ags@pucc-i (Seaman) (07/05/84)
> Is it coincidence that the computer declines > to write a sonnet and accepts the other challenges? A real human, trying > to prove that he is not a computer program, would probably welcome the > opportunity to offer a poem. Yes, I believe it is a coincidence. Another conversation from the Turing article demonstrates that he did not mean to exclude the possibility of a sonnet-writing machine: Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads 'Shall I compare thee to a summer's day,' would not 'a spring day' do as well or better? Witness: It wouldn't scan. Interrogator: How about 'a winter's day.' That would scan all right. Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day. Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison. Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one means a typical winter's day, rather than a special one like Christmas. And so on [Turing continues]. What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was able to answer like this in the viva voce? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > My attack was not against the details of the conversation (for that > matter, the third problem is ambiguous), but the premise of the Test. Yes, the third problem was ambiguous. I thought it was also rather clever: Q: I have K at my K1, and no other pieces. You have only K at K6 and R at R1. It is your move. What do you play? A: (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate. A machine might be expected to ask whether the rook is at QR1 or KR1, not realizing that it is irrelevant. The answer "R-R8 mate" is correct in either case. Was this a trap laid by the questioner? You say you object to the premise of the test. The reason for that becomes apparent in your next comment: > You may remember that Turing called it a "Game" rather than a "Test." This > sort of situation arises _only_ as a game; if you really want to know > whether somebody is a person or a computer, you just look at him/it. Where does Turing say or imply that being able to tell a person from a computer is of any importance? The question is merely, "Can a machine think?" Unless you believe that "having a human form" is a prerequisite for thinking, physical appearance means nothing. Is your objection of the form, 1. The Turing "imitation game" is not an adequate test of a machine's ability to think? [If not, why not?] 2. It is of no importance to decide whether machines can think, and therefore the Turing "imitation game" has no value? [If this is your position, then I think we have nothing more to discuss.] > I should think that ELIZA has laid to rest the myth that a program's > "humanity" has anything to do with its intelligence. ELIZA's intel- > ligence was low, but she was a very human source of comfort to many > people who talked with her. I don't think the imitation game is (or was intended to be) a test of "humanity." Since ELIZA cannot come close to performing well in the imitation game, she has no relevance to the validity of the test. Yes, I am aware that ELIZA has fooled people, but this happened under circumstances that are very different from the imitation game. -- Dave Seaman "My hovercraft is full of eels." ..!pur-ee!pucc-i:ags
mikevp@proper.UUCP (07/10/84)
It seems to me that a good place to try a Turing test would be on just such a network as this eone. Could one or more of the people who write these messages be AI programs? Probably not, but it would certainly be a good place to ry out such a pam if someone has one that looks convincing.