Hengst.WBST@PARC-MAXC.ARPA (12/29/83)
The flaming on the science component of computer science intrigues me
because it parallels some of the 1960's and 1970's discussion about the
science component of social science. That particular discussion, to
which Thomas Kuhn also contributed, also has not yet reached closure
which leaves me with the feeling that science might best be described as
a particular form of behavior by practitioners who possess certain
qualifications and engage in certain rituals approved by members of the
scientific tribe.
Thus, one definition of science is that it is whatever it is that
scientists do in the name of science ( a contextual and social
definition). Making coffee would not be scientific activity but reading
a professional book or entertaining colleagues with stimulating thoughts
and writings would be. From this perspective, employing the scientific
method is merely a particular form of engaging in scientific practice
without judging the outcome of that scientific practice. Relying upon
the scientific method by unlicensed practitioners would not result in
science but in lay knowledge. This means that authoritative statements
by members of scientific community are automatically given a certain
truth value. "Professor X says this", "scientific study Y demonstrates
that . . ." should all be considered as scientific statements because
they are issued as authorative statements in the name of science. This
interpretation of science discounts the role of Edward Teller as a
credible spokesman in the area of nuclear weapons policy in foreign
affairs.
The "licensing" of the practitioners derives from the formalization of
the training and education in the particular body of knowledge: eg. a
university degree is a form of license. Scientific knowledge can
differentiate itself from other forms of knowledge on the basis of
attempts (but not necesssarily success) at formalization. Physical
sciences study phenomena which lend themselves to better quantification
(they do have better metrics!) and higher levels of formalization. The
deterministic bodies of knowledge of the physical science allow for
better prediction than the heavily probabilistic bodies of knowledge of
the social science which facilitate explanation more so than prediction.
I am not sure if a lack of predictive power or lack of availability of
the scientific method (experimental design in its many flavors) makes
anyone less a scientist. The social sciences are rich in description and
insight which in my judgment compensates for a lack of hierarchical,
deductive formal knowledge.
>From this point of view computer science is science if it involves
building a body of knowledge with attempts at formulating rules in some
consistent and verfiable manner by a body of trained practitioners.
Medieval alchemy also qualifies due to its apprenticeship program (rules
for admitting members) and its rules for building knowledge.
Fortunately, we have better rules now.
Acco