david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (09/18/84)
A factual error was made in the referenced article, in which it was
stated that six to twenty 40 kiloton bombs were necessary to destroy a
large Soviet city. It takes six bombs, exploded on the same spot, to
produce the same destruction as a single 250 kiloton weapon, which
will level any city. However, one 40 kiloton bomb will end any city's
economic and military usefullness. Two 40 kiloton bombs, placed at
opposite ends of town, can do more damage than a single 250 kiloton
bomb (though admittedly would not produce as much fallout). Finally,
most medium and smaller cities could be eliminated with a single 40
kiloton warhead. Thus, it is apporpriate to divide the number of
Poseiden warheads by two rather than six to twenty in calculating how
many cities would be destroyed.
David Rubin
{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!davidorb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER) (09/19/84)
> >for the effects of an allout nuclear attack by the US submarine > >strategic missile force. First off, let me point out that a single > >Polaris submarine has enough warheads to destroy over 100 Soviet cities. > > OK...first of all, a `Polaris' submarine exists only in a scrapyard > today...there is not a single Polaris missile in the US arsenal...but > this is strictly a technical quibble...a Poseidon submarine, however, > does carry 16 missiles with more than one hundred total warheads > aboard...each of these warheads ~40 kilotons, by FAR the smallest > strategic weapons in the world today...it would take anywhere from > six to twenty of these weapons, most likely, to destroy any city worth > hitting in the first place. I have to admit that your technical quibble is correct. They are Poseidon not Polaris submarines. My essential point is merely backed up by your factual details. Your conclusions however are questionable. So these warheads are "only" 40 kilotons- big deal, right? The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was "only" 13 kilotons. That one bomb seemed to do quite an effective job on Hiroshima as I recall. I am sure thousands of these bombs wouldn't phase the Russians a bit. > > > > >That the Soviet population could survive an assault by literally > >thousands of nuclear warheads is ludicrous. > > No more ludicrous than anything else I see in this posting. > > --- das I think the idea that the Soviets or anyone could survive a nuclear war is a necessary fantasy for people unwilling to face the likelihood of human extinction in an allout nuclear war. Obviously we can never be absolutely certain what would happen---but I think we cannot afford to find out. I also think that people who advocate more and more nuclear weapons are militarists--they relentlessly seek military and technical solutions to the political problem of war. We have been pursuing such solutions for 40 years--have they made us any safer? Is there any way such first-strike weapons as the MX missile CAN make us safer? I do not think so. Yes, I think that Soviet MIRV capabilities threaten our strategic arsenal and moreover our lives. Will building more arms stop them? It never has. We had the chance to stop Soviet MIRV capabilities during the SALT talks in the early 70's. But just as Reagan and the militarists are spreading nuclear conflict to space "because we are ahead", so back then Nixon and Kissinger refused to include MIRVed weapons in the SALT accords. At that time we were ahead in MIRVed missiles, and the Soviets were eager to include MIRVed weapons in an agreement. We could have stopped the Soviets from developing MIRVed weapons then--with an arms agreement. We didn't. We are now that much more in danger. I do not pretend to know every intricacy of nuclear weaponry--I think such technical arguments often obscure the fundamental point-- nuclear war threatens the human race--the nuclear arms race has brought us closer not further from nuclear war--no weapon ever deployed by the US has ever stopped the Soviets from deploying more nuclear weapons. The only way to prevent nuclear war AND any Soviet threat to the US is to stop the arms race for the safety of both sides, and to enact bilateral verifiable treaties to do so. To continue the search for purely military and technical solutions to the political problem of preventing nuclear war is militaristic. If you don't wish to be called a "militarist" then don't support militaristic solutions to the nuclear problem. Tim Sevener Bell Labs, Whippany whuxl!orb
jec@iuvax.UUCP (09/19/84)
[]
It seems to me that you could hardly call the MX a first strike
weapon. The idea behind it was that it would be impervious to a first
strike so that it could be used as a second strike weapon. The MX missiles
aren't as accurate as the type of missiles used to take out other silos.
A minor quibble since it is totally unnecessary with a large submarine
fleet.
--
James Conley
Indiana University
68K Education Board Project
...{isrnix|iuvax}!jecdavid@randvax.UUCP (David Shlapak) (09/20/84)
----------
NOTE TO THE NET: This message was originally posted to Tim Sevener in
response to a mail reply on his part to some comments of mine. I have
chosen to submit it for more general review in reply to Mr. Sevener's
latest articles.
Bulleted (>) paragraphs are citations from Mr. Sevener's message to me.
[****************************************************************************]
>If I have misrepresented your position on the nuclear arms race, then
>I apologize. Obviously arms experts have for years believed that
>they were preventing nuclear war by deploying more weapons. But
>after 40 years of this strategy and various halfhearted attempts to
>stop the most technically obsolescent parts of the arms race with treaties
>while allowing the most technologically advanced parts of the arms race
>to be exempted from such treaties, I think, along with many other supporters
>of the Nuclear Freeze, that it is time to say stop. This strategy has NOT
>made us any more secure. It has NOT stopped the Soviets. (except in the
>limited areas covered by treaties)
First of all, your first statement is a typical context-less assertion
that misrepresents the intentions of "arms experts." "More weapons"
are not deployed, as you imply, merely for the sake of acquiring new
toys...they are deployed in order to enhance this vague phenomenon known
as "deterrence," which I (among many others) believe has kept us from
revisiting the horrors of World War II for forty years. Sure, deterrence
is an emotionally unsatisfying thing to rely on for the safety of
millions of people; however, it has the virtue of at least seeming to
work. Until somebody can propose an alternative that is both an
improvement (like total world disarmament) and workable (UNlike total
world disarmament), I don't see what's wrong with making the world
unsafe for both nuclear and conventional war...like it is today.
You might note, too, that the treaty that most arms-control advocates
call the most successful arms-control effort since the end of the war
is the ABM Treaty...this certainly was not a "...halfhearted attempt
to stop the most technically obsolescent parts of the arms race with
treaties;" in fact, it was a successful effort to slow down (at least) the
most cutting-edge efforts on both sides; an attempt, in fact, to keep
a whole new arms race from starting.
Again, I mean no affront, but when you make statements like that one which
are so obviously at odds with the common consensus amongst even those
on "your side" who do have competence in this area, I have to question
your erudition on this topic. Nothing personal, but if it looks like
a duck, smells like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck...
As for whether or not deterrence has made us "more secure," well, I guess
that depends upon one's definition of security. If one means by security
the confidence that one will be able to live his years in peace and
freedom without any real threat of imminent violent death hanging over
his head, then yes, I would say that the West, at least, is at least as
secure today as ever before. If, however, one means by "security"
the ability to total quell all ones fears (including paranoia), which is
my impression of "your" view, than all I can say is the only place in
space-time you're going to find "security" is when you're dead. Sorry.
Also, to assert that the only places we've stopped the Soviets is in those
areas where we've induced them to sign treaties, well, that's downright
laughable. Even with the "best" treaty (the ABM agreement) the Soviets
have not only deployed systems in excess of the treaty but have continued
R&D far in excess of US efforts to the point where a "breakout" from the
treaty on their part is a distinct possibility. Let's not even go into
SALT...coincidentally, SALT I and SALT II accomplished quite parallel
things for both Western disarmers and the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces:
it gave them each more ammunition.
In fact, the evidence of multiple violations of those strategic arms
treaties that do exist provides an interesting case study of what I
consider the "disarmers mentality," to wit: "Don't tell the world about
the Soviets' cheating; that'll just make them more reluctant to negotiate
a new treaty!" In other words, the important things is the symbolic
signature on a piece of paper; that, in and of itself, is supposed to
make the world safer, despite the fact that we can be pretty damn sure
that one side ain't going to abide by the terms on the paper. I don't
see any sense in that at all.
>I am not an ignorant student of the nuclear arms race. I have read numerous
>books on the subject, as well as Foreign Affairs and other such magazines
>periodically. But while some knowledge of technical issues is important
>it is trivial and inconsequential to delve into arcane arguments about the
>exact effects of this or that weapon, or the exact numbers of this or that
>weapon. This is the snare and delusion that arms experts have been locked
>into for the past 40 years- arguing so much about weapons as weapons that
>they forget the very human and potentially devastating effects of those
>weapons. It is a fundamental fact that nuclear war would devastate mankind.
>Whether it would lead to the absolute extinction of the species--nobody
>knows.
Well, I've read a bunch of books on neurology, but that unfortunately
doesn't make me a brain-surgeon. It all depends upon what books you read.
If you've read Brodie, Schelling, Kahn, Freedman, Kissinger, etc., then
you may be ok...however, if you've been browsing through Ground Zero
books, "Scientific American" articles, the "No-first-use" series in
Foreign Affairs, or "Missile Envy," then you're quite likely worse off
than if you'd read nothing to begin with. The old saw about a little
knowledge is all too true, I'm afraid.
Nobody, least of all me, is trying to fog things up with "arcane arguments
...about weapons." However, when you come out and say that US SLBMs
"probably have more than 5000 megatons" worth of warheads, and make
that a key element in an argument, I think I'm completely justified in
informing you that your numbers are more than a factor of ten too high,
in the hopes that this datum will assist you in re-thinking that argument.
The fact that you want to brush my correction asides as inane quibbling
says more about your thought processes than perhaps you might wish to have
known.
As for the "fundamental fact that nuclear war would devastate mankind,"
well, OK...so would a re-play of World War II...if fear of nuclear war
keeps not only the atomic wolf but the tank-and-dive-bomber one from our
door, then I agree with Chruchill: let safety be the sturdy twin of
terror (note that the key word in that phrase is "sturdy," not "terror.").
>>From this basis, citizens don't need to know the exact devastation details
>of this or that weapon system--what is most important is to try to
>prevent nuclear war. There are two basic approaches to this question:
>1)continue with the past emphasis on developing new arms, and
> promoting essentially the military solution
>2)stop developing new arms through bilateral agreement
>The former has been the policy for 40 years--it has worked in the sense
>that we haven't yet actually had a nuclear war. It hasn't worked in the
>sense that we are now threatened with more nuclear weapons than ever
>before in history, and the amount of warning/decision time before a nuclear
>counterattack to the other's sides attack has gottened progressively
>shorter. So short that the dangerous next phase of this vicious cycle
>will be to make such counterattacks automatic with launch on warning systems.
>I think it is long past time to pursue the second course of diplomacy
>and mutual agreement to stop ALL new nuclear weapons systems.
>I hope that you agree . . .
In the panel discussion following ABC's broadcast of "The Day After,"
Kissinger made one of the most profound statements I have heard yet in
this ongoing dialogue...to paraphrase he said, "This movie was at best
useless. We don't need to be told how bad nuclear war would be...we all
know that it would be terrible. The question is, how best do we prevent
it from occuring, and the hysteria whipped up by a film such as this
does nothing but cloud that issue."
First of all, the factual errors in your statement (sorry, but I
can only call 'em like I see 'em). We are not "threatened with more
nuclear weapons than ever before;" in fact, US megatonnage (the only
number that really matters if we're talking about hell's-bells, balls-
out counter-city nuclear-winter nuclear war) has been DROPPING steadily
for almost twenty years...it will continue to do so. While installing
Pershing II and GLCM in Europe (what, 572 warheads, each much, much less
than a megaton) NATO is WITHDRAWING 1,500 other weapons. The only
real growth in the destructiveness of nucelar arsenals has come on the
Soviet side. And this growth has taken place during an arms race with
only one contestant; the US has actually DISMANTLED ICBMs whilst the
Soviets were building close to 800 new ones.
Secondly, the amount of warning time available has not decreased noticably
since the first SSBNs went on station for both sides in the early 1960s.
I don't know where you got that impression.
Thirdly, no one has ever seriously proposed an "automatic...launch on
warning system;" this is not "War Games" we're talking about; it's the
Real World.
As for your two means of reducing the likelihood of nucelar war (that
fear can never be eliminated)---well, to the best of my knowledge,
arms control has never prevented a war that somebody wanted. The period
from 1920 til the mid-1930s was the heyday of disarmament. There was
parchment flying everywhere---naval treaties, nonagression pacts, "rules
of war" agreements, you name it. Once the balloon went up, however,
they became "so many scraps of paper." The interesting thing is that
the one weapon not used against combatants in WWII was poison gas, which
was also a weapon NOT covered by any treaty. Why wasn't it used?
Because everybody knew that anybody they used it against could reply
in kind, with nobody gaining any advantage. This is called "deterrence."
Unlike arms control, it has been known to work.
Don't get me wrong...I have nothing against negotiating with the Soviets.
I just don't see any value in signing a treaty merely for the sake of
the "scrap of paper." I'm also a realist (you might say pessimist)
who accepts the dismal history of arms control efforts as an object
lesson that we stand to learn a great deal from.
No, I'm sorry Tim, I don't agree at all.
--- das
PS---A good starter's book on most aspects of nuclear strategy is "Arms
and Influence" by Thomas Schelling. If as I suspect you haven't read
it, pick up a copy (your neighborhood college bookstore should have it, or
at least your neighborhood college library).
PPS---Again, I have to apologize for my "attitude." I just get sick of
hearing people say that everything they don't know anything about is
irrelevant.david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (09/21/84)
>[] > It seems to me that you could hardly call the MX a first strike >weapon. The idea behind it was that it would be impervious to a first >strike so that it could be used as a second strike weapon. The MX missiles >aren't as accurate as the type of missiles used to take out other silos. >A minor quibble since it is totally unnecessary with a large submarine >fleet. > James Conley > ...{isrnix|iuvax}!jec It is precisely because the MX is so vulnerable to first strike that it itself can only be considered a first strike weapon. The original idea WAS to make MX impervious to first strike (with the "shell game" basing), but this administration will be satisfied to put them in existing fixed siloes. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
renner@uiucdcs.UUCP (09/22/84)
> It seems to me that you could hardly call the MX a first strike > weapon. The idea behind it was that it would be impervious to a first > strike so that it could be used as a second strike weapon. The MX missiles > aren't as accurate as the type of missiles used to take out other silos. > A minor quibble since it is totally unnecessary with a large submarine > fleet. --James Conley I believe that the MX is at least as accurate as the Minuteman III missiles it is to supplement. That means that it could be used as a counter-force weapon. (As a rule of thumb, if a weapon can't be used against enemy missiles, it isn't "first strike.") Since the MX carries ten warheads, it is a perfect target for an enemy first strike. This is because it carries more warheads than the enemy needs to use to destroy it. If the Soviets strike first, they will strike hardest at the MX missiles. Consequently, the MX is not particularly useful as a second-strike weapon, because it isn't likely to survive the enemy first strike. What we have, then, is a weapon which could be used for a preemptive counter-forcestrike, but not for a second, retaliatory strike. This is why the MX is called a "first strike" weapon. This is also why we could find other, better weapons to spend our money on. Scott Renner ihnp4!uiucdcs!renner
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/23/84)
"...We could have stopped mirv's then, with a treaty..." Oh come on now, just because we didnt choose to pursue that course doesnt mean it would have worked. Even if the Soviet's would have signed a treaty banning mirv's, I'd like to point out one very important point: How do you verify that a missile isnt mirv'ed? This was apparently an important consideration to the administration in making its decision to go wih mirv'ing. Some people can talk in vague generalities that you can use satillites or some such box to tell us this. Dream on. A good treaty (if one exists) must be verifiable. If its not, what good is it? Its just like that genocide agreement the US has signed. Big deal. There are many countries that have signed it that have committed acts that would be considered genocide under the treaty. So what has happened to them? You want us to nuke them or something? That's why that treaty, while looking good on the surface, was worthless. Big deal. How can you enforce a treaty anyways? Especially one with the Soviets? Do you go to war over some violation of SALT like crypting your missile telemetry? You say, well the treaty covers violations... Yeah, you go to the SCC and say, 'Hey, you guys have broken article 6 subpart c item r of X treaty.' The Russians say, so what? SO then you go to the press and say, 'Hey! the Russians have violated article 6 subpart c item r of treaty X!' And nobody cares. You might go to the UN with it, and then they'll say, you still have enough, go away. So then what do you do? You eat the violation is what you do. Ok, then you say, well if they do it, we can do it too! And you tell the Air Force to go crypt your data. The Soviets scream bloody murder, the press jumps on your case, the Congress kills funds for the missile, and you get a rep. as a warmonger as well as getting all the 3rd world countries calling you a welcher and how you dont believe in arms control. You really think I am exaggerating? This is why I dont favor any sort of treaty with the russians being counted on to do diddly squat. Everybody talks about negotiations and some talk about verification. But nalmost nobody talks about compliance. How do you make the Russians live up to their word? The bottom line is you cant, and it all boils down to trust in the basic honor of the country. That isnt what I want to base my family's security on... Milo Medin ...!ucbvax!medin medin@ucbarpa
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/23/84)
You say that its precisely because the MX is vulnerable to a first strike that its a first strike weapon. Very good! Sounds like a reason for BMD doesnt it? Also, this fixed silo stuff is not the administration's idea. They wanted Dense Pack (and the follow-on BMD system). If you dont like fixed basing, write you're congressman and tell him to cooperate with the president on BMD issues. The bottom line is that the people who complain about MX and trident being first strike weapons are just plain opposed to them first strike capability or not. They dont want any modernization. That first strike stuff is all smokescreen... Milo Medin ...!ucbvax!medin medin@ucbarpa
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (09/25/84)
Sure, I said the MX is a first strike weapon. But rather than going to BMD, which will spark an incredibly expensive weapons race on both sides without giving anyone more security, it would be better (and cheaper) to place greater emphasis on existing systems not so vulnerable (SLBM's and CM's) and to spend our money on new systems which, unlike the MX, will not be vulnerable to first strike (e.g. "Midgetman"). David Rubin
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (09/26/84)
medin@ucbarpa asks: >Even if the Soviet's would >have signed a treaty banning mirv's, I'd like to point out one >very important point: How do you verify that a missile isnt mirv'ed? Our intelligence services claim to be able to count Soviet warheads and Soviet launchers, as both capabilities are necessary for any strategic treaty. If the number of warheads substantially exceeds the number of launchers, one may safely conclude that MIRVing has taken place. Thus MIRVing can be checked. What can't be checked is the difference between MIRVing (where the warheads are independently targetable even though on a single launcher) and MARVing (where they aren't). Thus, it it necessary to assume all launchers with multiple warheads are indeed MIRVed when negotiating strategic treaties. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
renner@uiucdcs.UUCP (09/26/84)
> The bottom line is that the people who complain about MX and > trident being first strike weapons are just plain opposed to them > first strike capability or not. They dont want any modernization. > That first strike stuff is all smokescreen... > -- Milo Medin (ucbvax!medin) Wrong. Just plain wrong. I object to MX because as a first-strike weapon, it does nothing to support the policy of mutual-assured destruction. The MX has always been a damn stupid idea ever since Jimmy Carter thought it up. It takes money from weapon systems that make some sense. I object to Trident subs because they are too big; rather than one huge SSBN, we should build two or three small ones. Subs are considered invulnerable today, but that won't last for long. I am in favor of improvements to our strategic forces. But the area that most needs improvement is command, control, communications, and information (C3I). This doesn't involve flashy new weapon systems. It involves a number of less glamorous but badly needed modernizations in SAC and Navy communications: eg. building phone & data lines resistant to EMP, reducing dependencies on vulnerable satellites, making sure that we can talk to our ballistic-missile subs. Better C3I systems reduce the chance of accidental war *and* make us less vulnerable to a first-strike aimed at command centers. It may be emotionally satisfying to imagine all those opposed to specific weapon systems as commie-loving peace nuts. But it isn't true. Scott Renner ...ihnp4!uiucdcs!renner
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/29/84)
You make a lot of assumptions. You say that BMD will thrust us into a new terribly expensive arms race that's going to make the world less safe. Well, I dont buy that. Whats your rationale? Also, some people who believe in arms control are terribly alarmed about the Cruise Missiles. There is no way to verify them, they can be stuck anywhere, like the back of a chevy van. Its an arms controller's nightmare. I dont buy arms control anyways, but the issue isnt as clear cut as people like to make it. You say you like midgetman now, but thats before you see the price tag. MIRV's are cheap. If you think you can make a highly accurate small ICBM at a lot less cost than MX, you are dreaming. Look at all those silos you have to dig, and harden. Look at the Massive C^3 you need to control them. Look at the number of maintanence people you need to take care of them. You gripe about how expensive BMD is, just wait until you see the price tag for midgetman. BMD will be a lot cheaper. (Note that I am talking about a system to protect missile fields, not a global defense system). Milo
medin@ucbvax.UUCP (09/29/84)
Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site houxe.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 8/7/84; site ucbvax.ARPA Message-ID: <2272@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Sat, 29-Sep-84 16:24:29 EDT 2@fisher.UUCP> Organization: University of California at Berkeley Lines: 15 6 bombs detonated at the same spot and the same time??? Come on now, I realize you are familiar with fuzing mechanisms but common sense should tell you something is wrong with that idea. Also, 2 40 kt warheads causing more damage than a single 250 kt is not necessarily correct. It depends on the city, its terrain, and the altitude you burst them at. Also, fratricide is going to make such a proposition much more risky than a single warhead. You cant explode things precisely in sychonization in this sort of context, at least its very hard. I wouldnt count on it for much, we've never tested warheads like that.... Milo
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/29/84)
6 bombs detonated at the same spot and the same time??? Come on now, I realize you are familiar with fuzing mechanisms but common sense should tell you something is wrong with that idea. Also, 2 40 kt warheads causing more damage than a single 250 kt is not necessarily correct. It depends on the city, its terrain, and the altitude you burst them at. Also, fratricide is going to make such a proposition much more risky than a single warhead. You cant explode things precisely in sychonization in this sort of context, at least its very hard. I wouldnt count on it for much, we've never tested warheads like that.... Milo
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (09/30/84)
Well, at least we agree on the need for improved C^3I. The first strike nature of our systems comes from their inherent accuracy, and people dont build missiles with less accuracy than they can put in. But accuracy alone does not constitute a first strike system, not even vulnerability. Some people think a vulnerable accurate system is built for a first strike. Its not, its built because various bozo's don't think that fixed silos are vulnerable, or that it would cost too much to harden them, or because they think BMD is destabilizing (something no one on this newsgroup has been able to give me a good reason to believe). No, I dont think think everyone opposed to MX is a commie, I never said anything about commies, I said freezeniks. There is a difference. At least I believe there is. But there is way too much irrationality involved in the weapons debate. But you have to deal with things in cold factual terms. We need a strong counterforce system, and that leads to MX and D-5. I am not arguing for vulnerability however, remember I am a BMD advocate. Question: If MX wernt vulnerable, would you still think of it as a first strike weapon? Milo
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (10/02/84)
>6 bombs detonated at the same spot and the same time??? >Come on now, I realize you are familiar with fuzing mechanisms >but common sense should tell you something is wrong with that >idea. Also, 2 40 kt warheads causing more damage than a single 250 >kt is not necessarily correct. It depends on the city, >its terrain, and the altitude you burst them at. Also, >fratricide is going to make such a proposition much more >risky than a single warhead. You cant explode things precisely >in sychonization in this sort of context, at least its very hard. >I wouldnt count on it for much, we've never tested warheads like >that.... > Milo I was responding to an article which equated 6 40kt warheads with 1 250 kt warhead. My point was that such an equivalence assumed a delivery as described: 6 bombs in the same place at the same time. Not only is it unlikely, it is inefficient. You are right that 2 40kt warheads may not produce as much damage as a 250kt warhead. It does depend on manyu other factors. Sometimes it will produce as much, sometimes more, sometimes less. My point was only that even the "6" factor was too large. As for fratricide, whatever effects are suffered by 40kt bombs will also be suffered by 250kt bombs. All major targets have more than one warhead targeted on them, and I don't see why delivering 6 40kt warheads will be more difficult than delivering 2 or 3 250kt warheads. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (10/02/84)
>Question: If MX wernt vulnerable, would you still think of it as >a first strike weapon? > Milo Answer: I would think of it as being both a first strike weapon and a second strike weapon (vulnerability reduces it to a first strike weapon only). However, because it would be a capable counterforce weapon, it would put pressure on a Soviet leader to "use 'em or lose 'em" in a crisis. Counterforce weapons, even if they can survive a first strike, are destabilizing, though far less so than vulnerable counterforce weapons. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (10/17/84)
MARV's have multiple reentry vehicles, but they are not INDEPENDENTLY
(the "I" in "MIRV") targeted. There are obsolete.
David Rubin
{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david
medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (11/01/84)
Who told you this? At Livermore they are working on an advanced MARV system for the MX. I forget what the MK number is, I think its referred to as the MK21. What you are talking about is MRV's. They are not independently targetable, but a MARV means 'MAneuvering (independently targetable) Reentry Vehicle. Its the latest thing in warhead design. The object is to make the RV hard to hit when its coming in so as to try an mitigate the effect of an ABM system. Milo