flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (12/23/85)
Some preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other preferences that a person holds (as in "preference transitivity"), but in their own right. In particular, one can determine by observation what benefits and harms oneself -- i.e., what is genuinely GOOD for oneself and what bad. This thesis of mine, which I implicitly relied on in questioning the basis of libertarianism, was criticized by Nat Howard. In the course of our discussion I ALSO claimed that I could rationally defend my relative weighting of benefits and harms to others in comparison to myself in considering how to act. It ought to go without saying -- so, given that this is the net, I obviously need to say loud and clear -- that the second claim is DIFFERENT than the first, and goes beyond it. In article <306@umich.UUCP> I write: >>Let's have no wriggling here: you state above: >>>>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >>>>>Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. >> >>Well? Defend it! I would argue that you are not allowed to use such >>concepts as "other people's lives have importance" without establishing >>them BY REASON. [NRH] > >Again, let me quote myself: >>>A fair challenge, I must admit. OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy... >>>"coming soon to a theater near you!" This promise has come due. A few preliminaries here, however. First, the position I will be defending is NOT the basis on which I hold that some preferences are more rational than others. I base that view on the fact that judgements of individual benefit and harm are verifiable by observation. The argument I am about to give will *depend* -- though I am not sure how crucially -- on this thesis. "But if the issue between you and Nat Howard is whether preferences are subject to rational assessment, why argue this other issue?" Because he asked me to. Besides, it's an important issue. Second, I will not reply to objections until the whole series of articles is done. I will keep copies of articles containing objections until then. Third, I realize that the position I take is in many respects counterintuitive. I do not consider this a devastating objection. Fourth, this will not be a knockdown argument; however, I think it shifts the burden of argument to the other side(s) (where, I can't resist predicting, it will stay). Some food for thought: Any weighting of benefits and harms other than an equal one must distinguish sets of people along lines that are plausibly taken to be *relevant* to how much consideration I ought to give their welfare. I will argue that it is impossible to draw such lines. One obvious candidate for such a line is that which divides "me" from "everyone else". When we see where that line lies, it will no longer seem significant. --Paul V. Torek, now at umcp-cs!flink, later at umich!torek