mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (08/08/84)
A thumbnail sketch of Arms Control Agreements made by the past 7 Administrations: Eisenhower Antarctic Treaty (1959) Kennedy Hot Line Agreement (1963) Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) Johnson Outer Space Treaty (1967) Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1967) Non-proliferation Treaty (1968) Nixon Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971) Accidents Measures Agreement (1971) Hot Line Modernization Agreement (1971) Biological Weapons Convention (1972) Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms (1972) Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973) Anti-Ballistic Missle Protocol (1974) Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) Ford Vladivostok Aide-Memoire (1974) Geneva Protocol (Ratified by U.S. 1975) Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) Carter Environmental Modification Convention (1977) SALT II Offensive Arms Treaty (1979) Nuclear Material Convention (1980) Reagan ----------------------------------------------------------------- Mike Kelly
alle@ihuxb.UUCP (Allen England) (08/09/84)
> Antarctic Treaty (1959) > Hot Line Agreement (1963) > Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) > Outer Space Treaty (1967) > Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1967) > Non-proliferation Treaty (1968) > Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971) > Accidents Measures Agreement (1971) > Hot Line Modernization Agreement (1971) > Biological Weapons Convention (1972) > Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) > SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms (1972) > Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973) > Anti-Ballistic Missle Protocol (1974) > Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) > Vladivostok Aide-Memoire (1974) > Geneva Protocol (Ratified by U.S. 1975) > Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) > Environmental Modification Convention (1977) > SALT II Offensive Arms Treaty (1979) > Nuclear Material Convention (1980) > Mike Kelly Mike, if Reagan had added 10 new treaties to the *21* you cited, do you think you would feel any safer? With *21* of these treaties signed, we still have the largest number of nuclear (and otherwise) weapons on this Earth. Why do you think treaties are going to solve the problem? --> Allen <-- ihnp4!ihuxb!alle
cher@ihuxi.UUCP (Mike Musing) (08/09/84)
While all of the aforesaid treaties were being signed USSR kept building its arms at a faster pace then USA. Does not make some people (myself included) feel any safer. It looks like the trend terminated during Reagan's term. Too bad there were no agreements signed. Also, this administration was not dealing with any stable (biologically) Soviet leader. The current one looks pretty bad, too. The only kind of agreements they had the time to make was funeral-related.
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (08/10/84)
>From: cher@ihuxi.UUCP (Mike Musing) > >While all of the aforesaid treaties were being signed USSR kept >building its arms at a faster pace then USA. Does not make some >people (myself included) feel any safer. >It looks like the trend terminated during Reagan's term. >Too bad there were no agreements signed. >Also, this administration was not dealing with any stable (biologically) >Soviet leader. The current one looks pretty bad, too. The only kind of >agreements they had the time to make was funeral-related. The question is not the pace at which either side builds up (which is too fast in both cases) but the relative balance produced. All four service chiefs have testified in Congress that they would not trade their forces for the Soviets. Independent (one cannot trust government agencies anymore when the stated policy of the government is clear superiority) analyses have found rough parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not mean exact equality -- the strategic situations are different. We, for example, do not have hostile borders surrounding us. Rough parity means that overall, neither side has a clear advantage. What Reagan has done is (1) first renounce arms control, then, when it became clear that this was politically impossible, make cosmetic efforts that were *designed* to fail (2) begin an unprecedented arms buildup with the stated goal of clear superiority (3) get the funds for this from cuts in social programs and massive deficit spending (4) declare over and over that there was a "window of vulnerability" that his own MX commission said was imaginary. Let's see a show of hands. How many people know that every significant advance in the arms race was initiated by the U.S.? We dropped the first bomb; we developed the first hydrogen bomb; we developed the first ICBMs; we developed submarine-launched missiles (still the most reliable part of the triad); we developed MIRVs (on which Henry Kissinger later remarked "I wish I'd thought through the consequences of a MIRVed world." We wish you had, too, Henry.) My point is not "look at the big, bad U.S." but (a) we have always been ahead by any reasonable analysis (b) it seems to me that the country that brought these weapons to the world and is the only country to use them has a special responsibility to reduce the threat of their use. The arms race is unstable. If Reagan's buildup continues, the U.S. probably will pull ahead of the Soviets. Do you think they're going to let that stay that way for long? Of course not. So they'll devote even more their GNP to military spending, pull even again or maybe even get ahead (although I doubt that Soviet technology will let them pull ahead in any significant way) and someone else will come along with tales of missile gaps or windows of vulnerability and so starts round 46. Where does it end? The cold warriors have no answer. A recent survey in Illinois, though, found that somewhere around 40% (I forget the exact figure) of people believe that nuclear war is "inevitable". Given the current pattern, I can't see how they're wrong. But I believe in human beings, and I think that, as Dwight Eisenhower said, enough people will want peace badly enough that their leaders will just have to get out of the way and let them have it. Reagan comes in as the cowboy from the west, talking about showdowns and "this planet ain't big enough for the both of us." The polls indicate that most Americans disagree with his approach, and that it is the second-most important issue to voters this fall (after the economy). The possibility is that Ronald Reagan could lose the election on this issue. Mike Kelly
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (08/11/84)
The point of any nuclear arms program is credible deterrence. The
Reagan administration has shown a willingness to advocate arms systems
which will not deter, but rather encourage both sides to more strongly
consider a first strike. Chief among these is the MX.
To understand what the MX will do to deterrence, one must first
understand how MIRVing has destabilized the nuclear balance. Suppose
each side has an equal number of launchers, each with with one
warhead, in a world with no ABM's. Then there is no conceivable way for
either side to begin a first strike without being subject to a
devastating response, and nuclear strikes are strongly deterred.
However, if one now supposes both sides have approximately the same
number of launchers, and each launcher has TEN warheads, each side will
be sorely tempted to target five warheads on EACH of the other's
launchers, and may realistically hope to destroy virtually all of the
opponent's nuclear forces while using only 50% of their own. A clear
advantage belongs to the power which strikes first, thus destabilizing
the balance of terror.
Now, the ideal solution would be to ban MIRVing, but this is no longer
possible, as neither side appears interested in negotiations. The next
best solution is to have the sites of the launchers unknown, as then a
first strike becomes impossible. This is why SLBM's are so effective,
and this is what the Carter administration was seeking to do with its
proposals for a "shell game" form of MX basing. The Reagan
administration is satisfied to base the MX in fixed siloes, thus going
a long way toward establishing incentives for both the US and the USSR
to strike first (this Prisoner's Dilemma (cf. Game Theory) is commonly
referred to by the phrase "use 'em or lose 'em).
Another way in which Reagan defense policy is undermining deterrence
is its exploration of "Star Wars" systems. This is just a new version
of the ABM, with all its attendant problems. By introducing a
"defense" against nuclear attack, the potential for miscalculation is
increased umpteenfold, as decision makers will have to rely on the
bureaucracy's estimate of its efficiency in formulating optimum
policy, and as that estimate is bound to be inaccurate on either the
Soviet's or our part, the perceived optimum policy may not be the
actual optimum, and the result could be war. It is important that in
the game of deterrence both US and USSR leaders play the same game,
that is, hold the same perceptions as to each other's abilities.
As Mike Kelly pointed out, the number of warheads is not too
important. Deterrence is based upon the perceived capability to carry
out a RETALIATORY strike, and thus the type and basing of warheads is
more important than the number of them. The role of treaty agreements
is as much to channel arms production into stable types and modes as
well as to reduce the total number of them, and cannot be judged only
by the latter standard. In fact, large numbers of warheads are
preferable to having very few. What could be worse than your opponent
having ONE more warhead than you, if they have one and you have none?
On the other hand, if they have 100,000, but you only have 10,000, and
your meager 10,000 is secure from a first strike, you are very secure
indeed.
David Rubin
{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david