davidson@sdcsvax.UUCP (12/11/83)
I am responding to an article claiming that psychology and computer science arn't sciences. I think that the author is seriously confused by his prefered usage of the term ``science''. The sciences based on mathematics, information processing, etc., which I will here call information sciences, e.g., linguistics, computer science, information science, cognitive science, psychology, operations research, etc., have very different methods of operation from sciences based upon, for example, physics. Since people often view physics as the prototypical science, they become confused when they look at information sciences. This is analogous to the confusion of the early grammarians who tried to understand English from a background in Latin: They decided that English was primitive and in need of fixing, and proceeded to create Grammar schools in which we were all supposed to learn how to speak our native language properly (i.e., with intrusions of latin grammar). If someone wants to have a private definition of the word science to include only some methods of operation, that's their privilege, as long as they don't want to try to use words to communicate with other human beings. But we shouldn't waste too much time definining terms, when we could be exploring the nature and utility of the methodologies used in the various disciplines. In that light, let me say something about the methodologies of two of the disciplines as I understand and practice them, respectively. Physics: There is here the assumption of a simple underlying reality, which we want to discover through elegant theorizing and experimenting. Compared to other disciplines, e.g., experimental psychology, many of the experimental tools are crude, e.g., the statistics used. A theoretical psychologist would probably find the distance that often separates physical theory from experiment to be enormous. This is perfectly alright, given the (assumed) simple nature of underlying reality. Computer Science: Although in any mathematically based science one might say that one is discovering knowledge; in many ways, it makes better sense in computer science to say that one is creating as much as discovering. Someone will invent a new language, a new architecture, or a new algorithm, and people will abandon older languages, architectures and algorithms. A physicist would find this strange, because these objects are no less valid for having been surpassed (the way an outdated physical theory would be), but are simply no longer interesting. Let me stop here, and solicit some input from people involved in other disciplines. What are your methods of investigation? Are you interested in creating theories about reality, or creating artificial or abstract realities? What is your basis for calling your discipline a science, or do you? Please do not waste any time saying that some other discipline is not a science because it doesn't do things the way yours does! -Greg
robison@eosp1.UUCP (12/13/83)
The definitions of Science that were offered, in defense of "computer Science" being a science, were just irrelevant. A field can lay claim to Science, if it uses the "scientific method" to make advances, that is: Hypotheses are proposed. Hypotheses are tested by objective experiments. The experiments are objectively evaluated to prove or disprove the hypotheses. The experiments are repeatable by other people in other places. The process of proving or disproving hypotheses is done with reference to axioms, a well-defined frame of reference, other proved hypotheses, and methods of reasoning that have been themselves developed scientifically. There are many other disciplines out there that are developing fascinating information (Computer Science is one of them), but that doesn't make them sciences. Say, if you are working in an exciting discipline, don't be embarrassed that it isn't a science! (It isn't a profession either, but that's another subject.) Here's a very useful rule of thumb, by the way: ANY field that needs to have the word "science" in its name, isn't. - Keremath, care of: Robison decvax!ittvax!eosp1 or: allegra!eosp1
unbent@ecsvax.UUCP (12/13/83)
By rights, these comments should probably go into
net.philosophy.of.science, but ecsvax doesn't subscribe and
the issue was raised here in net.ai, so here goes.
Of course no-one holds a copyright on the word 'science'.
Practitioners of astrology *call* their discipline a science,
and so do practitioners of cosmetology and hair-styling. It's
easy to understand why, too: 'science' is a *laudatory* term,
an honorific. What's important, obviously, is the de facto
methodology, not the de dicto terminology.
The methodology of the "natural" sciences--paradigmatically
physics--is *explanatory*. That is, the theories of a natural
science aim not merely at *systematizing* phenomena but at
*explaining* them, and progress in natural science is measured
by increases in explanatory scope and explanatory power. It's
this that licenses the claims of natural science to be telling
the truth about "reality". Appearance and reality are
logically connected by an explanatory 'because': Things seem
as they do *because* things are as they are. "Phenomena" are
"how things *seem*"; a theory wins epistemic credibility
within a natural science by offering an account of an
"underlying reality" which successfully explains *why* things
seem as they do. (The "logical positivists" and "logical
empiricists" of the first half of this century got this
wrong.)
The "social" and "informational" sciences--sociology,
cognitive psychology, Chomskian linguistics, information
science--are *not* explanatory. That's the significant
methodological difference. They have a different criterion
for "getting it right". (It's, in fact, fairly opaque just
what that criterion is: some sort of coherent "reflective
equilibrium" between intuitions about cases and espousals of
principles, I think.) There's nothing wrong with that, except
that lots of sociologists, psychologists, and contemporary
linguists evidently *think* that what they're up to is the
same as what, e.g., physicists are up to--and make a great
fuss insisting upon it. (That's the battle that's typically
fought in terms of the question of whether such disciplines
are "really" sciences.) Computer and information scientists
characteristically don't think that they're up to the same
sort of project as, e.g., physicists--and that's a good thing.
More power to them! ("Getting it right" is often just a
matter of getting it to *run*.)
Sorry this is so long. I'm a philosopher by trade, and we
tend to be a chatty lot.
--Jay Rosenberg (ecsvax!unbent)
Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hillmmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (12/14/83)
============
I am responding to an article claiming that psychology and computer
science arn't sciences. I think that the author is seriously confused
by his prefered usage of the term ``science''.
============
*** This response is routed to net.philosophy as well as the net.ai
where it came from. Responders might prefer to edit net.ai out of
the Newsgroups: line before posting.
I'm not sure, but I think the article referenced was mine. In any case,
it seems reasonable to clarify what I mean by "science", since I think
it is a reasonably common meaning. By the way, I do agree with most of
the article that started with this comment, that it is futile to
define words like "science" in a hard and fast fashion. All I want
here is to show where my original comment comes from.
"Science" has obviously a wide variety of meanings if you get too
careful about it, just as does almost any word in a natural language.
But most meanings of science carry some flavour of a method for
discovering something that was not known by a method that others can
repeat. It doesn't really matter whether that method is empirical,
theoretical, experimental, hypothetico-deductive, or whatever, provided
that the result was previously uncertain or not obvious, and that at
least some other people can reproduce it.
I argued that psychology wasn't a science mainly on the grounds that
it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce the conditions
of an experiment on most topics that qualify as the central core of
what most people think of as psychology. Only the grossest aspects
can be reproduced, and only the grossest characterization of the
results can be stated in a way that others can verify. Neither do
theoretical approaches to psychology provide good prediction of
observable behaviour, except on a gross scale. For this reason, I
claimed that psychology was not a science.
Please note that in saying this, I intend in no way to downgrade the
work of practicing psychologists who are scientists. Peripheral
aspects, and gross descriptions are susceptible to attack by our
present methods, and I have been using those methods for 25 years
professionally. In a way it is science, but in another way it isn't
psychology. The professional use of the word "psychology" is not that
of general English. If you like to think what you do is science,
that's fine, but remember that the definition IS fuzzy. What matters
more is that you contribute to the world's well-being, rather than
what you call the way you do it.
--
Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,uw-beaver,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmtcondict@csd1.UUCP (Michael Condict) (12/14/83)
It should be pretty clear that some areas of Computer Science qualify as a "science" by anyone's reasonable definition and that other areas, specifically the theory of computation, program logic and verification, mathematical semantics and complexity theory are studied completely within the bounds of the mathematical paradigm. As an example of "scientific" computer science, consider experimentation with various algorithms for paging in a virtual memory system, which might take place not by stating and proving theorems about the algorithms but by carrying out actual physical experiments (running benchmark programs using the various paging algorithms and timing the results). The problem is that to a lot of people the word science means any discipline the study of which typically requires a Ph.D. To them, when you say that Computer Science is not a science, you are saying it is not of equal academic stature when compared to, say, Physics. Perhaps it would be better to assure them quickly that you do not include Mathematics as a science either. Actually, the above definition of science does need a word to go with it, because we frequently want to use such a word in describing someone. The word discipline sometimes suffices, but to a non-academic it is often meaningless (or connotes something like a religious order or Eastern philosophy). And then there is the problem of what to call a person who is engaged in the pursuit of a scholarly discipline, scientific or not. The word "academician" is stuffy and implies working for a university, while the word "scientist" has the obvious problem. The word "scholar" doesn't distinguish beginning graduate students from established pursuers of the discipline. I don't know what the answer is -- I just wanted to help clarify the problem. Michael Condict, Computational Scholar New York University ...cmcl2!csd1!condict