nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/06/84)
#R:wucs:-45000:inmet:7800156:000:3717 inmet!nrh Nov 3 22:51:00 1984 First, Thanks, Paul Torek, for an article that (hopefully) sets new standards in backing up one's argument. On the other hand.... >***** inmet:net.politics / wucs!esk / 10:57 am Nov 2, 1984 > >Of course, there is no guarantee at this point that coercive measures (by >government) would be efficient either. But some of the main problems in >achieving efficiency through government intervention, *including the problem >of demand revelation*, can be solved in many cases [Clarke]. I should, of course, read Clarke to find out what he says about this, but if you know offhand, tell me: is he talking about the efficient moves a government could make were it benignly-motivated? If so, his argument loses a lot of interest for me, unless he can show how to keep a government benignly-motivated. If he does know how -- let's do it. If not, the whole point about what government might do to achieve Pareto-optimality is weakened to the point of humor. It's like talking about what we might do about nuclear defense if we had impenetrable force-fields. >It will also be noted that the number of Pareto-optimal ways of producing >a good is greater than one (because of different possible distributions >of costs: e.g., flat taxation vs. progressive taxation to pay for national >defense). >Thus, even though there is a possible arrangement that would make >*everybody* better off than they would be under laissez-faire, it is not >likely that government will hit on it, because of wealth redistribution >effects. These effects can be minimized, but not eliminated [Clarke]. >However, those who would eschew government interference altogether on >grounds of principle should note that even if the government *did* hit on >such a universally-beneficial arrangement, their principles require them >to oppose it. Why yes! Of course! Clearly a benign dictator of truly amazing mental capacity (equal to the rest of humanity combined) and with telepathic abilities would be able to achieve a better economic balance than the market. This says nothing about the morality of the force he must use to impose it. That you will thank me for it later doesn't give me the right to make you break up with your girlfriend, for example. This is the case EVEN IF WE BOTH KNOW that breaking up with your girlfriend is a good idea. >This puts them in the position of saying (assuming they hold >their principles to have some rational basis) that it could be rational to >oppose a policy that we would all benefit from. That is certainly a strange >-- and dubious -- position. In other words, if the government could find out true social costs and such, libertarians would be opposing the imposition of those costs. This might or might not be true, depending on what was thought to belong to government. On the other hand, it hardly matters: the government posesses no way of generating Pareto-optimal outcomes, so refusing to trust the government with the power to enforce such outcomes amounts to simple common sense. I suspect that were the government to be able to generate such outcomes, near-utopia would ensue (the best of all possible worlds) but until government CAN do this repeatably and demonstrably, and until it is clear that government corruption (given such power) is a lessor danger than market externalities, I'll vote Libertarian. By the way, in a libertarian society, nothing would prevent people from forming and joining compacts designed to result in enforced Pareto-optimal outcomes among themselves. If the technology to generate such outcomes was widespread, one would expect such agencies to be widespread also. Again, thanks for a very well-researched and presented article.