mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (03/15/84)
First, one has to look at disarmament as more than a simple "let's get rid of all the weapons" process. There is a crucial issue of trust. For years, both sides have given each other ample reason for fear. Reductions, particularly at the early stage, must be balanced so that there is no great fear of beginning, and there is confidence built so the process can continue. Second, one must enter into disarmament talks with legitimate goals. The issue of Reagan's motives is a very important one. His entire political life, up until just recently, shows that he has no faith in reductions. He places all his hope in gaining superiority over the Soviets. His advisors told him that if he continued with that tack, he would almost certainly lose the 1984 election. So he tempered and began trying to sound more conciliatory. His nice-sounding proposals (Zero Option, for example) hold no water. It is indicative that he names the MX, one of the most destabilizing missle systems ever, the "Peacemaker". One can legitimately wonder just what kind of "peace" he has in mind. It is important to understand the background of politicians; it is the best guide to what they really believe, and where they're really going. Reagan is a great actor, and he knows exactly what to say to make people feel good. Unfortunately, it usually has nothing to do with what he's actually doing. Third, you ask why Freeze supporters don't also support "eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe." Most probably do, but that has nothing to do with the Zero Option. Despite its name, the Zero option didn't mean zero nuclear weapons in Europe. It was an offer to abandon NATO plans for deployment of 572 Cruise and Pershing missiles in return for Soviet dismantling of all SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles already in Eastern Europe. The Soviets pointed out that our good friends, the French and British, have 144 submarine missiles, 18 intermediate land-based missiles and 150 medium-range bombers, and that those probably weren't aimed at New York or Bonn. The Reagan negotiators simply claimed that those don't count (technically, they claimed the French and British missles are tactical, not strategic.) The Soviets also consider our submarine-based missiles, which can travel anywhere in the world, a large threat, especially since they can't reliably track them. Those, too, weren't under discussion. An interesting side note: If you consider Reagan and Chernenko the two most powerful men in the world by virtue of the nuclear weapons they control, next in line is a U.S. nuclear submarine captain. Each captain is empowered to make his own decisions about when to fire missiles in the event he can't establish contact with his home base. The Freeze deserves support because it is balanced, implementable and a positive first step. The Freeze can be used to build confidence on both sides that good agreements will be followed and supported. The Test Ban Treaty is an example of such an agreement, albeit far more limited in scope. The Freeze would set a new course for U.S. policy, a course away from investing more and more money in weapons, and paradoxically, buying only greater and greater insecurity. The Freeze is not without its risks, of course. But neither is an endless build-up of nuclear weapons. There are risks associated with both and I'd rather take a chance for something positive than continue to take chances for policies which can only end in one way. Mike Kelly ..!ihnp4!tty3b!mjk