[net.philosophy] Conditioning for Reason

mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/14/85)

Rich Rosen has insisted that the mind is deterministic and that all behavior
is therefore determined by conditioning.  So let's consider what happens to
reason under that assumption.

Why should reason produce truth?  Because there is an evolutionary advantage
to it being true.  But what about all the errors?

Rich argues that argument and debate force out presumtions and other errors.
This they certainly do-- to a certain extent.  It's clear, for instance,
that in some people the reasoning process is interfered with to produce
erroneous answers.  Sometimes these are indeed trapped by the argumentation
process.  Others, however, are protected.  Assuming for the moment that
there is some flaw in someone's reasoning which they do not see, there must
be another flaw protecting it from counterarguments.  Build up enough of
these and you have a systematic error that is self-protecting.  THere is
reason to suspect that these do in fact exist.  So why aren't they
eliminated?  I can only see three responses, and each of them means trouble
for the truth of reasoning.

Response 1: These systematic errors are in fact evolutionarily advantageous.
This, it seems to me, knocks the wind out of the evolutionary argument for
the truth of reason by showing a falsehood which is advantageous.

Response 2: Systematic errors arise because the evolution towards reason is
not complete.  This paints a rather eschatological view of reason, and it
presupposes a certain destiny which man must strive for.  This may well be
true, but it certainly is not a reasoned argument.

Response 3: Abandon the evolutionary hypothesis, and claim a different basis
for truth.

Note that there are variations on these; for #1, for instance, one might
argue that retention of other desirable qualities guarantees the retention
of systematic errors.

In any case, it appears that we are stuck with systematic errors, and
therefore the reasoning of an individual cannot be trusted.  So what new
standard is there?  Various forms of group concensus generally seem to have
a problem in that they may simply be ratifying a common error.  I will
confess at this point that I don't have an answer.  My hunch is that error
is unavoidable.

Any comments?  Responses I have left out?

Charley Wingate

mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (11/23/85)

In article <2161@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>> Rich Rosen has insisted that the mind is deterministic and that all
>> behavior is therefore determined by conditioning.  So let's consider what
>> happens to reason under that assumption.

>> Why should reason produce truth?  Because there is an evolutionary
>> advantage to it being true.  But what about all the errors?  [WINGATE]

>Why introduce "evolutionary advantage"?  Why DOES reason produce truth?
>You've got it backwards.  Reason was devised as a methodology that accurately
>produces truth.  It produces truth because it was designed to.  And the
>human ability to reason allowed us to develop the reasoning methods that
>distinguish truth from falsehood, as opposed to not doing so.

That last sentence is precisely why Rich's argument here does not fly.  To
use Rich's conditioning framework, Reason (the philosophical entity) is
simply the system that reasoning (the mental facility) conditioned us to
create.  And the problem, therefore, is that it is *reasoning*, the mental
facility, that gives rise to whatever truth there is in Reasoning.

It is quite valid to argue that the Truth in Reason is conditioned to
appear.  There is this conditioned desire to see truth appear, so that one
expects the system so derived to give the illusion of Truth, whether or not
it actually is there or not.

>> Rich argues that argument and debate force out presumtions and other
>> errors.
>> This they certainly do-- to a certain extent.  It's clear, for instance,
>> that in some people the reasoning process is interfered with to produce
>> erroneous answers.  Sometimes these are indeed trapped by the argumentation
>> process.  Others, however, are protected.  Assuming for the moment that
>> there is some flaw in someone's reasoning which they do not see, there must
>> be another flaw protecting it from counterarguments.  Build up enough of
>> these and you have a systematic error that is self-protecting.  THere is
>> reason to suspect that these do in fact exist.  So why aren't they
>> eliminated?  I can only see three responses, and each of them means trouble
>> for the truth of reasoning.

>> Response 1: These systematic errors are in fact evolutionarily
>> advantageous.  This, it seems to me, knocks the wind out of the
>> evolutionary argument for the truth of reason by showing a falsehood
>> which is advantageous.

>> Response 2: Systematic errors arise because the evolution towards reason is
>> not complete.  This paints a rather eschatological view of reason, and it
>> presupposes a certain destiny which man must strive for.  This may well be
>> true, but it certainly is not a reasoned argument.

>> Response 3: Abandon the evolutionary hypothesis, and claim a different
>> basis for truth.

>The ridiculousness of the original premise is compounded in the responses
>to it.  The absurd introduction of what evolutionary "purpose" reason has
>is irrelevant.  Charles' misstatement of "evolution" of ideas seems to
>state that the bad ideas WILL be weeded out by the process of evolution.

Fine.  You are going to embrace Response 3, then.

>Perhaps, Charles, the systematic errors that do survive and continue are
>simply those which do not prove a detriment to survival.  You believe in
>god?  Does that hurt or help your survival?

I don't know; I'm still alive. [no smiley]  And what does it matter?
Evonultion is after all driven by averages and by chance.  But it seems to
me that, once you've agreed to this, then what happens to your argument that
religion is so horrible?

> You should take a look at Dawkins' "The Selfish
>Gene".  I haven't read the book itself, but excerpts I've seen from it
>discuss the very thing you speak of:  systematic errors that are both
>self-protecting and advantageous to the survival of the idea at hand.

Fine then.  You've just agree to the following statement I made:

>> In any case, it appears that we are stuck with systematic errors, and
>> therefore the reasoning of an individual cannot be trusted.

>Huh?  How is this conclusion reached (jumped to)?  The reasoning of an
>individual who shirks the presumptions and bases the evaluation on
>reason and verifiable evidence can be trusted.

No it can't, because there is no way the systematic errors can be
eliminated, by your own admission.  They are conditioned into the system.

Charley Wingate