information transfer, star-trek
transporters, and reincarnation -- all are unknowable questions. The
most we can really determine about them is whether or not they are logically
consistent and physically possible given the facts of our universe.
[wingate]
Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no
evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in
the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing
hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly
capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the
other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence
neither confirms nor denies either.
[balter]
Reasonableness certainly is part of science, as Occam's Razor.
One could offer a "super-astro-observer theory", which says that distant
objects wink into existence when being observed, but disappear or jump
somewhere else when no one is looking; such a theory isn't *disprovable*,
but it isn't *reasonable*. A model of the mind which says that it is
not a direct result of the workings of a particular brain requires extra
mechanism, for which there is no evidence (at least it can be argued that
there is not; I haven't seen any arguments that the mind is not mechanical
that are not easily refutable). To suggest that the mind can be expressed in
other media says nothing about the nature of the mind; given a mechanical
view, it simply suggests that the brain is simulatable. To say that the mind
has an existence separate from the brain is misleading. The mind is
different from the personality; it is the sum total of memory, mood, history,
thought, as an evolving process. My mind now is quite different from what it
was a minute ago.
[ellis]
Whatever is misleading or unreasonable about the mind as nonphysical
information? For a wishful religionist, Charles has taken a surprisingly
nonreligious position here!
Anyway, the harder people insist that a human is mechanical, the more
convincing Charles' case becomes, since the essence of a machine (at least
from the engineering standpoint) lies in the interrelationships of its
(replaceable) parts, rather than some `magical' quality possessed by any
particular piece of matter composing the machine.
Are the atheists and anti-religionists here now insisting that the matter
composing one's body possesses some `special spiritual aura' that is somehow
passed along (just like one's legal identity) during your life?
-michaelbrown@utflis.UUCP (Susan Brown) (09/26/85)
In article <733@psivax.UUCP> friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes: >In article <1560@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >>To be more precise, what I am rejecting is the notion of souls *in the form >>of* supernatural beings which are somehow linked to physical people. If you >>choose to identify the soul with the information comprising a person, then I >>have no objection-- but such a soul is obviously not supernatural, even >>though it isn't physical either. > As a matter of fact, *historically* speaking, this is very >close to the older definitions of 'soul'. Certainly the modern concept >of a *disembodied* soul is just that, relatively recent. Early >Christian and Jewish writers had no such concept. It is interesting >how easily we read occidental dualisitc interpretations into biblical >language which really has no such sgnificance. > Sarima (Stanley Friesen) I agree. The Genesis account speaks of man *becoming* a living soul, not of *receiving* one and the Bible frequently speaks of various animals as souls, or of the soul of a person as the whole being including physical body, personality, and spirit or life force. The early Hebrew writers did not anticipate their "immortal soul" living on after death. They hoped that God would remember them, as an individual, and resurrect them to life on earth again -- as the same person. The Hebrew word used for soul is nephesh, and carries this meaning. The Greek word psyche was used to translate these statements when they are quoted by early Christian Biblical writers without a change in the concept. The current common religious belief in an immortal soul seems to have originated in Greek philosophy. Susan (sources available on request, but I realize this is net.philosophy)
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (09/28/85)
[ellis]
Jim, I'm surprised at you! Earlier you (correctly) say:
Rather, the existence of a blue car in the parking lot should be
rejected (not denied) barring evidence that can be more readily
explained by positing such existence. I certainly won't *deny* the
existence of Odin and Asgard, but I reject them as unnecessary to the
explanation of the world as it is.
Then you contradict yourself with:
It urges you to assume that everything is false unless there is some
reason to think it true. In my experience, it gets better results
than the muddle I would expect from following Haldane's dictum.
Haldane's dictum sounds like a clear warning on the use Occam, which
can be misapplied by assuming a statement like..
George Washington sneezed on August 13, 1773
..is false. Must we conclude that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze
on August 13, 1773?
[balter]
You are equating "assume" with "conclude". We can *assume* that that for
which we have no evidence is not true, because such assumptions simplify
the modelling process (if there are little blue men in the center of the
Earth pulling levers that move the continents around, then plate tectonics
is not a correct model, but I don't think it is twisting the normal
use of language to say that we *assume* that such blue men do not exist).
But we cannot *deny* such things, which is tantamount to *concluding* that
they are false (I have no proof that the little blue men do not exist;
they just don't seem necessary to explain anything).
I agree that Haldane's dictum can be used as a warning, but I think Wingate
is using it to justify the manufacture of models out of thin air.
[ellis]
Charles continues (logically, I might add):
>[wingate]
>I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not
>arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are
>no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence).
[balter]
Just like little blue men. No objective objections. Counter-evidence
is not required, only lack of necessity. When someone proposes a theory,
the burden is on the proposer to provide evidence for the theory; the
theory must answer some question left unanswered by current theory.
That is a fundamental rule of scientific method. Merely demonstrating
that the theory is not provably wrong is not sufficient for it to be
considered. That is the error that almost all crackpots make.
>[balter]
>Charles, do you have any objective evidence that we don't all turn into
>mosquitoes with our souls buried in the right hind leg where they can't
>express themselves, when we die? *Who cares*? Philosophic inquiry
>is a game that requires analysis and evidence as part of the rules.
>The "anything is possible" game is stupid and childish; it is like playing
>dealer's choice and declaring all the cards wild. Intelligent people who
>have played the game for a while get tired and bored of yokels who come along
>with "you can't prove me wrong" like it was something *deep* and *original*.
[ellis]
Charles' treatment is quite unfair. He has not offered any dogmatic
assertions (although he has argued the heretical and logical point that
souls are not required). He is not insisting that reincarnation EXISTS. He
as admitted that whatever evidence there might be is not objective
evidence. He has argued against huge competition that reincarnation is not
inconsistent. Finally, he has made the point that it is consistent with
the notion of mind as information.
[balter]
Not unfair at all. You have just stated that Charles is cool because he
only doing those things which I just stated are the things done by yokels.
I didn't say that Charles offered dogma, or insisted existence, or provided
something inconsistent, so why are you responding to that strawman?
What I did was criticize those who offer models *merely because they
cannot be proved wrong*.
[ellis]
Now there is the issue of whether the commonly held belief in reincarnation
should be held in net.philosophy. If this were a point of interest to only
one particular faith, perhaps it should not be discussed here. But in fact,
positions on this issue are quite diverse both among members of the vanilla
faiths and among those who do not (BTW - I hold no view on this topic).
[balter]
It isn't an issue of whether it is only "one particular faith";
it is a matter of faith, not a philosophical issue, unless you can demonstrate
the *possible necessity* of reincarnation. Show some question in the real
world such that world_model_X does not answer it but
world_model_X + reincarnation does, and then it will be possible to discuss
reincarnation beyond the level of "some people believe in it and you can't
prove them wrong". Otherwise, it belongs in net.religion or net.sf_lovers.
[ellis]
This point originally arose as philosophical speculation concerning the
identity of a person -- as brain, soul, mind, or information? -- and
included such hypothetical phenomena as information transfer, star-trek
transporters, and reincarnation -- all are unknowable questions. The
most we can really determine about them is whether or not they are logically
consistent and physically possible given the facts of our universe.
[balter]
Actually, I think the identity discussion arose after the discussion of
reincarnation, but in any case, I consider the discussion naive because
you cannot deal properly with the effects of transporters etc. on your
notions of identity *until* you have formulated a notion of identity.
And notions of identity of objects are being confused with
personal identity, sometimes viewed from without and sometimes from within.
The discussion would be more coherent if restricted to transportation of
rocks first; if you can decide questions of duplicate copies of rocks,
transmitting rocks with or without destroying the original, etc.,then you can
expand to more complicated questions. Most important is to read the writings
of people such as Bertrand Russell who have analyzed these issues deeply.
As I see it, identity is a linguistic concept which we use to organize and
coordinate our sense perceptions into a coherent model. The idea that there
is some sort of "thread of identity" that exists as a thing in the real world
seems rather confused to me. To ask whether I am the same person as I was
five minutes ago, or whether a teleported copy of a rock is the same rock, is
to ask for a refined definition of the word "same". It is *our choice* as to
whether they are the same; whether we want "same" to mean that or not. So
many of these discussions seem to stem from this fundamental error of
assuming our words are universals. If an electron disappears and one
with the same qualities shows up elsewhere simultaneously, are they the same?
Well, aside from the non-existence of simultaneity and the fact that they
differ enough in the quality of location that we were forced to ask the
question in the first place, how do you tell? What does it mean for them to
be the same? An electron is the same as itself, but beyond that it is all
linguistics. Saying "it disappeared from A and it showed up at B" and "one
disappeared from A and one just like it showed up at B" are equivalent
discriptions. They both adequately describe the observed phenomenon. But,
since sameness is not an observable or measureable quality, in fact is not a
quality at all, neither description is more "true" than the other.
>[wingate]
>Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no
>evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in
>the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing
>hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly
>capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the
>other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence
>neither confirms nor denies either.
>
>[balter]
>Reasonableness certainly is part of science, as Occam's Razor.
>One could offer a "super-astro-observer theory", which says that distant
>objects wink into existence when being observed, but disappear or jump
>somewhere else when no one is looking; such a theory isn't *disprovable*,
>but it isn't *reasonable*. A model of the mind which says that it is
>not a direct result of the workings of a particular brain requires extra
>mechanism, for which there is no evidence (at least it can be argued that
>there is not; I haven't seen any arguments that the mind is not mechanical
>that are not easily refutable). To suggest that the mind can be expressed
>in other media says nothing about the nature of the mind; given a mechanical
>view, it simply suggests that the brain is simulatable. To say that the
>mind has an existence separate from the brain is misleading. The mind is
>different from the personality; it is the sum total of memory, mood, history,
>thought, as an evolving process. My mind now is quite different from what
it was a minute ago.
[ellis]
Whatever is misleading or unreasonable about the mind as nonphysical
information? For a wishful religionist, Charles has taken a surprisingly
nonreligious position here!
[balter]
To repeat:
unreasonable: requires extra mechanism.
misleading: separates the mind from memory, mood, history, thought, as a
trace of the change of physiological states in the brain.
To reduce the mind to mere information is misleading.
I think the best analogy is mind to process (computer science sense),
brain to computer running a specific (powerful problem-solving) program,
and input to input. Of course a process is non-physical, just as a mind is,
but it isn't *separate* from the physical. You cannot extract out the
process; you can only repeat it.
[ellis]
Anyway, the harder people insist that a human is mechanical, the more
convincing Charles' case becomes, since the essence of a machine (at least
from the engineering standpoint) lies in the interrelationships of its
(replaceable) parts, rather than some `magical' quality possessed by any
particular piece of matter composing the machine.
[balter]
I think you are quite confused about what my position is, and the best way
I can think to illustrate it is to ask you if you think that the harder
people insist that a machine is mechanical, the more convincing Charles'
case becomes? I never said that mind *is* matter; rather it is process;
it is purely descriptive. As I see it, Charles' (and your) case
is that mind is matter, in that it is some kind of entity that exists on
its own. I view mind as simply a *way of describing the actions of the
brain* (in conjunction with a specific input stream, including signals
and other impingements from the rest of the body).
[ellis]
Are the atheists and anti-religionists here now insisting that the matter
composing one's body possesses some `special spiritual aura' that is somehow
passed along (just like one's legal identity) during your life?
[balter]
Obviously not, and the fact that it may seem that way to you should encourage
you to consider that you have misinterpreted their position.
And in any case, I cannot see what this has to do with religion;
there are plenty of religious people who have a mechanical view of
human consciousness.
-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
>>Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like? >>Objectively? I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of >>light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective >>sense? Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct >>interpretation of what blue looks like? We can show scientifically that blue >>is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge >>of colors. But how do you know that sticking your brain into another >>body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"? [ROSEN] > Rich, your own words answer your questions elsewhere: > your knowledge of what blue looks like is subjective knowledge. > It certainly isn't objective, and it certainly isn't mere belief. > This "feeling" of blueness is not explainable mechanically. > You may mess around in the brain and note when the feeling happens, > but you won't find the feeling itself. That is located only within your > personal experience. Before you start devising a response, think about > whether you have a vested interest in contradicting what I have said. > Is your response obvious, or do you have to hunt for it? [BALTER] Very obvious, because I happen to agree with what you said (up to the point where you seems to assume that I would disagree with you). Except the words "subjective knowledge" are perhaps inappropriate. The feeling of blueness is indeed explainable "mechanically": it is the sensation produced by blue light (light of specific wavelengths). The fact is that in different people their network of brain connections may produce a different set of sensations. > Are you being > objective and scientific? Note that I am not arguing against determinism > or a mechanistic view of the universe or for souls; I am only arguing that > subjective experience exists in a way that is not explained by the familiar > mechanical view. I don't quite understand why subjective experience exists, > but I have a feeling that it has something to do with the fuzzy nature of > linguistics, description, and perception. Then you seem to understand it quite clearly, at least in comparison who make bold claims about its nature. > As for > >>"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >>proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >>room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking >>space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the >>first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, >>one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. >>The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the >>statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no >>blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not >>supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. >>Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be >>claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." > > Rich, I'm surprised you let Charles get away with this, and have dragged > the argument out so far. Aside from the name dropping (was that Haldane > the geneticist, or Haldane the revivalist evangelical?), as long as this > conversation is going on in net.*philosophy*, as opposed to net.religion > where it belongs, there is a most powerful argument for the rejection > of souls, resurrection, and blue cars in parking lots. It is called > ***Occam's Razor***. For the purposes of fruitful discussion, the situation > is most certainly not symmetrical at all. Rather, the existence of a blue > car in the parking lot should be rejected (not denied) barring evidence that > can be more readily explained by positing such existence. I certainly won't > *deny* the existence of Odin and Asgard, but I reject them as unnecessary to > the explanation of the world as it is. It seems to me that almost all > *logical* religious arguments involve ignoring Occam's Razor at some point. > If you want to "argue" religion based on faith, that is, belief out of desire > to believe, you are welcome to it, but in net.religion. Bra-vo! Yes, I avoided mentioning Occam, but only out of being sick of doing so only to hear "Oh, yeah, that, so what?" every time. >>I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or >>rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing >>that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no >>counter-evidence). [WINGATE] > Charles, do you have any objective evidence that we don't all turn into > mosquitoes with our souls buried in the right hind leg where they can't > express themselves, when we die? *Who cares*? Philosophic inquiry > is a game that requires analysis and evidence as part of the rules. > The "anything is possible" game is stupid and childish; it is like playing > dealer's choice and declaring all the cards wild. Intelligent people who > have played the game for a while get tired and bored of yokels who come along > with "you can't prove me wrong" like it was something *deep* and *original*. Bravo again, Jim. Charles can step back and claim that he's not arguing that resurrection takes place (and thus take in a few people), but obviously he believes this despite the apparent knowlege he has that he cannot defend that belief. Apparently even to himself. More importantly, the game of "anything is possible" is played in another way: assume a desired conclusion (because anything is possible, but...) and rebuild your axiomatic system to "make" the conclusion "true". -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/29/85)
>> >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least >> >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as >> >a statement of "selfness". >> >> No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with >> the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is >> the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it >> maybe mean "having the same soul"? [Frank Adams] > >scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. I think >it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and the same >as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the same >"selfness" as the original person. > >The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but >are not "the" original. [Padraig] What does it mean when we say two descriptors represent the "same" entity? As far as I can tell, any given descriptor implicitly carries with it a "universal set" in which it "exists", and the rules of that universe determine the equivalence relations used to decide identity. For example, are all instances of zero identical, or is each zero different from the next? Usually, zero is a mathematical entity. In math numbers are entities that exist only as universals. So there is only one zero, mathematically, I suppose. Or is there? Is the notion of zero as the origin of the complex plane the "same" as the zero of integers? We CAN choose to call them the same IF WE PREFER, as an equivalence relation, by the natural mapping of the reals into the complex plane. Then there is computer science. Every zero in your computer's memory is in a different location. Are they the "same"? That depends on the context of the conversation. If, by the "same", we mean that, should a C program execute "if (a==b) they_are_the_same()", then yes. It is the context of the discourse that decides. Then there is the quasi-physical world. Is this zero -> 0 <- THAT ONE RIGHT THERE the "same" as the one I am looking at while I write this? And when your terminal scrolls it up one line, is it still the same? What if you reread this article? Do we decide that every time anyone reads this article on any DrivelNet site anywhere, that it is "same"? Also note that the each technical specialist will insist that their view is `deeper' than anybody else's. For example, who cares whether I wrote (i = 0; printf(i, "d")) or (printf ("0")), it's still the same zero on the screen to anybody who reads it. The guy who wrote "printf" might feel differently, though, and the hardware designers would likewise have their opinions, if any. Was it the "same" zero? If each is different, was there a first ascii `0'? And are ascii `0's different from ebcdic or apl `0's?). It depends on your point of view. Songs and computer programs are much like that zero up there -- they only "exist" as copies -- unless we agree that there is something magical about their first instantiation. Do we? Was there a first instantiation of the Damned's "Feel Alright", from which all else were copies? Or are they all really copies of Iggy's "1970"? Sameness here involves mental abstraction -- ie: what we mentally ignore, so that our focus cannot distinguish differences. So-called intelligence tests are supposedly based on one's ability to ignore meaningless noise and thereby perceive deeper identity. What about electrons? They are (by theoretical dogma*) absolutely identical. If they weren't, the universe would break (*). Does that mean they are the "same"? Still, we can trace individual electrons in physics laboratories. Most people would agree each electron is a different entity. Or would they? When an electron meets with others about an atom's nucleus, it appears to lose its identity, merging back into communal electron-ness. Subsequently we can pry an electron away from the atom. Is it the "same" one that earlier fused into the atom? Crazed metaphysicists see understandinging as simply forcing the truth of Mach's principle (a radical version of Occam's razor asserting that "Nature does not twice express itself"), which drove Einstein to general relativity, starting with the assumption that gravitional and inertial mass REALLY ARE the same. In this case, all isomorphisms somehow entail identity. Less immaterially, nearly everyone will agree that pieces of hard and relatively unchanging matter are the "same", like your zero key. Of course, between now (0) and now (0) I have slightly modified my zero key by adding michael oil and wearing a bit of the plastic off. But we are all convinced that the majority of its molecules are still the same, and it still functions with identically respect to my terminal regardless of such waer. Is that zero key still the "same" object? If I smash my head through my terminal's screen, will my zero key still be the "same"? After all, it will become relatively useless at that point (unless I have a detachable keyboard). Will it not be both the "same" (seen as a collection of matter) and not the same (seen as a functional relationship), depending on the sense of speech? If essence consists of formal relationships, then do not even untouched things change as the external world goes its way? What do we assume when we perceive sameness of internal structure? The intuitive sense of causation tells us that when two `identical' things of sufficent complexity occur, that something lurks behind the scene -- that an earlier pattern `caused' (ie: was propagated thru spacetime) a forked identity. If we encountered frogs on Mars, we would surely assume that somebody brought them there from earth. Plop! In hops Igorina, the neighborhood frog -- is she the "same" as she was last night? After all, she has replaced many of her molecules since then. What about the creek which nurtured her? It changes its matter as the water flows. Here, we speak of confluences of causal chains as entities carrying identity regardless of the composing matter. Do we consider ourselves to be the "same" as we were moments or years ago? Well that depends -- we have obviously changed. Much flamage in the free will debate has come from this point. Am I == what I was (modulo (a)causal intervening modifications)? >Destruction of the original by death does not make >the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course >one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected.[Padraig] As to resurrection of individual persons, we can only speculate (or offer subjective (and unverifiable) testimony). Recall that most mystical sources deny the material aspect of self, which is in accord with the notion of self, not as a heap of matter, perhaps closer to the formal relationships among one's parts. I suppose then that the `soul' here would be a repository for such information while dead. To the extent that causality is the only conceivable ordering mechanism for information (even with `noncausal' interactions, information cannot be transmitted except causally), it is scientically impossible to cause a person's identity between instantiations without saving an offline backup somewhere, like in a `soul'. Of course, that presupposes a causal mechanism for writing it to offline storage in the first place. Death, no doubt, is nature's final core dump... Somehow, all these causal concerns fail to capture the non-physicality of mysticism -- which is admittedly as close to religion as Vi Subversa is to the Iron Bitch. Clearly, if one identifies oneself with one's matter, rebirth is kaka. Information is one level up, but is that removed enough? If it is not transitted causally (physically), then we clearly must accept scientific heresies (like formative causation, or an omnipotent omniscient deity) for soulless re-instantiation. What characterizes cosmic notions, such as Gandhi's Satyagraha or the categorical imperative anyway? Surely not that you will CAUSE actions elsewhere to occur. All one CAUSES is one's own actions -- and if, in that act, one resonates with higher patterns elsewhere, that knowledge is only seen from a loftier perspective. Anyway, this is only a problem if you believe that there is any absolute principle according to which things "really exist" in the first place. I do not see how such an absolute principle can be made meaningful except by faith. Agnostically, there cannot be any such thing. The propositions are elucidatory in this way: one who understands them finally will recognize them as senseless, when one has climbed out through them, on them, over them. One must so to speak throw away the ladder, after one has climbed up on it. - Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" -michael
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (10/01/85)
In article <1781@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >The point is not that this is impossible, but that it's not just a matter of >a brain dump/restore into ANY new body. If the point isn't that this is impossible, what does it have to do with the subject under discussion? Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (10/02/85)
[Note: the referenced article has been heavily edited to bring it in line with standard net referencing convention.] In article <27500134@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >>[wingate] >>I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not >>arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are >>no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). >Just like little blue men. No objective objections. Counter-evidence >is not required, only lack of necessity. When someone proposes a theory, >the burden is on the proposer to provide evidence for the theory; the >theory must answer some question left unanswered by current theory. >That is a fundamental rule of scientific method. Merely demonstrating >that the theory is not provably wrong is not sufficient for it to be >considered. That is the error that almost all crackpots make. As usual, Jim makes the error of assuming that I wish to demonstrate resurrection scientifically. I see no need to; the proposition is too vague to be a useful hypothesis, and it invokes the supernatural. What I am interested in is demonstrating that resurrection has not been scientifically demonstrated to be false. >>[balter] >>Charles, do you have any objective evidence that we don't all turn into >>mosquitoes with our souls buried in the right hind leg where they can't >>express themselves, when we die? *Who cares*? Philosophic inquiry >>is a game that requires analysis and evidence as part of the rules. >>The "anything is possible" game is stupid and childish; it is like playing >>dealer's choice and declaring all the cards wild. Intelligent people who >>have played the game for a while get tired and bored of yokels who come >>along with "you can't prove me wrong" like it was something *deep* >>and *original*. >[balter] >Not unfair at all. You have just stated that Charles is cool because he >only doing those things which I just stated are the things done by yokels. >I didn't say that Charles offered dogma, or insisted existence, or provided >something inconsistent, so why are you responding to that strawman? >What I did was criticize those who offer models *merely because they >cannot be proved wrong*. There is a long list of mistakes here, beginning with Balter's identification of philosophical inquiry with science. In fact, the two are quite different. What we are doing here is philosophical inquiry (perhaps bad, but that isn't relevant); it is certainly not science. The discussion earlier spawned a subdiscussion concerning the possibility of duplicating humans, and their identity with respect to the original. Some parts of that discussion (the brain simulation, for example) have produced models that are capable of scientific validiation. But the main discussion is not science. It is however philosophical inquiry, since one field of that is the identification of the proper forms of ideas. Now on to little blue men. Resurrection as christianity posits it is not scientifically demonstrable-- but doubt can be cast upon it. This comes not in the form of "I can't see it so it isn't there", but instead is of the nature of "the structure of the brain is sos-and-so, making resurrection very doubtful." It is worthwhile to investigate the plausibility of the hypothesis, even though it cannot be truly resolved. >[balter (with regard to reincarnation)] >It isn't an issue of whether it is only "one particular faith"; >it is a matter of faith, not a philosophical issue, unless you can >demonstrate the *possible necessity* of reincarnation. Show some question >in the real world such that world_model_X does not answer it but >world_model_X + reincarnation does, and then it will be possible to discuss >reincarnation beyond the level of "some people believe in it and you can't >prove them wrong". Otherwise, it belongs in net.religion or net.sf_lovers. Totally specious. This is not net.science. The whole question of how science should consider reincarnation is again philosophical inquiry, not science. ANd I don't think that having a problem with the model is the only driver of scientific inquiry. Scientists work out models which subdivide quarks and devise gravitational theory different from GR not because the existing theories have proven inadequate, but because of curiousity and a deisre to test the current standard models. >[balter] >Actually, I think the identity discussion arose after the discussion of >reincarnation, but in any case, I consider the discussion naive because >you cannot deal properly with the effects of transporters etc. on your >notions of identity *until* you have formulated a notion of identity. >And notions of identity of objects are being confused with >personal identity, sometimes viewed from without and sometimes from within. >The discussion would be more coherent if restricted to transportation of >rocks first; if you can decide questions of duplicate copies of rocks, >transmitting rocks with or without destroying the original, etc.,then you can >expand to more complicated questions. Most important is to read the writings >of people such as Bertrand Russell who have analyzed these issues deeply. >As I see it, identity is a linguistic concept which we use to organize and >coordinate our sense perceptions into a coherent model. The idea that there >is some sort of "thread of identity" that exists as a thing in the real world >seems rather confused to me. To ask whether I am the same person as I was >five minutes ago, or whether a teleported copy of a rock is the same rock, is >to ask for a refined definition of the word "same". It is *our choice* as to >whether they are the same; whether we want "same" to mean that or not. So >many of these discussions seem to stem from this fundamental error of >assuming our words are universals. If an electron disappears and one >with the same qualities shows up elsewhere simultaneously, are they the same? >Well, aside from the non-existence of simultaneity and the fact that they >differ enough in the quality of location that we were forced to ask the >question in the first place, how do you tell? What does it mean for them to >be the same? An electron is the same as itself, but beyond that it is all >linguistics. Saying "it disappeared from A and it showed up at B" and "one >disappeared from A and one just like it showed up at B" are equivalent >discriptions. They both adequately describe the observed phenomenon. But, >since sameness is not an observable or measureable quality, in fact is not a >quality at all, neither description is more "true" than the other. Again, not science but philosophy. And Balter is about to commit Rich Rosen's favorite error of defining words without worrying about what they mean now. If we are going to put this to scientific test, we need to come up with a set of models and a set of destiguishing experiments. Right now we are going through the model formulation stage. The first problem we encountered is that there are three different senses of sameness here: there is identically-the-same-at-this-point-in-time, which I think we all agree is not the kind we are concerned with; there is the-same-as-that-object-in- the-past; and there is the subjective sense of personal continuity. The third sense is the critical one, and especially its relationship to the second. Now the nature of the third is quite debatable; if we restrict consideration to those models which deny supernatural souls and the like, then copying a person should preserve type 3 sameness. This is true without regard to the exact nature of the mind; it is a fundamental axiom of science that duplicating the state must duplicate the behavior. >>[wingate] >>Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no >>evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in >>the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing >>hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly >>capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the >>other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence >>neither confirms nor denies either. >[balter] >Reasonableness certainly is part of science, as Occam's Razor. >One could offer a "super-astro-observer theory", which says that distant >objects wink into existence when being observed, but disappear or jump >somewhere else when no one is looking; such a theory isn't *disprovable*, >but it isn't *reasonable*. A model of the mind which says that it is >not a direct result of the workings of a particular brain requires extra >mechanism, for which there is no evidence (at least it can be argued that >there is not; I haven't seen any arguments that the mind is not mechanical >that are not easily refutable). To suggest that the mind can be expressed >in other media says nothing about the nature of the mind; given a mechanical >view, it simply suggests that the brain is simulatable. To say that the >mind has an existence separate from the brain is misleading. The mind is >different from the personality; it is the sum total of memory, mood, history, >thought, as an evolving process. My mind now is quite different from what >it was a minute ago. Is it? How do you know? How can you define the mind without having investigated the matter? Your statement is unscientific. Occam's razor is indeed a codification of reasonability, but tremendously restricted, and it only comes into play when you can't experimentally destiguish between two "theories". In this case, you can, so Occam's Razor says nothing except "Go and see for yourself." >>[ellis] >>Whatever is misleading or unreasonable about the mind as nonphysical >>information? For a wishful religionist, Charles has taken a surprisingly >>nonreligious position here! >[balter] >To repeat: >unreasonable: requires extra mechanism. Irrelevant, since the extra mechanism is detectable and verifiable. >misleading: separates the mind from memory, mood, history, thought, as a >trace of the change of physiological states in the brain. >To reduce the mind to mere information is misleading. >I think the best analogy is mind to process (computer science sense), >brain to computer running a specific (powerful problem-solving) program, >and input to input. Of course a process is non-physical, just as a mind is, >but it isn't *separate* from the physical. You cannot extract out the >process; you can only repeat it. Really? Do you have any proof? What's misleading is this rather religious statement about the nature of the mind. Balter has no more proof for his hypothesis than I do, so I can hardly accept this half-baked argument. In any case, there is a reason why I specifically restricted myself to atom-for-atom copying. Balter's process arguments are in fact an undetectable complication unless he is willing to give up the axiom of "same situation produces same behavior", because a process mind will still have to produce the same result when copied (just as would happen if you copied the entire state of a computer into an identical model). NOW Occam's razor IS relevant-- and it denies talk about processes! >[balter] >I think you are quite confused about what my position is, and the best way >I can think to illustrate it is to ask you if you think that the harder >people insist that a machine is mechanical, the more convincing Charles' >case becomes? I never said that mind *is* matter; rather it is process; >it is purely descriptive. As I see it, Charles' (and your) case >is that mind is matter, in that it is some kind of entity that exists on >its own. I view mind as simply a *way of describing the actions of the >brain* (in conjunction with a specific input stream, including signals >and other impingements from the rest of the body). In the absence of extra-natural inputs, though, the two must perforce produce the same results, since the ongoing state of the process must be determined (to whatever extent allowed by "freedom") by the instantaneous state of the matter. In any case, however, the instantaneous state of the mind could in principle be represented by something other than matter, allowing for the possiblity of copying the identity of a person in to something non-living. >>[ellis] >>Are the atheists and anti-religionists here now insisting that the matter >>composing one's body possesses some `special spiritual aura' that is somehow >>passed along (just like one's legal identity) during your life? >[balter] >Obviously not, and the fact that it may seem that way to you should encourage >you to consider that you have misinterpreted their position. Well, Padraig's reservations seem to me to be clearly based upon some intuition about continuity, an intuition which I don't share. >And in any case, I cannot see what this has to do with religion; >there are plenty of religious people who have a mechanical view of >human consciousness. The vociferity with which the case for copying people has been argued against is suprising, especially since it doesn't especially affect the question of resurrection, where a quite different transformation must be taking place (reasons for which have previously been argued). A suspicion of religious fervor on the part of the anti-copyists seems entirely in order. Charley Wingate
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (10/02/85)
[Not food] In article <27500134@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >>[wingate] >>I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not >>arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are >>no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). > >[balter] >Just like little blue men. No objective objections. Counter-evidence >is not required, only lack of necessity. When someone proposes a theory, >the burden is on the proposer to provide evidence for the theory; the >theory must answer some question left unanswered by current theory. >That is a fundamental rule of scientific method. Merely demonstrating >that the theory is not provably wrong is not sufficient for it to be >considered. That is the error that almost all crackpots make. Actually, I think Charlie was misstating his position above. He is not arguing for ressurection *at all*. He is arguing that ressurection does not depend on the concept of a soul. If he were arguing for ressurection, your point would be valid. >[balter] >Actually, I think the identity discussion arose after the discussion of >reincarnation, but in any case, I consider the discussion naive because >you cannot deal properly with the effects of transporters etc. on your >notions of identity *until* you have formulated a notion of identity. >And notions of identity of objects are being confused with >personal identity, sometimes viewed from without and sometimes from within. I don't think I have made any of these errors. I stated quite early that identity was not a concept of the real world, but an abstraction we put on it; since then I have been trying to define it in a way maximally consistent with ordinary usage. >The discussion would be more coherent if restricted to transportation of >rocks first; if you can decide questions of duplicate copies of rocks, >transmitting rocks with or without destroying the original, etc.,then you can >expand to more complicated questions. Ah, but people are quite different from rocks. I think there is a consensus that if you make a copy of a rock, whether by analyzing and duplicating it, or by deconstructing and reconstructing it, that the result is not the same rock. The same is true of a person's body. But personal identity is, I maintain, different from physical identity. >>A model of the mind which says that it is >>not a direct result of the workings of a particular brain requires extra >>mechanism, for which there is no evidence (at least it can be argued that >>there is not; I haven't seen any arguments that the mind is not mechanical >>that are not easily refutable). To suggest that the mind can be expressed >>in other media says nothing about the nature of the mind; given a mechanical >>view, it simply suggests that the brain is simulatable. To say that the >>mind has an existence separate from the brain is misleading. The mind is >>different from the personality; it is the sum total of memory, mood, history, >>thought, as an evolving process. My mind now is quite different from what >it was a minute ago. I do not dispute that the mind is the process which is taking place in the brain; this is perhaps a more accurate way of saying what I mean by the mind is the information content of the brain. The question is, if that process is simulated (with sufficient accuracy) in another medium, is that the same person? I maintain that it is more consistent with the normal use of the word identity to answer yes than no. >[ellis] >Whatever is misleading or unreasonable about the mind as nonphysical >information? For a wishful religionist, Charles has taken a surprisingly >nonreligious position here! > >[balter] >To repeat: >unreasonable: requires extra mechanism. No one is proposing any different mechanisms here. The question here is one of definition. The discussion for some time has been on that basis; you seem not to have noticed. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (10/04/85)
>>..Certainly the modern concept >>of a *disembodied* soul is just that, relatively recent. Early >>Christian and Jewish writers had no such concept. It is interesting >>how easily we read occidental dualisitc interpretations into biblical >>language which really has no such sgnificance. - Sarima >I agree. The Genesis account speaks of man *becoming* a living soul, not >of *receiving* one and the Bible frequently speaks of various animals as >souls, or of the soul of a person as the whole being including physical >body, personality, and spirit or life force. The early Hebrew writers did >not anticipate their "immortal soul" living on after death. They hoped that >God would remember them, as an individual, and resurrect them to life on >earth again -- as the same person. The Hebrew word used for soul is nephesh, >and carries this meaning. The Greek word psyche was used to translate these >statements when they are quoted by early Christian Biblical writers without >a change in the concept. The current common religious belief in an immortal >soul seems to have originated in Greek philosophy. - Susan Many anthropologists report that it is common for members of certain cultures to speak of losing their souls; such a person is said to behave without direction or purpose (perhaps similar to a severe depression). Some suppose that such `primitive' people are delicately poised on the brink of consciousness, and that without the correct stimulus from the supporting members of one's community, in particular, if one receives enough evil eyes and so on, one may sink back into lower animal preconscious. The appropriate spell from a curandero is reportedly restorative. It is not surprising that Jung was so interested in such lore, or that psychologists are called `shrinks', for that matter. Such a concept -- one who shares awareness with our group -- implies a kind of immortality, since one thereby participates in the perpetuation of the group's existence. Note too, that animals and infidels are typically candidates for enslavement and killing -- after all, they are said to have no souls. Around 2500 years ago, there appears to have been a general heightening of awareness around the globe, in each place stressing a different kind of mental experience that ultimately characterized the later cultural evolution -- Taoism, Confucianism, Jainism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Pythagorean numerology. The ancient Greeks had many concepts of just what the soul was. In their search for immutable perfection in the face of short and brutish life, the answer to the question: What impermanence is attainable by humans? ..was answered through a decided busy form of introspection. Philosophy, the cultivation of the intellect, led to the Greeks' eternal achievements -- geometry, mathematics, logic, science.., and their thoughts literally live in our minds today. The very notion of Socratic or maieutic (maieusomai = to act as midwife) method of education (e-ducere = to draw out) reflects the belief that a teacher only aids the student in remembering knowledge forgotten, but still dormant, in one's eternal soul. Note too, that empirical induction was not considered very important, since the only worthwile truth was to be found within. There were, of course, other Greek schools with conflicting views. But few ancient notions have played a more influential role in western culture than the Platonic idea that one's telos, final cause, soul, or reason for existence, is none other than reason itself. "Carry data chop logic" -michael
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (10/04/85)
My typos usually add mere incomprehensibility. In this case, the sense went
180 degrees:
> What impermanence is attainable by humans?
^^
Sorry. Nuke `im-'.
-michaelellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (10/08/85)
>[ellis] >Haldane's dictum sounds like a clear warning on the use Occam, which >can be misapplied by assuming a statement like.. > > George Washington sneezed on August 13, 1773 > >..is false. Must we conclude that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze >on August 13, 1773? > >[balter] >You are equating "assume" with "conclude". [ellis] OK, I will rephrase my question as you seem to suggest: Must we ASSUME that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze on August 13 1773? [balter] >We can *assume* that that for >which we have no evidence is not true, because such assumptions simplify >the modelling process (if there are little blue men in the center of the >Earth pulling levers that move the continents around, then plate tectonics >is not a correct model, but I don't think it is twisting the normal >use of language to say that we *assume* that such blue men do not exist). [ellis] I think that's overstating Occam. Only when we are forced to make an assumption, then we use Occam's principle. However, if little blue men were to occasionally transport you to Hades and cause earthquakes with their levers, you might think differently. Admittedly others would have reason to doubt you. [balter] >But we cannot *deny* such things, which is tantamount to *concluding* that >they are false (I have no proof that the little blue men do not exist; >they just don't seem necessary to explain anything). [ellis] I strongly disagree. I see Occam as tantamount to the wise old Zen saying `MU', which simply unasks the question. Do I `assume' that Goldbach's conjecture (that every even number > 2 is the sum of two primes?) is false in the absence of any proof? NOT AT ALL! Confusing `probably true' with `true' is one of the major sources of the intrinsic subjectivity of science! [balter] >I agree that Haldane's dictum can be used as a warning, but I think Wingate >is using it to justify the manufacture of models out of thin air. [ellis] Charles is hardly manufacturing anything; rather, he is subjecting his existing notions to logical scrutiny. Read again: I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). [Charles] >[balter] >Just like little blue men. No objective objections. Counter-evidence >is not required, only lack of necessity. When someone proposes a theory, >the burden is on the proposer to provide evidence for the theory; the >theory must answer some question left unanswered by current theory. >That is a fundamental rule of scientific method. Merely demonstrating >that the theory is not provably wrong is not sufficient for it to be >considered. That is the error that almost all crackpots make. [ellis] As scientific theories go, you have raised several valid points. There ARE scientific objections to blue men with levers AS A SCIENTIFIC THEORY. It conflicts with an established theory that explains a huge body of accumulated geological and biological facts and has additionally predicted new ones. And all indications are that the blue men can ultimately be conclusively denied. Is reincarnation being proposed as a scientific theory? NO. Does it in any way contradict or replace anything in science? NO. It is not even clear how it could be falsified on a purely scientifically basis, given that asserts that some aspect of a person can recur after death, although it may be verifiable. Re: crackpots.. Another error that crackpots make is attempting to invalidate theories about which they are incompetent to speak (ie- Velikovsky's flimsy attack on celestial mechanics). Another error crackpots make is their inability to convert their ideas into results of value to humanity. Is reincarnation a useful theory? I cannot answer, as I have not closely examined the appropriate religious and mystical evidence. I profess ignorance... >[balter] >Not unfair at all. You have just stated that Charles is cool because he >only doing those things which I just stated are the things done by yokels. [ellis] Yokels typically make assertions on which they are unqualified to speak. (We all do this, me included, BTW) >[ellis] >Now there is the issue of whether the commonly held belief in reincarnation >should be held in net.philosophy. If this were a point of interest to only >one particular faith, perhaps it should not be discussed here. But in fact, >positions on this issue are quite diverse both among members of the vanilla >faiths and among those who do not (BTW - I hold no view on this topic). > >[balter] >It isn't an issue of whether it is only "one particular faith"; it is a >matter of faith, not a philosophical issue, unless you can demonstrate the >*possible necessity* of reincarnation. Show some question in the real world >such that world_model_X does not answer it but world_model_X + reincarnation >does, and then it will be possible to discuss reincarnation beyond the level >of "some people believe in it and you can't prove them wrong". Otherwise, >it belongs in net.religion or net.sf_lovers. [ellis] How does faith in empirical induction differ from faith in reincarnation? They are both unprovable, but claimed by their respective advocates to be axioms of the highest possible meaning to humanity. Furthermore, philosophical speculation is invaluable for determining the merits of scientific versus nonscientific ideas, provided all concerned parties are willing to objectively and rationally sort out the axioms and definitions of their preferred systems. If science is so great, its superiority will stand up to such examination. Furthermore, it can prove most helpful to religionists who wish to update their faith or perceive mystical value in science's newest discoveries. BTW, the fact that scientific_world_model_X + reincarnation explains no more scientific facts than scientific_world_model_X only goes to show that science has yet to incorporate subjective experience in any real way. Reincarnation has no scientific meaning. So what? The question is, does it have PHILOSOPHICAL meaning? >[balter] >To ask whether I am the same person as I was >five minutes ago, or whether a teleported copy of a rock is the same rock, is >to ask for a refined definition of the word "same". It is *our choice* as to >whether they are the same; whether we want "same" to mean that or not. So >many of these discussions seem to stem from this fundamental error of >assuming our words are universals. If an electron disappears and one >with the same qualities shows up elsewhere simultaneously, are they the same? >Well, aside from the non-existence of simultaneity and the fact that they >differ enough in the quality of location that we were forced to ask the >question in the first place, how do you tell? What does it mean for them to >be the same? An electron is the same as itself, but beyond that it is all >linguistics. Saying "it disappeared from A and it showed up at B" and "one >disappeared from A and one just like it showed up at B" are equivalent >discriptions. They both adequately describe the observed phenomenon. But, >since sameness is not an observable or measureable quality, in fact is not a >quality at all, neither description is more "true" than the other. [ellis] OK, sameness is not a very scientific concept, as cleverly argue. But is it a philosophical concept? Subjectively, it most definitely is. I believe our sense of sameness in the face of change is due to the singular history of personal experience we each have, and our dream states reinforce this. Birth, deep sleep and death are the major discontinuities. It is most reasonable that a hardcore science advocate would deny any extension as unjustifiable. My more cautious mathematical background leaves me philosophically undecided, although as a practical matter I will live this life as though it were the only one I had. Clearly Hindus, Christians etc. have a different opinion. >[balter] >To reduce the mind to mere information is misleading. >I think the best analogy is mind to process (computer science sense), >brain to computer running a specific (powerful problem-solving) program, >and input to input. Of course a process is non-physical, just as a mind is, >but it isn't *separate* from the physical. You cannot extract out the >process; you can only repeat it. [ellis] I do not understand -- a computer CAN be halted, the desired memory locations transferred to alternate media, subsequently reloaded possibly on other hardware, and restarted where execution previously was stopped. If that's not extracting a process, then we have a clear language obstacle. A more successful approach, I would think, would be a direct assault on the basic nonsimilarity between digital and brain hardware. >[balter] >..And in any case, I cannot see what this has to do with religion; >there are plenty of religious people who have a mechanical view of >human consciousness. [ellis] For that metter, there are many in the scientific community who see fail to accept a mechanical view of the physical universe, humans included: "Mechanism in fact is at a complete loss to in front of such experimental "properties as identity and specificity of atomic aggregates... "We find definite "qualities" in the atomic world where we expected "quantitative differences.. "If matter is not the same as extension, mechanism collapses on this very "score, and the problem, and the problem of stability and structure of "matter, including extension itself, arises again in all its complexity. -- Enrico Cantore, "Atomic Order" -michael
usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) (10/10/85)
>Is reincarnation a useful theory? I cannot answer, as I >have not closely examined the appropriate religious and >mystical evidence. I profess ignorance... OK, one of my favorite topics. Here are some ideas about reincarnation. 1). My personal bias is towards the dignity and worth of each individual. If we take as an axiom the existence of an indestructable individual soul which reincarnates, this seems to me to provide a basis for a belief in one's own personal worth, as opposed to God, the state, etc. It argues against racism, oppresion of the individual by the state, religious leaders, etc. 2). It provides an explanation for precocious behavior in that it is assumed that pre-existing talents and interests are latent in children. It provides a reason for seeking to find and develop latent talents in children, rather than regarding them as "blank slates". 3). It entails a different attitude towards social organization. For example, if reincarnation is assumed, then lifelong education is valuable for the presumed benefits which will be carried over to the next life. It argues in favor of restructuring education so that students are not weeded out for slow development, but rather given the chance to retake courses repeatedly. It argues in favor of patience and willingness to help slower students in the hope that eventually the fruits of this effort will appear, even if not in this lifetime. Environmental concerns take on more importance relative to short term profits since the greedy capitalists will have to come back into the polluted world again at some point, and face the mess they have created, starting at the bottom of the power structure.. In general it provides a reason for concern about the well being of the earth, assuming we have to come back and go through all this suffering again ... It argues against unnecessary war and international conflict, since yesterday's Nazi can be today's Jew, today's white can be tomorrow's black, today's Russian can be tommorow's American, today's rich can be tommorow's poor, etc. It argues it favor of fairness towards one's fellow man, since the individual you shaft this time you may encounter again at some future time. It argues against creating unjust social institutions since one may have to experience this injustice oneself the next time around. 4). It provides a useful aid for strategically arranging ones life. For example, given that pre-existing interests and talents are latent in us all, seeking to pursue one's interests and uncover and develop ones innate talents (rather than trying to force oneself into an externally imposed mold) offers promise of success. Denying one's individuality and attempting to fufill roles imposed by external forces promises unhappiness and failure. It promises rewards for continued effort in whatever area one is working, if not in this lifetime then the next ...
walker@oberon.UUCP (Mike Walker) (10/26/85)
A while back someone (?) asked if you made a duplicate of yourself how
would your wife know which was the original. Another more pressing
problem is that you won't know either. After all if the copy is perfect
(ie has all the same memories as the original) then it will also think it
is the original.
--
Michael D. Walker (Mike)
Arpa: walker@oberon.ARPA
Uucp: {the (mostly unknown) world}!ihnp4!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker
{several select chunks}!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker