[net.politics] imposing beliefs & other good ideas

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (11/05/83)

Someone took the bait!  I just knew it -- old rhetoric dies hard ...

Laura Creighton's comments are indented once, previous statements by me 
are indented twice.  [I am not quoting to nitpick, I honestly reply to 
people this way.]

	Look, what I am saying is that it is quite possible to resist
	someone else' attempt to impose beliefs on me without my going about
	imposing my beliefs on them.  

And what I am saying is, that is NOT possible.  Again, if other people
believe that it is OK to impose beliefs, that is their belief.  If you use
force to prevent them from acting on that belief, you are imposing you
contrary belief on them.  You are forcing them to abide by *your* belief
that imposing beliefs is wrong.

	You seem to have bought [the pacifist argument] hook line and
	sinker.

No way -- I am not a pacifist.  You are so mesmerized by the rhetoric about
"imposing beliefs," you can't see that I am denying that imposing beliefs is
inherently wrong.  I am NOT saying you should never resist with force; I am
saying that when you do, you are imposing your beliefs.  My point is that if
you *really* want to avoid imposing your beliefs, you have to be a pacifist.
From that I conclude, since I don't like pacifism, that you should sometimes
impose beliefs.

	Look, if you have a belief X then it has the potential for causing
	action Y. if I resist the action Y, I may make you miserable, and I
	am preventing you from attaining the state where action Y has
	occurred, but in no way need I effect your belief X.

This cuts both ways.  Suppose my belief X is "premarital sex is great."  If
Jerry Falwell prevevnts my action Y (premarital sex), isn't that a case of
imposing beliefs?  Would you excuse Falwell's action if he argued that he
was not imposing beliefs, if Falwell pointed to the distinction between
beliefs and "actions arriving out of beliefs"?  Suppose Falwell says to us,

	I don't care if you have the belief ...  , its just when you get
	around to putting that belief into an action that I get upset.

Would that convince you that he wasn't imposing beliefs, since it's only the
action (premarital sex) that he doesn't like?  I think not.  Yet the above
quotation is taken verbatim from you, except that I omitted words that would
ruin the contextual fit.

	What I am objecting to is the notion that "an action that arises out
	of a belief is only a way of expressing that belief". 

Then your objection is unsound.

------------------------

Next issue: teaching morals.  I think I can anwer the next two questions
together.

		Teaching morality in school is nothing
		to be ashamed of either, as long as the right 
		guidelines are taught.

	And who is to say what is the "right guidelines"? 

		With political philosophy as with morals, we just have
		to fight (with legislation, not fists) to ensure that 
		the right ones are taught and the wrong ones aren't.

	Same problem. Who picks the right ones? 

I will!  (How does that grab you?)  Actually, other viewpoints will have
more say than mine will, but as long as the compromise package isn't too far
off, I'm game.

		I don't think that moral guidelines should be taught
		specifically concerning ... certain ...
		extremely controversial things, either.

	Well, now you are trying to have your cake and eat it too. ...
	How would you avoid teaching such issues if they keep coming up. 

The reason not to teach certain controversial moral guidelines is that it
would create too much hostility.  People would overreact.  It's not worth
the trouble.  Teachers should explain that the issue is controversial, and
be honest about it and tell them the school doesn't teach a position on the
issue for fear of the backlash.  And there's another reason to avoid those
issues:  the goal is to teach basic principles, and use applications to
specific cases only for illustration.  In illustrative cases the facts
should be clear (unlike abortion, which heavily involves scientific and
other non-ethical controversies as well as ethical ones).

On the other hand, some controversial moral principles are important enough,
and the backlash manageable enough, to be worth it.  Racial equality, for
instance (yes, it IS still controversial in some places).  You mentioned
Canadian history; I think I'd like to bring up some U.S. history.  Six
generations ago, the northern part of my country decided to impose its
beliefs -- its morality -- on the South.  Should that history be taught in a
morally neutral manner?  Should teachers say "the abolitionists believed
that blacks are people not property, but it's up to you what you want to
believe"?  H*** NO!  The North's moral viewpoint was BETTER than the
South's, and the North was right to impose its morality, and it should be
taught that way.

	To my mind, anyone that tries to teach 'the right guidelines' is in
	the same boat...

Ah, but there's a totally crucial difference.  Some guidelines are RIGHT,
and others are WRONG ...   

And if that doesn't irritate you sufficiently, let me save you the trouble
of asking the standard question: "If you have the right to impose your
beliefs, why doesn't [some viewpoint I find particularly obnoxious] have the
right to impose theirs on you?"  Because:  I'm RIGHT, and they're WRONG!

SUPERNOVA FLAMES!  I'll be engulfed in flames,
		I'll be reading disks full of hate mail, and ... and ...

AND: LOVING IT!			
				--Paul Torek, U of MD, College Park
				..umcp-cs!flink