[net.politics] History Corrected

stu3@mhuxh.UUCP (Mark Modig) (10/04/84)

>A point that is often overlooked is that we most likely could have achieved
>the same result by sending a "warning shot" to some uninhabited island
>rather than bombing two cities into oblivion without warning.
>
>Of course, the manner in which we stopped the war accomplished two tasks
>that the above method would not have: (1) We got 'em back for Pearl Harbor,
>(2) We got to see what an atom bomb does to cities, both air burst and
>impact at ground zero.

Some points that are also overlooked about the whole end of the
Pacific war:

(1)  The bombs were not dropped without warning.  Warnings were
issued through many channels (including dropping propaganda
leaflets, etc., hinting that a new weapon was to be used)-- certainly
the Intelligence staff in Tokyo must have guessed that the Americans
meant they had an A-bomb.  Warnings were even more in evidence after
the first bomb was dropped.  More information was given out,
including more leaflets, explaining what had happened and warning
that it might happen again if surrender was not immediate.  The
difficulty was that there were enough fanatics left who would rather
have the country basically commit mass suicide rather than
surrender.  If you mean by warning that we should have told the
Japanese that we were going to drop an A-bomb on Hiroshima at such
and such a time on such and such a date from a plane at such and
such an altitude, well, all I can say is you have an uncommonly
well-developed sense of fair play.

(2)  We only had two bombs at the time, and a third was not due for
several months after that.  Basically, the American brass decided
that they had to drop the second bomb immediately after the first if
Japan did not  surrender right away.  It was a bluff; the Americans
were gambling on the Japanese thinking that the Americans had many
bombs ready to go, and so could simply continue A-bombing Japanese
cities until they surrendered.  The bluff apparently worked and was a
factor in the decision by the Japanese to surrender.

(3) A warning shot would not have worked, I feel.  The Japanese
government from about the early 30's up until the end of the War was
dominated by the military.  Any who opposed the military were likely
to be assassinated.   (This even included the Prime Minister at one
point; he did manage to survive the attempt on his life, tho.)
Desperate measures were staged by these fanatics to try to stop the
surrender even up to the point of kidnapping the Emperor to make
sure he could not give the surrender speech to his people (that plot
fell through, fortunately), and an attempt to steal the recordings
of his speech after it had been made but before it had been
broadcast to the Japanese people the next day.  (It was anticipated
that an attempt would be made to steal the tapes, and precautions
were taken.  A break-in did occur, but thanks to the precautions,
the tapes were not in the vault where they would normally were
stored.  Otherwise, they would have been taken.)  In fact, it took
the spoken word of the Emperor himself at a private meeting with the
top officials of the Japanese government before any serious
consideration was given to the thought of surrender.

I am not saying that everybody in Japan was a fanatic; there were
many moderate figures.  Most of them were cut off from the reins of
power at the time though, and it was a pretty fair bet that you
would get knocked off if you came out publicly for surrender.  That
changed when Hirohito pretty much insisted that the government
consider surrender, but not before.

By the time the atomic bomb was used, America had been at war for
over 3 1/2 years.  Japanese cities were taking a terrible beating
from American explosive and incendiary bombs.  We had already
"gotten the Japanese back" for Pearl Harbor with the Tokyo raid by
Doolittle(sp?) and the victory at Midway.  The Americans did not
want to invade the Japanese home islands because of the casualties
they felt that would be caused.  Also, people wanted the war to end
sooner rather than later.  As for wanting to test the A-bomb on a
real city, I suppose that thought might have flashed through the
heads of the Americans, but I think they mostly wanted to get the
war over and done with and avoid the projected casualties and extra
time ( >1 MILLION American casualties and another year) an invasion
of Japan would add to the War.  At the time, the A-bomb seemed a
better answer to them.

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Mark Modig
..ihnp4!btlunix!mom