KEDAR-CABELLI@RUTGERS.ARPA (07/03/84)
From: Smadar <KEDAR-CABELLI@RUTGERS.ARPA>
[Forwarded from the Rutgers bboard by Laws@SRI-AI.]
A Ph.D. Oral Examination - Proposal Defense
Title: Analogy with Purpose in Legal Reasoning from Precedents
Speaker: Smadar Kedar-Cabelli
Date: Friday, July 6, 1984, 10:00 - 11:00 am
Location: Hill Center, room 423
Open to DCS Faculty and Students
One open problem in current artificial intelligence (AI) models of
learning and reasoning by analogy is: which aspects of the analogous
situations are relevant to the analogy, and which are irrelevant? It
is currently recognized that analogy involves mapping some underlying
causal network of relations between situations [Winston 82], [Gentner
83], [Burstein 83], [Carbonell 83]. However, most current models of
analogy provide the system with exactly the relevant relations,
tailor-made to each analogy to be performed. As AI systems become more
complex, we will have to provide them with the capability of
automatically focusing on the relevant aspects of situations when
reasoning analogically. These will have to be sifted from the large
amount of information used to represent complex, real-world situations.
In order to study these general issues, we are examining a
particular case study of learning and reasoning by analogy: forming
legal concepts by legal reasoning from precedents. This is studied
within the TAXMAN II project, which is investigating legal reasoning
using AI techniques [McCarty 82], [Nagel 83].
In this talk, we will discuss the problem and a proposed solution.
We examine legal reasoning from precedents within the context of
current AI models of analogy. We then add a focusing capability.
Current work on goal-directed learning [Mitchell 83a], [Mitchell 83b],
and explanation-based learning [Dejong 83] applies here: the
explanation of how the precedent satisfies the intent of the law (i.e.
its goals, or purposes) helps to automatically focus the reasoning on
what is relevant.
Intuitively, suppose a lawyer wishes to argue that a particular case
involving a bicycle violated the following statute: 'a vehicle is
forbidden in a public park' [Hart 58]. He might argue by analogy to a
clear precedent--a passenger car. He needs to establish that a bicycle
is a vehicle for the purposes of this statute, that bicycles should be
banned from the park for the same reasons that passenger cars are. The
purpose, or intent of the law is to prohibit those things that would
interfere with the serene, quiet setting of the park, or would destroy
the natural habitat, and so on. Reasoning from this, the lawyer can
determine that aspects of the cases such as the ability to trample over
lawns, run over small animals, make noise, are relevant for this
purpose. On the other hand, aspects of the cases involving the country
where the vehicles were manufactured, or the materials the vehicles are
made of, are irrelevant for this purpose. Given a different law and
purpose, these might well be relevant.