esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (11/02/84)
[] From: nrh@inmet.UUCP >>and seems to make very problematical the situation where a human must >>give the fruits of his labor to another to avoid starving. --ward@hao > >This is, in a nutshell, the problem lots of people have when they first >hear libertarian ideas. Socialists in particular argue that a starving >man is not free, and therefore only through whatever measures are >necessary to prevent starvation can man be freed. >This is an emotionally satisfying sort of argument, until one realizes >that there are no measures that are absolutely guaranteed to prevent >starvation, that by attempting to take such measures, one will give up >more and more freedom, and that people will still starve. But there ARE measures to guarantee that nobody who cares enough about himself to seek govt. aid when work is unavailable will starve. And they would not cripple anyone's freedom (does paying taxes of a small part of your income cripple your freedom?). >I have, of course, exaggerated here to make a point: it is difficult, >probably impossible, to measure the "net gain" or "net loss" of freedom. Then it is also impossible to say that such govt. activity would lower freedom. It IS possible however to say that if one had an equal chance of occupying any position in society one would have better expected prospects with such govt. activity. I think this is important; it is an application of something like the "golden rule". "What is the opportunity cost, in lives saved?" --Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.
tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (11/09/84)
>>I have, of course, exaggerated here to make a point: it is difficult, >>probably impossible, to measure the "net gain" or "net loss" of freedom. >Then it is also impossible to say that such govt. activity would lower >freedom. ... It is typical of the mathematical but pseudo-scientific approach taken by many economists and their followers that measurement is confounded with evaluation. I can say that this light is brighter than that light without being able to measure either the brightness of either or the difference between the brightnesses of both. But in case one is willing to argue that a crude form of measurement is being used in making that judgement, there are numerous examples where a comparison is made without measurement being involved. Suppose we have two things. One, Y, has qualities A, B, and C. The other, Z, has quality A. These are to be evaluated against X-ness, a quality composed of qualities A, B, C, and D. It can clearly be said that Z has less X-ness than Y. But these things do not involve comparable quantities of any kind. In fact, since B and C have no common unit of measurement, it is not possible to measure the net gain (assuming the qualities are viewed as being positive) from Z to Y, or the net loss from Y to Z, despite that the net can be qualitatively expressed, perhaps in a form that does employ quantities. The gain or loss can also be subjectively summarized by such as "much" better or worse, if the values of the viewer are understood to be the basis of evaluation, in the same manner as the difference is viewed as being a gain or loss (in other than in a purely arbitrary sense) in the first place. The implications of this kind of problem for economics are sweeping, for a radical element of subjectivity is involved in every human choice, not only in relating the Bs and Cs with respect to one person, but also in relating the As of B's and C's. The things to be chosen among have some objective existence, but the means of choosing among them is necessarily in part subjective. This fact is too often overlooked, leading to the hilarious but painfully common spectacle of "subjective conclusions parading as objectivity". David Hudson Death to utils!
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/09/84)
>***** inmet:net.politics / wucs!esk / 8:46 am Nov 6, 1984 >[] >From: nrh@inmet.UUCP >>>and seems to make very problematical the situation where a human must >>>give the fruits of his labor to another to avoid starving. --ward@hao >> >>This is, in a nutshell, the problem lots of people have when they first >>hear libertarian ideas. Socialists in particular argue that a starving >>man is not free, and therefore only through whatever measures are >>necessary to prevent starvation can man be freed. >>This is an emotionally satisfying sort of argument, until one realizes >>that there are no measures that are absolutely guaranteed to prevent >>starvation, that by attempting to take such measures, one will give up >>more and more freedom, and that people will still starve. > >But there ARE measures to guarantee that nobody who cares enough about >himself to seek govt. aid when work is unavailable will starve. Is this true in poor countries? Even in poor socialist countries? No? Why not? >And >they would not cripple anyone's freedom (does paying taxes of a small >part of your income cripple your freedom?). Yes indeed! How "small" do you mean? I'm not wealthy enough to be in the 50% bracket, but 50% doesn't strike me as "small". Regardless of the amount, it's clear that governments believe that the amount is more than people would willingly pay (otherwise, no need for enforcement of laws about tax evasion). >>I have, of course, exaggerated here to make a point: it is difficult, >>probably impossible, to measure the "net gain" or "net loss" of freedom. > >Then it is also impossible to say that such govt. activity would lower >freedom. NO! Read it over -- NET loss is not measurable. POINT loss (it's illegal for you to do that, buddy) is quite obvious (and although there are no scientific units of "freedom", it's clear that certain government actions lower freedom at certain points. I argued that the idea that there's an overall gain of freedom from these actions is not testable, (because such a gain is not obvious and not measurable) but the individual losses are VERY OBVIOUS. >It IS possible however to say that if one had an equal chance >of occupying any position in society one would have better expected >prospects with such govt. activity. I suppose it is possible to say it, but can you back it up? What units are you measuring in? If you're measuring in expected income, then you seem to be arguing that an intervening government produces higher economic output than a "night watchman" government, which is a most intriguing argument. I'd like to see some backing -- my understanding is that as government intervention goes down, economic throughput goes up. For backing, check out "Economics in One Lesson", by Hazlitt. I like the idea of the random-reoccupation as a measure of how "good" a society is. It has the obvious limit-case problem (your "expected" prospects would be (total_wealth/total_population) which means that this measure would make no distinction between a society where ONE person controlled all wealth, and one where wealth was distributed evenly) which perhaps rises out of the difficulty of measuring the value of wealth to an individual.
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/17/84)
Thanks, Dave Hudson, for a thoughtful article, one which stands up well under several re-readings. >***** inmet:net.politics / frog!tdh / 6:54 pm Nov 8, 1984 >>>I have, of course, exaggerated here to make a point: it is difficult, >>>probably impossible, to measure the "net gain" or "net loss" of freedom. > >>Then it is also impossible to say that such govt. activity would lower >>freedom. ... > >It is typical of the mathematical but pseudo-scientific approach taken by >many economists and their followers that measurement is confounded with >evaluation. I can say that this light is brighter than that light without >being able to measure either the brightness of either or the difference >between the brightnesses of both. But in case one is willing to argue that >a crude form of measurement is being used in making that judgement, there >are numerous examples where a comparison is made without measurement being >involved. > >Suppose we have two things. One, Y, has qualities A, B, and C. The other, >Z, has quality A. These are to be evaluated against X-ness, a quality >composed of qualities A, B, C, and D. It can clearly be said that Z has >less X-ness than Y. Suppose D mitigates or nullifies B and C, and without D, thing Y has less X-ness than if it only had quality A. Similarly, extremes can blow things apart. It could be that some balance between B and C is needed, and that B and C are badly out of joint in Z. As an example, suppose we consider two experimental rats: One has a body with no immune system and no intestinal flora. The other has intestinal flora and NO immune system capable of rendering the rat safe from the flora harmless. Which one is more "healthy", given that "health" is composed here of having intestinal flora (to help with digestion) AND an immune system? We will see that the rat with neither flora nor immune system appears to act more like the rat with both than the rat with just the flora (in a germ-free environment, of course). My understanding is that the rat without the immune system, but with flora, dies. Although the example is contrived, I think it serves my purpose -- one cannot conclude that a greater number of points of similarity with some model means a greater similarity to that model. Part of this stems from the fact that the "points" of similarity (the criterion for what a separate "point" would be) are subjective decisions, not normally inarguable. >The gain or loss can also be subjectively summarized >by such as "much" better or worse, if the values of the viewer are >understood to be the basis of evaluation, in the same manner as the >difference is viewed as being a gain or loss (in other than in a purely >arbitrary sense) in the first place. This was part of my original point, though I'd thought about it relatively little: One can say only SUBJECTIVELY that net freedom would be increased or decreased by some action. If I used the word "measure" inadvisedly I apologize. What I meant to point out was that it would be very hard to compare the point loss of freedom with the alleged societal gain of freedom. This is true even if one is willing to accept subjective criteria (so long as one wants to do a good job). Without measurement, of course, such things are matters of conviction, not science. >The implications of this kind of problem for economics are sweeping, for >a radical element of subjectivity is involved in every human choice, not >only in relating the Bs and Cs with respect to one person, but also in >relating the As of B's and C's. The things to be chosen among have some >objective existence, but the means of choosing among them is necessarily >in part subjective. This fact is too often overlooked, leading to the >hilarious but painfully common spectacle of "subjective conclusions >parading as objectivity". > > David Hudson > Again, thanks for a solid contribution to the discussion. - Nat Howard