dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (07/11/83)
FLAME ON Beware, for I have an evil and despicable habit; that most irrational and subhuman of traits -- yes, it is with utmost shame that I must admit to (shudder) CARING FOR OTHERS! And to make it even worse, I even dare to think that I ought to! FLAME OFF But seriously, folks: altruism does NOT mean ignoring one's own welfare, nor does it mean believing anything about moral requirements. It just means caring for others; having their good at heart. Tom Craver in his article "True Altruism - (not love)" introduces a "persuasive definition" of altruism -- that is, he uses the word in ways that are biased toward his position. Tom's "True Altruist" is, I submit, a straw man. Granted, altruism is not synonymous with love. Not all acts of altruism are acts of love, unless "love" is used in a very broad sense. But the two can not be radically separated in the way Tom wants. All acts of love ARE acts of altruism, by the above definition. (Although I did not get my definition out of a dictionary, I'm sure that it's a lot closer to the dictionary definition than Tom's.) If Tom insists on his definition of "altruism", I will just define a new term -- call it "altruism(2)" -- which means what everybody but Objectivists mean when they use the word: namely, caring for others. I hope it is clear that no substantive issues are to be settled by definitions alone. Caring for others and caring for oneself is not an "either/or" matter. Nor is caring for others to be subordinated to self-regarding concerns, as I think Objectivism would have us do. Talk of "the pleasure of giving [a] gift to a loved one" obscures this, as does talk of "sacrificing one's own values for others." If I give to a loved one FOR THE SAKE OF my own pleasure I expect to get from doing so, then something is missing -- the love. As far as sacrificing "my own values" for others, that all depends on what "values" means. If it means the things I value, then sacrificing my values would indeed be irrational -- but nearly impossible, given that I normally forego something I value only for the sake of something else I value. Note that if I am an altruist, in either Tom's sense or mine, then the welfare of others is something I value, and therefore part of "my own values"! On the other hand, if "my own values" means my own *welfare*, i.e. my own happiness and/or physical well-being, then there is nothing irrational about foregoing some of this in order to promote the welfare of others. If you love someone, you are willing to forego some of your welfare if necessary, to promote his (hers). Objectivists tell us that our *individual* lives are the basis of all values; that selfishness is a virtue and a requirement of rationality. Love and friendship are not really counterexamples to this thesis, they say, because we benefit from love and friendship. But it is most emphatically NOT the benefit *I* get that serves as my reason for loving, or being a friend to, somebody. NOR COULD IT BE. If I started looking to MY benefit as the only reason for anything, love and friendship would be slowly eaten away by that attitude. Of course, I could feign love and friendship, and still be loved by (deceived) others, but something would be missing -- in fact, I would be missing something. In this respect, selfishness is self-defeating. By attempting to get as many "values" for himself (herself) as possible, the selfish person misses out on some values. Similar problems beset the Objectivist analysis of morality. I recall an article of Tom's in net.philosophy that referred to the guilt and/or paranoia which a thief will suffer even if he is not caught. Presumably this is the Objectivist account of why one should not steal. But the person who is moral only BECAUSE OF the guilt he will feel otherwise, will have his morality slowly eaten away by that attitude -- he will overcome that guilt. As for paranoia, the thief will not have that problem unless there's a good chance of being caught. There is something missing from the analysis of morality as avoidance of (internal, by guilt; or external) punishment -- morality is missing. Tom says that obligations must be voluntarily entered into by an individual. But what about the general obligation to keep one's promises or bargains? It cannot be voluntarily entered into -- that would be viciously circular. If it does not exist, though, then neither do any voluntarily undertaken obligations. Finally, I would like to ask what Tom finds so objectionable about the claim that morality requires that people act in a benevolent manner (leaving out the part about disregarding the consequences to oneself). Just because one thinks that some behavior is morally required does not mean that one thinks that others should be coerced to behave that way, as all those pro-choice articles surely must have taught us. I do think that people should sometimes be coerced to benefit others, but that's another story... -- Paul Torek, U of MD College Park p.s. I was misinformed -- I CAN receive mail. You can chew me out personally -- dr_who@umcp-cs -- or in public.