esk@wucs.UUCP (11/25/84)
Stuart, Everything from your article that I don't comment on, I agreed with. I have some additional points I would like to make below. From: glosser@ut-ngp.UUCP (glosser) > "One allocation is said to be Pareto-superior to another > if the utility of at least one individual is higher and the > utility of none is lower, even though the allocation may not > be Pareto-optimal." [a quote from Henderson and Quant] Conversely, an allocation may be Pareto-optimal and yet not Pareto- superior to a non-optimal status quo. Of what interest would that be? Well, if we can move from the status quo to an optimal allocation but we can't ensure that the new one will be Pareto-superior, there still might be a good argument for the move: if we accept as a general principle that moves to Pareto-optimality should be made, at least this might improve everyone's long-run *expected* (probable) benefit. > ... to make interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction assumes > that it is possible to cardinally rank (assign a measurable > magnitude to) satisfaction. However, economists can not make such > interpersonal comparisons, nor, do I wager, can anybody else. Well, that depends what is meant by "satisfaction". Think about the term your authors used: "utility". In economics this term refers to a person's preferences, which are in turn defined in terms of behavior (what a person chooses he is said by economists to prefer). So, by "satisfaction" the economists are meaning "preference satisfaction", where "preference" is defined as indicated above. So defined, interpersonal comparisons make no logical sense, because we could not say in terms of whose behavior the "preferences" that are "satisfied" are defined. But now, note that economists often use the term "better off" as if this were interchangable with "more satisfied". This is NOT quite fair, however, for -- allow me to fly in the face of modern liberal dogma -- what you want isn't necessarily what's good for you. And I now submit that what benefits you, and how much, is a matter of FACT (yes, you heard me) and that interpersonal comparisons of *real* benefit *do* make logical sense. However they are still out of the domain of the economist qua economist, because scientific measurement of a person's pain or joy is not possible in practice. It *is* possible in principle however, as I will argue if you want to move to net.philosophy. Sorry for the philosophical digression, but I had to address a statement that has philosophical implications. To sum up, I have agreed that economists qua economists cannot make interpersonal comparisons, but I suggested that interpersonal comparisons of a different sort do at least make sense. (I think they are ethically important too.) > ... When discussing alternative allocations of goods and services another > criterion, besides efficiency, such as distributional justice, is needed. > Hence to say that market system [or] government intervention ... [is > Pareto-efficient] ... is really not saying too much. I agree that another criterion is needed to make a complete evaluation. However I still think that the concept of Pareto-efficiency is an important tool, because there is clearly something wrong with a Pareto- inefficient allocation, and because Pareto-efficiency is something we can talk about *qua* economists. --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's.