janc (04/04/83)
One of the more interesting things I've found to think about is the
proper way to go about trying to avert a nuclear holocaust. Strangely,
this seems to be a very unusual occupation. I thought I'd write up
some of my thoughts on the subject, and see what people out on the net
think about this. Some of my conclusions are rather different.
(1) Nightmares vs. History
Nuclear weapons are scary. A nuclear confrontation could easily wipe
out civilization. (Is that bad? Let's assume it is.) On the other hand,
we've had them around for some 30 years without anyone using a single one.
In fact, we've pretty much avoided really big wars for that period. The
situation, up to now, has been fairly stable. Suppose, for example,
that America tryed unilateral disarment. Would the resulting political
situation be as stable? Gosh, I don't know. Moreover, I don't believe
anyone who says he knows. Unilateral disarment is risky because it puts
us on unknown ground.
Analogy: You are in the middle of a mine field. What's the best
way out? A straight line? Sorry, life is not Euclidian. The best
way out is the way you came in.
The way we got into this situation was a slow bilateral build-up. The
safest way out is a slow bilateral reduction. This keeps us pretty much
on safe ground. Our politicians know how to handle a stalemate. Any
other strategy could make the situation worse.
(2) Protest vs. Negotiation
To achieve bilateral reduction of nuclear weapons requires a negotiation
between the Americans and the Russians. Each side would prefer to have
more nuclear weapons than the other, if only because they trust themselves
more than the other guy (a fallacy). Thus negotiating is a painful process.
Many people who want fewer bombs in the world express this opinion by
taking part in protests. The purpose is to apply political pressure to
their leaders to do...something. The problem with this is that the pressure
is applied to only one side. The other side, perceiving that his opponent
is under pressure to produce something fast, refuses to give an inch, in
hopes that his opponent will be forced to give in. (The Vietnam war is a
good example of what I'm talking about. Remember the arguments over the
shape of the table? That was a tactic designed to drive the Americans
frantic. In the end the Vietnamese got whatever they wanted, and the
Americans packed up and went home. What happened in Vietnam afterwards
is partly the fault of the American peace protesters who made it impossible
to negotiate a genuine peace.) In general, protest is only effective when
it places pressure on all involved parties.
What this comes down to, is that the nuclear protesters are doing more
to hinder nuclear disarment than to help it. They apply pressure to the
government to find a solution, while at the same time making it impossible
to achieve one. This is a classic example of a strange loop. The world is
full of them. The only real effect is to get Reagan out of office, but
doing this at the price of sustaining the nuclear threat seems irrational.
(3) More vs. Less
Reagan is currently proposing to base Pershing missiles in Europe. The
idea is to put pressure on the Soviets to agree to withdraw intermediate
nuclear missiles from Europe. Obviously, this is another strange loop.
I'm not at all sure that it's a workable one, but it makes a lot more sense
than what the protesters are doing. It also seems to be targeted right.
The intermediate range nuclear missiles are very likely the most immediate
threat. Reagan seems to be using the levers available to him reasonably well.
The main problem is that if Reagan can't talk the Soviets into a deal, both
sides in Europe will loaded with nuclear missiles, and we won't be able to
pull ours out again. IMPORTANT: Because of this you want Reagan to succeed,
even if you hate his guts. Nuclear disarment is not a political issue!
(4) Ask not what your country can do for you...
The biggest chance of failure in his plan is that the Soviets don't
believe that he has sufficient public support. They will stall, in
hopes that he will not be reelected, and that his successor will not
pursue Reagan's plan (this is likely).
What to do? How about rallying in support of Reagan's initiative,
instead of in protest? (You can't keep protesting everything--eventually
you have to support something.) The point here would be to deliver two
main messages:
(A) WE SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN
(B) WE ARE WILLING TO WAIT FOR A FAIR SETTLEMENT
This keeps our side on the ball, but does not help deadlock the negotiation.
Most of the media-grabbing tactics would be the same as those well known
to protesters, but the tone would be different. For example, go to the
place where the negotiations are going on and, instead of screaming insults
at the delegates, hail them as the saviors of mankind. Note that I'm
not asking you to believe in (A) and (B), only to sound like you do.
Sometimes you have to go against your ideals to achieve them. (Another
strange loop? You guessed it.)
Please let me know what you think of the above. It's my best approximation
to the truth, and I would like to hear your criticisms. Needless to say,
the opinions above are exclusively those of--
Jan D. Wolter
uofm-cv!jancka (04/04/83)
First of all, a factual correction: two nuclear weapons *have* been used, both in Japan at the end of WW2. I agree that unilateral disarmament is a risky strategy, and that the best approach is a bilateral reduction, or at least a freeze. I have problems with the attempt to blame for what happened in Vietnam on the peace pro- testers. If nobody had protested against the war, we might still be fight- ing there. Place the blame for any negative effects the protests my have had on the negotiations not on the protesters, but on the politicians for failing to us get out of Vietnam until the protesters forced them to. Similarly for the peace movement. Ford and Carter didn't have to contend with a nuclear freeze movement; the anti-nuclear movement has become a sig- nificant force in this society *because* of Reagan's insensitivity to the concerns about nuclear war. Now Reagan is dealing with the issue, but judging by how long it took him to get this far, I doubt that he will go any farther than he is forced to; thus the reason for applying continued pressure. As an aside, if the Soviets want to wait out Reagan, they don't have to guess about the vagaries of the 1984 election--they *know* he won't run in 1988. The nuclear protest movement has not limited itself to putting pressure on Reagan. The Soviet Union is sensitive to world opinion and has at least paid lip service to the nuclear freeze movement. (Admittedly, it is not clear that its actions, as opposed to its words, can be influenced.) In spite of the points above, Jan's proposal (section 4 of her article) makes sense. When I was at the disarmament rally in New York last June I was somewhat disturbed by the predominately liberal and anti-Reagan views of the organizers, not because I disagreed with these views but because I felt that the issue of nuclear war transcends them. Reading Jan's article has made me reconsider that reaction. I don't think that Reagan has much personal commitment to arms control, so that he should be periodicly reminded that the issue is important. But since he is now taking some positive steps in that direction, why not praise him for the things he does right? I am not saying that he should not be attacked for his failures, but that praise can be as effective as criticism. Kenneth Almquist
wrongLogin (04/06/83)
The general problem with Reagan's "interim solution"
proposal is that it does not recognize that the European INF
question is part of a larger political battle between the
Soviets and the U.S. There are very few military experts
advancing the proposition that the Pershing missile
deployment would significantly alter the military balance in
Europe. Indeed, recall the history of the Pershing issue.
Several years ago, our western allies complained of a lack
of commitment to the defense of Europe. As a result, the U.
S. agreed to deploy the Pershings. Later, for one reason or
another ( internal peace movements, fear of Europe's
becoming a battleground, the spectre of partial German
control of nuclear weapons ), many allies pressed for the
so-called Zero-Zero option. When Reagan came into office, he
embraced the proposal as his own, and stuck to it so
stubbornly that many allies feared there would be no
agreement at all. The result was pressure for an interim
solution. Hence, the latest Reagan proposal.
The specific problems are twofold. First, the Soviets
have already rejected the Nitze proposal. A proposal which
was far more favorable to the Soviets than the current one.
Indeed, there is little incentive for the Soviets to accept
such an agreement from either a political or military point of
view. Secondly, by offering so unacceptable a proposal,
Reagan allows the media to paint the U.S. as uncommited to
arms control.
By viewing the INF negotiations in a strictly military
context, Reagan is allowing the Soviets to further their
goal of causing discord in NATO.