flink%umcp-cs%CSNet-Relay@sri-unix.UUCP (10/14/83)
From: Paul Torek <flink%umcp-cs@CSNet-Relay>
From Michael Condict ...!cmcl2!csd1!condict
This, then, is the reason I would never step into one of those
teleporters that functions by ripping apart your atoms, then
reconstructing an exact copy at a distant site. [...]
In spite of the fact that consciousness (I agree with the growing chorus) is
NOT an illusion, I see nothing wrong with using such a teleporter. Let's
take the case as presented in the sci-fi story (before Michael Condict rigs
the controls). A person disappears from (say) Earth and a person appears at
(say) Tau Ceti IV. The one appearing at Tau Ceti is exactly like the one
who left Earth as far as anyone can tell: she looks the same, acts the same,
says the same sort of things, displays the same sort of emotions. Note that
I did NOT say she is the SAME person -- although I would warn you not too
conclude too hastily whether she is or not. In my opinion, *it doesn't
matter* whether she is or not.
To get to the point: although I agree that consciousness needs something to
exist, there *IS* something there for it -- the person at Tau Ceti. On
what grounds can anyone believe that the person at Tau Ceti lacks a
consciousness? That is absurd -- consciousness is a necessary concomitant
of a normal human brain. Now there IS a question as to whether the
conscious person at Tau Ceti is *you*, and thus as to whether his mind
is *your* mind. There is a considerable philosophical literature on this
and very similar issues -- see *A Dialogue on Personal Identity and
Immortality* by John Perry, and "Splitting Self-Concern" by Michael B. Green
in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 62 (1981).
But in my opinion, there is a real question whether you can say whether
the person at Tau Ceti is you or not. Nor, in my opinion, is that
question really important. Take the modified case in which Michael Condict
rigs the controls so that you are transported, yet remain also at Earth.
Michael Condict calls the one at Earth the "original", and the one at Tau
Ceti the "copy". But how do you know it isn't the other way around -- how
do you know you (your consciousness) weren't teleported to Tau Ceti, while
a copy (someone else, with his own consciousness) was produced at Earth?
"Easy -- when I walk out of the transporter room at Earth, I know I'm still
me; I can remember everything I've done and can see that I'm still the same
person." WRONGO -- the person at Tau Ceti has the same memories, etc. I
could just as easily say "I'll know I was transported when I walk out of the
transporter room at Tau Ceti and realize that I'm still the same person."
So in fairness, we can't say "You walk out of the transporter room at both
ends, with the original you realizing that something went wrong." We have
to say "You walk out of the transporter at both ends, with *the one at
Earth* realizing something is wrong." But wait -- they can't BOTH be you --
or can they? Maybe neither is you! Maybe there's a continuous flow of
"souls" through a person's body, with each one (like the "copy" at Tau Ceti
(or is it at Earth)) *seeming* to remember doing the things that that body
did before ...
If you acknowledge that consciousness is rooted in the physical human brain,
rather than some mysterious metaphysical "soul" that can't be seen or
touched or detected in any way at all, you don't have to worry about whether
there's a continuous flow of consciousnesses through your body. You don't
have to be a dualist to recognize the reality of consciousness; in fact,
physicalism has the advantage that it *supports* the commonsense belief that
you are the same person (consciousness) you were yesterday.
--Paul Torek, U of MD, College Park
..umcp-cs!flinkdinitz@uicsl.UUCP (10/25/83)
#R:sri-arpa:-1270700:uicsl:15500010:000:200 uicsl!dinitz Oct 24 10:23:00 1983 See also the 17th and final essay by Daniel Dennett in his book Brainstorms [Bradford Books, 1978]. The essay is called "Where Am I," and investigates exactly this question of "split consciousness."
rlr@pyuxn.UUCP (10/26/83)
My own feelings on consciousness: consciousness is understandable (though not yet understood) as a physical/chemical process or state. Thus, a person's "consciousness" could conceivably be duplicated in another entity at another location (through some sort of teleporting device as previously described). Though the notion of a teleporting device may be beyond the scope of current knowledge (just like the knowledge of what "consciousness" is all about is beyond our current scope) it is irrelevant. The duplication can take place through local chemical/physical actions for our purposes. If one's consciousness can be construed to be the biochemical state of one's brain (and body) at a given moment, then the possibility exists that it can be reconstructed according to exact specifications in "another entity". If *you* are the subject of this reconstruction, would the reconstructed entity be the real you? Not if the original "you" still exists. Would it be "another" you? Only for the single moment of its conception, and in reality not even then. First off, changes in one's consciousness are at least partially determined by outside influences (sensory input), so the very fact that the other entity is in another place will result in different sensory inputs and different subsequent states of consciousness in the future. Secondly, the process of duplication will probably not be instantaneous. Thus, the duplicate will have the same state of consciousness that you *had* at the time of "scanning" for "duplication". However, at that moment of conception, the duplicate entity will have the consciousness that you had; the same knowledge, the same memories, etc. I realize that I'm saying "this *will* happen when blah blah" somewhat overauthoritatively. These are just my pet theories for this week as to the consequences of consciousness being a physical (cf. metaphysical) phenomenon. Rich