mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (11/18/84)
From fa.poli-sci:
====================
Bandy's solutions to environmental polluters:
"The penalty for an organization polluting the enviroment
should be that the government will clean up the mess (and
maybe make it a little better than it was in the process),
and then BILL that organization for what it cost the feds
to clean it up. This should be more than adequate incentive
for the polluters to clean up their act themselves (we all
know how, shall we say, well the government spends its
monies."
This suggestion is unrealistic and inefficient. Suppose a
company was to cause some massive environmental damage.
1. It might not be discovered until IRREPARABLE damage had occured.
2. If the damage was serious enough, the cost of clean up might
very well bankrupt the company. This would cause loss of jobs,
and the government would still end up picking up the tab for the
difference. (while the managment retires on their generous pensions)
3. The short term benefits (to an individual manager) of
polluting often outwiegh any percieved statistical cost due to
getting caught. No criminal expects to get caught.
Thus, this plan is not a likely disincentive to polluting.
====================
This is precisely the situation with acid rain. The damage is not evident
until it is irrecoverable. In the early stages of forest damage, forest
productivity apparently increases. It is not until 20 or so years have passed
(like cancer) that the forest is obviously fatally damaged.
How does one (a) find the polluter, when many contribute, including
most car drivers; (b) correct the damage, when the nutrients have been
leached from the soil; (c) pay for any of it; (d) convince the Government
that extraordinary costs to society as a whole should outweigh minor
costs to businesses?
--
Martin Taylor
{allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt
{uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsrgv!dciem!mmt