flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (11/15/83)
Ah, good. Laura's Response Part A makes some important concessions. For example: Nobody has an automatic right to actions on the basis of their beliefs. I am not saying that everyone is going to have their beliefs fulfilled. That's a step forward. Now you need to acknowledge the next point: preventing someone from acting on the basis of her beliefs *always* constitues an imposition of beliefs by the preventer on the preventee. You never directly answered my question about whether Jerry Falwell is imposing beliefs in my example. I'll try to make it as clear as possible. Suppose Jerry Falwell prevents me (by force) from having premarital sex. You come along, and condemn Falwell's action. But then Falwell asks you, "I know you condemn my action, but do you also consider it an imposition of beliefs? Well it's NOT an imposition of beliefs. You see, I make a crucial distinction between beliefs and actions. Look, I don't care if Torek *believes* that premarital sex is great. It's just when he puts that belief into *action* that I get upset." If you say that Falwell is not imposing beliefs, you are using a narrower definition of "imposing beliefs" than most people. Most people would apply the term "imposing beliefs" even when a person's *belief* is not forced to change; only his actions. If you say that Falwell IS imposing beliefs, then you are forced to admit something else. When the police carry off Falwell for his use of force against me, you have to admit that *the police are imposing *their* beliefs on Falwell*. Now since you haven't argued your case very clearly, let me try to shorten the exchange by anticipating your best response. Here is what you should say to the above paragraph. "I say that Falwell IS imposing his beliefs, but the police are NOT. The difference is that the police are using force IN RESPONSE to Falwell's first use. I define 'imposing beliefs' recursively. The first use of force constitutes an imposition of beliefs. The responce with force to stop the first use of force does not. A third use of force to counter the second, does. And so on." That is a good summary of your view, is it not? The problem with such a recursive definition of "imposing beliefs" is that it changes the original meaning of the words. Webster's defines "impose" as "to make prevail by force." The police are certainly doing that to Falwell, just as much as he is doing that to Torek. Any use of force constitues an imposition (if you disagree, argue with Webster). "But is it an imposition *of beliefs*?" Yes. Any *principled* use of force (and that includes all law enforcement) is an imposition of belief (of belief in the principle). I rest my case. Language and logic are on my side. Well, you are not defeated yet. You can simply give up the language of "imposing belief", but still hold that those things which you wanted to label "imposing belief" are still wrong, whatever the label. Your substantial position (libertarianism) would remain the same, with its recursive procedure for evaluating the use of force. But another problem remains: that of determining what constitues a *first use* of force. That problem is insoluable. But that's another story. the aspiring iconoclast, --Paul Torek, U of MD, College Park ..umcp-cs!flink
laura@utcsstat.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (11/16/83)
Paul, you still don't get it. if the police cart off Falwell, then they are imposing their beliefs, yes. But what if there were no police to cart him off? Laura Creighton utzoo!utcsstat!laura