band@ccivax.UUCP (Bill Anderson) (06/21/84)
I recently read Barbara Tuchman's "The March of Folly,"
and she discusses the domino theory in reference to
US involvement in Vietnam. Basically, the most problematic
aspect of viewing SE Asia, or Central America, as a set
of standing dominoes is that it ignores any differences
among the nations in question. Tuchman points out very
clearly that US planners and advisors saw the entire region
as a homogeneous culture with the same values. Hence,
if one falls, then all will fall. The problem in SE Asia
was that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (and the others) are
highly diverse cultures, each with their own heritage,
values, and traditions. And since each nation is different,
and intensely aware of their own identity, the individual
countries are nothing like dominoes. By ignoring these differences
the US planners and advisors displayed an incredible
arrogance toward, and insensitivity to, these diverse peoples.
What worries me today is that we seem to be just as
arrogant and insensitive with the diverse cultures in
Central and South America. Tuchman's description of
Vietnam is frighteningly similar to what is happening
in Central America today. Can we learn from history?
--
Bill Anderson
...!{ {ucbvax | decvax}!allegra!rlgvax }!ccivax!bandrcb@fortune.UUCP (Robert Binstock) (06/22/84)
-----
Just a thought:
There is always the possibility that the domino theory is
essentially correct, but that our actions in Southeast Asia were
not the most constructive response to the fact that there were
teetering dominoes there. Maybe if we'd done things differently,
they would still be standing, and there wouldn't be any communist
governments in the area today.
Proponents of the military approach to Viet Nam tend to cite the
domino theory in support of their position, but even if valid, it
doesn't prove a thing. It may be that the dominoes fell because
we "lost" or "didn't win" or "didn't try to win" on the battlefields
of Viet Name, or there may be entirely different reasons that no one
has yet recognized. There may have been other things we should have
done or tried to do that we never even thought of, or that we
thought of but never tried.
Many people believe that the best way to counteract the spread of
communism is to try to make friends with revolutionary governments
BEFORE they are totally committed to a Soviet-supported, 2nd-world
communist path. Cuba is a good example.
[P.S. I myself don't pretend to know enough to support one side
or the other of this idea. I bring it up because it
seems to have some logic to it and to shed some light on
the ongoing discussion.]
Bob Binstockmat@hou5d.UUCP (06/22/84)
There is some unhappy irony to 'Nam. I have a book called ``The Ten-
Thousand Day War'', which points out several things.
First, during and after WWII, we were friendly with Ho Chi Minh (NOT his
real name). Viet Nam was ``French Indo-China'' back then.
Second, our military intelligence services made some promises of aid. In
return, HCM promised to institute a Constitutional government.
Third, we backed out on our promise to keep the French happy, instead of
trying to negotiate a solution between DeGaulle and HCM.
Fourth, HCM went to the USSR for aid, since we lied to him.
Fifth, when HCM started talking to the USSR we saw Red and decided that
we had to kick his butt. HCM had to accept Soviet ideology and methods to
get their aid against the French (whom we backed).
Sixth, when the French and the native Viet Namese were fighting the French
got their butts kicked. Douglas MacArthur said that there was NO WAY a
foriegn power could secure the land militarily, given the terrain and
large-scale geography. Remember, MacArthur still holds the third-highest
graduating score ever awarded at West Point. If MacArthur said it was
impossible, it probably was.
Welching on HCM and then insisting on setting up a puppet in the South
(rather than trying to get HCM and Franch to sit tight for a few years -- the
French needed to regain their pride after WWII and wouldn't have backed off)
cost and is costing millions of lives and really screwed up this country,
human rights and life in general in IndoChina.
Realpolitik dictated that we back the French over our word as we gave it to
HCM. In this case, idealism would have served better. Most of the time when
we are idealist, realpolitik would do better. If we could only straighten our
act up and find out which to use when, we would be one hell of a lot better
off -- and so would everyone else in the world.
By the way, the ``10,000 Day War'' book cost me about twelve bucks (THICK
hardcover) and is about the most boring book I have ever tried to read.
--
from Mole End Mark Terribile
(scrape .. dig ) hou5d!mat
,.. .,, ,,, ..,***_*. (soon hou4b!mat)revc@noscvax.UUCP (06/26/84)
[The Communist Religion cannot survive peace.] >Many people believe that the best way to counteract the spread of >communism is to try to make friends with revolutionary governments >BEFORE they are totally committed to a Soviet-supported, 2nd-world >communist path. Cuba is a good example. >. >Bob Binstock Cuba is a bad example. We "were friends" with Castro's revolution. In fact, a couple of students at the US Navy run High School in Gitmo who ran off to join the revolution were considered heros by "the rest of us kids". I was in the elementary school there at that time. However, after taking over, Castro "showed his true colors." Making enemies is easy. We had some unwritten agreements with Uncle Ho during World War II about not allowing the French to return after the the defeat of the Japanese. We somehow forgot about that commitment with our preoccupation with Europe. -- Bob R.E. Van Cleef (REVC) Computer Sciences Corporation San Diego, CA ihnp4 \ MILNET revc@nosc akgua \ UUCP decvax -------------!sdcsvax!noscvax!revc dcdwest / ucbvax / CompuServe 71565,533
rcd@opus.UUCP (Dick Dunn) (06/27/84)
I'd like to play devil's advocate on this one: >recall that the original domino theory was that, if we didn't save Viet Nam >from the communists, that Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and on would go next. > >Check who is running Cambodia (kampuchea) and Laos now. >...[other examples of fall of S.E. Asian countries]... >Tell me again that the 'domino theory' isn't valid. Charlie Martin has a point here. Of course, just because the theory says "A leads to B" and you have one instance of A followed by B you haven't proven the theory. I'd like to pose an alternative theory: We didn't prevent the fall of Viet Nam, but we did, in many cases, make our presence felt in rather obnoxious ways, for many years. Recall also that we didn't come in at the start - we sort of took over for the French. They had been battling Ho Chi Minh & Co. for decades but apparently they finally wanted out of the colony business. Thus the Viet Namese were likely more than a little annoyed with Western troops trying to run their show. They might have been happy to get help from anywhere, including Chinese communists. This attitude could easily spill over into adjoining countries. Is it possible that, had we not been there, they would have been pushing the communists out instead of taking their help (and getting swallowed in the bargain)? As I say, I'm mostly posting this to play devil's advocate; I'd like to hear ideas for/against the domino theory and for/against others of the ilk I've suggested. -- Dick Dunn {hao,ucbvax,allegra}!nbires!rcd (303)444-5710 x3086 ...Cerebus for dictator!
rcb@fortune.UUCP (Robert Binstock) (06/28/84)
>>Cuba is a bad example. We "were friends" with Castro's revolution. >>In fact, a couple of students at the US Navy run High School in >>Gitmo who ran off to join the revolution were considered heros by >>"the rest of us kids". I was in the elementary school there at that >>time. However, after taking over, Castro "showed his true colors." >>R.E. Van Cleef (REVC) My understanding [quite possibly incorrect] from various sources is that the "true colors" showed by Castro were 1) his insistence that a communist economic system didn't necessarily mean a political dictatorship and 2) his avowed intention to maintain some independence from the great powers, notably the U.S., the gargantuan nation in his back yard. Both of these positions are understandable, even if one considers them misguided. At the first signs of this kind of behavior, however, most of our government threw in its hand and began to consider him an enemy. (Also, some very outspoken criticism of the racial situation in the U.S. didn't help much.) I'm not defending Castro, God knows; it turned out that he DID create a dictatorship and totally trashed any chance he had at independence by establishing a lackey relationship with the USSR. I'm just suggesting that if we had dealt with him in a more sensible manner -- used the right combination of persuasion, coaxing, and threats -- the whole Caribbean/Central American picture might be very different today. Bob Binstock