trc (04/28/83)
Someone recently attempted to "boil down" my philosophy to: "Do unto others before they do unto you" Few things could be further from the truth. My philosophy, with regards to one's actions towards others, can be stated as: "Human beings have rights arising from their nature. A right to something means that no other can ethically use or change that thing without permission from the owner of the right. Life, liberty, and ownership of property are three things that humans have rights to." This is, by the way, neither the most basic part of my philosophy, nor did I originate it. I give credit to Ayn Rand for her philosophy, which is based upon acceptance of reality and of human reason as the means of recognizing and dealing with reality. I believe the above is an accurate representation of part of that philosophy. I would recommend that anyone interested read some of her works, perhaps starting with one of her novels - "Atlas Shrugged" or "Fountainhead", then one of the basic works such as "The Virtue of Selfishness". Now, in regard to "The Prisoner's Dilemma". The situation is one where two prisoners are isolated, and offered a deal - accuse the other prisoner, and if he doesnt accuse you, you benefit. If you accuse each other, you both get sentenced, but less harshly. If neither accuses, neither is worse off. (My source is "Game Theory - Mathematical Models of Conflict" by A.J.Jones. I could not find the article in Scientific American.) Of course, this is an artifical situation, which could be re-designed to present any viewpoint. By game theory, the prisoner should accuse the other prisoner, since this minimizes his maximum sentence. The author points out that this is not the optimum choice - since if both choose not to accuse the other, there is no sentence. For some reason, the author chooses to call the first "individual rationality" and the second "collective rationality", and thereby inducing the conclusion that somehow it is better to act in a collective manner. In fact, only individuals have rationality, and any rational acts taken by a group can only arise from the rationality of the members of the group. The author's "collective" rationality requires the sneaking in of knowledge of the other prisoner's action, which is supposed to be prohibited by the rules of the game. That is, beyond blind chance, both parties should only refuse to accuse each other if they are reasonably sure that the other party will cooperate and act similarly. If they have no way of knowing, which is what the game is supposed to require, then the best choice is to accuse. To step back from this artificial context for a moment, it is worth considering what the same scenario would be like in real life. If we assume the two prisoners are guilty, and that they have not conspired ahead of time, they will almost certainly accuse. If they are innocent, they will have no real reason to fear the accusation of the other, and so will not accuse. Tom Craver houti!trc