eugene@ames.UUCP (Eugene Miya) (07/23/84)
I am not an AI expert, but I do know image processing and certain other computationally intensive tasks which are 'easy' for humans. I also know the original definition of the Turing test. I take issue with statements that LISP machines are 'smarter' or 'better' than humans for "subgoal" tasks. What I am wondering is "should the Test be modified to Our times?" I recall that Turing specified that a communication link such as a tty or phone like could be used[1930s]. Should this be changed to a video link? [This is am example only, there might be other aspects.] Should the testee 'see' images? Can machines recognize defocused images of an animal and say "That is a cow" as humans could [to a limit]. Perhaps, what our definition of 'human' constitutes a moving target which might take the Test more difficult. The processing requirements of the Turing Test in the 1930s would be less than those of today. I can see it now, over a crude link, we discover that we cannot tell the difference between man and machine, then we hook up a video link, and the difference 'becomes apparent.' Admittedly, one can argue that this is only a matter of adding more processig power, but ignore that argument or a while. Also, there might be audio examples (perhaps not as power as the video example). Comments? This is for discussion purposes, not just me. --eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center
steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) (07/27/84)
References: <276@west44.UUCP> *** > I think that we're all missing something here - the Turing test was not > designed to test how like a human a machine could be, but to test whether > or not a machine could appear to think. Adding . . facilities to the test > . . merely makes the test into an imitation game. This > is not what the test was designed for. Huh? Turing did not think that intelligence could be defined and he proposed the test, an imitation game,INSTEAD of answering the question. "Imitation game" is Turing's term and is the exact test he proposed calling it "merely . . an imitation game" seems to be missing the articles point, which is about an imitation game. "Intelligence", like any abstract term, is lacking an unambigious reference. Its meaning varies depending on who is using it (at Turing points out in the following article). Even within a narrow specialized range there are fundemental disagrements about the nature of learning. Turing sought to sidestep the disagreement by proposing a different goal, one that we can agree we have reached. It goes without saying that the Turing Test seems inadaquate. Each of has a different defination of intelligence, as do various specialties within science. For instance Chomsky and Piaget have different irreconcilable requirements. If you made a machine that exhibited intelligence for one it would not for the other. DeCarte believed in "non-interactionalism". He believe that the "think" in "I think therefore I am" was done by a "I" which did not interact with the physical engine of the body. In DeCartes view, if a machine does it, it is by definition not intelligence. ____________________________________________________________ THE IMITATION GAME A. M. Turing I propose to consider the question,'Can machines think?' This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms 'machine' and 'think'. The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the words 'machine' and 'think' are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, 'Can machines think?' is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms ofa game which we call the 'imitation game'. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interroga- tor (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either 'X is A and Y is B' or 'X is B and Y is A'. The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus: C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair? Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer. it is A's object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identification. His answer might therefore be 'My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long.' In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should be written,or better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms. Alternatively the question and answers can be repeated by an intermediary. The object of the game for the third player (B) is to help the interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add such things as 'I am the woman, don't listen to him!' to her answers, but it will avail nothing as the man can make similar remarks. We now ask the question, 'What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game isplayed like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, 'Canmachines think?' CRITIQUE OF THE NEW PROBLEM. As well as asking, 'What is the answer to this new form of the question', one may ask, 'Is this new question a worthy one to investigate?' This latter question we investigate without further ado,there by cutting short an infinite regress. The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible that at some time this mightbedone, butevensupposing this invention available we should feel there was little point in trying to make a' thinking machine' more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh. The form in which we have set the problem reflects thisfactin the condition which prevents the interrogator from seeing or touching the other competitors,or hearing their voices. Someother advantages of the proposed criterion may be shown up by specimenquestionsandanswers. Thus: Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge. A: Count me out on this one. I could never write poetry. Q: Add 34957 to 70764 A: (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 105621. Q: Do you play chess? A: Yes. Q: I have K at my K1, and no other pieces. You have only K at K6 and R at R1. It is your move. What do you play? A: (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate. The question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavor that we wish to include. We do not wish to penalise the machine for its inability to shine in beauty competitions, nor to penalise a man for losing a race against an aero- plane. The conditons of our game make these disabilities irrelevant. The 'witnesses' can brag, if they consider it advisable, as much as they please about their charms, strength or heroism, but the interrogator cannot demand practical demonstrations. The game may perhaps be criticised on the ground that the odds are weighted too heavily against the machine. If the man were to try and pretend to be the machine he would clearly make a very poor showing. He would be given away at once by slowness and inaccuracy in arithmetic. May not machines carry out something which ought to be described as thinking but which is very different from what a man does? This objection is a very strong one, but at least we can say that if, nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by this objection. It might be urged that when playing the 'imitation game 'the best strategy for the machine may possibly be something other than imitation of thebehaviorofaman. Thismaybe,but I think it is unlikely that there is any great effect of this kind. In any case there is no intention to investigate here the theory of the game, and it will be assumed that the best strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be given by a man. -------------------------------------------------------------- "observations which no one has doubted but have escaped remark only because they are always before out eyes." Don Steiny Personetics 109 Torrey Pine Terr. Santa Cruz, Calif. 95060 (408) 425-0382 ihnp4!pesnta -\ fortune!idsvax -> scc!steiny ucbvax!t
gurr@west44.UUCP (Dave Gurr) (07/31/84)
< force of habit ... > I think that we're all missing something here - the Turing test was not designed to test how like a human a machine could be, but to test whether or not a machine could appear to think. Adding such facilities to the test such as a video link merely makes the test into an imitation game. This is not what the test was designed for. Personally, I think the test is totally inconclusive and irrelevant. It gives merely a subjective qualitative answer to a question which we cannot answer satisfactorily about other people, or even about ourselves (from some of the items on USENET, I'm sure some people don't think :-) !!!). mcvax "Hello shoes. I'm sorry \ but I'm going to have to ukc!west44!gurr stand in you again!" / vax135 Dave Gurr, Westfield College, Univ. of London, England.