ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/24/85)
>>>All those who believe in free will must of necessity and implication >>>believe in souls. There is of course nothing to stop a person from >>>holding two contradictory beliefs... >> Horsefeathers! You have only shown that YOUR definition of free will >> (spontaneous behavior) is not consistent with the decrepit a priori >> assertion: >> >> All actions are totally determined by antecedent causes >Which is supported both by scientific study... What scientific study? You are ignoring the most accurate scientific evidence and analysis of this century! I have a question for you: How could we ever determine the truth or falsity of determinism? Clearly we cannot roll back time and see if the same events transpire. The only way I know is to devise controlled experiments in which initial conditions are as identical as possible, and then see if identical results recur. Now the amount of experimental accuracy is constrained by the technological limitations of the day. But until recent times, the scientific community had little reason to doubt that all `chance' in experimental results would not ultimately yield to ever increasing scientific accuracy. Certain nondeterministic scientific theories (such as the statistical ones used in thermodynamics) were grudgingly accepted in classical times as the practical consequences of the difficulty in gathering the enormous amount of data that corresponded to the initial conditions of zillions of particles -- in principle, scientists asserted, given perfect knowledge, we could totally determine the subsequent positions of each and every particle from the initial conditions alone. Similarly, the unpredictability of human behavior was explained as due to lack of knowledge. Such mere lack of knowledge is referred to as `classical indeterminism'. As I see it, the empirical evidence for determinism rests on the validity of such statements as: As we progressively refine our accuracy in controlling the initial conditions of an experiment, our ability to predict the outcome correspondingly improves without limit. In particular, as we narrow our focus to the simplest phenomena, all uncertainty in the experimental outcome approaches zero. Until science encountered quantum randomness, nobody ever had any reason to doubt that physics would not forever improve the accuracy of its predictions without bound. But when science finally reached the level of quantum phenomena, our ability to predict outcomes encounters an empirical limit -- a point where `chance' persists despite continued refinements in scientific technique. Consequently, the strongest advocates of determinism had to abandon empirical arguments in favor of metaphysical ones and hopes that the barrier might someday be overcome. At first, wishful determinists could successfully argue that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle represented nothing more than a threshhold of knowability -- they insisted that even if science cannot know the complete state of quantum entities, that at least in principle a precise state `exists' metaphysically. This is referred to as the `hidden variables' hypothesis, and has been rigorously shown TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH EMPIRICALLY VERIFIABLE QUANTUM PHENOMENA (Bell's interconnectedness principle), unless one is willing to abandon Einstein's locality principle (the notion that all effects must be propagated thru spacetime). If you abandon the locality principle, you and I have no disagreement, as you have then asserted that a person's present state is not striclty determined by antecedent causes, but additionally by noncausally related events occurring in remote regions of relativistic `elsewhen' (whose effects could otherwise not impinge until the future) not to mention the possibility of noncausal past (or even future) influences. Let me repeat -- the evidence against strict causal determinism is not just quantum randomness. Rather, the arguments are rigorous logical analyses of such phenomena as the far more enigmatic instantaneous collapse of the Schroedinger probability wave, and noncausal interactions across macroscopic distances that have empirically verified Bell's interconnectedness principle, whose truth has been shown to be independent of QM. >..and by many of the philosophers you quoted in your last article, whom you >use as "ammunition". I think you failed to perceive the purpose of those quotes -- note that I included two anti-free-will arguments as well (Hume, Voltaire) -- what I first showed is that free will has had many definitions. And my "ammunition" outflanked your position by demonstrating that, even with the assumption of strict determinism, many of the most influential philosophers still upheld free-will by arguments that do not require `souls'. Below are the critical passages: Descartes: That we possess free will is self-evident: ..we perceived in ourselves such a liberty such that we were able to abstain from believing what was not perfectly certain and indubitable Leibniz: He made a rational decision, and therfore acted freely.. Hobbes: A man's volitions, desires, and inclinations are necessary in the sense that they are the results of a chain of determining causes; but when he acts in accordance with these desires and inclinations, he is said to act freely. Kant: ..he regards himself as determinable only through laws which he gives himself through reason. And to be determinable through self-imposed laws is to be free. I fail to see how the above arguments imply that free will necessarily entails a belief in souls. >>>...It's just a sign that they haven't thought things through. >> As a libertarian (=freewiller), I take that as an insult! >Now you know how your choice of words sounds to me. You repeatedly dumped insults on others (me included) long before they were ever returned. Frankly, I take it as a compliment to receive verbal abuse from one who will not read or think. >You could of course, >show me how you HAVE thought these things through rather than just >asserting that you haven't. Your avoidances of consequences and >implications of beliefs has been astounding. Baloney! What arguments have I ignored? I hardly deny that strict determinism is the conclusion of the classical sciences up to and including Einsteinian relativity. My point is that the conclusions of the vanguard of modern thought (relativity and Skinnerism excluded) convincingly demonstrate that strict causal determinism cannot disprove spontaneous behavior (your definition of free will). I have backed up my assertions with empirical evidence that is widely accepted within scientific community; and my philosophical claims are supported by quotes from well respected sources -- all of which required extensive outside research on my part. For what good? To have them glossed over by a person who would rather fill this newsgroup with opinions based on obsolete science and reluctance to read any philosophical literature whatsoever? May I humbly infer a desperate attempt on your part to justify your intellectual fossilization. Do you fear new ideas that might force you to reevaluate your moldy opinions? Have you lost all trace of youthful curiosity about the nature of things? On the contrary, I have not only examined your evidence and explained why I found it wanting, I used to hold your identical position until I encountered the evidence you refuse to examine. It is you who seem unable to grasp what many here, including myself, are saying. Several of us have REPEATEDLY presented hard scientific evidence which you simply ignore -- evidence that, by the way, not only also explains your precious causal determinism, but which has been rigorously shown to be inexplicable by causal determinism. And what astounding beliefs do I hold? My claims agnostically suspend faith on all issues for which the evidence is not compelling. For example: *I hold no belief about determinism in general; however I do insist that your causal determinism (where all effects are determined by temporally and spatially impinging causes) is contradicted by the empirical evidence and rigorous arguments (from Von Neumann, Bell, Von Fraassen, and unintentionally, from Einstein himself, who argued that QM and locality are contradictory). Such causal determinism is still, of course, quite pragmatically useful for many modern feats of engineering, just as behaviorism is a useful methodology for focusing our attention on that portion of human behavior that can be objectively understood. The weakness of your arguments is when you abuse perfectly useful methodologies THAT ARE SCIENTIFICALLY KNOWN TO BE LACKING to `prove' that certain phenomena cannot exist. *I hold no belief as to the absolute existence of free will; instead, I insist each definition and corresponding set of assumptions should be analyzed on its own terms and given credence according to the explicative value of that philosophical framework. For example, if free will is "spontaneous choice", then it does not exist in systems where causal determinism runs everything. Conversely, if free will is "rational choice of a conscious agent", then it would seem to exist within any system where consciousness and rationality are real entities. "What's so great about science?" -- Paul Feyerabend -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
> Similarly, the unpredictability of human behavior was explained as due > to lack of knowledge. Such mere lack of knowledge is referred to as > `classical indeterminism'. [ELLIS] Was? How is it explained now? "We don't know, so it must be caused by this"? Another example of Ellisist science in action (hey, if he can label my thinking as "Rosenism", I'm within my rights to invent Ellisism). > But when science finally reached the level of quantum phenomena, > our ability to predict outcomes encounters an empirical limit -- > a point where `chance' persists despite continued refinements in > scientific technique. Consequently, the strongest advocates of determinism > had to abandon empirical arguments in favor of metaphysical ones > and hopes that the barrier might someday be overcome. Funny how when *I* speak absolutely about such things, I am "obviously" wrong for doing so, and perhaps I did speak too strongly. Yet when Ellis states the existence of an absolute empirical limit, no one flinches an eyebrow... >>..and by many of the philosophers you quoted in your last article, whom you >>use as "ammunition". > I think you failed to perceive the purpose of those quotes -- note > that I included two anti-free-will arguments as well (Hume, Voltaire) > -- what I first showed is that free will has had many definitions. On the contrary, you showed just the opposite. You showed that all your friends shared a definition, and they either agreed, disagreed, or built new axiomatic systems to "get it to exist". > I fail to see how the above arguments imply that free will > necessarily entails a belief in souls. Because you haven't been listening (apparently). Free will means the ability to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? >>>>...It's just a sign that they haven't thought things through. >>> As a libertarian (=freewiller), I take that as an insult! >>Now you know how your choice of words sounds to me. > You repeatedly dumped insults on others (me included) long before > they were ever returned. Frankly, I take it as a compliment to > receive verbal abuse from one who will not read or think. I'd like to see some of the insults that I offered first. "Wishful thinker"? Your own Feyerbandism shows that you glorify wishful thinking, so I would hardly think you would be insulted by that. However, words like "fool", "one who will not read or think", etc., all of which came from you, are clearly abusive and insulting. Obviously it is more important for you to preserve your sacred religious beliefs at all cost, even if it means abusing your "attacker" and engaging in namecalling to "prove" your point. >>You could of course, >>show me how you HAVE thought these things through rather than just >>asserting that you haven't. Your avoidances of consequences and >>implications of beliefs has been astounding. > Baloney! What arguments have I ignored? The one I offered above (and many times before) on free will, for example. The fact that you engage in the very same despicable absolutism ("an absolute definitive limit of knowledge") you accuse me of, and refuse to acknowledge that. I could go on... > I hardly deny that strict > determinism is the conclusion of the classical sciences up to and > including Einsteinian relativity. My point is that the conclusions of > the vanguard of modern thought (relativity and Skinnerism excluded) > convincingly demonstrate that strict causal determinism cannot > disprove spontaneous behavior (your definition of free will). Obviously (from this) you never read my definition of free will, otherwise you wouldn't have mislabelled it so blatantly. > I have backed up my assertions with empirical evidence that is > widely accepted within scientific community; and my philosophical > claims are supported by quotes from well respected sources -- all of > which required extensive outside research on my part. Bravo. It's always easy to find sources that support one particular position and ignore the rest, though. I haven't been ignoring yours, though. I've been answering it. Which is more than I can say for you. > For what good? To have them glossed over by a person who would > rather fill this newsgroup with opinions based on obsolete science > and reluctance to read any philosophical literature whatsoever? I.e., to have them answered by someone who disagrees with the conclusions and says why. > May I humbly infer a desperate attempt on your part to justify your > intellectual fossilization. Do you fear new ideas that might force > you to reevaluate your moldy opinions? Have you lost all trace of > youthful curiosity about the nature of things? New ideas with substance behind them certainly merit such re-evaluation. After your quoting of Feyerband, in which you glorify believing in what you want to believe in rather than what is uncovered by investigation (if it contradicts your desired beliefs) AND working backwards from the conclusion to build axioms, I think the problem is that you have a completely different set iof axioms than I do. They are clearly counterrational and counterscientific in the extreme. > Several of us have REPEATEDLY presented hard scientific evidence which you > simply ignore -- evidence that, by the way, not only also explains your > precious causal determinism, but which has been rigorously shown to be > inexplicable by causal determinism. And I have acknowledged the current state of scientific knowledge regarding quantum phenomena. And you have failed to show how they ipso facto "prove" your point. You must have forgotten that. Often we forget to state what is obvious to us. > *I hold no belief as to the absolute existence of free will; instead, > I insist each definition and corresponding set of assumptions should be > analyzed on its own terms and given credence according to the > explicative value of that philosophical framework. > > For example, if free will is "spontaneous choice", then it does not > exist in systems where causal determinism runs everything. > > Conversely, if free will is "rational choice of a conscious agent", > then it would seem to exist within any system where consciousness > and rationality are real entities. Finally, if free will is "hot fudge sauce", or "a Porsche 924", or "left shoes", then free will obviously exists. The moral: define it as you like to get a given result, regardless of the real definition. > "What's so great about science?" -- Paul Feyerabend What's so great about Feyerband? -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (10/03/85)
In article <1806@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >Because you haven't been listening (apparently). Free will means the ability >to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists >mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly >they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical >make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you >act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for >you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? > Rich, it is you who are not listening. This is the third time I have tried to make this point. If you will read philosophy for a bit you will see that this is *exactly* what a lot of philosophers are claiming. They claim that you are NOT CONSTRAINED by either YOUR PHYSICAL MAKEUP or YOUR ENVIRONMENT when you make a FREE CONSCIOUS DECISION. Your free conscious decisions are not determined. That is the claim. Not that they are determined by a physical agent external to your physical self (ie a soul) but that they are not determined at all. They either are self-determing (which makes human beings free agents) or they arise spontaneously (as in how an electron decays), but they are not determined. You are prefectly free to disagree with this. You are not free to reinterperet what everybody says in light of what you think they must mean. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/03/85)
>Because you haven't been listening (apparently). Free will means the ability >to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists >mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly >they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical >make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you >act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for >you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? [Rich Rosen] Again, I must question the inclusion of "the insides of one's own body" as a physical constraint on one's decisions. If we assume pure materialism, any decision not only *depends* on body-state, it *is* body state, like memory, consciousness, and most of the other good things in life. How can one talk about making decisions independently of everything that one experiences, remembers, and *is*? Acting contrary to one's physical desire is not at all the same thing as acting contrary to one's physical make-up. The concept of "free will" in moral philosophy can still be accommodated in a materialist universe. For instance, one can view it as an assumption of the primacy of internal state relative to external stimuli in determining behavior. "Sin" can be attached to an individual whose internal state leads to "wrong" actions, while an individual performing the same actions unknowingly and unthinkingly (i.e. independently of such internal state) might not be "sinning". Baba
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/04/85)
>>Free will means the ability >>to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >>environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists >>mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly >>they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical >>make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you >>act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for >>you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? [Rich Rosen] > Again, I must question the inclusion of "the insides of one's own body" as a > physical constraint on one's decisions. If we assume pure materialism, any > decision not only *depends* on body-state, it *is* body state, like memory, > consciousness, and most of the other good things in life. How can one talk > about making decisions independently of everything that one experiences, > remembers, and *is*? Acting contrary to one's physical desire is not > at all the same thing as acting contrary to one's physical make-up. [BABA] Then, at last, you understand the implicit self-contradiction that makes free will impossible unless there is an external agent of some sort that represents the "you", the "will", that is unencumbered by current physical states. Unfotunately, your "I must question the inclusion of..." statement sounds an awful lot like someone saying "I must question the inclusion of Einstein's relativity model in these equations because it makes our elegant simple equations go 'poof!'". > The concept of "free will" in moral philosophy can still be accommodated in > a materialist universe. For instance, one can view it as an assumption of > the primacy of internal state relative to external stimuli in determining > behavior. "Sin" can be attached to an individual whose internal state leads > to "wrong" actions, while an individual performing the same actions > unknowingly and unthinkingly (i.e. independently of such internal state) > might not be "sinning". Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide variety of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads them to do "wrong", makes them a sinner! I cannot express in words my revulsion to such a philosophy, that people who do "wrong" because of what their brains have come to be are "sinners" (and thus, I assume, "worthy" of some form of punishment either from a deity or from human beings in power). I know certain people hold this philosophy near and dear to their hearts, but I think this just goes to show that this is an example of building a system of thought where you can take credit for whatever good happens to you while blaming others for their "evil". Work backwards from the goal of blaming people and being able to punish them for being "bad", and you get this. -- "I was walking down the street. A man came up to me and asked me what was the capital of Bolivia. I hesitated. Three sailors jumped me. The next thing I knew I was making chicken salad." "I don't believe that for a minute. Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is La Paz." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/07/85)
ct 85 08:31:56 GMT Lines: 51 7 Oct 85 08:31:56 GMT Organization: The Institute of Impure Science Lines: 47 >>>Free will means the ability >>>to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >>>environment, or the insides of one's own body. [Rich Rosen] > >> Again, I must question the inclusion of "the insides of one's own body" as a >> physical constraint on one's decisions. If we assume pure materialism, any >> decision not only *depends* on body-state, it *is* body state, like memory, >> consciousness, and most of the other good things in life. How can one talk >> about making decisions independently of everything that one experiences, >> remembers, and *is*? Acting contrary to one's physical desire is not >> at all the same thing as acting contrary to one's physical make-up. [BABA] > > Then, at last, you understand the implicit self-contradiction that makes > free will impossible unless there is an external agent of some sort that > represents the "you", the "will", that is unencumbered by current physical > states. [Rosen] Yes, at last, it is clear that your definition is absurd, and hence cannot be satisfied by any phenomenon of nature. What I still don't understand is why you think anyone would use it. Now that you've retired "free will" from the vocabulary of philosophy, how do you distinguish between coerced and uncoerced behavior? What do you call the difference between involuntary manslaughter and premeditated murder? What do you call the difference between a mistake and a lie? You may not see any difference, but most of the rest of us do, and see a common thread to it for which the phrase "free will" serves as a label. People certainly disagree as to what the physical (or ethereal) basis of this perception. But they agree that they are talking *about* something. The distinction between mind and body was made in language and philosophical thought at a time when physics and medicine were scarcely conceived. It is unsurprising that people as recently as 300 years ago should have associated volition with the immaterial (and, they hoped, immortal) spirit, but the inadequacy of their *explanation* doesn't invalidate the phenomenon. Saying that "free will" cannot exist without an immaterial component is like saying that "light" cannot exist because there is no luminiferous ether. > Unfotunately, your "I must question the inclusion of..." statement > sounds an awful lot like someone saying "I must question the inclusion of > Einstein's relativity model in these equations because it makes our elegant > simple equations go 'poof!'". Einstein's equations don't contradict *themselves*. Your "definition", by your own admission, does. Baba
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/08/85)
s of one's physical 3>make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you 3>act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for 3>you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? [Rich Rosen] > >> The concept of "free will" in moral philosophy can still be accommodated in >> a materialist universe. For instance, one can view it as an assumption of >> the primacy of internal state relative to external stimuli in determining >> behavior. "Sin" can be attached to an individual whose internal state leads >> to "wrong" actions, while an individual performing the same actions >> unknowingly and unthinkingly (i.e. independently of such internal state) >> might not be "sinning". [Baba] > > Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide variety > of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads them to > do "wrong", makes them a sinner! I cannot express in words my revulsion to > such a philosophy, that people who do "wrong" because of what their brains > have come to be are "sinners" (and thus, I assume, "worthy" of some form > of punishment either from a deity or from human beings in power). I know > certain people hold this philosophy near and dear to their hearts, but I think > this just goes to show that this is an example of building a system of > thought where you can take credit for whatever good happens to you while > blaming others for their "evil". Work backwards from the goal of blaming > people and being able to punish them for being "bad", and you get this. > [Rosen] First of all, it was Rich who introduced the term "sin" to the debate. Since his reaction was rather predictably based on emotion rather than on reason, I suppose I should have used a nice, irreligious word like "responsibility". It ought not to matter, but I forget who I'm dealing with sometimes. I probably also have to make it explicit that I am talking about *possible* moral systems based on hypothetical axioms, not my own convictions. Anyone incapable of arguing positions outside his own belief system has no business in net.philosophy anyway. In this materialist universe, we have no ghosts in our machines, but the human machines continue to program themselves and one another nonetheless. Nothing too paradoxical about that, though it leads through a mire of self-reference jokes. This programming takes many forms, including reward, advice, admonition, and punishment. Unacceptable (to parent, social unit, or other programming entity) behavior requires reprogramming only if the behavior arose from the programming (internal mental state) of the individual automaton. Unnecessary reprogramming, as most usenetters know, is itself a source of error. The notion of *volition*, the isolation of the effects of the self/program on the actions of an individual from the effects of the environment/data, is thus critical to the programming process. The boundary between the two might well be the limit of program self-awareness, even though that presents a moving target. But then, I never said materialist moral philosophy was going to be easy. Baba
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/08/85)
>>Because you haven't been listening (apparently). Free will means the ability >>to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >>environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists >>mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly >>they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical >>make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you >>act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for >>you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? > Rich, it is you who are not listening. This is the third time I have tried > to make this point. If you will read philosophy for a bit you will see > that this is *exactly* what a lot of philosophers are claiming. They claim > that you are NOT CONSTRAINED by either YOUR PHYSICAL MAKEUP or YOUR > ENVIRONMENT when you make a FREE CONSCIOUS DECISION. Your free conscious > decisions are not determined. That is the claim. That is the ASSERTION. In order for the choices (deliberated considered choices) to be unconstrained, there must be more than an assertion that they simply ARE unconstrained (which is what many of Michael's "choice" philosophers asserted). But thank you for (at last) confirming what I've been saying: that free will represents exactly such a level of non-constraint as I have described. Philosophers can claim (assert) away just as religionists have. Makes for great conversation at parties, I'm sure. But does it reflect anything but their assertions? > Not that they are > determined by a physical agent external to your physical self (ie a soul) > but that they are not determined at all. They either are self-determing (which > makes human beings free agents) or they arise spontaneously (as in how an > electron decays), but they are not determined. Again, nice assertion. > You are prefectly free to disagree with this. You are not free to reinterperet > what everybody says in light of what you think they must mean. On the contrary, this is EXACTLY what I said was meant by free will for the last n odd months. When confronted with the rather blatant contradictions in this, some have decided that in order to "keep" or "get" free will, it's "OK" to alter the definition to mean something else. No matter. This whole discussion has become truly redundant. There's no point in arguing with someone who wants to believe particular things. Any evidence, any logic, any reasoning becomes irrelevant and secondary to the desire to believe. Since such eminent scholars as Paul Dubuc (the one who insists that there cannot be non-religious moral codes despite all evidence to the contrary) claim that this newsgroup consists of "Rich Rosen vs. everyone else", it is best that I just vacate the discussion. Freedom of expression, by what seems to be the moral code of so many in this newsgroup, is secondary to the good (i.e., uniformity) of the community. Who am I to stop anyone from believing what they want? Not that anyone has expressed a desire to curtail my freedom of expression, heavens, no. But how much "you're an ass for disagreeing with me" can one person be expected to take? Enjoy. -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (10/08/85)
In article <1843@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >.UUCP> >Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week >Lines: 50 > >>>Free will means the ability >>>to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding >>>environment, or the insides of one's own body. Think about what religionists >>>mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly >>>they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical >>>make-up: choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so. Can you >>>act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for >>>you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? [Rich Rosen] I think that it is important for people to continue to remind Rich Rosen how wrong he is about this. This analysis represents ONLY ONE of the historically conspicuous attempts to define "free will." Even as such, it is a distortion. Descartes was perhaps as far in this direction as anybody, but I don't think that even he would have claimed that free action takes place "regardless of one's physical make-up." Still, I will grant that Rich Rosen's roughly Cartesian definition has had its defenders [Yes, that's right, definitions have to be defended or criticized according to their success in capturing what people mean when they talk about a phenomenon, when that phenomenon resists facile description]. Rich Rosen should grant that there are other definitions, or at least grant that he doesn't really know. >Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide variety >of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads them to >do "wrong", makes them a sinner! Exactly what does "control" mean here? Todd Moody {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody Philosophy Department St. Joseph's U. Philadelphia, PA 19131
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (10/12/85)
Rich Rosen: > Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide > variety of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads > them to do "wrong", makes them a sinner! I cannot express in words my > revulsion to such a philosophy, that people who do "wrong" because of what > their brains have come to be are "sinners" (and thus, I assume, "worthy" > of some form of punishment either from a deity or from human beings in > power). I know certain people hold this philosophy near and dear to > their hearts, but I think this just goes to show that this is an example > of building a system of thought where you can take credit for whatever > good happens to you while blaming others for their "evil". Work backwards > from the goal of blaming people and being able to punish them for being > "bad", and you get this. Right off the bat in this passage there is a clear and obvious contradiction. A person's internal state, in the absence of "free will souls", IS the person. I can't lead them to do anything; it does it directly. And the fact that there are some deterministic influences does not imply that the inner state is not responsible in and of itself in some fashion (and thus, that the person is responsible). To compound these errors, we have this little diatribe against what can only be described as a parody of bad Christian theology. To be charitable, I will take this statement as washed of much of its absurdity. I'm still faced with the fact that Rich appears to be swayed more by the possible abuse of an idea, or even its direct implications, rather than by truth. If the rule of sin holds, and there is a God who judges, then it is so, regardless of anyone's revulsion or any other emotion. Perhaps this is what Rich really thinks; but if it is so, he is hardly one to run about shouting "Wishful Thinking!" at his opponents. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/18/85)
>>Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide >>variety of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads >>them to do "wrong", makes them a sinner! I cannot express in words my >>revulsion to such a philosophy, that people who do "wrong" because of what >>their brains have come to be are "sinners" (and thus, I assume, "worthy" >>of some form of punishment either from a deity or from human beings in >>power). I know certain people hold this philosophy near and dear to >>their hearts, but I think this just goes to show that this is an example >>of building a system of thought where you can take credit for whatever >>good happens to you while blaming others for their "evil". Work backwards >>from the goal of blaming people and being able to punish them for being >>"bad", and you get this. [ROSEN] > Right off the bat in this passage there is a clear and obvious > contradiction. A person's internal state, in the absence of "free will > souls", IS the person. I can't lead them to do anything; it does it > directly. And the fact that there are some deterministic influences does > not imply that the inner state is not responsible in and of itself in some > fashion (and thus, that the person is responsible). [WINGATE] Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that internal state into various forms) is "responsible" for anything it does despite the fact that it is not responsible for becoming the way it is, which may mean a state in which it is unable to make reasoned decisions. I call this proposition a vacuous assertion. If a person has learned through religious indoctrination or any other means to be unable to make conscious rational decisions, if they have not learned such methods for making such decisions, how on earth could a reasonable thinking person hold them responsible? Obviously a lot of people want to do so, because that enables them to engage in various forms of blame and punishment for wrongdoing. (Which "contradiction" were you talking about?) > To compound these errors, we have this little diatribe against what can only > be described as a parody of bad Christian theology. To be charitable, I > will take this statement as washed of much of its absurdity. I'm still > faced with the fact that Rich appears to be swayed more by the possible > abuse of an idea, or even its direct implications, rather than by truth. When Charles learns a way to dissociate an idea from its direct implications, I will nominate him for a Nobel Prize. Until then, I will continue to associate ideas with their direct logical implications, and will continue to be wary of how certain ideas build in that potential for abuse. As (I would think) we all should. Charles, I only wish it was a parody. > If the rule of sin holds, and there is a God who judges, then it is so, > regardless of anyone's revulsion or any other emotion. Perhaps this is what > Rich really thinks; but if it is so, he is hardly one to run about shouting > "Wishful Thinking!" at his opponents. But since "the rule of sin" and the "god who judges" are just your assumptions, I have every right to express revulsion at the notion that such assumptions should be the basis by which laws are formulated and by which human beings are judged and restricted. Charles' peculiar insistence that I am somehow wishfulthinking away the "truth" that god exists offers a substantiation of why his beliefs are rightly called wishful thinking. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/22/85)
> Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten > to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that > internal state into various forms) is "responsible" for anything it does > despite the fact that it is not responsible for becoming the way it is, > which may mean a state in which it is unable to make reasoned decisions. > I call this proposition a vacuous assertion. [Rich Rosen] Why? What's the rosenist definition of "responsibility"? Does it require a soul or something? Responsibility is accountability, a measure of participation in a causal chain. Don't you believe in causality? > If a person has learned > through religious indoctrination or any other means to be unable to make > conscious rational decisions, if they have not learned such methods for > making such decisions, how on earth could a reasonable thinking person > hold them responsible? If your thesis of materialistic determinism is correct, it can hardly matter whether a person is capable of reason or not. > Obviously a lot of people want to do so, because > that enables them to engage in various forms of blame and punishment for > wrongdoing. As long as you're interested in talking about motives, Rich, do you take pleasure in punishing people? Did your parents? You seem to have this strange vision of the world as an endless sea of sadistic disciplinarians. Or is it important to you to feel free of responsibility for something you have (or haven't) done? Baba
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (10/25/85)
>Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten >to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that >internal state into various forms).. But does past history, in fact, determine `present state'? If a great deal of recent scientific research and theory in biology, chemistry, and physics is true, your pet behaviorist theories must be tossed into the Humean flames! Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? SMASH SKINNERISM!! -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/30/85)
>>Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten >>to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that >>internal state into various forms).. > But does past history, in fact, determine `present state'? Of course. > If a great deal of recent scientific research and theory in biology, > chemistry, and physics is true, your pet behaviorist theories > must be tossed into the Humean flames! By Hume-an beings? > Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? Because the bulk of psychology department intelligentsia find the notions repugnant, and have done their best to rid psychology curricula of the abominable notions! (Otherwise, wouldn't we have heard the grand debunking round the world?) > SMASH SKINNERISM!! Why not just reply to all my articles in the future with the following: Rosen is wrong because he believes in Skinnerism, which I don't like, in determinism, which I also don't like, etc. and thus he is completely and utterly wrong. Nahh! -- Life is complex. It has real and imaginary parts. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (10/31/85)
>>>Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten >>>to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that >>>internal state into various forms).. > >> But does past history, in fact, determine `present state'? > >Of course. WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots WeAretheRobots ... >> If a great deal of recent scientific research and theory in biology, >> chemistry, and physics is true, your pet behaviorist theories >> must be tossed into the Humean flames! > >By Hume-an beings? Frankly, Rich, I'd think you'd like Hume a great deal. He was one of the first philosophers who was successful at systematically doubting everything, including science. Besides labeling causality a superstition (albeit more reasonable than most), he doubted religion, morality, mind -- everything! After over 200 years, his treatment of causality and empirical induction is amazingly valid. His positions on morality and mind are likewise starkly modern and free of theistic or subjective arguments. BTW, the `Humean flames' refer to one of his most memorable quotations: Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? NO. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? NO. Commit it to flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. Hume no doubt believed that past history determined present state (incidentally, he did not believe in free will and offered determinstic arguments similar to yours). However, in his time, there was no empirical evidence otherwise. Today, the strong forms of determinism all require metaphysical `hidden variables', and even then, the resulting determinism bears little resemblance to old fashioned causal determinism, which has PROVABLY been tossed into the same flames Newton's absolute space and time. Bohr's minimal indeterministic interpretation carries the least metaphysical baggage, and I suspect Hume would have endorsed it over the `metaphysical' deterministic theories you apparently prefer. >> Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? > >Because the bulk of psychology department intelligentsia find the notions >repugnant, and have done their best to rid psychology curricula of the >abominable notions! (Otherwise, wouldn't we have heard the grand >debunking round the world?) It must be a conspiracy then, among those in psychology, biology, biochemistry, and quantum mechanics to suppress the poor martyred Skinnerists. It'd sound great in the National Enquirer. >> SMASH SKINNERISM!! > >Why not just reply to all my articles in the future with the following: > >Rosen is wrong because he believes in Skinnerism, which I don't like, >in determinism, which I also don't like, etc. and thus he is completely >and utterly wrong. Nahh! But Skinnerism CONTRADICTS modern science. At best, any argument which is based on Skinnerism is based on little better than faith in the literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Even belief in a Spinozan supreme being at least does not contradict science. (although, no doubt, Hume would have tossed God into those same flames!) And whereas Skinner's dogma on scientific issues is often merely wrong, his grandiose moral, philosophical, and political issues, based is it is on the most discredited of his scientific presuppositions, betrays an analytical disability of almost Velikovskian microencephalism. Skinner's specialist mentality was simply unable to comprehend anything outside of his tiny Skinnerbox brainset. Please note -- I have no more quarrel with behaviorism as a useful methodology than I do, with, say, Christian Science faith healing. All approaches that do not propose evil things (such as killing people) and stand a reasonable chance of producing results should be encouraged. In fact, I highly respect his findings where they are properly seen under the light of his restricted methodology, just as I accept the results, if not the entire theory behind, holistic medicine. It is the intolerant quality of Skinnerian behaviorism, a blight whose strict dogma stunted all other kinds of psychological research right up until the 50's that I thoroughly detest. For decades, any scientific attempt to analyze mental phenomena on their own terms was labeled pseudoscience. Most appalling of all is that his lunacy should has become a pop religion for those who, apparently, would like to have all questions answered in a single set of scriptures. Only Fundamentalist Christians and Ayn-Randian `Libertarians' have less ability to think, being fed incredibly narrow minded pabulum that purports to be a cure for all possible problems! In summary, I dislike Skinner's dogma because: (1) It is in conflict with nearly everything in science since 1930. (2) It effectively barred scientific advance along paths that have been extremely effective (eg- Chomsky's transformational grammar with mentalistic notions such as `deep structure') (3) His incompetent proposals for grandiose social and moral codes in which those of his specialty would be in total control. He would have brute-forced his anti-free-will doctrine onto society BY BRAINWASHING in order to `make' his theories become `true', had he been given the opportunity! (4) Many fine people, like you, have been brainwished to the point where they are unwilling and unable to openly examine other competing theories. In your case, entire semantic dimensions of your vocabulary have been excised! For example, in your vocabulary: mind = free will = soul = responsibility = autonomy = deus ex machina = {blame/praise}-worthiness = irrationality = antiscience = the evil of {religion,Nazism...} On the other hand, I do agree with his distaste for old time morality and terms like guilt, sin, punishment, and so on. Sadly, his shoddy thinking did much to discredit his good ideas. SMASH SKINNERISM!! -michael
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/02/85)
In article <1993@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? >Because the bulk of psychology department intelligentsia find the notions >repugnant, and have done their best to rid psychology curricula of the >abominable notions! (Otherwise, wouldn't we have heard the grand >debunking round the world?) Well, those of us who read even so lowly a scientific journal as S. American are aware that Strict Behaviorism is basically a dead theory. Rich's speculation in the first sentence is quite obviously a piece of that wishful thinking he so roundly deplores, since his accusation is obviously unfalsifiable, and indeed bears all the marks of a "conspiracy theory" explanation. If one knows any psychology faculty, one quickly learns that pschology types have earned their reputation for fighting over matters such as these. So I can hardly credit Rich's rationalization with any truth. Charley Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/02/85)
>>>>Hmmm, this is an intriguing proposition. The internal state, having gotten >>>>to be the way it is (with indoctrination and conditioning leading that >>>>internal state into various forms).. >>> But does past history, in fact, determine `present state'? >>Of course. > WeAretheRobots > WeAretheRobots > WeAretheRobots > ... [ELLIS] The fact that you respond to what I said, not with substance, but with vague emotional rhetoric (insisting that anyone who would DARE to believe this is a "robot", and thus [because you also insist that a human is not a "machine"] INhuman!!), says it all, Michael. >>> If a great deal of recent scientific research and theory in biology, >>> chemistry, and physics is true, your pet behaviorist theories >>> must be tossed into the Humean flames! >>By Hume-an beings? > Frankly, Rich, I'd think you'd like Hume a great deal. He was one of the > first philosophers who was successful at systematically doubting > everything, including science. Besides labeling causality a superstition > (albeit more reasonable than most), he doubted religion, morality, mind -- > everything! I'm glad you think I "would" like him. Obviously you can dish out your little "jokes" (quotes most necessary, unfortunately), but you can't take them in return. > Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? > NO. > Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact > and existence? > NO. > Commit it to flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and > illusion. When do you start? :-) > Hume no doubt believed that past history determined present state > (incidentally, he did not believe in free will ... Perhaps because he understood the definition? (I shouldn't be belittling you, Michael, for definition-changing games. If anything, you are one of the few people here who understands such things. Rather than changing the definition to "get" what you want, which is a dishonest rhetorical trick, you change the premises to get to "acausality". What you miss, however, is that acausality cannot get you free will. Free will requires an active agent of first cause making the choices, unaffected by other causes of the material world. Yet it must be a WILLFUL agent, one of deliberateness that causes other things to happen. Acausality may be a necessary condition, but it is far from sufficient, and other internal contradictions make it effectively impossible, acausality or not. >>> Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? >>Because the bulk of psychology department intelligentsia find the notions >>repugnant, and have done their best to rid psychology curricula of the >>abominable notions! (Otherwise, wouldn't we have heard the grand >>debunking round the world?) > It must be a conspiracy then, among those in psychology, biology, > biochemistry, and quantum mechanics to suppress the poor martyred > Skinnerists. It'd sound great in the National Enquirer. It'd sound better in the Skeptical Inquirer. Note, readers, that the grand debunking (which should be so simple a child could understand it, no?) is not forthcoming from Michael. Could it be that there is none, that it IS just wishful thinking? Yes, there is a passive conspiracy "I don't like that, we cannot be THAT way" presumptions, not among particular groups, but among people in general. >>> SMASH SKINNERISM!! >>Why not just reply to all my articles in the future with the following: >> >>Rosen is wrong because he believes in Skinnerism, which I don't like, >>in determinism, which I also don't like, etc. and thus he is completely >>and utterly wrong. Nahh! > But Skinnerism CONTRADICTS modern science. At best, any argument > which is based on Skinnerism is based on little better than faith > in the literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Even belief in > a Spinozan supreme being at least does not contradict science. > (although, no doubt, Hume would have tossed God into those same flames!) Nice set of assertions. It DOES, it DOES contradict... > And whereas Skinner's dogma on scientific issues is often merely wrong, > his grandiose moral, philosophical, and political issues, based is it > is on the most discredited of his scientific presuppositions, betrays an > analytical disability of almost Velikovskian microencephalism. Skinner's > specialist mentality was simply unable to comprehend anything outside of > his tiny Skinnerbox brainset. And so on... You have succeeded in convincing me that here is a man whose writing is worth reading, through your persistent insistence without evidence that he is simply wrong because you don't like what he has to say. > It is the intolerant quality of Skinnerian behaviorism, a blight whose > strict dogma stunted all other kinds of psychological research right up > until the 50's that I thoroughly detest. From your own writing, and from that of others, it sounds more like it's the other way around. > In summary, I dislike Skinner's dogma because: > > (1) It is in conflict with nearly everything in science since 1930. > (2) It effectively barred scientific advance along paths that > have been extremely effective (eg- Chomsky's transformational > grammar with mentalistic notions such as `deep structure') > (3) His incompetent proposals for grandiose social and moral > codes in which those of his specialty would be in total control. > He would have brute-forced his anti-free-will doctrine onto > society BY BRAINWASHING in order to `make' his theories become > `true', had he been given the opportunity! > (4) Many fine people, like you, have been brainwished to the point where > they are unwilling and unable to openly examine other competing > theories. In your case, entire semantic dimensions of your > vocabulary have been excised! For example, in your vocabulary: > > mind = free will = soul = responsibility = autonomy = > deus ex machina = {blame/praise}-worthiness = irrationality = > antiscience = the evil of {religion,Nazism...} You mean in your analysis of my vocabulary! You mean as a result of YOUR having been brainwashed (or, as you called it, brainwished) by your own set of presumptions. Don't you? > On the other hand, I do agree with his distaste for old time > morality and terms like guilt, sin, punishment, and so on. Sadly, > his shoddy thinking did much to discredit his good ideas. You mean the labelling of his thinkin as shoddy had that effect. -- "Mrs. Peel, we're needed..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (11/04/85)
>> Hume no doubt believed that past history determined present state >> (incidentally, he did not believe in free will ... [ELLIS] > >Perhaps because he understood The Definition? [ROSEN] Hume well understood that there is an "essential ambiguity" in the term "liberty" (or words to that effect -- I don't have my copy handy). In Hume's view, that is why the dispute had not been resolved -- there is no The Definition. He described a common understanding of "liberty" as "a power of acting or not acting, according to our will: which is universally allowed [i.e. acknowledged to be the case]" (approximate quote). So the statement that Hume did not believe in free will is not true without qualification. [ROSEN] >(I shouldn't be belittling >you, Michael, for definition-changing games. If anything, you are one of the >few people here who understands such things. Rather than changing the >definition to "get" what you want, which is a dishonest rhetorical trick, you >change the premises to get to "acausality". What you miss, however, is >that acausality cannot get you free will. Free will requires an active >agent of first cause making the choices, unaffected by other causes of the >material world. Yet it must be a WILLFUL agent, one of deliberateness >that causes other things to happen. Once again: Rich Rosen is the only person in this newsgroup, to my knowledge, who is claiming either that people possess or that they do not possess "free will." In other words, he is the only person who is doing what he accuses everyone else of doing, namely, arbitrarily defining "free will" in order to "get [rid of]" free will. When writing future articles, Rich, please ask yourself whether your article arbitrarily defines free will in order to obtain a wished-for conclusion (the nonexistence of free will). If so, commit it then to net.flame: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. -- Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/05/85)
>>> Why do you suppose Strict Behaviorism is obsolete? >>Because the bulk of psychology department intelligentsia find the notions >>repugnant, and have done their best to rid psychology curricula of the >>abominable notions! (Otherwise, wouldn't we have heard the grand >>debunking round the world?) > Well, those of us who read even so lowly a scientific journal as S. American > are aware that Strict Behaviorism is basically a dead theory. Rich's > speculation in the first sentence is quite obviously a piece of that wishful > thinking he so roundly deplores, since his accusation is obviously > unfalsifiable, and indeed bears all the marks of a "conspiracy theory" > explanation. Then where IS the grand debunking, Charles? Without it, there's no wishful thinking involved. > If one knows any psychology faculty, one quickly learns that > pschology types have earned their reputation for fighting over matters such > as these. So I can hardly credit Rich's rationalization with any truth. You, Charles, I never look to for "credit" for my "rationalizations". -- "Mrs. Peel, we're needed..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr