[net.ai] AIList Digest V3 #102

LAWS@SRI-AI.ARPA (08/01/85)

From: AIList Moderator Kenneth Laws <AIList-REQUEST@SRI-AI>


AIList Digest            Thursday, 1 Aug 1985     Volume 3 : Issue 102

Today's Topics:
  Queries - PRESS & Loglan,
  Linguistics - Aymara,
  Expert Systems - Definition,
  Games - Chess Programs and Cheating,
  AI Tools - POPLOG

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Date: Thu, 25 Jul 85 10:08 EST
From: D E Stevenson <dsteven%clemson.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa>
Subject: Information on PRESS

I would like to get a copy of PRESS.  Can anyone tell me
how to obtain one?

PRESS is the name of the symbolic algebra system that he developed
at Edinburgh.  I have read spots here and there about it, mostly in
the applied math literature.  It is written in PROLOG and is
reputed to be very fast.  I asked for PROLOG-based systems on the
symalg net; PRESS was the only system identified.

I am interested in functional/logic programming and numerical analysis;
I thought I might get a copy and see what I could do with it.

Steve Stevenson
(803) 656-5880

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Date: Sun 28 Jul 85 18:11:09-PDT
From: FIRSCHEIN@SRI-AI.ARPA
Subject: Loglan

LOGLAN was (is?) a language designed to test the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis that the natural languages limit human thought.
The Loglan Institute was set up to publish books on the
subject and to carry out investigations in loglan.

Does anyone know whether the Loglan Institute still exists
and what has been done with loglan? Does anyone have a current
address for them?


  [The most recent address I have is The Loglan Institute, Inc.,
  2261 Soledad Rancho Road, San Diego, CA 92109.  -- KIL ]

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Date: Mon 29 Jul 85 10:59:04-PDT
From: Ken Laws <Laws@SRI-AI.ARPA>
Subject: Aymara

Robert Van Valin ("ucdavis!harpo!lakhota"@BERKELEY) sent me a clipping
from the SSILA Newsletter.  It's a letter from Dr. M.J. Hardman-de-Bautista,
Director of the Aymara Language Materials Program, stressing that
Ivan Guzman de Rojas is not associated with the ALMP, does not himself
speak Aymara, and bases his work in machine translation on a grammar
and dictionary written over 400 years ago by a Jesuit priest.  He claims
that Mr. Guzman's published examples of Aymara are nearly all grammatically
incorrect and that the stated meanings for acceptable sentences are
often wildly inaccurate.  "His poor understanding of Aymara word and
sentence structure results in forms that are simply unintelligible to
the Aymara."  Which is not to say that Guzman's translation program
can't work, but it does cast a suspicious light on the matter.

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Date: 30 Jul 85 15:38 PDT
From: Miller.pasa@Xerox.ARPA
Subject: Defining the Expert System

I am spending this summer as an intern for Xerox AI Systems group where
part of my task is to come up with a working definition of what
constitutes an "Expert System."  Having done some rather extensive
reading on AI in general and expert systems in particular throughout the
past month, I have come to two conclusions:

        First, due perhaps to media hype, the term "expert system" tends to get
bantered about extremely loosely and broadly and is applied to a wide
variety of programs and packages.

        Second, the only definitions which seem to exist in testbooks,
articles, or company literature all seem to go something like this:  "An
expert system is a computer program which does what an expert does."

While this definition is basic, I would like some more detail.  So
here's the question: What do you, as a knowledgeable person in the field
of AI, consider to be the necessary minimum attributes for an "Expert
System?"  Is it fair to give the same title to both CADUCEUS and to
'Tell Me Doctor' from Apple?  Why or why not?  Can you build an "Expert
System" with ART?  How about TOPSI from Dynamic Master Systems (1000
rules maximum, forward-chaining, $75) ?  How many rules does it take to
make a system 'expert'?  What kind (and how large) of a domain must an
"expert system" address?  Etc.

If you've got (or would care to write) a working definition of your own,
I'd love to hear it.  Otherwise, I'd really appreciate your thoughts on
any of the above questions or any others that may come to mind.
Pointers towards reading sources probably wouldn't hurt.  Look at this
as a very informal survey of the field-- linguistically speaking, a term
can only be defined by those who use it.

If anybody's interested, I'll be glad to compile the results and send a
copy.

Please reply to me at
Miller.pasa@Xerox.ARPA

--Chris Miller


  [Alex Goodall supplies the following definitions in The Guide to
  Expert Systems (published by Learned Information):

    An expert system is a computer system that performs functions
    similar to those normally performed by a human expert.

    An expert system is a computer system that uses a representation
    of human expertise in a specialist domain in order to perform
    functions similar to those normally performed by a human expert
    in that domain.

    An expert system is a computer system that operates by applying
    an inference mechanism to a body of specialist expertise
    represented in the form of 'knowledge'.

  He prefers the latter, but discusses all three in his first chapter.
  Feigenbaum, in Knowledge Engineering for the 1980's (quoted by
  Gevarter in An Overview of Expert Systems and by Kolbus and Mazzetti
  in Artificial Intelligence Emerges) says:

    An 'expert system' is an intelligent computer program that uses
    knowledge and inference procedures to solve problems that are
    difficult enough to require significant human expertise for their
    solution.  The knowledge necessary to perform at such a level,
    plus the inference procedures used, can be thought of as a model
    of the expertise of the best practitioners of the field.

    The knowledge of an expert system consists of facts and heuristics.
    The 'facts' constitute a body of information that is widely shared,
    publicly available, and generally agreed upon by experts in a
    field.  The 'heuristics' are mostly private, little-discussed
    rules of good judgement (rules of plausible reasoning, rules of
    good guessing) that characterize expert-level decision making
    in the field.  The performance level of an expert system is
    primarily a function of the size and quality of the knowledge base
    that it possesses.

  I don't care for the words "intelligent" and "difficult" in the first
  paragraph, but the intention is clear.

  As for size, expert systems for process control (e.g., using fuzzy
  logic or qualitative "derivatives") can be quite small.  I remember
  a news note in Expert Systems (a journal from Learned Information)
  about a system with 7 rules that was said to function well.  -- KIL]

------------------------------

Date: Sun 28 Jul 85 15:11:41-EDT
From: Oolong  <WESALUM.A-LIAO-85@KLA.WESLYN>
Reply-to: LIAO%Weslyn.Bitnet@WISCVM.ARPA
Subject: More on Chess Programs and Cheating

     In reading Dr. Laws objection, let me begin by saying that I
certainly  agree  that  programs are better chess  machines  than
people are.  Further, I agree that superior memory and speed in a
computer does NOT give a program an unfair advantage.
      But  perhaps  I should clarify my position a  bit  more:  I
believe  that chess programs with moves written INTO the  program
cheat  in  the sense that they will ALWAYS carry  around  ENCODED
(and thus represented) moves. Human players do not, on the whole,
do  any such thing.  Perhaps it would be best to try a  Searleian
approach to the problem.  In particular, you might be right about
the  way humans play chess...we may have some moves memorized and
yet  not always have them actively represented.  Perhaps to  some
extent,  these  might  one  of (or at  least  part  of)  Searle's
unconcious  Intentional states.   However,  I'm not convinced  of
that this position completely accounts for the way we play.
     Consider  players who are familiar with each other's form of
play.   One cannot store every move made in every game played and
associate  each  game  with the correct  player  (that  goes  for
programs as well).   Still one recognizes particular COMBINATIONS
of  moves  ("chunking"  a la Hofstadter)  through  experience  of
following  the other player's games and,  moreover,  direct  play
reinforces  those  experiences.   As Searle would put it  - these
experiences/practices  create capacities presumably  realized  as
neural pathways (a sort of learning, if you will).  So in effect,
the  "practiced  moves" become part of the background  and  never
become  embedded/encoded representations.   This background  only
creates  the  capacity  to create the representations  needed  to
decide  what move to make (i.e.  to recognize a pattern of  moves
made  and  then  decide  what moves  are  needed  thwart  such  a
strategy).   Certainly,  if  one  chooses to memorize  particular
moves,  that  is one's perogative,  but on a whole,  we don't  do
that.   If you will notice,  this is the reason I argued for  the
notion of "playing from our own experiences".  This position that
I  hold  has the implication that we recognize strategies by  the
results of our experience and so it is actually a part of  us.  I
think  the interpretation of "run what ya brung" does not  escape
the  problem  of the program playing by its author's  experiences
and not its own.
     Now  let's  consider  the situation where two  players
are  not  familiar with each other's form  of  play.   Certainly,
there  can be no pre-memorized set of optimal opening moves since
you  have no experience with this player's strategic  tendancies.
Yet,  how is it that you open with your favorite move when you do
not  know what else to do.   Do you do it thinking "This  is  the
right  move  to  make",  or  do you just  move  from  experience?
How is it then you decide on what strategy to  use?   Presumably,
it makes more sense,  perhaps, to say that we use memorized moves
going  into such a game but use our background (thus  experience)
to recognize what the other person is doing.  In this way a human
player  can  "probe"  the other player's  strategy,  though  this
probing  technique  may  be an inefficient way  of  deciding  the
optimal strategy.   However, this relies on experience and again,
a computer with built in moves cannot "probe" if it MUST to  rely
on built-in moves (i.e.  experiences not its own).  In fact, this
is  a  form of learning and the acquirement of experience  (a  la
Searle).   Personally,  I do not see how my position differs from
Mr. Jennings - I too believe that a computer should "learn how to
play  chess" before it is allowed to play in a tournament  rather
than  rely on moves ENCODED into the program.   I see  one  major
problem  however - one may keep entire games on disk/tape for use
later  on  in other tournaments with other players  but  after  a
while you may exceed disk/tape memory.  One may object by saying,
"Well, we could get a program to convenietly forget certain moves
(etc)  and  install  the  better ones."   My  problem  with  that
response   is   the  question  "What  constitutes  moves  to   be
forgotten?"    Presumably,    all   this   is   a   question   of
Intentionality.   After   reading   Searle's   chapter   on   the
"Background"  (from "Intentionality") I am beginning  to  suspect
that  we may just forget the details of particular capacities and
retain some sort of skeletal structure of that capacity (whatever
that  maybe).   Just what is forgotten and how it is forgotten is
a question I offer to the forum for consideration.

                                                - drew liao

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Date: 23 Jul 1985 23:58:11-BST
From: Aaron Sloman <aarons%svgv@ucl-cs>
Subject: POPLOG - A mixed language development system.

          [Forwarded from the Prolog Digest by Laws@SRI-AI.]


Poplog is available on VAX and DEC 8600 computers.

It includes Prolog (compiled to machine code), Common Lisp (large
subset ready now, remainder available early 1986), POP-11
(comparable in power to Common Lisp, but uses a PASCAL-like syntax),
VED an integrated multi-window multi-buffer screen editor, which can
be used for all interactions with programs, operating system
utilities, online help, program libraries, teaching libraries, etc.
VED includes 'compile this procedure' 'compile from here to here'
'splice output into current file' etc.)

Incremental compilers are provided for Prolog, Lisp, and
POP-11. All the languages compile to the same intermediate
POPLOG 'Virtual machine' language, which is then compiled
to machine code. The 'syscompile' facilities make it easy
to add new front end compilers for additional languages,
which all share the same back-end compiler, editor and
environmental facilities. Mixed language facilities allow
sharing of libraries without re-coding and also allow
portions of a program to be written in the language which
is most suitable.

Approximate recent Prolog benchmarks, for naive reverse test,
without mode declarations:

 VAX/780 + VMS               4.2 KLIPS
 VAX/750 + Unix 4.2          2.4 KLIPS (750+Systime accelerator)
 DEC 8600                   13.0 KLIPS
 SUN2 + Unix 4.2             2.5 KLIPS (also HP 9000/200)
 GEC-63 + Unix V        approx 6 KLIPS

The Prolog is being substantially re-written, for greater
modularity and improved efficiency. Mode declarations should
be available late 1985, giving substantial speed increase.

POP-11 and Common Lisp include both dynamic and lexical scoping,
a wide range of data-types, strings, arrays, infinite precision
arithmetic, hashed 'properties', etc. (Not yet packages, rationals
or complex numbers.) POP-11 includes a pattern-matcher (one-way
unification) with segment variables and pattern-restrictors.

External_load now allows 'external' modules to be linked in and
unlinked dynamically (e.g. programs written in C, Fortran, Pascal,
etc.). This almost amounts to a 'rapid prototyping' incremental
compiler for such languages.

A considerable number of AI-projects funded by the UK Alvey
Programme in universities and industry now use a mixture of
Prolog and POP-11, within Poplog.

Enquiries:

    UK Educational institutions:
        Alison Mudd,
        Cognitive Studies Programme,
        Sussex University,
        Brighton, England. 0273 606755

-- Aaron Sloman

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