dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (07/18/83)
From: trc@houti
You claim that altruism means "caring for others; having their good at
heart", and that it "does NOT mean ignoring one's own welfare". Yet you
later state "Nor is caring for others to be subordinated to
self-regarding concerns" In other words, one must look first to the
needs of others, and then if there is something left over, look to one's
own needs.
Two objections. First, the "in other words" does not at all follow from
what I said. It is possible (some say it is right) to treat one's
own needs as of EQUAL importance to others' needs. Tom apparently thinks
that being against SUBordination IMPLIES being FOR SUPERordination -- but
that's a non sequitur: subordination and superordination are contraries,
not contradictories. Second, Tom misunderstands my point (through no fault
of his own -- I was unclear.) I wasn't criticizing caring MORE about one's
own needs than others' needs. I was criticizing caring AT ALL about others
ONLY because of the benefit to oneself of caring. The distinction is
subtle, but crucial. Objectivism says (doesn't it?) that the ONLY REASON to
care for others is to get benefits for oneself. THAT is what I deny.
That is, [altruism says] that one must sacrifice in order to be moral.
As you state at one point, this is irrational, and nearly impossible -
it is simply against human nature to give up that which one perceives
are being in one's best interest.
Wrong: altruism has nothing to do with moral beliefs. But since Tom
insists on his (non-standard-English) definition, let us call Tom's
"altruist" a True Altruist. Now, what I state at one point is NOT that it
is irrational to give up one's "best interest" -- whatever that means. I say
that it is irrational to sacrifice what one values (i.e., what one THINKS TO
BE VALUABLE) for what one does not value. But note that whereas a True
Altruist sacrifices his own needs for others, he does NOT sacrifice his own
*values* for others, WHERE "HIS OWN VALUES" MEANS WHAT HE THINKS TO BE
VALUABLE. For, a True Altruist thinks that sacrificing his own needs is
valuable.
The essence of your argument is an attempt to blur the distinction
between what is benevolent, and what is altruistic. You do this mainly
by ignoring benefits one gains from actions you claim are altruistic -
such as loving someone else.
The first sentence is true; the second false. The difference between
benevolence and altruism is small to nonexistent. Neither altruism nor
benevolence is precluded by benefit to oneself, nor by an act's being
motivated PARTLY by the prospect of such benefit. I think that both
altruism AND benevolence are precluded by that being the WHOLE motivation.
Or perhaps you would claim that loving in order to get this good feeling
is wrong? Why? Typically, when it is wrong to do one thing (that is
normally right) because of a second, it is the second that is wrong.
This means that you consider seeking good feelings wrong. On the other
side of the coin - do you ever *really* love someone that you get no
good feeling or other benefit from loving them?
Close, but no cigar. I claim that loving (ONLY) in order to get that good
feeling is not wrong, but impossible. By "loving" I mean the whole emotion
and commitment rather than individual acts of giving. Seeking good feelings
is right, and even MORE right when one seeks them not only for oneself but
ALSO for others. The answer to Tom's last question may be no, but consider:
do you ever really love someone if you lose, ON BALANCE, good feelings or
other benefits? YES, DEFINITELY, and Objectivism would seem to condemn such
loves.
From me:
Tom says that obligations must be voluntarily entered into by an
individual. But what about the general obligation to keep one's
promises or bargains?
A duty or obligation to satisfy an obligation? There is generally no
such thing.
Granted, but I didn't say there was. I said "keep promises", not "satisfy
obligations". How do we know that a particular promise obligates if not
through the principle that promises generally obligate? And what's the
difference between the truth of this principle and the existence of a
general obligation to keep promises?
It is *very* worthwhile to be known as an honest person that fulfills
obligations.
Still, one can be believed to be honest without being so. I don't see why a
selfish person will fulfill all his obligations. I don't even see how their
being obligations counts for anything INTRINSICALLY to him at all.
You ask "what . . . [is] so objectionable about the claim that morality
requires that people act in a benevolent manner"? The key word is
"requires". If it is right to be benevolent, why should anyone have to
be forced? Implicit in this is the idea that morality is something that
one will NOT WANT TO DO.
Tom seems to ignore what I said before, so I repeat: "Just because one
thinks that some behavior is morally required does not mean that one thinks
that others should be coerced to behave that way, as all those pro-choice
articles surely must have taught us." No one HAS to be forced to be
benevolent; the statement that it is morally required means they would
choose to be so if they were fully rational, fully informed, vividly
imaginative... It means that it is BEST to be so. It does not mean that
it would be best to force people to benefit others.
--Paul Torek (yes, that's a k at the end) U of MD College Park