jrrt@hogpd.UUCP (12/13/83)
tekigm!dand made a few observations and comments about the possibility of a US Navy ballastic missile submarine accidently launching one of their Posiedon/Trident missiles. I'd like to add my two-cents worth. I have some direct experience -- over 4 years as a Weapons Officer on SSBN 643 (George Bancroft). During that time I was responsible for, among other areas, the Missile Division and the Missile Fire Control Division. I will be somewhat limited in my ability to rebut tekigm!dand's errors, because many of the details of the Strategic Weapons Command and Control systems are classified up to and including Top Secret. Nonetheless, I think I can set the record straight. 1) SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines) are on the Failsafe system. Consider the (il)logic of tekigm!dand's claim: If SSBNs were totally independent, and unable to communicate with the US, when would they *ever* launch? They wouldn't, of course, because they'd never have any reason to. 2) Official Operating procedure requires the following to occur before a sub launches a missile: a) The Joint Chiefs send a special coded message to one or more subs. This message originates with the President. The Radiomen on board the USS Eversail receive the message and recognize its special nature, although they do not know what it says. b) They call the Officer of the Deck (the guy running the routine evolutions on the ship) who announces the reception of the message over the ship's intercom. All hell breaks loose as the Missilemen rush to set up the launch sequence, the Fire Controlmen prepare the targeting computers, the Ship Control Party puts the sub in a launch position, and the officers in the Command and Control party decode the message. Note that each of these actions have one or more "holding points", beyond which the personnel may not proceed without (ultimately) the Commanding Officer's (CO's) permission. Also consider that the books to decode the message are locked in a special safe, the access to which requires at least two officers, neither of which may be the CO. c) Assume the worst, and the message has been verified to be a real launch order. The CO still has ultimate authority, and the crew physically cannot launch without his permission. Therefore, the CO may decide to disobey his orders, and not launch. Assume he does order the launch. Then both he and the Weapons Officer must get two keys (each held in a different special safe with combinations not known to the other officer), and simultaneously manipulate the keys to effect the launch. While they are doing this, they must be on separate decks in separate compartments. The bottom line: The Captain can't do it alone, he can't do it with only a handful of personnel, and he can't do it without the initial word from the JCS. The following facts contradict tekigm!dand's assertions: 1) SSBNs are on the Failsafe system. In general, subs hear quite well, as long as they are *relatively* shallow. (I recall listening to a Super Bowl broadcast...). 2) The Executive Officer and the Engineering Officer may be members of the Command and Control party, and hence help decode the message, but have no real say in the launch process itself. By the way, in general, the Engineering Officer is *not* the third-in-command on a submarine, the Navigator is. 3) It would be incredibly difficult to convince submarine personnel that a nuclear war was already underway, other than by radio. The suggested scenario (setting off a nuclear weapon near the sub) is preposterous. First, to the people in the sub, a nuclear blast is indistinguishable from a conventional blast (near enough, and the sub's not there anymore. Far enough, and all the sub notices is noise and unsettled water -- both effects which can be explained by a powerful but nearby conventional depth charge). Using nuclear weapons against a sub is rather excessive overkill, anyway. And if a sub was attacked with a nuclear weapon, I suspect other nastiness would be going on, and that launch message would be sent ASAP. Last but not least, finding a submerged American sub is a very difficult; they're not as vulnerable to a fanatic (to use tekigm!dand's term) as, say, New York City. 4) DEFCON 1 means we are at war. 5) tekigm!dand's understanding of how targeting and inertial guidance is handled is inaccurate. Enough said. (Sorry if that's not convincing). Now, how does all this affect tekigm!dand's plug? Perhaps surprisingly, not at all. The Navy certainly has been trying to build an LF radio system. Wisconsin and Michigan (at least) have politely informed the Navy that they are unwilling to be the home of what would be a very large and powerful broadcasting center. Most concerns have been ecological, with many people also worried about the effect of lots of LF radiation on human beings. Why did the Navy want it? It's a well-knowwn fact that the lower the frequency of a radio transmission, the deeper it can penetrate water. The deeper a sub can stay, the harder it is for anyone to find it. Therefore, having this new facility increases the survivability of the sub, which presumably thereby increases the deterrent effect of the sub's missiles. I don't know if the Navy is still interested in the project. Personally, I was never convinced that the marginal benefit to our strategic posture was worth the environmental impact.