[net.ai] "self-styled philosophers"

mark@umcp-cs.UUCP (Mark Weiser) (02/13/86)

A recent posting called the Dreyfus' "self-styled philosophers".  This
is unfair, since Hubert Dreyfus is also styled a philosopher by many another
philosopher in the area of phenomenology.

"Self-styled computer scientist" ok.
-mark

-- 
Spoken: Mark Weiser 	ARPA:	mark@maryland	Phone: +1-301-454-7817
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ladkin@kestrel.ARPA (Peter Ladkin) (02/14/86)

In article <3189@umcp-cs.UUCP>, mark@umcp-cs.UUCP (Mark Weiser) writes:
> A recent posting called the Dreyfus' "self-styled philosophers".  This
> is unfair, since Hubert Dreyfus is also styled a philosopher by many another
> philosopher in the area of phenomenology.

Agreed. He is also a professional philosopher, holding a chair at
U.C. Berkeley. His criticisms of AI claims are thoroughly thought
through, with a rigor that a potential critic of his views would
do well to emulate. He has done AI great service by forcing
practitioners to be more self-critical. AAAI should award him
distinguished membership!
His main thesis is that there are certain human qualities and
attributes, for example certain emotions, that are just not the
kinds of things that are amenable to mechanical mimicry. This
general claim seems unexceptional. His examples may not
always be the most appropriate for his claims, some of
his arguments seem to be incorrect, and, since he isn't a
practicing computer scientist, his knowledge of current research
is lacking. But it is intellectual sloppiness to deride him
without addressing his arguments.
There is, however, a political component to the discussion.
He believes he is able to show that certain types of research
cannot justify the claims they make on the basis of which they
are funded. He may be right in some of these cases. This is
clearly a sensitive issue, which muddies the intellectual
waters. Both sides would do well to separate the issues.

Peter Ladkin

dpb@philabs.UUCP (Paul Benjamin) (02/17/86)

> In article <3189@umcp-cs.UUCP>, mark@umcp-cs.UUCP (Mark Weiser) writes:
> > A recent posting called the Dreyfus' "self-styled philosophers".  This
> > is unfair, since Hubert Dreyfus is also styled a philosopher by many another
> > philosopher in the area of phenomenology.
> 
> Agreed. He is also a professional philosopher, holding a chair at
> U.C. Berkeley. His criticisms of AI claims are thoroughly thought
> through, with a rigor that a potential critic of his views would
> do well to emulate. He has done AI great service by forcing
> practitioners to be more self-critical. AAAI should award him
> distinguished membership!

Baloney. His views show a total lack of understanding of science,
together with an inability to perform useful work relating to science.

For example, in his recent article, he recounts an "experiment"
he conducted to show that chessplayers do not use reasoning very
much, but just play instinctively. This experiment consisted of
an International Master playing against a weaker player. The IM
was forced to add a sequence of numbers while playing, thus
supposedly occupying his reasoning capability. The IM won anyway,
thus supposedly showing that chess is not primarily a reasoning
venture, or more precisely, that the difference between being a
master and just very good is not due to superior reasoning.

But wait a minute! How does this qualify as an experiment? Where
is the control group? Did he have the IM play a number of players,
sometimes having to add, sometimes not, and compare their results?
NO. Did he vary the distracting task, in case addition was not
demanding enough? NO.

In short, this experiment means nothing, since the IM may well have
played worse than he would have without having to add, but won
anyway. This type of "evidence" is constantly cited by Dreyfus to
support his views, but it's meaningless, due to his inability to
perform good work.

Also, he remarks that he and his brother have both failed to improve
to a master level in chess, and somehow uses this to support his
views, too! His basic argument is that if reasoning is so important,
then he should be able to make master, implying that he is a good
reasoner! It obviously has never occurred to him to ask someone
who is a master if reasoning is important to him. I am a USCF master,
and can guarantee that improving my reasoning capability has raised
my rating (over 300 points in the last few years). It seems arrogant
for him to reach conclusions about fields in which he is not
accomplished. This applies to both chess and AI.

Paul Benjamin

bzs@bu-cs.UUCP (Barry Shein) (02/17/86)

>For example, in his recent article, he recounts an "experiment"
>he conducted to show that chessplayers do not use reasoning very
>much, but just play instinctively. This experiment consisted of
>an International Master playing against a weaker player. The IM
>was forced to add a sequence of numbers while playing, thus
>supposedly occupying his reasoning capability. The IM won anyway

I just repeated this experiment and I think he is right. I forced
my SUN to add sequences of numbers while playing chess with me and
I lost.

Here, do it yourself:

	main()
	{
		int i,j;

		for(;;) for(i=j=0; i < 10000 ; i++) j += i ;
	}
save this in file foo.c, compile with 'cc foo.c' and say:

	a.out & (runs it in the background)
	chesstool

it slows it down only a tad, barely noticeable, but I still keep losing!
AMAZING! my computer is human!

	-Barry Shein, Boston University

ladkin@kestrel.ARPA (Peter Ladkin) (02/19/86)

(ladkin on Dreyfus)
> > He is also a professional philosopher, holding a chair at
> > U.C. Berkeley. His criticisms of AI claims are thoroughly thought
> > through, with a rigor that a potential critic of his views would
> > do well to emulate. He has done AI great service by forcing
> > practitioners to be more self-critical. AAAI should award him
> > distinguished membership!
(benjamin)
> Baloney.
> [comments on Dreyfus on chess .....]
> It seems arrogant
> for him to reach conclusions about fields in which he is not
> accomplished. This applies to both chess and AI.

Before you cry *baloney*, how about addressing the issue?
As I pointed out, but you deleted, his major argument is that
there are some areas of human experience related to intelligence
which do not appear amenable to machine mimicry.
Do you (or anyone) think that this statement is obviously false?
(Negate it and see if that sounds right).

People reach (good and bad) conclusions about fields in which
they are not accomplished all the time. That's how AI got started,
and that's how computers got invented. 

Why is it that people get so heated about criticism of AI that
they stoop to name-calling rather than addressing the points made?
(That question has probably also been asked by Dreyfus).

Peter Ladkin

dpb@philabs.UUCP (Paul Benjamin) (02/20/86)

> (ladkin on Dreyfus)
> > > He is also a professional philosopher, holding a chair at
> > > U.C. Berkeley. His criticisms of AI claims are thoroughly thought
> > > through, with a rigor that a potential critic of his views would
> > > do well to emulate. He has done AI great service by forcing
> > > practitioners to be more self-critical. AAAI should award him
> > > distinguished membership!
> (benjamin)
> > Baloney.
> > [comments on Dreyfus on chess .....]
> > It seems arrogant
> > for him to reach conclusions about fields in which he is not
> > accomplished. This applies to both chess and AI.
> 
> Before you cry *baloney*, how about addressing the issue?
> As I pointed out, but you deleted, his major argument is that
> there are some areas of human experience related to intelligence
> which do not appear amenable to machine mimicry.
> Do you (or anyone) think that this statement is obviously false?
> (Negate it and see if that sounds right).
> 
> Why is it that people get so heated about criticism of AI that
> they stoop to name-calling rather than addressing the points made?
> (That question has probably also been asked by Dreyfus).
> 
> Peter Ladkin

I DID address the issue. I deleted your reference because reproducing
entire postings leads to extremely large postings. But I am addressing
his argument about areas of human experience which supposedly will
never be amenable to machine implementation. My whole point, which I
thought was rather obvious, is that he conjures up examples which are
poorly thought out, and experiments which are poorly executed. Thus,
his entire analysis is worthless to any investigators in the field.

I would welcome any analysis which would point out areas which I should
not waste time investigating. I receive this sort of input occasionally,
in the form of "it is better to investigate this than that, for this reason"
and this is very helpful. I certainly don't love wasting time looking at
dead ends. If Dreyfus' work were carefully constructed, it could be very
valuable. But all I see when I read his stuff is vague hypotheses, backed
up with bad research.

So I am not calling him names. I am characterizing his research, and
therefore AM addressing the issue.

Paul Benjamin

olaf@ihwpt.UUCP (olaf henjum) (02/20/86)

Is there any other kind of "lover of wisdom" than a "self-styled" one?

   -- Olaf Henjum (ihnp4!ihwpt!olaf)
      (and, of course, my opinions are strictly my own ...)

bsmith@uiucdcsp.CS.UIUC.EDU (03/03/86)

William James once wrote that all great theories go through three
distinct stages:  first, everyone claims the theory is simply wrong,
and not worth taking seriously.  Second, people start saying that,
maybe it's true, but it's trivial.  And third, people are heard to
say that not only is it true and important, but they thought of it
first.

Here at the University of Illinois, it seems to be de rigeur
to laugh and deride Dreyfuss whenever his name comes up.  I am
convinced the majority of these people have never read any of
Dreyfuss' work--however, this is unimportant to them (clearly I don't
mean everyone here).  There are also those who spend a great deal of
time and effort rejecting everything Dreyfuss says.  For example,
recently Dr. Buchanan (of Stanford) gave a lecture here.  He purported
to be answering Dreyfuss, but in the great majority of cases agreed
with him (always saying something like, "Well, maybe it's true, but
who cares?").  It seems to me that, if Dreyfuss is so unimportant, it
is very strange indeed that so many people get so offended by
everything he says and does.  Perhaps AI researchers ought to be less
sensitive and start encouraging this sort of interdisciplinary
activity.  Perhaps then AI will move forward and finally live up to
its promise.

Barry Smith