dand@tekigm.UUCP (Dan C. Duval) (12/16/83)
hogpd!jrrt has missed the point, and trailed a number of misleading if not downright false statements along with it. The point is not that each sub crew is looking for an opportunity to launch their missiles the first chance they get, but rather that it is possible for them to launch without authorization from the US. For one thing, the Failsafe system prevents the launch of ground-based missiles and the arming of airborne weapons as long as communications are maintained-- if any unit is out of communications, there are procedures to launch anyway. Submarines are more likely to be out of communications than airplanes and missile control sites, because their very nature is to hide from electro- magnetic detection as well as sight and sound detection. This often means diving deeper than reliable short-wavelength radio communication depths. In peacetime, an SSBN can cruise shallow and listen to the Bowl games, but in wartime (DEFCON 1) or when war is imminent(DEFCON 2), shallow running subs are risking detection by a hostile force. There is no effective radio communications at 100 meters down, for frequencies in the 1/2 + megacycle ranges, and the Tridents are reported to be able to get as far down as 300 meters. The conclusion is that it is entirely possible for a sub to be out of communications and thus be on its own to decide it if should launch or not. Low frequency radio will reduce the chances of a sub being out of communications and thus will remove some possibility of an accidental launch. I am not saying that I believe the average naval officer is looking for a chance to launch missiles. I don't believe the average naval officer is going to commit suicide, either, but some do. My contention is that we can reduce the amount of discretion the average naval officer has to do something which risks everyone. The contention that the use of nuclear weapons on subs is "preposterous", is itself rather silly. The Soviet FRAS 1 system mounted on the Kievs and Moskvas is an anti-submarine system which does not have a version without a nuclear warhead, and the SS-N-15(an anti-submarine missile launched like a torpedo) also has a nuclear warhead(though it also has a conventional warhead)[this from Combat Fleets of the World 1980/1981 by Couhat]. A 20 kiloton warhead is likely to kill a submarine if it detonates within 800 meters[How to Make War by James Dunnigan]. These tend to suggest that someone somewhere believes nuclear weapons are effective against subs. That a sub could not tell whether it was being attacked by a nuclear or conventional weapon is rather trivial to the sub being attacked -- the fact of attack puts the entire mission of the sub at danger, and increases the tension the crew is going to be under, increasing the chance of them making a mistake. Besides, a 20kt nuclear explosion 1 mile away, even through the water, is going to cause a radio-frequency pulse that the sub should be able to detect -- it won't kill the sub, but I find it hard to believe the crew could not figure out whether it was nuclear or not. If your soundman reports a splash in the water 2 miles away and the sub shakes, you might safely conclude it was not a conventional depth charge that exploded. As to detection, I must grant that it is harder to find a sub than a surface ship, but the sub is not invulnerable to detection. According to a GAO report made in a public House committee session just last week(reported in my local newspaper, no less) a Lafayette-class SSBN must resurface about every 8 hours to prevent serious degradation of the accuracy of its inertial guidance system. The Trident subs, with the latest SNIG (Ship's Navigational Inertial Guidance), must surface every 100 hours to perform this task. The SSBN-643, of the Benjamin Franklin class, must, according to the GAO, reset their inertial guidance system every 40 hours. Therefore, anyone around to see them has every possibility to do so. Not correcting the inertial guidance system threatens the mission of the sub, as an error of 20 km in launch position makes at least 20 km of error at the target. And again, the more shallow the sub runs to keep in communications, the greater the chance of being detected, by wake, by heat tracks, or by passive listening, not to mention active pinging. Finally, if American subs are so hard to detect, why are American attack subs assigned to shadow the Soviet attack subs that shadow our SSBNs, eh? If they can't find us, they can't track us, no? What does all this lead to? If the sub runs deep, they do not get any news from the outside world unless someone is dropping explosives of one sort or another on them -- chance to make an error. If they run shallow, they may be detected and destroyed before they get a chance to fulfill their mission. If they do not come to the surface and locate themselves, their ability to perform their mission degrades with time and thus they have a time constraint on how long they can stay out of communications. This entire discussion comes down to whether the subs can communicate or not, and currently, there is every reason to believe not -- and this is a chance to make an error. What we need to do is reduce the chances of error. Dan C Duval Instrument Systems Integration Tektronix,Inc.