[net.politics] tekigm!dand and Accidental Launch

jrrt@hogpd.UUCP (12/13/83)

tekigm!dand made a few observations and comments about the possibility
of a US Navy ballastic missile submarine accidently launching one of
their Posiedon/Trident missiles.  I'd like to add my two-cents worth.
I have some direct experience -- over 4 years as a Weapons Officer on
SSBN 643 (George Bancroft).  During that time I was responsible for,
among other areas, the Missile Division and the Missile Fire Control
Division.

I will be somewhat limited in my ability to rebut tekigm!dand's errors,
because many of the details of the Strategic Weapons Command and Control
systems are classified up to and including Top Secret.  Nonetheless, I
think I can set the record straight.

1) SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) are on the Failsafe system. 
Consider the (il)logic of tekigm!dand's claim:  If SSBNs were totally
independent, and unable to communicate with the US, when would they
*ever* launch?  They wouldn't, of course, because they'd never have any
reason to.

2) Official Operating procedure requires the following to occur before a
sub launches a missile:

a) The Joint Chiefs send a special coded message to one or more subs. 
This message originates with the President.  The Radiomen on board the
USS Eversail receive the message and recognize its special nature,
although they do not know what it says.
b) They call the Officer of the Deck (the guy running the routine
evolutions on the ship) who announces the reception of the message over
the ship's intercom.  All hell breaks loose as the Missilemen rush to
set up the launch sequence, the Fire Controlmen prepare the targeting
computers, the Ship Control Party puts the sub in a launch position, and the
officers in the Command and Control party decode the message.  Note that
each of these actions have one or more "holding points", beyond which
the personnel may not proceed without (ultimately) the Commanding
Officer's (CO's) permission.  Also consider that the books to decode the
message are locked in a special safe, the access to which requires at
least two officers, neither of which may be the CO.
c) Assume the worst, and the message has been verified to be a real
launch order.  The CO still has ultimate authority, and the crew
physically cannot launch without his permission.  Therefore, the CO may
decide to disobey his orders, and not launch.  Assume he does order the
launch.  Then both he and the Weapons Officer must get two keys (each
held in a different special safe with combinations not known to the
other officer), and simultaneously manipulate the keys to effect the
launch.  While they are doing this, they must be on separate decks in
separate compartments.  The bottom line:  The Captain can't do it alone,
he can't do it with only a handful of personnel, and he can't do it
without the initial word from the JCS.

The following facts contradict tekigm!dand's assertions:
1) SSBNs are on the Failsafe system.  In general, subs hear quite well,
as long as they are *relatively* shallow.  (I recall listening to a
Super Bowl broadcast...).
2) The Executive Officer and the Engineering Officer may be members of
the Command and Control party, and hence help decode the message, but
have no real say in the launch process itself.  By the way, in general,
the Engineering Officer is *not* the third-in-command on a submarine,
the Navigator is.
3) It would be incredibly difficult to convince submarine personnel that
a nuclear war was already underway, other than by radio.  The suggested
scenario (setting off a nuclear weapon near the sub) is preposterous. 
First, to the people in the sub, a nuclear blast is indistinguishable
from a conventional blast (near enough, and the sub's not there anymore. 
Far enough, and all the sub notices is noise and unsettled water -- both
effects which can be explained by a powerful but nearby conventional depth
charge).  Using nuclear weapons against a sub is rather excessive
overkill, anyway.  And if a sub was attacked with a nuclear weapon, I
suspect other nastiness would be going on, and that launch message would
be sent ASAP.  Last but not least, finding a submerged American sub is a
very difficult; they're not as vulnerable to a fanatic (to use tekigm!dand's
term) as, say, New York City.
4) DEFCON 1 means we are at war.  
5) tekigm!dand's understanding of how targeting and inertial guidance is
handled is inaccurate.  Enough said.  (Sorry if that's not convincing).

Now, how does all this affect tekigm!dand's plug?  Perhaps surprisingly, not at
all.  The Navy certainly has been trying to build an LF radio system. 
Wisconsin and Michigan (at least) have politely informed the Navy that
they are unwilling to be the home of what would be a very large and
powerful broadcasting center.  Most concerns have been ecological, with
many people also worried about the effect of lots of LF radiation on
human beings.  Why did the Navy want it?  It's a well-knowwn fact that
the lower the frequency of a radio transmission, the deeper it can
penetrate water.  The deeper a sub can stay, the harder it is for anyone
to find it.  Therefore, having this new facility increases the
survivability of the sub, which presumably thereby increases the
deterrent effect of the sub's missiles.  

I don't know if the Navy is still interested in the project. 
Personally, I was never convinced that the marginal benefit to our
strategic posture was worth the environmental impact.