rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/30/85)
>>I could care less about the exact type of machine that the human mind really >>is, but I have no disagreement with the notion that the mind and brain are >>represented as some sort of machine. [Rosen] > Indeed, Rich Rosen should have no disagreement, since as long as "the > exact type of machine" is not specified, agreement or disagreement > would be without content. As long as one is careless about the exact > type of machine, *anything* can be represented as some sort of > machine. [MOODY] My curiosity is piqued: why is Moody going out of his way to make this sound "bad"? "Careless" about the exact type of machine? One should note that the central point of argument on this issue here has seemed to be the notion held by some that the human brain CANNOT be represented in a mechanized fashion as in a machine! Amazing how Moody tries to make a concession on his part (that the brain fits into the "*anything*" category he describes above) be called "carelessness" on my part. (The mark of a great philosopher?) >>To throw yet another bone into this mix, I will quote from the oft-misquoted >>(at least here) John Searle, from his "Minds, Brains, and Programs": > [Rosen, quoted material from Searle omitted] As it had been conveniently omitted the first time around, as well. > To my knowledge, the only people in this newsgroup who have been > quoting Searle are Michael Ellis and me. I have checked my archives against > Searle's papers; neither of us has misquoted him. Except in that his opinion on the issues presented have been directly at odds with those presented BY you and Ellis (i.e., deliberate omission of those sections I included as if they were irrelevant). > | "Could instantiating a program, the right program of course, > | by itself be a sufficient condition of understanding?" > | > | This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually > | confused with one of the earlier questions, and the answer to it is no. > | > | "Why not?" > | > | Because the formal symbol manipulations themselves don't have > | any intentionality... > |______________________________ [Searle, quoted by Rosen] > >>I think at this point Searle destroys his own argument. By saying that these >>things have "no intentionality", he is denying the premise made by the person >>asking the question, that we are talking about "the right program". Moreover, >>Hofstadter and Dennett both agreed (!!!!) that Searle's argument is flawed. >>"He merely asserts that some systems have intentionality by virtue of their >>'causal powers' and that some don't. Sometimes it seems that the brain is >>composed of 'the right stuff', but other times it seems to be something else. >>It is whatever is convenient at the moment." (Sound like any other conversers >>in this newsgroup?) > Now, let's look at Rich Rosen's argument. The claim that formal > symbol manipulations lack intentionality is the *conclusion* of > Searle's arguments, which Searle recaps at the end of the paper. Far > from destroying his argument, Searle is merely summarizing its > conclusions, in order to distinguish them from other positions. The > "right program" does *not* mean "the program that has intentionality"; > it means "the program that passes the Turing Test." Now I see why you chose to omit the sections I quoted: including them would show the holes in your point of view and the fabrications surrounding it. You deliberatele left out the questions (from that question/answer section) that led up to that "ultimate" question, which in fact did not ONCE mention the Turing test! What was meant by being "the right program" WAS in fact (despite your assertion to the contrary) having all the characteristics necessary for "thought". If intentionality (not present in the "Chinese room" example) is one of them, so be it. A program lacking that is NOT "the right program" by Searle's OWN definition! > The whole point of Searle's argument, of course, is that passing the Turing > Test is not a sufficient condition of intentionality. And more! He asserts the fallaciousness of the claims of what he calls "strong AI", which based on his own reasoning is nothing but an assertion. > It's true that Hofstadter and Dennett do not accept Searle's > arguments. Rich Rosen proceeds to quote some of Hofstadter's > responses, from _The_Mind's_I_. Presumably, Rosen agrees with > Hofstadter. But Hofstadter's arguments are weak. Rather than "merely > asserting" that some systems possess intentionality in virtue of their > causal powers, Searle has written several books on the subject (one > was written after _The_Mind's_I_). Odd that all Moody had to say about "Hofstadter's arguments" was an assertion that they "are weak". (Why? Because he doesn't like them?) > Note that the purpose of Searle's > "Minds, Brains, and Programs" was not to develop a general theory of > intentionality, but to criticize the notion that intentionality is > just a matter of instantiating a Turing Machine program. Hofstadter's > insinuation that Searle vacillates on whether minds need to be > embodied in neural stuff is a straw man. Searle makes no such claim. A thorough reading would show a good deal of vacillation. > The last two sentences of Hofstadter, quoted by Rosen, > cannot be called counterarguments; they are mere counterassertions. > Rich Rosen offers no arguments of his own. Indeed, he never clearly > states just what it is that he is claiming about this Turing Machine > issue. Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but (counter-)assertions. Does the same rule apply to Moody's statements? > I will grant that Hofstadter does offer *some* arguments in his > remarks, but Rosen has not mentioned one of them. Rosen also claims > that those of us who have quoted him (Ellis and me) do so in defense > of positions that Searle would reject. Rosen does not name names, nor > does he identify those positions, but it sure sounds good, doesn't it? Perhaps it "sounds good" because it is true. Note how Ellis was real big on Searle, until it came to defining machine, at which point Ellis decided to arbitrarily redefine things to suit his "needs" (i.e., desired conclusions). > In short, the substantive content of Rosen's comments on Searle and > the relation of Turing Machines to minds is vanishingly close to zero. And the substantive content of YOUR comments (as evidenced here) is not zero, not even negative, but rather, imaginary. -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (11/02/85)
In article <1987@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>I could care less about the exact type of machine that the human mind really >>>is, but I have no disagreement with the notion that the mind and brain are >>>represented as some sort of machine. [Rosen] > >> Indeed, Rich Rosen should have no disagreement, since as long as "the >> exact type of machine" is not specified, agreement or disagreement >> would be without content. As long as one is careless about the exact >> type of machine, *anything* can be represented as some sort of >> machine. [MOODY] > >My curiosity is piqued: why is Moody going out of his way to make this sound >"bad"? "Careless" about the exact type of machine? One should note that >the central point of argument on this issue here has seemed to be the notion >held by some that the human brain CANNOT be represented in a mechanized >fashion as in a machine! Amazing how Moody tries to make a concession on >his part (that the brain fits into the "*anything*" category he describes >above) be called "carelessness" on my part. (The mark of a great philosopher?) To satisfy your curiosity: "anything" means "whatever there is." Is it a "concession" to put the brain in this category? No, because the brain is something. What is bad about Rosen's "I could care less" comment is that it effectively blocks any effective inquiry into the problem. Rosen might as well have said "Mind and brain are something." True, but hardly a contribution. If Rosen has something more substantial in mind -- and I'm sure he does -- then he should just state it and present the arguments. >>>To throw yet another bone into this mix, I will quote from the oft-misquoted >>>(at least here) John Searle, from his "Minds, Brains, and Programs": >> [Rosen, quoted material from Searle omitted] > >As it had been conveniently omitted the first time around, as well. The convenience is, I hope, that of the readers of this newsgroup, who might get tired of the repeated lengthy inclusions. Those who are interested have no doubt saved the relevant sections. >...his Searle's] opinion on the issues presented have been directly at odds >with those presented BY you and Ellis (i.e., deliberate omission of those >sections I included as if they were irrelevant). At last, a substantive claim. Now, SHOW us exactly which claims Ellis and I have made that are at odds with exactly which claims of Searle's. That way, Ellis and I have the opportunity to judge whether you are correct or not. This is how the game is played. >> |______________________________ [Searle, quoted by Rosen] {I've omitted it; check your archives, folks} >> Now, let's look at Rich Rosen's argument. The claim that formal >> symbol manipulations lack intentionality is the *conclusion* of >> Searle's arguments, which Searle recaps at the end of the paper. Far >> from destroying his argument, Searle is merely summarizing its >> conclusions, in order to distinguish them from other positions. The >> "right program" does *not* mean "the program that has intentionality"; >> it means "the program that passes the Turing Test." > >Now I see why you chose to omit the sections I quoted: including them would >show the holes in your point of view and the fabrications surrounding it. >You deliberatele left out the questions (from that question/answer section) >that led up to that "ultimate" question, which in fact did not ONCE mention >the Turing test! What was meant by being "the right program" WAS in fact >(despite your assertion to the contrary) having all the characteristics >necessary for "thought". If intentionality (not present in the "Chinese room" >example) is one of them, so be it. A program lacking that is NOT "the right >program" by Searle's OWN definition! I really have to insist that this is just wrong, and seriously misrepresents what Searle is doing. In fact, I will do more than insist; I will *show* it. First, a summary of the Q&A section from Searle's paper: Can machines think? -- yes. Could a man-made machine think? -- possibly. Could a digital computer think? -- sure. Could instantiating the "right" program be a sufficient for understanding? -- no. So, we have to inquire what Searle might have meant by the "right program". Rosen's contention appears to be that Searle could only have meant "a program having all the characteristics necessary for 'thought'". Let's suppose that this is indeed what Searle meant, even though Rosen offers no support for his contention. Would it follow that Searle's argument is viciously circular? Hardly, because it wouldn't follow that the characteristics *necessary* for thought are *sufficient* for understanding (or intentionality in general). And *that* is what the whole argument is about. I contend that Searle is quite interested in criticizing the validity of the Turing Test, throughout his paper. It would explain why he would say "But precisely one of the points at issue is the adequacy of the Turing test. The example shows that there could be two 'systems,' both of which pass the Turing test, but only one of which understands..." >> It's true that Hofstadter and Dennett do not accept Searle's >> arguments. Rich Rosen proceeds to quote some of Hofstadter's >> responses, from _The_Mind's_I_. Presumably, Rosen agrees with >> Hofstadter. But Hofstadter's arguments are weak. Rather than "merely >> asserting" that some systems possess intentionality in virtue of their >> causal powers, Searle has written several books on the subject (one >> was written after _The_Mind's_I_). > >Odd that all Moody had to say about "Hofstadter's arguments" was an assertion >that they "are weak". (Why? Because he doesn't like them?) > >> Note that the purpose of Searle's >> "Minds, Brains, and Programs" was not to develop a general theory of >> intentionality, but to criticize the notion that intentionality is >> just a matter of instantiating a Turing Machine program. Hofstadter's >> insinuation that Searle vacillates on whether minds need to be >> embodied in neural stuff is a straw man. Searle makes no such claim. > >A thorough reading would show a good deal of vacillation. But I *have* read it thoroughly, more than a few times. I can't find any vacillation on this point. Neither Hofstadter nor Rosen has said anything to show that Searle does vacillate. That's why I find these "arguments" weak. >> The last two sentences of Hofstadter, quoted by Rosen, >> cannot be called counterarguments; they are mere counterassertions. >> Rich Rosen offers no arguments of his own. Indeed, he never clearly >> states just what it is that he is claiming about this Turing Machine >> issue. > >Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but >(counter-)assertions. Does the same rule apply to Moody's statements? An argument is the giving of reasons for one's claims. I try to do that. I do not see how counterassertions, or even counter-interrogatives, can count as arguments. >> I will grant that Hofstadter does offer *some* arguments in his >> remarks, but Rosen has not mentioned one of them. Rosen also claims >> that those of us who have quoted him (Ellis and me) do so in defense >> of positions that Searle would reject. Rosen does not name names, nor >> does he identify those positions, but it sure sounds good, doesn't it? > >Perhaps it "sounds good" because it is true. Note how Ellis was real big >on Searle, until it came to defining machine, at which point Ellis decided >to arbitrarily redefine things to suit his "needs" (i.e., desired conclusions). Okay, I'll let Ellis speak for himself, if he is inclined to. Note that Rosen has *still* not identified the positions, but at least he has identified the persons who are supposed to be adducing Searle in support of positions that Searle would reject. Since I am one of those persons, I invite Rosen to *specify* the position, or to withdraw the claim. >And the substantive content of YOUR comments (as evidenced here) is not >zero, not even negative, but rather, imaginary. Todd Moody | {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody Philosophy Department | St. Joseph's U. | "I couldn't fail to Philadelphia, PA 19131 | disagree with you less."
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (11/06/85)
>>My curiosity is piqued: why is Moody going out of his way to make this sound >>"bad"? "Careless" about the exact type of machine? One should note that >>the central point of argument on this issue here has seemed to be the notion >>held by some that the human brain CANNOT be represented in a mechanized >>fashion as in a machine! Amazing how Moody tries to make a concession on >>his part (that the brain fits into the "*anything*" category he describes >>above) be called "carelessness" on my part. (The mark of a great >>philosopher?) [ROSEN] > To satisfy your curiosity: "anything" means "whatever there is." Is it a > "concession" to put the brain in this category? No, because the brain > is something. What is bad about Rosen's "I could care less" comment > is that it effectively blocks any effective inquiry into the problem. > Rosen might as well have said "Mind and brain are something." True, > but hardly a contribution. If Rosen has something more substantial in > mind -- and I'm sure he does -- then he should just state it and > present the arguments. [MOODY] But I did, and your efforts to obscure what I am saying smack of yahoo tactics. We were talking about brain as machines, and the inability (or not) of humans to build a machine that performs the same types of functions. >>>>To throw yet another bone into this mix, I will quote from the oft-misquoted >>>>(at least here) John Searle, from his "Minds, Brains, and Programs": >>> [Rosen, quoted material from Searle omitted] >> >>As it had been conveniently omitted the first time around, as well. > The convenience is, I hope, that of the readers of this newsgroup, who > might get tired of the repeated lengthy inclusions. Those who are > interested have no doubt saved the relevant sections. Why does this sound so much like bland assertions made by political manipulators who proudly state "the facts are there for all to see", in hopes that no one will bother to look? >>...his Searle's] opinion on the issues presented have been directly at odds >>with those presented BY you and Ellis (i.e., deliberate omission of those >>sections I included as if they were irrelevant). > At last, a substantive claim. Now, SHOW us exactly which claims Ellis > and I have made that are at odds with exactly which claims of > Searle's. That way, Ellis and I have the opportunity to judge whether > you are correct or not. This is how the game is played. The claim (for one) that you repeatedly make here regarding Searle's intent. Where you would claim that I wasn't saying anything of substance because I concur with the parts of Searle's writing that you deliberately left out (and which, when they were posted, you twisted to your own ends to avoid what was said). >>> |______________________________ [Searle, quoted by Rosen] > {I've omitted it; check your > archives, folks} "My record is open for public view, and if elected..." >>> Now, let's look at Rich Rosen's argument. The claim that formal >>> symbol manipulations lack intentionality is the *conclusion* of >>> Searle's arguments, which Searle recaps at the end of the paper. Far >>> from destroying his argument, Searle is merely summarizing its >>> conclusions, in order to distinguish them from other positions. The >>> "right program" does *not* mean "the program that has intentionality"; >>> it means "the program that passes the Turing Test." >>Now I see why you chose to omit the sections I quoted: including them would >>show the holes in your point of view and the fabrications surrounding it. >>You deliberatele left out the questions (from that question/answer section) >>that led up to that "ultimate" question, which in fact did not ONCE mention >>the Turing test! What was meant by being "the right program" WAS in fact >>(despite your assertion to the contrary) having all the characteristics >>necessary for "thought". If intentionality (not present in the "Chinese room" >>example) is one of them, so be it. A program lacking that is NOT "the right >>program" by Searle's OWN definition! > I really have to insist that this is just wrong, and seriously > misrepresents what Searle is doing. In fact, I will do more than > insist; I will *show* it. > > First, a summary of the Q&A section from Searle's paper: Can machines > think? -- yes. Could a man-made machine think? -- possibly. Could a > digital computer think? -- sure. Could instantiating the "right" > program be a sufficient for understanding? -- no. > > So, we have to inquire what Searle might have meant by the "right > program". Rosen's contention appears to be that Searle could only > have meant "a program having all the characteristics necessary for > 'thought'". Let's suppose that this is indeed what Searle meant, even > though Rosen offers no support for his contention. Hold your horses. Assertion follows assertion here. First you "summarize" the section that I quotd directly (which, if posted, would make my points very clear---again, is this the reason you leave this out???) Then ... > Would it follow > that Searle's argument is viciously circular? Hardly, because it > wouldn't follow that the characteristics *necessary* for thought are > *sufficient* for understanding (or intentionality in general). Funny, I thought the characteristics necessary for thought INCLUDED understanding and intentionality. Without those things it simply wouldn't be THINKING. Now you arbitrarily claim that these are "extra" characteristics that can be added on (like a sunroof). Again, the "right program" for thinking would include those facets. If it didn't, it wouldn't be the right program. > And *that* is what the whole argument is about. I contend that Searle > is quite interested in criticizing the validity of the Turing Test, > throughout his paper. It would explain why he would say "But > precisely one of the points at issue is the adequacy of the Turing > test. The example shows that there could be two 'systems,' both of > which pass the Turing test, but only one of which understands..." I don't disagree with the problems Searle is trying to evince. I think there are flaws in his argument, as I have shown above regarding the use of the term "right program" in an erroneous way. >>> Note that the purpose of Searle's >>> "Minds, Brains, and Programs" was not to develop a general theory of >>> intentionality, but to criticize the notion that intentionality is >>> just a matter of instantiating a Turing Machine program. Hofstadter's >>> insinuation that Searle vacillates on whether minds need to be >>> embodied in neural stuff is a straw man. Searle makes no such claim. >>A thorough reading would show a good deal of vacillation. > But I *have* read it thoroughly, more than a few times. I can't find > any vacillation on this point. Neither Hofstadter nor Rosen has said > anything to show that Searle does vacillate. That's why I find these > "arguments" weak. As Hofstadter said, sometimes the brain has exactly that "right stuff", and other times it doesn't. And of course there is the vacillation in using the term "right program" in the first place. >>> The last two sentences of Hofstadter, quoted by Rosen, >>> cannot be called counterarguments; they are mere counterassertions. >>> Rich Rosen offers no arguments of his own. Indeed, he never clearly >>> states just what it is that he is claiming about this Turing Machine >>> issue. >>Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but >>(counter-)assertions. Does the same rule apply to Moody's statements? > An argument is the giving of reasons for one's claims. I try to do > that. I do not see how counterassertions, or even > counter-interrogatives, can count as arguments. Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but (counter-)assertions. >>> I will grant that Hofstadter does offer *some* arguments in his >>> remarks, but Rosen has not mentioned one of them. Rosen also claims >>> that those of us who have quoted him (Ellis and me) do so in defense >>> of positions that Searle would reject. Rosen does not name names, nor >>> does he identify those positions, but it sure sounds good, doesn't it? >>Perhaps it "sounds good" because it is true. Note how Ellis was real big >>on Searle, until it came to defining machine, at which point Ellis decided >>to arbitrarily redefine things to suit his "needs" (i.e., desired >>conclusions). > Okay, I'll let Ellis speak for himself, if he is inclined to. Note that > Rosen has *still* not identified the positions, but at least he has > identified the persons who are supposed to be adducing Searle in > support of positions that Searle would reject. Since I am one of > those persons, I invite Rosen to *specify* the position, or to > withdraw the claim. I most certainly HAVE identified the positions, repeatedly, and to claim that I haven't is both evasion and rhetorical babble. To repeat: Ellis suddenly retracted his "support" of Searle when it came to the definition of machine. And in a discussion revolving around free will, determinism, and mechanism in the brain, Searle does NOT dispute notions of mechanism in the brain as has been attempted here. In fact, he would seem to support them. >>And the substantive content of YOUR comments (as evidenced here) is not >>zero, not even negative, but rather, imaginary. [ROSEN] I find it quaint that Moody elected to insert this sentence from MY posting, evidently to put me in a bad light, while leaving out the section from his own posting that this was in response to: >>> In short, the substantive content of Rosen's comments on Searle and >>> the relation of Turing Machines to minds is vanishingly close to zero. I find it DOUBLY quaint in light of Moody's extended treatise on "ad hominem" arguments. Evidently using such arguments to find fundamental flaws in reasoning and assumptions is a cardinal sin, whilst using them to kick your opponent in the balls is acceptable philosophical discourse. Your school must have some curriculum in philosophy... -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr