cw (12/08/82)
In several recent articles here, there has been a serious confusion. The articles have stated that there is such a thing as a plea of "Guilty by reason of insanity." The correct plea is "Not guilty by reason of insanity." There are, in effect, two subcases of this plea: 1) The defendant pleads that at the moment the crime was committed, he was insane--the reason for insanity is irrelevant to the defense, but must be one recognized by law and, of course, must be accepted by the jury. Should the jury find this plea substantiated, the defendant is free of the criminal charge forever. However, the judge may, depending on the current status of the defendant, hold him for his or society's protection until it is absolutely certain that he is not a danger. If the defendant (who of course is no longer charged with a crime) wishes to leave institutional care, he may bring a writ of habeas corpus against some official (probably the head of the institution) demanding freedom for his body. The writ will then be heard on the merits of his present sanity. This is not a criminal proceeding and the details may vary under statute law. 2) The defendant may claim (through an attorney, presumably) that he is presently insane and incapable of mounting a defense. In this case, there is no trial (if the claim is upheld), the defendant is held for treatment, and only when the defendant is sufficiently competent to mount a defense is the trial held. Notice that this is not a question for a jury to decide and does not have anything to do with insanity at the time of the crime. Strictly speaking, this is only the same plea in the popular mind, but it sometimes serves the same purpose from the defendant's point of view. The newly proposed plea (and judgement) is "guilty but insane." In this case, the defendant is convicted, sentenced in the normal way, but is institutionalized instead of incarcerated. If the defendant should become sane, then presumably he would be incarcerated for the remainder of the sentence. It is thought that this plea might be regarded as a mitigating circumstance for people who are rational in some of their actions but whose goals are obsessive (e.g., Hinckley). Customary punishments may also be ineffective for such people, since they may well not be able to recognize the fact of their punishment without treatment. Charles PS: I am thinking of posting a note discussing why net communication requires more care than talking. The (probably unthinking and unnoticed) dropping of "not" from the previous articles will illustrate the point.