jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) (10/12/86)
I. What is "understanding", or "ducking" the issue... If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is *called* a duck. If you cut it open and find that the organs are something other than a duck's, *then* maybe it shouldn't be called a duck. What it should be called becomes open to discussion (maybe dinner). The same principle applies to "understanding". If the "box" performs all of what we accept to be the defining requirements of "understanding", such as reading and responding to the same level as that of a "native Chinese", then it certainly has a fair claim to be called "understanding". Most so-called "understanding" is the result of training and education. We are taught "procedures" to follow to arrive at a desired result/conclusion. The primary difference between human education and Searle's "formal procedures" is a matter of how *well* the procedures are specified . Education is primarily a matter of teaching "procedures", whether it be mathematics, chemistry or creative writing. The *better* understood the field, the more "formal" the procedures. Mathematics is very well understood, and consists almost entirely of "formal procedures". (Mathematics was also once considered highest form of philosophy and intellectual attainment). This leads to the obvious conclusion that humans do not *understand* natural language very well. Natural language processing via purely formal procedures has been a dismal failure. The lack of understanding of natural languages is also empirically demonstrable. Confusion about the meaning of a person's words, intentions etc can be seen in every interaction with your boss/students/teachers/spouse/parents/kids etc etc. "You only think you understand what I said..." Jeffrey M. Jacobs CONSART Systems Inc. Technical and Managerial Consultants P.O. Box 3016, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 (213)376-3802 CIS:75076,2603 BIX:jeffjacobs USENET: well!jjacobs "It used to be considered a hoax if there *was* a man in the box..."
ladkin@kestrel.UUCP (10/14/86)
In article <1919@well.UUCP>, jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) writes: > Mathematics is very well understood, and > consists almost entirely of "formal procedures". I infer from your comment that you're not a mathematician. As a practicing mathematician (amongst other things), I'd like to ask precisely what you mean by *well understood*? And I would like to strongly disagree with your comment that doing mathematics consists almost entirely of formal procedures. Are you aware that one of the biggest problems in formalising mathematics is trying to figure out what it is that mathematicians do to prove new theorems? Peter Ladkin ladkin@kestrel.arpa
jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) (10/15/86)
In <13428@kestrel.ARPA>, Peter Ladkin writes: >In article <1919@well.UUCP>, jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) writes: >> Mathematics is very well understood, and >> consists almost entirely of "formal procedures". >I infer from your comment that you're not a mathematician. >As a practicing mathematician (amongst other things), I'd >like to ask precisely what you mean by *well understood*? I'd like to answer precisely, but one of the problems with English, as opposed to mathematics, is the difficulty of answering precisely. Let me instead give you an example; which do you understand better, a proof of a theorem, or the lead story in today's paper, describing why the summit, (which wasn't a summit), failed? I don't intend to imply that the field of mathematics is in any way *completely* understood or running out of new things to do. >And I would like to strongly disagree with your comment that >doing mathematics consists almost entirely of formal procedures. What you are disagreeing with is a misinterpretation on your part. I didn't use the term "doing mathematics", and didn't intend to. I was speaking on the nature of what it is that mathematics consists of. "doing mathematics"has many aspects; it may be a "canned" procedure, or it may be an incredibly tough, creative, intuitive effort. >Are you aware that one of the biggest problems in formalising >mathematics is trying to figure out what it is that >mathematicians do to prove new theorems? That's not a problem in mathematics, it's a problem in psychology! The end result of mathematics is "formalism"; well defined, algorithmic procedures to transform a set of symbols into a different set of symbols (or to describe the transformations, etc). It is much more rigorous and well defined (aka understood) than other realms of human endeavor (such as psychology, or even physics). >Peter Ladkin >ladkin@kestrel.arpa "He only thought he understood what I wrote :-)" Jeffrey M. Jacobs CONSART Systems Inc. Technical and Managerial Consultants P.O. Box 3016, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 (213)376-3802 CIS:75076,2603 BIX:jeffjacobs USENET: well!jjacobs
ladkin@kestrel.ARPA (Peter Ladkin) (10/17/86)
In article <1933@well.UUCP>, jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) writes: > [..] which do > you understand better, a proof of a theorem, or the lead > story in today's paper, describing why the summit, (which > wasn't a summit), failed? If the theorem is the Four Color Theorem, Friedman's theorem on the four-sphere, or any of many others, then I understand the newspaper story much better. What do you intend to conclude from your example? > >Are you aware that one of the biggest problems in formalising > >mathematics is trying to figure out what it is that > >mathematicians do to prove new theorems? > > That's not a problem in mathematics, it's a problem in psychology! Have you heard of the `definition' of mathematics as whatever it is that mathematicians do? > The end result of mathematics is "formalism"; well defined, algorithmic > procedures to transform a set of symbols into a different set of symbols > (or to describe the transformations, etc). It is much more rigorous > and well defined (aka understood) than other realms of human > endeavor (such as psychology, or even physics). So mathematics consists of procedures? Neither theorems nor proofs are procedures. Should I conclude from this that theorems and proofs are not mathematics? Or should I conclude that you don't really mean this? Peter Ladkin ladkin@kestrel.arpa
gilbert@aimmi.UUCP (Gilbert Cockton) (10/21/86)
In article <1919@well.UUCP> jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) writes: > >Most so-called "understanding" is the result of training and >education. We are taught "procedures" to follow to >arrive at a desired result/conclusion. Education is primarily a >matter of teaching "procedures", whether it be mathematics, chemistry >or creative writing. The *better* understood the field, the more "formal" >the procedures. Mathematics is very well understood, and >consists almost entirely of "formal procedures". This is contentious and smacks of modelling all learning procedures in terms of a single subject, i.e. mathematics. I can't think of a more horrible subject to model human understanding on, given the inhumanity of most mathematics! Someone with as little as a week of curriculum studies could flatten this assertion instantly. NO respectable curriculum theory holds that there is a single form of knowledge to which all bodies of human experience conform with decreasing measures of formal success. In the UK, it is official curriculum policy to initiate children into several `forms' of knowledge (mathematics, physical science, technology, humanities, aesthetics, religion and the other one). The degree to which "understanding" is accepted as procedural rote learning varies from discipline to discipline. Your unsupported equivalence between understanding and formality ("The *better* understood the field, the more "formal" the procedures") would not last long in the hands of social and religious studies, history, literature, craft/design and technology or art teachers. Despite advances in LISP and connection machines, no-one has yet formally modelled any of these areas to the satisfaction of their skilled practitioners. I find it strange that AI workers who would struggle to write a history/literature/design essay to the satisfaction of a recognised authority are naive enough to believe that they could program a machine to write one. Many educational psychologists and experienced teachers would completely reject your assertions on the ground that unpersonalised cookbook-style passively-internalised formalisms, far from being a sign of understanding, actually constitute the exact opposite of understanding. For me, the term `understanding' cannot be applied to anything that someone has learnt until they can act on this knowledge within the REAL world (no text book problems or ineffective design rituals), justify their action in terms of this knowledge and finally demonstrate integration of the new knowledge with their existing views of the world (put it in their own words). Finally, your passive view of understanding cannot explain creative thought. Granted, you say `Most so-called "understanding"', but I would challenge any view that creative thought is exceptional - the mark of great and noble scientists who cannot yet be modelled by LISP programs. On the contrary, much of our daily lives has to be highly creative because our poor understanding of the world forces us to creatively fill in the gaps left by our inadequate formal education. Show me one engineer who has ever designed something from start to finish 100% according to the book. Even where design codes exist, as in bridge-building, much is left to the imagination. No formal prescription of behaviour will ever fully constrain the way a human will act. In situations where it is meant to, such as the military, folk spend a lot of time pretending either to have done exactly what they were told or to have said exactly what they wanted to be done. Nearer to home, find me one computer programmer who's understanding is based 100% on formal procedures. Even the most formal programmers will be lucky to be in program-proving mode more than 60% of the time. So I take it that they don't `understand' what they're doing the other 40% of the time? Maybe, but if this is the case, then all we've revealed are differences in our dictionaries. Who gave you the formal procedure for ascribing meaning to the word "understanding"? >This leads to the obvious conclusion that humans do not >*understand* natural language very well. >The lack of understanding of natural languages is also empirically >demonstrable. Confusion about the meaning >of a person's words, intentions etc can be seen in every interaction ... over the net! Words MEAN something, and what they do mean is relative to the speakers and the situation. The lack of formal procedures has NOTHING to do with breakdowns in inter-subjective understanding. It is wholly due to inabilities to view and describe the world in terms other than one's own. -- Gilbert Cockton, Scottish HCI Centre, Ben Line Building, Edinburgh, EH1 1TN JANET: gilbert@uk.ac.hw.aimmi ARPA: gilbert%aimmi.hw.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ..!{backbone}!aimmi.hw.ac.uk!gilbert
gilbert@aimmi.UUCP (Gilbert Cockton) (10/28/86)
In article <1933@well.UUCP>, jjacobs@well.UUCP (Jeffrey Jacobs) writes: > (or to describe the transformations, etc). It is much more rigorous > and well defined (aka understood) than other realms of human > endeavor (such as psychology, or even physics). `well-defined' and `understood' are not synonyms where I come from. As an Englishman, and thus an ancestor of the folk who invented the language, can I ask you transatlantic chappies to stop messing around with it. English was very nice until you got your hands on it! Seriously, science tends to generate very well-defined theories, which, more often than not, turn out to be wrong. Under your silly synonymy, this means that falsehood and understanding are equivalent. There is a school of philosophy (and thus unread by the philistine (amateur?) element in AI), which holds that `verstehen' or understanding, is wholly subjective, a personal experience with no linguistic form. Any attempt to define it must therefore fail. Outside of AI with its dated (Platonic?) epistemologies and theories of mind, the logocentrism of tight definitions is becoming something of a joke, although an unpleasant one for anyone who has suffered at the hands of someone else's small print definitions. -- Gilbert Cockton, Scottish HCI Centre, Ben Line Building, Edinburgh, EH1 1TN JANET: gilbert@uk.ac.hw.aimmi ARPA: gilbert%aimmi.hw.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ..!{backbone}!aimmi.hw.ac.uk!gilbert