David@ariel.UUCP (David) (09/07/83)
A New York Times article (Sun, July 31, 1981) characterizes the flow of arms from Nicaragua and other outside sources to rebels in El Salvador as relatively minimal. This revelation, far from attesting to the effectiveness of the Reagan Administration's policy in Central America, as some would claim, instead seems to cast serious doubts on the central assumption upon which that policy is based. All along, President Reagan had insisted that El Salvador's revolution was being fueled by the Nicaragua, Cuba and ultimately the Soviet Union. But recent testimonies by high-level Salvadoran and U.S. officials seem to indicate that the rebels are getting their arms primarily from sources within El Salvador and from the open world market for arms. Now that the central assumption of the Reagan policy is being challenged outright, so U.S. policy in the region should itself be reviewed from a fresh, more critical perspective. The question upon which our policy should hinge, is a question which is rarely answered in a sufficiently clear and concrete manner. It is often, however, the inspiration for President Reagan's most animated, but equally shallow oratory. The question is this: What exactly *are* U.S. "interests" in Central America? The answer has at least two major components, which must be addressed. First, economic interests must be explicitly described and defined in terms of dollars and cents they are worth to the U.S., and/or to U.S.-based corporations. Second, U.S. geopolitical interests in the region must be examined in detail. But before we can determine U.S. geopolitical interests, we must look closely at the internal political dynamics of the countries in the region. The diverse groups---both rightist and leftist--- which articulate the internal political interests of these countries, will ultimately define the shape that their governments will take. The U.S. must understand them in all their complexity, if we are to begin to understand just what our best interests are in the region. President Reagan's continued adherence to a purely East-West view of the conflict in Central America is too simplistic to accurately describe the nature of the conflict there. Thus his definition of U.S. geopolitical interests in the region has been perpetually distorted and counterproductive. The appointed presidential commission on Central America will soon begin to explore these issues. It is well known that the commission appointed chairman, Henry Kissinger, has a record of myopia when it comes to Latin American politics, caused by his East-West dominated tunnel vision in Third World affairs. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the commission's analysis will plumb the true depths of the causes of regional conflict, and that it will take regional complexities into consideration when recommending a long-term strategy for U.S. policy. In the short term, the U.S. has two pressing policy moves to make in the region. First, we must continue in earnest with the recently initiated efforts to begin regional peace negotiations. Regional negotiations are an important starting point for the peace process. However, individual, internal conflicts will eventually also need to be comprehensively addressed. In the meantime it is imperative that the U.S. cut off all aid to insurgents seeking to overthrow the government in Nicaragua. This aid is explicitly forbidden by act of Congress, and is therefore illegal under U.S. las. Legalities notwithstanding, the aid constitutes an act of military aggression on the part of the U.S., and renders any posturing of the Reagan Administration as a peacemaker, plainly hypocritical. David Sehr Note: I hold a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J., 1980. I am presently enrolled in an M.A. program at Teachers College, Columbia University, NY, NY. I have lived and studied in Mexico, and have traveled extensively in Guatemala and Belize.