mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (10/25/85)
In article <1951@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > Responsibility has come to mean two things. First, as >Baba says, there is the "measure of participation in a causal chain". >X is responsible for Y if X caused Y to happen. But then Baba adds in >"accountability", which really has nothing to do with THIS definition of >responsibility. Well it does if you take accountability in the sense of indicating where the behavior could effectively have been different. This bears upon the following: > Yet responsibility has come to mean "charged with the duty >of accomplishing/not accomplishing something, taking the credit for 'good' >things accomplished, and taking the blame for 'bad' things accomplished (or >'good' things not accomplished)". If perchance we were able to create >a sentient machine, and we conditioned/programmed it to kill someone, would >the machine be "responsible" for the death of the person? NOT just in that >first sense of "participation in a causal chain", but in the second sense >of taking the blame for what occurred? How can you impose blame on a >non-self-determining entity? Well, first one has to separate conditioning from programming. Advertisements are certainly a form of conditioning, but they are resistable. If one goes out and buys something because of an ad, we still hold them responsible because they chose to believe it. Responsibility is generally connected to choice. If one can't choose, then one cannot be responsible. (I'm not concerned with legal responsibility, since it worries about rationality and other concerns which aren't immediately important.) So at least from one point of view, a deterministic entity cannot responsible. On the other hand, responsibility still exists, although in a vastly different fashion, in a deterministic world. In this case it is just as Rich says; it emanates from human feelings of guilt and pride. It is the common principle behind the statements "it was my fault" and "I'm proud of my work", regardless of whether these feelings are "justified". So discussion of responsibility is still possible, although now it must concern itself with the evocation of these feelings rather than with their justification. Note, however, that this moves you into a curiously amoral grey area. One talks about guilt as a motivating factor, and how to evoke it. It ceases to become a symptom of a moral dilemma, and becomes instead a mere psychological tool. >> If your thesis of materialistic determinism is correct, it can hardly >> matter whether a person is capable of reason or not. >Oh, but clearly it does. The person you are today exists as a result of >all your experience that came before. If today you can think rationally, >it is because you were taught to use your brain in a maximal fashion from >early on in childhood, and have had that behavior reinforced by the positive >results it offers in interfacing with reality. Or because your mind naturally inclines to this mode. As best I know, this question hasn't been adequately resolved. One must also note that use of reason is invariably suspended in many circumstances, which suggests that things are more complicated then Rich seems willing to admit. > If today you are a mass >murderer, is it because you "made a conscious free decision" to become a >mass murderer? Or because those previous experiences led you to your >current state? You saw your parents behaving violently and learned that this >was "acceptable". You grew up behaving violently and had that behavior >reinforced by the success of behaving violently. You learned that acting >violently when things don't go your way is acceptable behavior. Etc. >Which is it? Both. One has to choose to learn, after all. One thing which is characteristic of psychology is that its results (thus far) can only be stated in terms of statistical trends. Correlations are almost invariably quite fuzzy. Most children of violent homes do not grow up to be mass murderers; perhaps most do not murder at all. The children of thieves are not invariably thieves. There's clearly some process going on which often overrides the supposed conditioning. >> As long as you're interested in talking about motives, Rich, do you take >> pleasure in punishing people? Did your parents? You seem to have this >> strange vision of the world as an endless sea of sadistic disciplinarians. >I do? Obviously the people who formulate such notions as societal rules >see things that way. Look at the Christian motif of "man is fallen, we are >all evil and need to be regulated and controlled, and if we're not good >we should be punished". The sea isn't endless, but I still haven't seen the >other coastline yet. This notion permeates a good deal of western law: >you do something wrong, YOU are a bad person who should be punished. That >may not be the hallmark of "sadistic discplinarians", but it hardly sounds >like the actions of rational people to me. Once Clarence Darrow made the mistake of making this kind of argument in court, to which the judge replied that if you take away responsibility for the crime, you also take away responsibility for the punishment too (althoug, being wise and learned, he said much more pithily). And once again I will only note upon Rich's gross misconception of christianity as whatever Jerry Falwell (or pick your favorite Fundamentalist demagogue) believes in. But to return to the first point: there is almost invariably an inconsistency in this sort of argument; Rich acts as if we are free when we apply reasoning (what ever that is) and not free when, for instance, we do something conditioned. Under Rich's assumptions, reasoning is just another conditioning force (and a poor one at that, by his own admission). Why should we be concerned with the truth of reason? The only argument which to my mind holds any water here is (I believe it was suggest by Paul Torek) that it is evolutionarily advantageous for reasoning to be true. One could then quite reasonably ask why all the non-rational and irrational modes persist, unless they too are somehow advantageous. Either way, truth becomes a much less precious commodity. >If what I say is false, regarding the way experience and >exposure to the rest of the world leads you (conditions you) to become what >you become, why do we bother with parenting, with attempting to imbue >positive values in children, guiding that conditioning process toward a >goal of a mature rational adult? Hell, by your reasoning, it doesn't >matter what we do as parents. If we smoke in front of our kids, if we >show violence and anger as acceptable behaviors, if we act dishonestly >or hatefully when we serve as examples to our children, they are still >"responsible" for what they do as adults, right? It wasn't OUR fault >that the kid is now a delinquent, or a failure, or a murderer, or a hacker... Well, if what you say is true, then we have no choice but to do whatever we do as parents, so you can hardly fault the bad ones, or praise the good-- unless of course you want to consider it in terms of manipulation, something you swore off of just this week. From my point of view, their's plenty of blame to spread around. The bad parents have some responsibility, but, given that many kids overcome such disadvantages, some of the responsibility has to hew to the kid too. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "I say this because I want to be prime minister of Canada someday." - M. Fox
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/30/85)
>> Responsibility has come to mean two things. First, as >>Baba says, there is the "measure of participation in a causal chain". >>X is responsible for Y if X caused Y to happen. But then Baba adds in >>"accountability", which really has nothing to do with THIS definition of >>responsibility. [ROSEN] > Well it does if you take accountability in the sense of indicating where the > behavior could effectively have been different. [WINGATE] "Could have been different"? Given a completely different universe, may-be. But we are talking about the universe in which what happened happened, because of the configuration of your behavior patterning. >> Yet responsibility has come to mean "charged with the duty >>of accomplishing/not accomplishing something, taking the credit for 'good' >>things accomplished, and taking the blame for 'bad' things accomplished (or >>'good' things not accomplished)". If perchance we were able to create >>a sentient machine, and we conditioned/programmed it to kill someone, would >>the machine be "responsible" for the death of the person? NOT just in that >>first sense of "participation in a causal chain", but in the second sense >>of taking the blame for what occurred? How can you impose blame on a >>non-self-determining entity? > Well, first one has to separate conditioning from programming. > Advertisements are certainly a form of conditioning, but they are > resistable. If one goes out and buys something because of an ad, we still > hold them responsible because they chose to believe it. They are resistable for YOU because you are aware of what they are. They may not be so resistable for other people. Just as I find wishful religious propaganda resistable (because I have learned not to make certain bogus assumptions), while you, Charles, do not find it so. > Responsibility is generally connected to choice. If one can't choose, then > one cannot be responsible. (I'm not concerned with legal responsibility, > since it worries about rationality and other concerns which aren't > immediately important.) Odd definition of "immediate". Are they important yet? ... How about now? I find the issue of paramount importance. > at least from one point of view, a deterministic entity cannot responsible. > On the other hand, responsibility still exists, although in a vastly > different fashion, in a deterministic world. In this case it is just as > Rich says; it emanates from human feelings of guilt and pride. It is the > common principle behind the statements "it was my fault" and "I'm proud of > my work", regardless of whether these feelings are "justified". So > discussion of responsibility is still possible, although now it must concern > itself with the evocation of these feelings rather than with their > justification. Note, however, that this moves you into a curiously amoral > grey area. One talks about guilt as a motivating factor, and how to evoke > it. It ceases to become a symptom of a moral dilemma, and becomes instead a > mere psychological tool. You noticed! But this is hardly an "amoral" area, for moralist are forever concerned with the "need" for guilt and fear in certain moral systems, and the requirement that moral systems induce such phenomena in order to be effective (e.g., Dubuc on why morality should be religious in nature). The fact remains: can we use something that we cannot justify as a reason for "punishing" people? >>> If your thesis of materialistic determinism is correct, it can hardly >>> matter whether a person is capable of reason or not. >>Oh, but clearly it does. The person you are today exists as a result of >>all your experience that came before. If today you can think rationally, >>it is because you were taught to use your brain in a maximal fashion from >>early on in childhood, and have had that behavior reinforced by the positive >>results it offers in interfacing with reality. > Or because your mind naturally inclines to this mode. Or a combination of both. Perhaps THIS is an assumption, but I tend to think that any reasonably intelligent human being has the ability to interface to reality in this mode, if properly exposed to methodologies of thought that induce this. > As best I know, this question hasn't been adequately resolved. One must > also note that use of reason is invariably suspended in many circumstances, > which suggests that things are more complicated then Rich seems willing to > admit. So? I question your use of "invariably", but certainly in many reasonable people reason is sometimes suspended. >> If today you are a mass >>murderer, is it because you "made a conscious free decision" to become a >>mass murderer? Or because those previous experiences led you to your >>current state? You saw your parents behaving violently and learned that this >>was "acceptable". You grew up behaving violently and had that behavior >>reinforced by the success of behaving violently. You learned that acting >>violently when things don't go your way is acceptable behavior. Etc. >>Which is it? > Both. One has to choose to learn, after all. One thing which is > characteristic of psychology is that its results (thus far) can only be > stated in terms of statistical trends. Correlations are almost invariably > quite fuzzy. Most children of violent homes do not grow up to be mass > murderers; perhaps most do not murder at all. The children of thieves are > not invariably thieves. There's clearly some process going on which often > overrides the supposed conditioning. Yes, OTHER conditioning, other opportunities. Cause and effect is very simple, but often the number and configuration of causes that produces an effect is very complex (some assume that in such a case, the "supernatural" is involved, or "acausality"...). PLUS each person is different (even child from parent), and the exact same circumstances may be reacted to very differently by two people. BOTH because of innate genetic differences AND learned behavioral differences. >>Obviously the people who formulate such notions as societal rules >>see things that way. Look at the Christian motif of "man is fallen, we are >>all evil and need to be regulated and controlled, and if we're not good >>we should be punished". The sea isn't endless, but I still haven't seen the >>other coastline yet. This notion permeates a good deal of western law: >>you do something wrong, YOU are a bad person who should be punished. That >>may not be the hallmark of "sadistic discplinarians", but it hardly sounds >>like the actions of rational people to me. > Once Clarence Darrow made the mistake of making this kind of argument in > court, to which the judge replied that if you take away responsibility for > the crime, you also take away responsibility for the punishment too > (althoug, being wise and learned, he said much more pithily). And obviously you missed the article I posted months ago rebuttinng this judge's notions and showing what a piss-poor judge he was. (When someone else---was it you?---posted the same story.) Simply put, the very idea behind having a system of justice in the first place is to administer fair treatment. If we have knowledge of what fair treatment is, it is up to the system of justice to provide it, otherwise it is not performing its function. To deliberately not do this is exactly equivalent to a judge allowing and supporting lynchings, because "it's in people's nature to do it". Darrow was absolutely right, but true justice would not have been to set his client free, but to assist him in leading a non-criminal life. > And once again I will only note upon Rich's gross misconception of > christianity as whatever Jerry Falwell (or pick your favorite Fundamentalist > demagogue) believes in. And what you seem to believe in as well, Charles, as evidence by your very actions and statements here. As always, you assert "me, I'm not a fundmentalist", which makes it all the more scary. > But to return to the first point: there is almost > invariably an inconsistency in this sort of argument; Rich acts as if we are > free when we apply reasoning (what ever that is) and not free when, for > instance, we do something conditioned. Under Rich's assumptions, reasoning > is just another conditioning force (and a poor one at that, by his own > admission). 1) When did I admit that reasoning is a poor conditioning force? 2) When did I say anything about being "free" when applying reason but not free otherwise? I think that's Torek's belief, but it's not mine. > Why should we be concerned with the truth of reason? The only > argument which to my mind holds any water here is (I believe it was suggest > by Paul Torek) that it is evolutionarily advantageous for reasoning to be > true. One could then quite reasonably ask why all the non-rational and > irrational modes persist, unless they too are somehow advantageous. Either > way, truth becomes a much less precious commodity. Nonsense. The best adaptive traits survive better than those less adaptive traits, not "to their exclusion". Reasoning is evolutionarily advantageous for precisely one reason: it works in giving us an accurate picture of the world we live in and the means to deal with it, when applied thoroughly. >>If what I say is false, regarding the way experience and >>show violence and anger as acceptable behaviors, if we act dishonestly >>or hatefully when we serve as examples to our children, they are still >>"responsible" for what they do as adults, right? It wasn't OUR fault >>that the kid is now a delinquent, or a failure, or a murderer, or a hacker... > Well, if what you say is true, then we have no choice but to do whatever we > do as parents, so you can hardly fault the bad ones, or praise the good-- > unless of course you want to consider it in terms of manipulation, something > you swore off of just this week. "This week"? One can't swear off something one doesn't engage in, Charles. However, you are always free to do so yourself at any time. I fail to see any point being made here by you. You're absolutely right, we have no choice but to do whatever we do. That goes for parents, too. So no "blame" or "punishment" is in order. Does this mean we have a vicious cycle? Possibly. But vicious cycles have been broken before, through dissemination of better information and learning, especially when it comes to learning about parenting. > From my point of view, their's plenty of > blame to spread around. The bad parents have some responsibility, but, > given that many kids overcome such disadvantages, some of the responsibility > has to hew to the kid too. Ah, the old saw: I (or "he/she") "overcame" all this, so why can't these other people do the same? For a very good reason: if they could, they would, but their circumstances are simply very different from other people (even those who did "overcome"), and you can't boldly assert that "I/he/she did it, therefore..." That is a fallacy, especially when you lack all the data necessary to make such a judgment. --
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/01/85)
In article <1988@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> at least from one point of view, a deterministic entity cannot responsible. >> On the other hand, responsibility still exists, although in a vastly >> different fashion, in a deterministic world. In this case it is just as >> Rich says; it emanates from human feelings of guilt and pride. It is the >> common principle behind the statements "it was my fault" and "I'm proud of >> my work", regardless of whether these feelings are "justified". So >> discussion of responsibility is still possible, although now it must >> concern itself with the evocation of these feelings rather than with their >> justification. Note, however, that this moves you into a curiously amoral >> grey area. One talks about guilt as a motivating factor, and how to evoke >> it. It ceases to become a symptom of a moral dilemma, and becomes instead >> a mere psychological tool. >You noticed! But this is hardly an "amoral" area, for moralist are forever >concerned with the "need" for guilt and fear in certain moral systems, and >the requirement that moral systems induce such phenomena in order to be >effective (e.g., Dubuc on why morality should be religious in nature). The >fact remains: can we use something that we cannot justify as a reason for >"punishing" people? Sure. Everything is now a conditioning stimulus, so the question is not "is it moral?" but "does it acheive the results I want?" It's all a question of whether you resist the moral conditioning of others. >>>[Rich asks whether mass murderers become what they are through choice or >>> conditioning.] >> Both. One has to choose to learn, after all. One thing which is >> characteristic of psychology is that its results (thus far) can only be >> stated in terms of statistical trends. Correlations are almost invariably >> quite fuzzy. Most children of violent homes do not grow up to be mass >> murderers; perhaps most do not murder at all. The children of thieves are >> not invariably thieves. There's clearly some process going on which often >> overrides the supposed conditioning. >Yes, OTHER conditioning, other opportunities. Cause and effect is very >simple, but often the number and configuration of causes that produces an >effect is very complex (some assume that in such a case, the "supernatural" >is involved, or "acausality"...). PLUS each person is different (even >child from parent), and the exact same circumstances may be reacted to >very differently by two people. BOTH because of innate genetic differences >AND learned behavioral differences. A nice bit of speculation-- utterly ungrounded in experimentation. Consider the hypothesis that these conditioning stimuli are fed into the mind/brain, which is a randomizing process, and that THIS is what produces the distributions. One can of course mix the two, but a) it quite apparent that in our present state of knowledge either represents the data and b) the data rules out neither. Personally, considering the omnipresence of apparently random behavior at every scale, especially at the cellular level, I tend to prefer the second. >> Once Clarence Darrow made the mistake of making this kind of argument in >> court, to which the judge replied that if you take away responsibility for >> the crime, you also take away responsibility for the punishment too >> (althoug, being wise and learned, he said much more pithily). > Simply put, the very idea >behind having a system of justice in the first place is to administer fair >treatment. If we have knowledge of what fair treatment is, it is up to >the system of justice to provide it, otherwise it is not performing its >function. To deliberately not do this is exactly equivalent to a judge >allowing and supporting lynchings, because "it's in people's nature to do >it". Darrow was absolutely right, but true justice would not have been >to set his client free, but to assist him in leading a non-criminal life. Well, first of all, in your ignorance of the whole story you have manufactured a lot of untruth. In the original story, Darrow's defendant was plainly guilty. This wild nonsense about lynching is just a fabrication having nothing to do with the matter. The argument is "You have no moral argument against me, because I was conditioned;" and the only possible reply is "we are conditioned too, and so YOU have no moral argument either." There simply is no way for you to absolve the criminal without at the same time absolving the judge, regardless of whether the judge is acting rightly or wrongly. There is a consistent iconsistency in Rich's position here, as though we who are educated (or however priveleged) have free will, and can be held responsible, whereas those such as criminals or the masses he lords it over lack free will. I thought there was no free will up here either, according to Rich's system. >> But to return to the first point: there is almost >> invariably an inconsistency in this sort of argument; Rich acts as if we >> are free when we apply reasoning (what ever that is) and not free when, for >> instance, we do something conditioned. Under Rich's assumptions, reasoning >> is just another conditioning force (and a poor one at that, by his own >> admission). >1) When did I admit that reasoning is a poor conditioning force? Because it fails to work so often! :-) (You have asserted that we don't listen to you, haven't you Rich?) >2) When did I say anything about being "free" when applying reason but not > free otherwise? One gets the opinion that we should listen to your arguments, even though you are forced to believe in them by your previous conditioning. Is there really any reason why we should take that as truth? (THere's a trap in that sentence, by the way.) [Concerning parents and children, and manipulation as the true nature of argument] >"This week"? One can't swear off something one doesn't engage in, Charles. Oh, but you do. The argument you are making is a conditioning stimulus, and therefore represents a conscious effort on your part to manipulate my mind. Anyway... > You're absolutely right, we have no >choice but to do whatever we do. That goes for parents, too. So no >"blame" or "punishment" is in order. Does this mean we have a vicious >cycle? Possibly. But vicious cycles have been broken before, through >dissemination of better information and learning, especially when it comes >to learning about parenting. It's the same cycle. Information and learning are, again, manipulative stimuli for the purpose of altering the minds of others. The fact that we now engage in it consciously doesn't matter much, especially since the unconscious stimuli continue (and indeed, one solid result of psychology is that clashes between the two types are in themselves a most powerful stimulus). Charley Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/05/85)
>>>at least from one point of view, a deterministic entity cannot responsible. >>>On the other hand, responsibility still exists, although in a vastly >>>different fashion, in a deterministic world. In this case it is just as >>>Rich says; it emanates from human feelings of guilt and pride. It is the >>>common principle behind the statements "it was my fault" and "I'm proud of >>>my work", regardless of whether these feelings are "justified". >>>Note, however, that this moves you into a curiously amoral >>>grey area. One talks about guilt as a motivating factor, and how to evoke >>>it. It ceases to become a symptom of a moral dilemma, and becomes instead >>>a mere psychological tool. >>You noticed! But this is hardly an "amoral" area, for moralist are forever >>concerned with the "need" for guilt and fear in certain moral systems, and >>the requirement that moral systems induce such phenomena in order to be >>effective (e.g., Dubuc on why morality should be religious in nature). The >>fact remains: can we use something that we cannot justify as a reason for >>"punishing" people? > Sure. Everything is now a conditioning stimulus, so the question is not "is > it moral?" but "does it acheive the results I want?" It's all a question of > whether you resist the moral conditioning of others. It sounds like you see something "wrong" in this. The "results I want" are in fact based on non-interference morality and respect for human freedom, so I fail to see what your problem with this is. And the fact remains that in a society with such a moral structure, it is in your interest to live up to such respect for other people. >>>>[Rich asks whether mass murderers become what they are through choice or >>>> conditioning.] >>> Both. One has to choose to learn, after all. One thing which is >>> characteristic of psychology is that its results (thus far) can only be >>> stated in terms of statistical trends. Correlations are almost invariably >>> quite fuzzy. Most children of violent homes do not grow up to be mass >>> murderers; perhaps most do not murder at all. The children of thieves are >>> not invariably thieves. There's clearly some process going on which often >>> overrides the supposed conditioning. >>Yes, OTHER conditioning, other opportunities. Cause and effect is very >>simple, but often the number and configuration of causes that produces an >>effect is very complex (some assume that in such a case, the "supernatural" >>is involved, or "acausality"...). PLUS each person is different (even >>child from parent), and the exact same circumstances may be reacted to >>very differently by two people. BOTH because of innate genetic differences >>AND learned behavioral differences. > A nice bit of speculation-- utterly ungrounded in experimentation. Consider > the hypothesis that these conditioning stimuli are fed into the mind/brain, > which is a randomizing process, and that THIS is what produces the > distributions. One can of course mix the two, but a) it quite apparent that > in our present state of knowledge either represents the data and b) the data > rules out neither. Personally, considering the omnipresence of apparently > random behavior at every scale, especially at the cellular level, I tend to > prefer the second. There! You've said it all. APPARENTLY random behavior. YOU (the great wisest of guts, Winga!) cannot see the interweaving patterns of cause and effect, so you ASSUME none. THIS is the speculation! THIS is the type of "reasoning" that has gone on repeatedly throughout the ages by religious wishful thinking types who, in the absence of knowledge, ASSUME their own desired conclusions. Of course you "prefer" the second! When you have some evidence to offer as to how the brain operates so very differently from the rest of the world, be sure to clue me in. >>> Once Clarence Darrow made the mistake of making this kind of argument in >>> court, to which the judge replied that if you take away responsibility for >>> the crime, you also take away responsibility for the punishment too >>> (althoug, being wise and learned, he said much more pithily). >> Simply put, the very idea >>behind having a system of justice in the first place is to administer fair >>treatment. If we have knowledge of what fair treatment is, it is up to >>the system of justice to provide it, otherwise it is not performing its >>function. To deliberately not do this is exactly equivalent to a judge >>allowing and supporting lynchings, because "it's in people's nature to do >>it". Darrow was absolutely right, but true justice would not have been >>to set his client free, but to assist him in leading a non-criminal life. > Well, first of all, in your ignorance of the whole story you have > manufactured a lot of untruth. In the original story, Darrow's defendant > was plainly guilty. I never said he wasn't. Darrow's defense was that he did indeed do the dirty deed, but that he was not responsible for engaging in the action and thus not worthy of punishment. Your stating that I am "ignorant" of the story is a fatuous rhetorical falsehood. > This wild nonsense about lynching is just a fabrication having nothing to do > with the matter. Whenever I hear someone claim "that has nothing to do with the matter", a light goes on in my head asking "Why is this person saying that?" Frankly, it has everything to do with the matter. The judge's conclusion was that, just as the defendant was (according to Darrow) not responsible for his actions, the jury (and the justice system) were not responsible for engaging in actions of punishment that THEY were conditioned to do, so who was he to stop this "natural order". By that reasoning, lynching should not be stopped either, if it should occur. If the goal of a justice system is to administer fair justice, then this judge was ill qualified to sit on a bench for making a statement like that. > The argument is "You have no moral argument against me, because I was > conditioned;" and the only possible reply is "we are conditioned too, and so > YOU have no moral argument either." The only possible reply that YOU see. I just gave another reply, related to what the notion of system of justice is all about. > There simply is no way for you to absolve the criminal without at the same > time absolving the judge, regardless of whether the judge is acting rightly > or wrongly. There is a consistent iconsistency in Rich's position here, as > though we who are educated (or however priveleged) have free will, and can > be held responsible, whereas those such as criminals or the masses he lords > it over lack free will. I thought there was no free will up here either, > according to Rich's system. There isn't, but again it can be shown that those who think rationally and without presumptions are free of such presumptions clouding their thinking. That is exactly what a judge is supposed to be and do. The goal of a system of justice is to perform that function in that sort of rational fashion. If this weren't the case, why the need for a justice system at all; why not just let the people exercise mob justice at will? >>> But to return to the first point: there is almost >>> invariably an inconsistency in this sort of argument; Rich acts as if we >>> are free when we apply reasoning (what ever that is) and not free when, for >>> instance, we do something conditioned. Under Rich's assumptions, reasoning >>> is just another conditioning force (and a poor one at that, by his own >>> admission). >>1) When did I admit that reasoning is a poor conditioning force? > Because it fails to work so often! :-) (You have asserted that we don't > listen to you, haven't you Rich?) I never said that either. Your putting words in my mouth in this repeated way smells real bad. YTes, in fact, you don't listen, and you don't listen to ANY form of reason that might contradict your precious presumptions, but of course that's another matter entirely. I asked "when did I admit" this, and you responded with a statement I never made. >>2) When did I say anything about being "free" when applying reason but not >> free otherwise? > One gets the opinion that we should listen to your arguments, even though > you are forced to believe in them by your previous conditioning. Is there > really any reason why we should take that as truth? (THere's a trap in that > sentence, by the way.) There are "traps" in so many things you say, Charles. One always has the ability to reason. If you are unwilling to see certain reasoning, perhaps due to blockage owing to stakes in certain belief systems, argument/debate on the topic forces the presumptions to come out. Of course, you are still "free" to continuing believing what you like even in light of said reasoning, because those beliefs are so important to you that you fell you must at all cost. > [Concerning parents and children, and manipulation as the true nature of > argument] > >>"This week"? One can't swear off something one doesn't engage in, Charles. > Oh, but you do. The argument you are making is a conditioning stimulus, and > therefore represents a conscious effort on your part to manipulate my mind. What I have professed repugnance toward is manipulation that does NOT involve facts and reasoning, but rather deliberate emotional rhetoric, such as the proselytizing of small children that you have espoused and condoned. The "argument I am making" involves reasoning, thinking, NOT manipulative rhetoric. Stating facts to another person is NOT manipulating their mind. (Except perhaps to YOUR way of thinking...) >> You're absolutely right, we have no >>choice but to do whatever we do. That goes for parents, too. So no >>"blame" or "punishment" is in order. Does this mean we have a vicious >>cycle? Possibly. But vicious cycles have been broken before, through >>dissemination of better information and learning, especially when it comes >>to learning about parenting. > It's the same cycle. Information and learning are, again, manipulative > stimuli for the purpose of altering the minds of others. Now I see why you support proselytizing and other vile mindsets. You see no difference between crass manipulation without evidential support, using every dirty rhetorical trick in the book, and reasoned argument. -- "Mrs. Peel, we're needed..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr