dand@tekigm.UUCP (Dan C. Duval) (09/07/84)
A point that I think many people are overlooking is that the military and a number of politicians are not looking at Ballistic Missile Defense (Star Wars) solely as a means to defend American cities from missile attack but rather as a means of continuing the arms race. BMD would have to be 100% efficient to provide any sort of credible defense against a city-busting nuclear attack. Any less than 100% and cities will go down. I might be willing to spend $500 billion to have Los Angeles and New York nuked, but not to spend $500 billion on defense just to have them nuked anyway. If we look at the current situation from the point of view of the Air Force brass, Star Wars looks much different. As the Soviets build more ICBMs, they can allocate more warheads to each US silo and make their chance of success against the entire US ICBM force better, especially since the US ICBM force will probably have to ride out a surprise Soviet first strike (see John Steinbrunner, "Launch Under Attack", Scientific American, Vol 250, No.1, January, 1984:pp 37-47). The Air Force's job is to set things up so that enough missiles survive that strike to retaliate against the Soviet Union, thus keeping up their part of deterence. The traditional means of reducing the Soviets' chances were to build more missiles and scatter the silos around so that the same number of Soviet warheads have more targets they need to cover. However, with the debates going on about MX and the Midgetman, it is not clear that the Air Force is going to get any more missiles in the near future, so that day by day the chances of success of a first strike grow more in favor of the Soviets. Someone then suggests a Ballistic Missile Defense. Even if that system is only 50% efficient, it cuts in half the number of warheads the Soviets can assign to each silo, increasing the chance of that silo being operable for the retalitory strike. So suddenly, the Air Force has a way to continue in the arms race without building any new missiles. Clever, no? I say, "no". It may be clever, but unless a 100% effecient BMD system can be made, that BMD is there only to provide the US with a way to continue the arms race without building any more politicly-unfavorable ICBMs. When the missiles start to fall, the Air Force-operated BMD is not going to be used to stop the missiles falling on US cities but rather to defend US silos so that the destruction of the civilized world can be completed. The politicos in favor of BMD should make it clear that this is a strategic MILITARY weapon that continues the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, not a system to replace MAD. Some say that the money desired now is seed money to decide if such a system is feasible or not. If part of the $24billion Research and Development money that the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines allocated in the 1984 budget (Armed Forces Journal, Vol 121 No 6, January 1984) is not being used to study the feasibility of such a system, then the warplanners are misusing those funds. Indeed, if such studies haven't been undertaken on a regular basis since the first ICBMs, then our military and civilian leaders have not been doing their jobs. I prefer to think that these people are not stupid and that they are conscientious and that these studies have been done regularly under existing and previous budgets, so we shouldn't need more money for more studies unless there is a breakthrough they'd like to announce to us. My conclusion is, if we are not going to spend money on new missiles to continue the arms race, we should not spend money on a BMD that is less than 100% efficient, for it is merely another way to continue the arms race. If there is a 100% efficient BMD, then I need more information than what has been published to convince me that it is feasible. These views are not necessarily those of my employers. Dan C Duval tektronix!tekigm!dand
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/09/84)
Your scenario of the Air Force liking even a 50% effective BMD system is quite correct, but you make it sound like using BMD to protect silos is something the DoD is hiding. Its not. The first BMD system deployed will certainly not have 100% effectiveness, or anywhere close enough to save our cities ffrom a countervalue strike. We shouldn't expect it to. Protecting our silos is something I and many others see as vital to the survival of our landd based ICBM force. Note, BMD in this case is a fform of 'active' hardening. Noone protests when people propose improving the hardness off our silos but scream bloody murder when you talk about using BMD to to do the same thing. Look, if you have a certain P(k) on a silo, and you lower it by increasing its hardness, or lower it by decreasing the number of incoming warheads, its still lowered. You seem to despise the idea of protecting our land based missile force. Do you really want them vulnerable? BMD used in this way is clearly stabilizing. If you use BMD to protect your most accurate heavily mirved missiles, there is no advantage to having it in a first strike. If we launched one, those silos would be empty and would be protecting nothing. If we were attacked, it would increase the number of missiles surviving for a retaliatory strike. You say this is expanding the arms race. Well, quite frankly, what I'm cconcerned with is stability. And having a vulnerable land based missile force is destabilizing. It encourages the enemy to launch a strike since its so easy to take them out. By the same rationale, I would assume you would be opposed to exchanged ICBM's for SLBM's. You view that as an expansion, even though the world is more stable afterward. This is the same mentality of the freezniks. They want to stop everything, even systems that icrease stability. I or one am not happy with the state of the world now, and like to change it for the better instead of locking us in to what we have now. BMD will make the world much better off. People who think that you can somehow remove useful weapons systems from the world's arsenals by signing some piece of paper are really fooling themselves. The issues simply arent that simple. We need to use reason when dealing with problems like this, and not be motivated by hysterical emotions... Milo Medin NASA Ames Research Center
mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) (09/10/84)
Milo Medin writes that protecting land-based ICBMs is very important since their so-called vulnerability means the Soviets are more likely to launch a strike against them "because they're so easy to take out." Look at this from the Soviet point of view. We have submarines which we are virtually certain they can't track. Reason: we are ahead of the Soviets in almost every important technology area and WE can't track them. The missiles on those submarines are enough to take out the 50 largest cities in the USSR. So of course they're going to launch a strike against our land-based missiles, right? What have the got to lose but their 50 largest cities? Amazed they haven't done it already. A complete lack of common sense seems to be a requirement for high positions in the U.S. military-industrial complex. Mike Kelly
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (09/18/84)
>> /***** uokvax:net.politics / tty3b!mjk / 5:26 pm Sep 10, 1984 */ >> Look at this from the Soviet point of view. We have submarines which we >> are virtually certain they can't track. Reason: we are ahead of the Soviets >> in almost every important technology area and WE can't track them. The >> missiles on those submarines are enough to take out the 50 largest cities in >> the USSR. So of course they're going to launch a strike against our land-based >> missiles, right? What have the got to lose but their 50 largest cities? >> Amazed they haven't done it already. >> >> Mike Kelly >Mike is missing a point. The fear of vulnerable land based icbms >is that the Soviets could destroy them, then hold U.S. cities >hostage for the good behavior of our submarines. Would the U.S. >President launch a punitive counter-value strike on Russian >cities if it meant the utter destruction of the U.S. as well, or >would he just accept the damage. What would you do, Mike? (Note >that asking what someone would do in a no-win situation is not a >counterargument, and is not intended as such. I'm just curious.) > >Personally I find this scenario rather implausible, but if you >ignore this scenario and the need for the nuclear deterrent for >Europe, you might as well junk all the ICBMs and depend solely on >the Subs. For that matter, you could probably junk all the subs >except 4 (50% on patrol, and you'd want to have a sub on backup >in case something happened to the first). > > Carl Carl is right, it is implausible. It is also inconsistent. To assume a Soviet leader would not be disuaded by the balance of terror from launching a first "limited" strike and to assume that same leader will confidently rely upon his American counterpart to be dissuaded from retaliation by the balance the Soviet ignored is to assume an irrational Soviet leadership. There is no defense against irrationality. Besides, even if a Soviet strike succeeded in wiping out US land-based missiles, there is an available response which is approporiately limited and therefore credible. An American leader need not respond by launching a full retaliatory strike, but could instead launch a strike against a few Soviet cities to bring casualties up to the same level. Soviet leaders, even granted technical success, even assuming American leaders would allow 10 million Americans to die rather than force the Soviets into full retaliation, cannot put the US in the that dilemma. The "limited" strike scenario assumes that the elimination of land-based ICBM's would leave the US only two choices: surrender or "unlimited" nuclear war. It doesn't hold water once other options are recognized as available. The real "limited" war scenario to be concerned about is not a strike on US siloes, but on European cities. US threats to sacrifice Chicago to avenge Hamburg may not be convincing to Soviet leaders. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/29/84)
>Carl is right, it is implausible. It is also inconsistent. > >To assume a Soviet leader would not be disuaded by the balance of >terror from launching a first "limited" strike and to assume that same >leader will confidently rely upon his American counterpart to be >dissuaded from retaliation by the balance the Soviet ignored is to >assume an irrational Soviet leadership. There is no defense against >irrationality. > >Besides, even if a Soviet strike succeeded in wiping out US land-based >missiles, there is an available response which is approporiately >limited and therefore credible. An American leader need not respond by >launching a full retaliatory strike, but could instead launch a strike >against a few Soviet cities to bring casualties up to the same level. >Soviet leaders, even granted technical success, even assuming American >leaders would allow 10 million Americans to die rather than force the >Soviets into full retaliation, cannot put the US in the that dilemma. >The "limited" strike scenario assumes that the elimination of >land-based ICBM's would leave the US only two choices: surrender or >"unlimited" nuclear war. It doesn't hold water once other options are >recognized as available. > >The real "limited" war scenario to be concerned about is not a strike >on US siloes, but on European cities. US threats to sacrifice Chicago >to avenge Hamburg may not be convincing to Soviet leaders. > > David Rubin David, you are missing sveral points: 1) You talk about having to be irrational to launch a first strike ignoring the balance of terror. I hardly consider 93% casulties for the US and 10% for the Soviets a balance of anything. 2) You talk about the US leader trying to launch a small strike to equalize causlaities is impossible. First, its really hard to talk to submarines now, what makes you think you can talk to them at all during a nuclear war. It also takes about a hour or more to transmit the EAM to the SLBM alert force via VLF, what kind of adds are you willing to give that the few sites which can transmit at that frequency are going to be intact after a USSR first strike? This is why sub commanders can launch their missiles without the EAM, but how are they going to know what war plan to use? Odds are it'll be a spasmodic launch of everything if he launches at all which is questionable. 3) Even if you lobbed all our SLBM force at the Russians in a countervale strike, you will kill slightly more russians percentage wise than the collateral damage to Americans of a Soviet first strike (estimate of collateral damage = ~8%). 4) I agree that putting US cities at risk to avenge NATO country losses isnt credible. Thats why the British and French have their own nuclear forces. And why we are deploying pershing and cruise. I am glad that you support that act at least. In short, things arent nearly as simple as you make them out to be. The US and USSR are very dissimilar is population distribution, strategic doctrine, and force structure, you have to be very careful when making comparisons. Also, a whole range of techincal issues are raised when operating in a nuclear environment, the C^3 system we have is more vulnerable than our ICBM force, but thank goodness the present administration isnt ignoring C^3 like the past several. We are finally making major expenditures in C^3. Milo
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (10/02/84)
>David, you are missing sveral points: >1) You talk about having to be irrational to launch a first >strike ignoring the balance of terror. I hardly consider 93% >casulties for the US and 10% for the Soviets a balance of anything. Soviet casualties will be far greater than 10%. After perhaps a year, allowing the more serious cases of radiation poisoning to die off, Soviet casualties will run from 50-70%, while US casualties would probably run from 75-90%. The difference is due mostly to the greater urbanization of the US rather than civil defense. Moreover, the destruction to Soviet infrastructure will be so great as to cause the Soviet Union to cease existing as a unitary political entity, and this is the best deterrent for a Soviet leader. >2) You talk about the US leader trying to launch a small strike >to equalize causlaities is impossible. First, its really hard to >talk to submarines now, what makes you think you can talk to them >at all during a nuclear war. It also takes about a hour or more >to transmit the EAM to the SLBM alert force via VLF, what kind >of adds are you willing to give that the few sites which can transmit >at that frequency are going to be intact after a USSR first strike? >This is why sub commanders can launch their missiles without the >EAM, but how are they going to know what war plan to use? Odds >are it'll be a spasmodic launch of everything if he launches at >all which is questionable. Time delays are of little concern; retribution can wait an hour, a day, or a week. Also, since we are speaking of a response to a LIMITED nuclear strike, we are presuming that no warhead has landed on Washington, and thus central authority remains intact. A strike taking out all VLF sites would not be limited, as this would require strikes on the heavily populated Eastern seaboard (isn't one of the sites in Maryland?). Finally, even if the Soviets could take out all communications between the submarine fleet and the US, they would NOT do so if they intended a limited strike on land-based ICBM's, especially if they were told that the fleet's default instructions included launching everything if the commander is in doubt... >3) Even if you lobbed all our SLBM force at the Russians in >a countervale strike, you will kill slightly more russians >percentage wise than the collateral damage to Americans of >a Soviet first strike (estimate of collateral damage = ~8%). Whoa! There are enough SL warheads to blanket every Soviet city with a population greater than 50,000! The SLBM force can, by itself, kill nearly as many Russians as the entire nuclear force; what it can't do is conduct a "surgical" strike, but I'm not interested in conducting one. >4) I agree that putting US cities at risk to avenge NATO >country losses isnt credible. Thats why the British and French >have their own nuclear forces. And why we are deploying >pershing and cruise. I am glad that you support that act at >least. I support Cruise. I do not support Pershing, as their ability to reach Soviet cities in less than ten minutes might cause a Soviet leader to act rashly in a crisis. Slowness in delivery, so long as it does not make an attack ineffective, is a positive GOOD, not a liability. There is still a tremendous problem with European deterrence. The West Germans are prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons, yet are also the ones most threatened by Soviet attack. If we aren't willing to sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg, it probably follows that neither Marseilles nor Liverpool are available for such service, either. I'm not satisfied that this problem has been solved. It may not be soluble. >In short, things arent nearly as simple as you make them out >to be. The US and USSR are very dissimilar is population >distribution, strategic doctrine, and force structure, you >have to be very careful when making comparisons. >Also, a whole range of techincal issues are raised when operating >in a nuclear environment, the C^3 system we have is more >vulnerable than our ICBM force, but thank goodness the >present administration isnt ignoring C^3 like the past >several. We are finally making major expenditures in C^3. > Milo But it is ignoring conventional preparedness, unlike the Carter administration. The dilemma in Europe is that our conventional weakness may force us to go nuclear, and it is precisely because Soviet doctrine differs from ours that we cannot be sure that nuclear war can be contained. I applaud expenditures on C^3, but not on most of the nuclear arms programs. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david