apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/08/86)
In article <325@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes: >In article <1101@oddjob.UUCP>, apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) tries to present >some of his reasoning (not religiously-based) as to why one ought not to >murder adult human beings. This is something which is quite difficult to do, >and Adrian makes several mistakes. Lines beginning with >> are from Adrian. I agree it's difficult to do. I certainly haven't given a complete argument: that wouldn't have been appropriate even if it were possible. But I don't accept that most of your criticisms relate to mistakes on my part. At most, they put forward alternative points of view. >> ... I'll give you two arguments which suggest that it's generally wrong to >> kill people. >> (1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is >> intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral >> action. > >Unfortunately, Adrian is starting from a position of *global* utilitarianism; >that is, he feels that the principles of ut. are applicable by him to others. >This is a very weak position, the reasons for which are better suited to >net.philosophy. Let me give just one example, from real life, indicating some >of the problems: In Jamaica, there are Rastafarians who use ganja in their >religion and in their everyday lives. They believe that it increases their >abilities, intellect, etc. They tried quite hard to convice me that I was >somehow incomplete because I didn't want to smoke it. Now, if they held to the >principle above, they would believe that it was moral for them to force me to >smoke it. Adrian can use his principle only because the large majority of his >readers have very similar ideas of what is `the good.' Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarianRastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to forceyou to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people ought to be permitted to make their own decisions. Incidentally, the only obvious alternative breed of utilitarianism that I can imagine is "greatest self-perceived good of the greatest number", and that seems a preposterous moralprinciple. Also incidentally, I think (global) utilitarianism has a number of flaws, but is often a good rule of thumb. > >> >> (2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities >> which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity). >> I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character" ... >> Corpses have no discernible character, so people with good characters are >> better for the world than corpses, all else being equal. I therefore enjoin >> you not to kill people with good character. This argument does not apply to >> abortion, since the character of a foetus is little-developed. > >Leaving aside the argument about the goodness of humans, I must point out that >here, as elsewhere, you equate fetus with human. This is clearly a fallacy, >as debate here and elsewhere (including before the Supreme Court) has >indicated that there is no way to `prove' when these two become the same. There's no way to prove the issue because it's entirely a matter of definition. Nowhere have I drawn any moral consequences from the equation foetus == human. > >> Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of >> her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, >> would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was >> generally protected. > >I would like to point out that this, too, is an unsupported claim. Do you find it implausible, or do you just object to unsupported claims on principle? > >> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect >> for adult life. > >Again, no support for this is given. As a counter-example, consider the >Vietnam conflict. A great deal of opposition to the war could be traced to the >daily body counts, augmented by grisly pictures every night on our TV screens. >For years after (maybe even today) Americans were sensitive to when and where >our troops were used. Carter was quite proud of the fact that no American >soldier was killed during his administration. > Again, I don't think it's a very controversial statement. Do you really think there was more general respect for adult life during the Vietnam war ? Do you really think there's no *tendency* for violence to escalate? OK, maybe as a consequence of the Vietnam war there was some reluctance among some Amercians for some time period for their country to fight again, but I would suggest that this good is insignificant compared to the harm caused by the war itself. >--Alan Wexelblat >-- >WEX@MCC.ARPA >...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex ak
wex@milano.UUCP (01/09/86)
Disliking articles w/ many levels of inclusion, I will try to summarize.
Summaries are in {}. I hope to get all summaries correct; point out where I
fail.
{Adrian Kent originally tried to present reasons why one ought not to murder
adult human beings. I presented what I thought were weaknesses in his
reasons. Inclusions are from Adrian's replies to that article.}
{Adrian agrees that it's difficult to present reasons why one ought not to
murder adult humans; he feels that presentation is inappropriate and hard.
Adrian takes global utilitarianism to be a good starting point. I disagreed
and presented the example of some Rasta-men I had met in Jamaica who tried
quite hard to convice me that I was incomplete and unfree because I didn't
smoke ganja.}
Adrian:
> Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarian
> Rastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to
> force you to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people
> ought to be permitted to make their own decisions.
I was not clear enough: the Rasta-man believed that my mind was not free
because I was not high, and that therefore I could be treated as a child, and
*made* to do what was good for me. This position is consistent with global ut.
The point I wish to make by this example is that global application of one's
beliefs of the good is not a good starting position.
{Adrian's argument is that people tend to have good/valuable qualities, called
`character' which corpses lack. Adrian assumes that having character in the
world improves it, and therefore one ought not to kill "people with good
character."}
This seems rather strange. First, the presence or absence of character is not
something that can be objectively judged. Second, what makes you assume that
the mere existence of such people improves the world? Third, am I to assume
that you do not forbid the killing of people who lack "good character"? What
about a sleeping person? Surely he does not display good character. The point
I wish to make is that you have not given sufficient reason for your moral
principle.
Adrian:
> A society in which each member evaluated the character of her sisters and
> brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, would be a less
> pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected.
I find this to be non-intuitive and also do not see how it supports your moral
principle. Are morals based on general concepts like "less pleasant"?
> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect
> for adult life.
I do not think that this is a true statement. I can give several counter-
examples (in addition to the example I gave of the effects of Vietnam on the
American consciousness). Will it help if I do so, Adrian? Can you give some
support to this claim?
--Alan Wexelblat
--
ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA
UUCP: ...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wexapak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) (01/11/86)
In article <355@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes: >{Adrian Kent originally tried to present reasons why one ought not to murder > adult human beings. I presented what I thought were weaknesses in his > reasons. Inclusions are from Adrian's replies to that article.} > Adrian takes global utilitarianism to be a good starting point. I disagreed > and presented the example of some Rasta-men I had met in Jamaica who tried > quite hard to convice me that I was incomplete and unfree because I didn't > smoke ganja.} > >Adrian: >> Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarian >> Rastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to >> force you to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people >> ought to be permitted to make their own decisions. > >I was not clear enough: the Rasta-man believed that my mind was not free >because I was not high, and that therefore I could be treated as a child, and >*made* to do what was good for me. This position is consistent with global ut. >The point I wish to make by this example is that global application of one's >beliefs of the good is not a good starting position. That position is certainly *consistent* with global utilitarianism, but it isn't a *consequence* of g.u.. It would follow from g.u. only given a particular set of values on the part of the utilitarian. Now any attempt to establish an ethical system is going to require an input of values, so you can't regard that as a flaw of a *particular* system. Perhaps you don't; perhaps you regard *all* ethical systems as equally flawed, for this reason? (That's a perfectly tenable and reasonable position, but if you do hold it then there's no point in trying to produce moral arguments for you.) > >{Adrian's argument is that people tend to have good/valuable qualities, called > `character' which corpses lack. Adrian assumes that having character in the > world improves it, and therefore one ought not to kill "people with good > character."} > >This seems rather strange. First, the presence or absence of character is not >something that can be objectively judged. Second, what makes you assume that >the mere existence of such people improves the world? Third, am I to assume >that you do not forbid the killing of people who lack "good character"? What >about a sleeping person? Surely he does not display good character. The point >I wish to make is that you have not given sufficient reason for your moral >principle. Your first point makes me wonder whether we're talking completely at cross purposes. Moral philosophy is mainly about quantities which cannot be objectively judged. In particular, most of the values in any moral equation are ultimately subjective. If we're going to debate the values (rather than the moral calculus, say), then we have to accept that. Now, secondly, why do I assume that the existence of good people (or, on average, people) improves the world? Because I see around me all the time people doing things which, on average, improve the world, and because I have no reason to believe that the people I'm in contact with are especially unrepresentative. Perhaps my use of the phrase "good character" was confusing? It's not intended to mean that someone with "good character" is necessarily moral; it means they do things which I value. We may disagree about the proportion of people with "good character", but isn't it almost tautological to say that good character is good for the world? Thirdly, you are definitely not to assume that I do not forbid the killing of people who lack good character. The fact that I give one argument against killing does not imply that it's my only argument. In fact, in my earlier posting, I gave a second argument against killing, which applies regardless of character. There's a difference between possessing character and displaying it at a particular instant in time. My arguments apply to the former, and so sleeping people are not exempt. (If anyone tries to suggest that *this* implies foetuses are also not exempt I shall scream.) > >Adrian: >> A society in which each member evaluated the character of her sisters and >> brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, would be a less >> pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected. > >I find this to be non-intuitive and also do not see how it supports your moral >principle. Are morals based on general concepts like "less pleasant"? Maybe I put it too abstractly. If people run around killing people they don't like, and this is generally regarded as acceptable moral behaviour, then life will be nasty, brutish and (to look on the bright side) short. Yes, morals are based on values: pleasant was used because I get bored of repeating "good" or "which I value". >> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect >> for adult life. > >I do not think that this is a true statement. I can give several counter- >examples (in addition to the example I gave of the effects of Vietnam on the >American consciousness). Will it help if I do so, Adrian? Can you give some >support to this claim? Remember the context of the statement: it's in an argument against individuals killing other individuals because they regard their "character" as "bad". Within that context I think it's true, if a little vague. Classic contemporary examples supporting it would be the situations in Northern Ireland or the Lebanon. (However, I accept that there are situations where it doesn't hold, and where I might want to produce other arguments against killing.) >--Alan Wexelblat Adrian Kent
wex@milano.UUCP (01/16/86)
Adrian and I are approaching convergence. A summary of Adrian's position (as I see it): 1)I have certain likes and disklikes and wish to maximize the former and minimize the latter (utilitarianism or hedonism). 2)I regard my values as good, in a moral sense. 3)I believe that people, as a general rule, have characteristics that I like, and that are beneficial to me. 4)I believe that my values are held by other people, or I may impose my values on them if they hold values that contradict 1 (global utilitarianism). It seems clear that 1+2+3 adds up to a moral imperative for Adrian not to kill people. But without 4, I do not see how this imperative can apply to others, provided that they disagree with specifics of 1 or 3. Is it reasonable to pursue the discussion on this basis? I believe that I can provide strong arguments against 4, and somewhat weaker arguments against 1, 2 and 3 (in specific cases). --Alan Wexelblat -- ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA UUCP: ...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex