tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (10/29/85)
[]
I recently received some comments from Laura Creighton, concerning my
"Consistency" article. I include them here, with permission:
begin(laura)
I think that what you are pointing out is that what
mathematicians mean by ``true'' and what everybody else means by
``true'' may be similar but not identical concepts.
I think that ``true'' means ``consistent with all the facts I have
available to me''. There is a need for a more rigorous definition, since
people can play word-twisitng games with this definition and say that
it is possible to not examine one's beliefs despite having evidence
which is entirely correct, but is also what I call ``weaselling''...
So, given this definition of true, you can reformat your statements to
read:
S1. Take any particular belief of mine that you choose; I hold
that belief to be consistent with all the facts I have available to me,
since that's what it means for something to *be* a belief (of a
rational person).
S2. I believe that there exists facts which are unavailable to me
now but which, if they were made available, would cause me to change
certain of my beliefs.
I think that you have eliminated the consistency problem here. What
you have lost is a belief in truth that is utterly independent of the
observer. I believe that there are such truths, but I never get to
deal with them in life (I only get truths in the context of the rest
of my experience). For that reason, I believe that for human beings
``consistency is truth''. Clearly if my set of beliefs come to approach
a list of Capital-Truth (the absolute, independent of observer kind)
then I will have a very good working set of consistency-truths for my
beliefs.
But I am not sure whether Truth exists at all except as a ``theoretical
construct'' in the same way that Black Holes may have no real existence
and that I believe Omnipotence has no real meaning. It is an extrapolation
and explanation for the fact that we can attain a high level of consistency
perhaps?
end(laura).
I think it is fair to describe Laura's position as a "coherence
theory of truth." For a coherentist theorist, truth is only definable
within sets of statements, I take it. Individual statements would
lack truth values. A false statement, on this view, would be one that
would make a contradiction derivable from the set, that would not have
been derivable had that statement not been added.
For purposes of analysis, regard someone's belief system as the set of
propositions to which that person would assent. When contradictions
become apparent, a rational individual rejects the smallest possible
number of propositions required to remove the inconsistency. This
ranking process is necessary to keep the coherence theory from
licensing the rejection of tremendous portions of the belief system
for the sake of isolated incongruities. Nothing said so far requires
that truth be defined as a relation between statements and
mind-independent reality.
But I am not clear about what Laura means by "facts", since these, on
the face of it, appear to be observer-independent Truths. If that is
the case, then the inconsistency is reintroduced after all.
Todd Moody | {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department |
St. Joseph's U. | "I couldn't fail to
Philadelphia, PA 19131 | disagree with you less."rsl@ihwpt.UUCP (11/01/85)
Todd, 11/1/85 Thanks for the continued stimulation. I have a few comments reguarding your (you and/or Laura) use of the concepts "truth", "facts", "appear", and "belief" (mostly addressed to your last paragraph in which you, once again, can not resist injecting the ole Kantian skepticism, as I see it). > But I am not clear about what Laura means by "facts", since these, > on the face of it, appear to be observer-independent Truths. If > that is the case, then the inconsistency is reintroduced after all. First, truth is a concept that only has meaning when applied to statements. "Observer-independent Truths" seems like a conceptually-muddled notion, since all statements (thus, all truths) are the products of human observers. Perhaps you really mean "observer-independent" reality, in which case, "Truth" is not an issue (reality exists, independent of statements about it or observations of it). On the other hand, a fact is a particular true statement about reality. (We call it a fact, only because it is true; if it is not true, it is not a fact). "Appearances" are always appearances OF SOME OBJECT(S) and not independent of the observed objects (appearances and objects are causally inseparable; mental experiences of "the presence of an object" without causal objects present are properly identified as hallucinations). Observer dependency properly applies only to interpretations of objects and their resultant appearances. Remaining issue (if you accept the above conceptualizations) include: "Do (or Can) particular individuals distinguish between their observations and their interpretations?" "Do they report these observations accurately and truthfully?" If accuracy and truthfulness are applied to both interpretations and reportings, the result is consistency. The absenc<e of consistency is our evidence of the occurrence of inaccuracy and/or dishonesty. Now, where was the "inconsistency reintroduced"? The concept of belief is distinguished by "an acceptance as true in the absence of complete or adequate evidence". Belief is distinguished from knowledge by this projection beyond what one actually (accurately and honestly) knows. If I know something, I do not say "I believe it" (unless I am a complete philosophical skeptic). I welcome feedback on my use (or misuse) of these concepts. Eudaemonia, Richard S. Latimer [(312)-979-4886, Wheaton, IL] -- Eudaemonia, Richard S. Latimer [(312)-979-4886, Wheaton, IL]
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (11/05/85)
Todd understand me very well. I have never been described as a coherentist theorest before, but the shoe seems to fit. There are a few things that I would like to elucidate a bit more... >I think it is fair to describe Laura's position as a "coherence >theory of truth." For a coherentist theorist, truth is only definable >within sets of statements, I take it. Pretty well. Of course, the process of dividing things into statements is to some extent a-priori, and so the statements that result are to some extent artificial. Truth is only definable within beliefs, which are commonly expressed as statements (statements of beliefs). >Individual statements would lack truth values. I am not sure that this is strictly so. It is impossible to determine the truth of a statement independent of other beliefs, but it is easy to determine that the statement ``Laura is 7 feet tall'' is false. At that point, I would say that it is quite correct to assign a truth value of false to that statement. Note that it is impossible to arrive at this statement without some beliefs in the accuracy of your ability to measure. There are certain statements which cannot be assigned a truth value, of course. Consider the pair: The following sentence is true. The preceeding senetence is false. To consider them individually would be a mistake. To consider them in reference to each other yeilds ambiguity. You cannot assign truth values to either of them. >A false statement, on this view, would be one that >would make a contradiction derivable from the set, that would not have >been derivable had that statement not been added. This is dead-on. >For purposes of analysis, regard someone's belief system as the set of >propositions to which that person would assent. When contradictions >become apparent, a rational individual rejects the smallest possible >number of propositions required to remove the inconsistency. This >ranking process is necessary to keep the coherence theory from >licensing the rejection of tremendous portions of the belief system >for the sake of isolated incongruities. Nothing said so far requires >that truth be defined as a relation between statements and >mind-independent reality. I think that I am defining truth as a relationship which beliefs have taken as a whole. Statements of belief which are called ``true'' are ways of expressing memebers of the set of beliefs which have the truth relationship. Also, the ranking of true beliefs in a rational person is more complicated than what you have outlined. At some point it would be simpler to reject the evidence of your own eyes and remove the smallest number of propositions that keeps you inconsistent with other people. A rational person does this sometimes, but often should tenatiously hang onto their beliefs because it is the other people who are mistaken. Observational errors are common. Somebody may have a set of beliefs that are consistent with what they believe they observed but not consistent with what happened because they made an observational error. For this reason, most rational people have a ``bullshit index'' that they apply to all new evidence -- how likely is it that this new bit of information is bogus? >But I am not clear about what Laura means by "facts", since these, on >the face of it, appear to be observer-independent Truths. If that is >the case, then the inconsistency is reintroduced after all. No, a fact is a presumed-true. it is a statement that I believe is true. (Once I disbelieve it, it is no longer a fact). I think that I use ``fact'' where you would use ``true statement'' or ``true proposition''. A new fact is a belief that you have to integrate into your set of beliefs. This will often entail rejecting things which yesterday you would have called facts, and today which you would call ``mistaken beliefs''. -- Help beautify the world. I am writing a book called *How To Write Portable C Programs*. Send me anything that you would like to find in such a book when it appears in your bookstores. Get your name mentioned in the credits. Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (11/05/85)
In article <542@ihwpt.UUCP> rsl@ihwpt.UUCP writes: >Thanks for the continued stimulation. I have a few comments >reguarding your (you and/or Laura) use of the concepts "truth", >"facts", "appear", and "belief" (mostly addressed to your last >paragraph in which you, once again, can not resist injecting the ole >Kantian skepticism, as I see it). > >> But I am not clear about what Laura means by "facts", since these, >> on the face of it, appear to be observer-independent Truths. If >> that is the case, then the inconsistency is reintroduced after all. >First, truth is a concept that only has meaning when applied to >statements. Are you speaking for yourself here, or generally? This statement is at variance with the statement ``God is Truth'' which some people (including some philosphers) have believed. >"Observer-independent Truths" seems like a >conceptually-muddled notion, since all statements (thus, all truths) >are the products of human observers. Perhaps you really mean >"observer-independent" reality, in which case, "Truth" is not an >issue (reality exists, independent of statements about it or >observations of it). No, that is no the distinction I was trying to make. The one that I was after is ``are there any statements that are inherantly true?'' If there are a set of statements which are true independent of observations of it then all beliefs which contradict these statements must be false. Out of these inherant truths and inherant falsehoods is it possible to build an utterly-true and utterly correct belief system? Me, I am not sure about the status in reality of ``inherantly true'' statements. I tend to believe that they exist, but not particularily strongly. I tend to believe that Black Holes exist as well, but if they and ``inherantly true statements'' turn out to only be theoretical constructs, it will not rock the foundations of my belief system much. Let us consider ``inherant truth'' as a theoretical construct. ``truth'' then is a property which an observer assigns a statement when he considers it in the light of other statements. A so-called ``inherantly true'' statement then becomes a statement that everybody (either does or should) assigns truth to. ``Inherant truth'' is a theoretical property which such beliefs are said to have, but which may not exist at all. Let us take your last statement: (reality exists, independent of statements about it or observations of it) That is pretty strong stuff. That is a belief. the question is -- is it true? And, when you say ``yes it is true'' as I am sure you will, what do you mean? Do you mean that the existence of an objective reality is consistent with the rest of your beliefs? Or do you mean that there is something fundamentally and inherantly true about the existence of an objective reality? These are two different meanings! >On the other hand, a fact is a particular true statement about >reality. (We call it a fact, only because it is true; if it is not >true, it is not a fact). But how can one be sure that ones facts are facts? Facts are things that you believe are true, yes, but is there any certainty to be had? (I'm the one that is arguing that there isn't, remember...) >The concept of belief is distinguished by "an acceptance as true in >the absence of complete or adequate evidence". Belief is >distinguished from knowledge by this projection beyond what one >actually (accurately and honestly) knows. If I know something, I do >not say "I believe it" (unless I am a complete philosophical >skeptic). > I do not think that I am a complete philosophical skeptic. I do not think that I ``know'' very much by your definition, however. I believe a lot, however, and those beliefs which i find consistent I call ``true'' and those which I do not I call ``problems''. I am working on my problems, trying to resolve inconsistencies. In doing so I fully expect that what I now call true I will later call false. Were those beliefs ever knowledge? Is there any way without perfect hindsight to tell the difference between knowledge and beliefs? -- Help beautify the world. I am writing a book called *How To Write Portable C Programs*. Send me anything that you would like to find in such a book when it appears in your bookstores. Get your name mentioned in the credits. Laura Creighton sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa