dr_who@umcp-cs.UUCP (08/12/83)
I can't let Alan Wexelblat have ALL the fun with Tim Maroney's prescription for "liberty". Tim Maroney defines liberty as "the ability to do things." Tim explains that murder is a restriction of another's liberty in that the victim cannot do anything. But suppose that I can kill one innocent person and thereby save thousands. For example, suppose a lunatic threatens to put deadly contaminants in a city's water system unless a certain (innocent) person is killed, and we KNOW that he is serious. (Or for those who have seen "The Revenge(?) of the Pink Panther," how about the one where Inspector Clousseau's (sp?) former boss threatens the nations of the UN that he will disintegrate their cities unless Clousseau is killed.) Now it would seem that there is more "ability to do things" inherent in the lives of the thousands than the one. Does this mean it's OK to kill the one? If Tim doesn't think that it would be OK, then it seems he needs a new definition of "liberty," or perhaps a different approach altogether. If there be any doubts about quantitative comparisons of "ability to do things" in the above case, try a slightly modified case. Suppose that all we have to do to the innocent person is break his legs. Surely there is more "ability to do things" associated with thousands of lives than with one person's legs. Another point just occurred to me. If "liberty" (i.e. the ability to do things) is the only legitimate basis for laws, how about the infliction of pain? It seems that pain could be inflicted on somebody (even if we have to resort to science fiction to find an example) without restricting his liberty. If I had a constant headache, I bet that I could still do things as well as I do now. Would it therefore be wrong for there to be a law against inflicting such pain on me (suppose the headache can be caused in such a way as to preserve my abilities to do things)? Jurisprudence will have to go back to the drawing board! --Paul Torek, U of MD College Park