mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (11/21/83)
Given that a strategic nuclear force of some kind is necessary
for the foreseeable future, Michael Turner's idea of basing the
missiles in densely populated areas is the most sensible
suggestion in a long time. All the reasons he states are valid.
I doubt very much it would be possible politically, though. These
things have "radiation", and must therefore be kept away from people.
Perhaps they aren't as bad as nuclear power stations, though :-).
Interesting point: would people object more to a missile silo or
to a nuclear power station within 2 miles?
Martin Taylor
--
Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,uw-beaver,floyd,ubc-vision}!utcsrgv!dciem!mmtdave@utcsrgv.UUCP (Dave Sherman) (11/21/83)
With all the current concern about nuclear war, I would like to
start a movement to change the standard smallest novice C program to:
main()
{
printf("goodbye world\n");
}
Dave Sherman
--
{allegra,cornell,decvax,ihnp4,linus,utzoo}!utcsrgv!davenotes@ucbcad.UUCP (11/23/83)
#N:ucbesvax:7500053:000:3608 ucbesvax!turner Nov 15 23:38:00 1983 Here is an odd thought about strategic missile basing that has been kicking around in my head ever since the MX basing controversy heated up: Just base all strategic missiles in the most densely- populated regions of the country. This is quite the opposite of most basing schemes--the "shuttle" plan and "dense pack" were both "sponge" strategies. The idea was to put the missiles in the most sparsely populated regions, deployed in such a way that Soviet first-strike missiles would have to be piled on at ratios that were (supposedly) very disadvantageous to them. Now, before the anti-nuclear people start lambasting me as Strangelovian, consider the following: - What could be a less ambiguous message to the effect that the U.S. does not intend to strike first? If we *did* attempt a first-strike, it could only be in the expectation of retaliation against civilian populations--hence any first strike of ours would as much as say, "goodbye world." (True in any case, right?) - Since "goodbye world" is difficult to construe as a national defense policy, the Soviets would have a reasonable basis for believing in our good intentions. (Personally, I don't think they have one, at the moment.) - Since any first-strike from the Soviets would necessarily also be a genocidal action against the U.S., they need not doubt that the U.S. response would be massive--the doctrine of deterrence would thus be re-established; more forcefully, in fact, than ever before. - Domestically, basing missiles in the civilian population is an overt statement on the part of the U.S. government of the apparent need for such weapons. An MX in the town square is not (by this reasoning) any less needed than out in the alkali flats of Nevada--in fact, it might be more usefully deployed in the town square, if in doing so, the U.S. is making an honest statement to its citizens and its enemies. - Certainly, we are expecting no less from West Germany. (Unattributed quote from some DoD analyst: "towns in Germany are only a few kilotons apart.") Why not demonstrate our good faith, and deploy long-range missiles in a similar manner in our own country? - The domestic political barriers seem significant--who would really *want* a silo-system downtown, anyway? However, the question is really one that disarmament promoters could capitalize on: what is the *difference*, given that the strategy is, or should be, deterrence? If there is no difference, then what is the objection? (I, for one, would prefer a silo to some of the office-building projects being pushed around Berkeley--missiles do not create a "need" for ugly parking structures, and are probably not a significant source of carbon monoxide.) - There seems to be an obvious flaw: doesn't this scheme mean that a U.S. launch-on-warning is much more likely? Maybe so. However, since this scheme *is* a statement of seriousness and good faith, perhaps the result would be a better state of cooperation among the superpowers in detecting and correcting errors in our (currently, rather error-prone) early warning systems. So there it is: an MX in every backyard, two cruises in every garage. A strategic policy for the 80's. Perhaps we can rephrase it more respectably in a constitutional amendment. I hope this has been sufficiently heretical for everyone. I certainly wouldn't want to be accused of having tame opinions in one of netland's biggest flame newsgroups. --- Michael Turner (ucbvax!ucbvax.turner)
renner@uiucdcs.UUCP (renner ) (11/24/83)
#R:ucbesvax:7500053:uiucdcs:29200044:000:808
uiucdcs!renner Nov 24 01:59:00 1983
Basing missiles in population centers makes no difference to the
practicality of a US first strike. Retaliation against cities is
always an possible response to a first strike; furthermore, after a
first strike, the missiles will be *gone*; empty missile silos will
not make the Soviets more likely to hit cities or to avoid them.
The other arguments are valid. With missiles in cities, the Soviets
can no longer make a "counter-force" attack; blowing up our missiles
means blowing up our cities, and would result in retaliation against
their cities. Odds of accidental war are reduced as well; since the
US does not fear a first strike, it need not adopt a launch-on-warning
policy.
Now, how do we convince the Soviets that *we* won't launch a first strike?
Scott Renner
{pur-ee,ihnp4}!uiucdcs!rennerrigney@uokvax.UUCP (11/25/83)
#R:ucbesvax:7500053:uokvax:5000034:000:486 uokvax!rigney Nov 23 04:03:00 1983 Tucson, Little Rock, Wichita, Oakland, Colorado Springs, Charles- town, Newport, Louisville, Annapolis, Great Falls, Omaha, Fay- etteville, Charlotte, Philadelphia, El Paso, Oakland, Oklahoma City, to name just a few, are all located near major military targets. As well, fallout patterns from ground bursts vs. missile bases would cover most of the midwest, the U.S. breadbasket. Perhaps your plan is already in effect:-) Have a nice day, Carl ..!ctvax!uokvax!rigney