[net.ai] Dog Modelling: a correction

gary@rochester.UUCP (10/14/84)

From: Gary Cottrell  <gary>

The careful reader will have noticed that the default rule in the previous
announcement was upside down. The following announcement corrects the error.



                     University of Cottage Street
                         Dept. of Dog Science
                          55 Cottage Street
                      Rochester, New York 14608


                               SEMINAR


                      Saturday, 20 October, 1984
                            55 Cottage St.
                              9:00 p.m.

            _M_o_d_e_l_l_i_n_g _t_h_e _I_n_t_e_n_t_i_o_n_a_l _B_e_h_a_v_i_o_r _o_f _t_h_e _D_o_g

                         Garrison W. Cottrell


          Many of us, while  out  for  a  stroll,  have  had  the
     experience   of  observing  a  dog  trotting  along,  alone,
     obviously _g_o_i_n_g _s_o_m_e_w_h_e_r_e.  This raises many questions, such
     as, "Where is he going?", "Why is he going there?", "Will it
     be more fun than where I'm  going?",  and  so  forth.   Such
     questions  motivate  us  to  postulate the existence of (and
     hence the efficacy of  further  study  of)  the  intentional
     behavior of the dog[1].

          We propose a highly parallel, neurologically  plausible
     model  of  dog  behavior  based  on  a connectionist (neural
     network) implementation  of  a  subset  of  Reiter's  (1980)
     Default  Logic, as reported in Cottrell (1984).  As outlined
     in that paper, there is a well specified mapping of  default
     rules  to  connectionist  network  fragments  that implement
     those rules, with the benefit that the network  operates  in
     real  time  by  continuously updating the truth value of all
     predicates in parallel[2] (thus  making  Doyle's  work,  and
     perhaps  Doyle  himself,   superfluous).    Currently,   the
     implementation   only   allows   inference  rules  with  one
     universally quantified variable.  While inadequate for  many
     purposes,  we  claim  that  this  is  all  we  need  for dog
     modelling, since it appears that dogs can only  think  about
     one thing at a time anyway[3].  In this work we  reinterpret
     ____________________
        [1]Grembowitz (1982) proposed a model  of  the  cat,  but
     only  handled  the case of the cat tripping on catnip, cata-
     tonically staring at the wallpaper for hours  with  sporadic
     leaps  into  space.   This  simple  behavior  was  elegantly
     modeled by the composition of only two standard UNIX  calls,
     random(3c) and sleep(1).
        [2]The observant reader will recognize a certain similar-
     ity to British Motor Corporation's  oft-lamented  experiment
     of  shoehorning an Austin Healey six cylinder engine into an
     MGB.  Early results support the contention that our  bastard
     child of a similar "marriage made in hell" will be more suc-
     cessful.
        [3]It is interesting to note that the set of things a dog
     can think about as noted in "Dog:  A  Canine  Architecture",
     Cottrell  (1981)  may  be _f_i_n_i_t_e and limited to food, squir-
     rels, and other dogs.  Further, the dog we have studied  ap-
     pears  to only have three responses to other dogs, depending
     on their sex.





     Reiter's  default  inference  rules  as  precondition-action
     behavior rules.  An example behavioral rule is:

                         Moving(x) : Squirrel(x)
                         -----------------------
                                Chase(x)


          An  English  interpretation  of  this  rule   is,   "if
     something  is  moving,  and  we  don't have evidence that it
     isn't a squirrel, then chase it." This models  the  observed
     behavior  of  Jelly Bean chasing a paper bag.  The real time
     behavior of our implementation captures his stopping when it
     turns  out  not  to  be  a  squirrel,  since that blocks the
     inference of Chase(x), which then  slowly  decays,  much  as
     Jelly  Bean  slows  to  a  confused halt.  (As a simplifying
     assumption, we ignore his subsequent pretense of not  having
     been  chasing  it  at  all.)  Of  course,  we  still have to
     determine whether there might still be  some  peanut  butter
     and  jelly in the bag, but this can be easily handled by the
     addition of more rules.  Note that since we are  building  a
     model  of  behavior, the consequent of the rule is an action
     (Chase(x)), not  an  addition  of  the  useless  information
     Squirrel(x) to the already overtaxed knowledge base[4].

          We have a grandiose long term research  plan  to  model
     the  entire  mind  of  the  dog,  which  will generate grant
     proposals _a_d _n_a_u_s_e_u_m.  One of the new tools we plan  to  use
     in  this  research  is  the  previously unnoticed ability to
     access the goal structures of the dog through measurement of
     tail wagging (for a discussion of some other aspects of tail
     wagging, including tail recursion,  see  "The  Dog  Papers",
     Benson  & Sloan (1984)).  We claim that tail wagging will do
     for dog modelling research what reaction times have done for
     psychology.   For  example,  we  can  use  this technique to
     assess the goal priorities of the dog.  If we  ask  "do  you
     want to go out?" we get a vigorous wagging response, whereas
     if we ask, "do you want to stay?", we get no  tail  wagging.
     Further,  we  can map out all of the levels of the system by
     studying  the  _t_i_m_e  _c_o_u_r_s_e   of   the   wagging   behavior.
     Demonstrations  of  the  the  time  course  of  the  wagging
     response will be provided.











     ____________________
        [4]As  evidence  that the knowledge base is already full,
     one only needs to note that when Squirrel(x)  holds,  and  x
     climbs a tree, the dog repeatedly attempts to climb the tree
     by jumping on the trunk, even though this tactic  has  never
     been observed to succeed.