david@randvax.UUCP (David Shlapak) (09/21/84)
------- From: jec@iuvax.UUCP > It seems to me that you could hardly call the MX a first strike >weapon. The idea behind it was that it would be impervious to a first >strike so that it could be used as a second strike weapon. The MX mis- >siles aren't as accurate as the type of missiles used to take out other >silos. A minor quibble since it is totally unnecessary with a large >submarine fleet. Just to show that I'm not a total `militarist,' let me disagree with the thrust of this comment as well...according to "Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I," the Peacekeeper has a projected CEP of ~ 0.07 NM; according to John Collins; fine volume, "US-Soviet Military Balance," the SS-18 Mod 4 ICBM (the primary "hard target killer" on the Soviet side) has a CEP of 0.14 NM. Given the yields of the respective RVs (estimated to be ~0.3 MT for Peacekeeper, and 0.5 MT for the SS-18, the US missile would seem, in fact, to be a significantly SUPERIOR anti-silo weapon than its Soviet counterpart. Would that your assertion that Peacekeeper "would be impervious to a first strike" were true. In fact, the current plan is to put the new missile in silos currently used by Minuteman ICBMs...that same silos that are probably vulnerable to a Soviet attack. Unfortunately, changing the contents of a silo does not in any way increase its hardness...Peacekeeper in a Minuteman silo is no safer than a Minuteman. It is this combination of factors which makes the Peacekeeper, from a Soviet vantage anyway, look like a "first-strike weapon." It's a hard target killer, meaning that it is technically adequate in a first strike role; it is a powerful weapon, which makes it a quite tempting target for Soviet pre-emption; and it is insufficiently protected to survive such a strike. To Moscow, these factors together make Peacekeeper look like a classic "use-it-or-lose-it" system. Another alternative would be to adopt a "launch under attack" option for Peacekeeper; assure them of survival by having them pass the incoming RVs at 100K feet or something like that. Feasibility questions aside, this would obviously be a somewhat risky strategy to adopt. Obviously, there are counterarguments to this "first-strike" issue: we don't plan to build enough Peacekeepers to threaten a substantial portion of the Soviet ICBM force; it is the avowed policy of this country never to launch a first strike (of course, the Soviets have declared the same...I believe us); if nothing else we need the Peacekeeper as a "bargaining chip." My opinion is that without a survivable basing mode, Peacekeeper is a destabilizing weapons system and an overly expensive bargaining chip. We don't really want it, I' pretty convinced we don't need it, and I don't think it should be built. --- das NOTE: The opinions expressed above are those of the author, and do do not necessarily represents those of the Rand Corporation or the sponsors of its research.