steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) (01/05/86)
> > In article <582@scc.UUCP> steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) writes: > > > Wittgenstein points out that because we use the > >word 'thought' in the same way that we use the word > >'table' as in: > > > 1) She has a thought. > > 2) She has a table. > > > We are misled into believing that there is a 'thing' > >called a 'thought' that we can somehow point to. > > Pardon me for presuming to correct the learned doctor, but in fact we are > not misled at all. First, we must reconize that in English, a 'thought' as > used in the context of the above sentence is synonymous with an idea-- and > is in fact something that can be written down on a piece of paper, Are you saying that the idea is the thing that is written down one paper? If I look at peice of paper with things written on it, I see a peice of paper with things written on it. Which part of it is this "idea" you claim is there? If I take the position that there is no idea there, then how are you going to prove to me that there is? Show it to me, and I will believe it is there. > > When a person says, "I have an idea," and then writes it down, he sees an > identity relationship between the mental whatsit and whatever it is that he > is put on paper. I absolutely do not believe this is true and I challenge yo to come up with some way of verifying this hypothesis. You state it as a fact that there are "mental whatsits." That is unsupportable and unprovable. Hillary Putnam, Wittgenstein, and others have argued quite effectively that the idea of "mental objects" of any sort is unprovable. > To copy the same text down from memory is not thinking in > the same sense, but there isn't necessarily any behavioral clue to point out > the difference-- especially if the copist lies and claims to have thought up > the idea. I suspect that all purely operational test of intelligence are > prone to failure on this point-- and incidentally, some tests of human > intelligence as well. > Charley Wingate Not only are tests prone to failure, but *our* ability to decide is also prone to failure. The failure is inherent in the question. My friend John Grinder put it well, "There is no such thing as understanding. There are only people pretending to understand, and people pretending not to understand." How can you ever prove anything different? What would such a proof be like? Is there even a difference at all? If there is, how would you prove it? -- scc!steiny Don Steiny @ Don Steiny Software 109 Torrey Pine Terrace Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060 (408) 425-0382