esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor ) (11/20/84)
[replies to laura@utzoo, nrh@inmet, danw@oliven] From: laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) > Only a consequentialist would worry about whether the disired > consequences would arise from his political philosophy. Then so much the worse for non-consequentialism! Actually, what you say here is not quite true -- almost every philosophical position worries *to some degree* about consequences. To ignore them completely would be absurd. Let me remind the net exactly what consequence the libertarians are willing to accept: that there could be a situation in which a coercive action could make everyone better off, and they would still oppose it. For all we know this may be the situation for some coercive actions that are occurring right now. There is a word for accepting bad consequences when nobody gets any net benefit in return: IRRATIONAL. Laura mentions that some people may be totally opposed to some of the things govt. produces (e.g. nukes). In this case, government non- production is Pareto-optimal. Nevertheless, at this point one may want to depart from the restrictions of economic analysis and ask whether people's preferences are rational (in the case of nuclear weapons, it's a tough question; however in other cases it might be easier). > Any figure that you come up with will have to be some person's opinion > of the value of the public good. Wrong! It will be some personS' opinionS of the value of the public good. If people can be made to reveal their preferences for a public good honestly (and Clarke explains how this can be done), the government (or anyone) can determine what level of provision of the public good will be Pareto-optimal. Unfortunately for libertarians, the mechanism by which this is achieved involves a tax, so the free market can't do it. The free market is LESS EFFICIENT than one with certain kinds of govt. inter- ference. From: nrh@inmet.UUCP > I should, of course, read Clarke to find out what he says about this, but > if you know offhand, tell me: is he talking about the efficient moves > a government could make were it benignly-motivated? A red herring par excellence. Motivation has nothing to do with it; Clarke is talking about efficient moves that government could make, period. Pre- sumably we have to *force* the government to make these moves, by threaten- ing to "vote the rascals out" of the legislature who don't work for economic efficiency. This is worth elaborating on, for here we have a CLASSICAL libertarian FALLACY. Libertarians see political philosophy as a ONE-DIMENSIONAL spectrum: someone is either for "less" government or "more". To state the obvious (obvious to everyone but libertarians that is), this totally ignores the fact that there are DIFFERENT KINDS of government activity. Political moderates like myself favor more of some kinds of activity and less of others. Furthermore, if libertarians ever get up enough votes to reduce the size of government, they will ALSO have enough votes to impose on government those policies that would promote efficiency. On morality: Your "breaking up with your girlfriend" example is a bad one because it is totally beyond me how anyone could *force* me to do that unless they did something drastic, in which case I would not be better off. Let's take a better example: suicide. Now, if by forcing me not to kill myself you would make me grateful afterwards, do you have a right to do it? I say you do. > In other words, if the government could find out true social costs and > such, libertarians would be opposing the imposition of those costs. > This might or might not be true, depending on what was thought to > belong to government. On the other hand, it hardly matters: > the government posesses no way of generating Pareto-optimal outcomes ... On the contrary, it does. And even if it falls somewhat short of Pareto- optimality (efficiency) it may still come closer than a laissez-faire market. What I have conceded it cannot generate (except by luck) are outcomes that make everyone better off than they were under the status quo. Nevertheless, over a wide range of issues, as far as anyone has the relevant knowledge, it might make all of our *expected* prospects better. It could easily fulfill my "modified golden rule" criterion that says that society is best which one would choose if one didn't know which member of that society one was to be. > By the way, in a libertarian society, nothing would prevent people from > forming and joining compacts designed to result in enforced > Pareto-optimal outcomes among themselves. That's a valid point which Clarke discusses at some length. However, it would not work for large-scale externality problems like air pollution, national defense, research, and many others. > One [book] which addresses the subject more directly, but which I've never > read all the way through is "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" by (I think) > Robert Van Nozick. Robert Nozick (no Van). This is a book I would highly recommend to danw (@oliven, I think) if he hasn't already read it. Unfortunately I lost his article in which he explained his views on rights in more detail than previously. Danw says that people have rights against force and fraud. Unfortunately this leaves unclear what constitutes force and fraud; for example, if I threaten to build an ugly structure on my property, demanding payment from my neighbors not to, is this illegitimate (is that a use of force)? What if *I* think the ugly structure is attractive; is it wrong then? (Nozick's answers: yes; no; respectively.) Well, this is too long already, but stay tuned ... --The Aspiring Iconoclast Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.
mwm@ea.UUCP (11/24/84)
> Let me remind the net exactly what consequence the libertarians are > willing to accept: that there could be a situation in which a coercive > action could make everyone better off, and they would still oppose it. > For all we know this may be the situation for some coercive actions > that are occurring right now. There is a word for accepting bad > consequences when nobody gets any net benefit in return: IRRATIONAL. Everybody would be better off? Then why do you have to coerce them? Maybe they think they wouldn't be better off after all, or maybe they are irrational? And of course, after you coerce people into the situation, they have *all* lost something - part of their freedom. If nothing else, their freedom to act irrationally. > Wrong! It will be some personS' opinionS of the value of the public good. > If people can be made to reveal their preferences for a public good > honestly (and Clarke explains how this can be done), the government (or > anyone) can determine what level of provision of the public good will be > Pareto-optimal. Unfortunately for libertarians, the mechanism by which > this is achieved involves a tax, so the free market can't do it. The > free market is LESS EFFICIENT than one with certain kinds of govt. inter- > ference. Yes, it would make the free market less efficient. So? Should efficiency be the be-all and end-all of society? On top of which, are you sure that letting the public decide what level of provision a good should be supplied at is correct? For instance, what would the pareto-optimal level of slaves in the south have been in the 1840s? > This is worth elaborating on, for here we have a CLASSICAL libertarian > FALLACY. Libertarians see political philosophy as a ONE-DIMENSIONAL > spectrum: someone is either for "less" government or "more". This is just flatly false, and is followed by an ad-hominom attack. I, as a libertarian, see *many* kinds of people. They have been characterized as "statist-on-the-left", "statist-on-the-right", and libertarian. This characterization is broken, of course. You can't put a political stance into one dimension, and I seriously doubt that you can fit it in two or three. (It will fit in something less than a hilbert space, though. :-) Almost everybody (libertarians and anarchists are the obvious exceptions) wants more of some government functions, and less of others. You, as a moderate, are the rule, not the exception (as you seem to believe). > Your "breaking up with your girlfriend" example is a bad one because it > is totally beyond me how anyone could *force* me to do that unless they > did something drastic, in which case I would not be better off. Let's > take a better example: suicide. Now, if by forcing me not to kill myself > you would make me grateful afterwards, do you have a right to do it? I > say you do. Yes, but if I'm not grateful afterwards, did you have the right to do it? I claim the answer is no. Now, if you can show me a working time machine, I'll gladly not object to your interfering with other peoples attempts at suicide. > better. It could easily fulfill my "modified golden rule" criterion > that says that society is best which one would choose if one didn't know > which member of that society one was to be. Interesting concept. I would still choose a society with minimal government interference, because I feel that that would give me the best chance of improving my lot if I wound up on the bottom. I suspect you would choose something different - which just shows that "best society" varies from individual to individual under your criterion. <mike
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (11/26/84)
Paul, we've had it. We've already determined that I value freedom more
than you do. Therefore there will be no way in which we can agree on
what is optimal in any issue which involves freedom (which from my
point of view is pretty well all of them).
Sooner or later we will get to the point where we both agree that
action X is a good thing to have done, but I will maintain that it is
not a proper function of government to provide action X. You will
claim that action X is most efficiently done by government. I will
claim that you are ignoring the loss of freedom involved in giving the
government the power to do X, or even that it was the voluntariness of
X that was a large part of its value.
At this point we are at a deadlock until one of us renounces our valuation
of freedom, simply because we can never reach any sort of consensus. At
this point it would be unfair of me to say that you are irrational,
though it would be fair to say that if you claimed to share my standard
of value and maintainted your position that you were irrational or mistaken.
(I may have other reasons for calling you irrational -- indeed, I may
find that your preferred standard of value is irrational -- but within
the context of your atandard of values you can still be behaving
rationally.)
This is what I meant by saying that your worries were the worries of a
consequentialist. It is not fair to call me irrational -- I never claimed
to be a consequentialist. From my point of view it is not sufficient to
merely work out a teleological theory of ethics -- a deontic principle is
also necessary. Certain things are *wrong* -- not in that they produce a
result that I do not (or should not) desire [though they may do that] but
because other people have a moral claim on me to *not do* such actions.
There is a great difference for me between things which I am morally
permitted to do but *ought* not to do (such as overeating) and things
which I am morally not permitted to do and *should* not do (such as
stealing from you). Neither of these actions are in my interest -- and
you would be quite correct in saying that I *ought* to not do them, but
if you protest that I should not rob you
you are actually saying more than this -- you are saying that there is
something wrong in the action of robbing itself. From my perspective
(as an ethical egoist) your claim is that just as I should not act in a
manner contrary to my own interest, neither should I act in a way which
implicitly assumes that you should not act in your own interest.
{aren't triple negatives wonderful...}
In robbing you I am asking you to act, not in your interest, but in *mine*,
where your interest and mine are in conflict. (On another level, it is
not actually in my interest to rob you at all. In addition to the other
ethical consequences of this action, it is a mistake on my part to think
that it is in my interest to rob you. This is not the basis of your
claim against me, however.)
Therefore, given that you want to achieve your objective, my understanding
of whether the attainment was or will be moral will depend on 2 things. First of
all, the objective must be worthwhile, and secondly the means which you
use to reach your objective must not be immoral (ie they must not
involve you thinking htat other people should act, not in their own
interest but in your interest). This is why coercion is out: the ends
will never justify the means. To put it another way -- any actions which
are a result of coercion can never be pareto-optimal.
Laura Creighton
utzoo!laurammt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (11/27/84)
> > better. It could easily fulfill my "modified golden rule" criterion > > that says that society is best which one would choose if one didn't know > > which member of that society one was to be. > > Interesting concept. I would still choose a society with minimal government > interference, because I feel that that would give me the best chance of > improving my lot if I wound up on the bottom. I suspect you would choose > something different - which just shows that "best society" varies from > individual to individual under your criterion. > > <mike Libertarians keep making this point, but it seems to me that one of the main functions of government is to increase the chance of someone at the bottom making his/her way to the top. Under "freedom" in the libertarian sense, those who have the power are free to keep it, AND to ensure that those who don't can't get it without violence. Libertarianism implies liberty for few, not for all; good government implies less liberty for the powerful, more for most of us. Totalitarianism and libertarianism are "opposite" ends of the same circle, in the same way that left-wing and right-wing extremism lead to the same totalitarian result. Totalibertarianism forever! -- Martin Taylor {allegra,linus,ihnp4,floyd,ubc-vision}!utzoo!dciem!mmt {uw-beaver,qucis,watmath}!utcsrgv!dciem!mmt
edhall@randvax.UUCP (Ed Hall) (11/29/84)
I've been following the discussion of libertarianism here for a while (only recently reverting to the ``n'' key as the discussion turns circular or becomes semantic nit-picking). It often seems like those arguing the ``pure'' libertarian position are committing the falacy of asserting as an axiom the supreme moral goodness of personal freedom, then using this axiom to ``prove'' the relative badness of all other points of view. Remember that something taken as an axiom is taken as a matter of faith. Not everyone sees personal freedom as the highest good. I might feel that other things, such as the health of society in general, are at least as important, and perhaps in some cases *more* important than absolute personal freedom. And someone who tries to prove to me the virtue of a point of view based on an axiom I don't accept is simply wasting time. Here, as in many places, deciding ``who's right'' or ``who's wrong'' depends upon ``whose rules'' are used... -Ed Hall decvax!randvax!edhall
nrh@inmet.UUCP (11/29/84)
>***** inmet:net.politics / wucs!esk / 7:24 am Nov 26, 1984 > >Let me remind the net exactly what consequence the libertarians are >willing to accept: that there could be a situation in which a coercive >action could make everyone better off, and they would still oppose it. >For all we know this may be the situation for some coercive actions >that are occurring right now. There is a word for accepting bad >consequences when nobody gets any net benefit in return: IRRATIONAL. DING! Hold it, please. When you say: "make everybody better off" do you mean: A) Economically better off B) Better off in the sense that everyone would prefer the new situation to the old. If you mean (A), then it is quite obvious that libertarians have a rational reason to "accept bad consequences" -- they'd rather be poor and free than rich and fettered. If you mean (B), I fail to see the point -- LIBERTARIANS would not prefer that coercive actions take place, so the coercive actions you are proposing would NOT be Pareto superior. Let me just note here that it *DOESN'T MATTER* if you think libertarians are crazy for preferring an entirely no-initiated-coercion society -- if even one "irrational" type somewhere prefers it (even given greater personal benefits), the proposed situation is not Pareto superior to the old one. >Laura mentions that some people may be totally opposed to some of the >things govt. produces (e.g. nukes). In this case, government non- >production is Pareto-optimal. Nevertheless, at this point one may want >to depart from the restrictions of economic analysis and ask whether >people's preferences are rational (in the case of nuclear weapons, it's >a tough question; however in other cases it might be easier). And if they are NOT rational? Who gets to judge? Congress? The Madison Ad agencies? A "council"? To claim that you've got a metric for showing one situation superior to another, and then to abandon it when it turns out not to result in what you preferred is a little chicken, don't you think? > >> Any figure that you come up with will have to be some person's opinion >> of the value of the public good. > >If people can be made to reveal their preferences for a public good >honestly (and Clarke explains how this can be done), the government (or >anyone) can determine what level of provision of the public good will be >Pareto-optimal. Unfortunately for libertarians, the mechanism by which >this is achieved involves a tax, so the free market can't do it. The >free market is LESS EFFICIENT than one with certain kinds of govt. inter- >ference. It has long been known that the MOST efficient sort of government is an incorruptible, benevolent, absolute dictatorship. That it is impractical and offensive to free men is enough to keep me from espousing it. That the "free market" can't do it, doesn't mean a libertarian society can't do it. Free people may give to charity, or they may fulfill what some may see as their obligations to society, or they may participate in boycotts against those who do not. While the free market would almost certainly be the primary arena of economic interaction in a libertarian society, it would not be likely that those choices that drive the market were made in a social vacuum, and it would be even less likely that all economic decisions were market-driven (giving to charity doesn't make market sense, but some folks do it anyhow). >From: nrh@inmet.UUCP >> I should, of course, read Clarke to find out what he says about this, but >> if you know offhand, tell me: is he talking about the efficient moves >> a government could make were it benignly-motivated? > >A red herring par excellence. Motivation has nothing to do with it; Clarke >is talking about efficient moves that government could make, period. Pre- >sumably we have to *force* the government to make these moves, by threaten- >ing to "vote the rascals out" of the legislature who don't work for >economic efficiency. Hmmm.... Are you saying that an imperfect means for threatening legislators would result in their behaving so as to overrule their personal interests (getting rich off "incorrect" decisions?) Why do I doubt this is a practical scheme for instituting a particular set of rules for decision making? If the legislators make significant choices, their motivation has EVERYTHING to do with it -- they determine what choices will be made. If Clarke's mechanism can reveal unambiguously what SHOULD be done, and legislators merely carry this out (as accountants "carry out" the balance sheet), I'm impressed. Of course, the possibility of a sudden "embezzlement" followed by leaving the legislature (and perhaps the country) remains. > >This is worth elaborating on, for here we have a CLASSICAL libertarian >FALLACY. Libertarians see political philosophy as a ONE-DIMENSIONAL >spectrum: someone is either for "less" government or "more". Wrong, Pareto-breath :-)! That many of us regard it as the MOST important axis is true, but let's not set up any straw men here. >To state >the obvious (obvious to everyone but libertarians that is), this totally >ignores the fact that there are DIFFERENT KINDS of government activity. Sure! Obvious to me, also (concede the point?). >On morality: >Your "breaking up with your girlfriend" example is a bad one because it >is totally beyond me how anyone could *force* me to do that unless they >did something drastic, in which case I would not be better off. If the example did nothing else, it has prompted you to raise the issue of HOW Pareto-superior choices are enforced. I'll make a deal with you: I'll tell you how I make you break up with your girlfriend, and how it doesn't hurt either of you, if you tell me how a government imposes an otherwise Pareto-superior choice (against market dictates) WITHOUT giving cause for someone to feel worse off. That's fair, right? We're both talking about imposing solutions for someone else's own good.... If you can't come up with such a solution, then Clarke's whole discussion is pretty, but remains academic. >Let's >take a better example: suicide. Now, if by forcing me not to kill myself >you would make me grateful afterwards, do you have a right to do it? I >say you do. That's nice. Remember, I had to grab the gun, or hit you, or something. In that moment, there was a Pareto-inferior situation imposed by me on you. To what extent did I have the right to do THAT? How long can a Pareto- inferior situation be imposed? Do the "ends justify the means"? >> In other words, if the government could find out true social costs and >> such, libertarians would be opposing the imposition of those costs. >> This might or might not be true, depending on what was thought to >> belong to government. On the other hand, it hardly matters: >> the government posesses no way of generating Pareto-optimal outcomes ... > >On the contrary, it does. We're all eager to hear it. Remember -- the government has to UNDERSTAND everyone's preferences in order to generate situations more in-line with those preferences. I think you'll find this particularly sticky given the hill-climbing nature of social situations -- to generate a Pareto-superior position might involve a transfer through a Pareto-inferior one. For example, we might all be happier if we were all richer, but we might all have to work harder for that. Even though we'd be happier afterwards, we'd probably be LESS happy while we did the 60 hour weeks working up to that point. >And even if it falls somewhat short of Pareto- >optimality (efficiency) it may still come closer than a laissez-faire >market. What I have conceded it cannot generate (except by luck) are >outcomes that make everyone better off than they were under the status >quo. Nevertheless, over a wide range of issues, as far as anyone has >the relevant knowledge, it might make all of our *expected* prospects >better. This is a rather mealy-mouthed set of assertions. The point remains that to ENFORCE Pareto-optimality, you must use force. This invariably results in pain (those forced to do things are hurt or threatened). On the other hand, a free market requires (from government) only restraint. >It could easily fulfill my "modified golden rule" criterion >that says that society is best which one would choose if one didn't know >which member of that society one was to be. > Again, a pretty notion, but I'm still curious what happens if you became a member of society adjudged (to coin a phrase) "Pareto-insane", that is, unwilling to go along with the mechanism chosen to choose and enforce Pareto-superior outcomes. Or if it is frequent that the government meddles in people's decisions. >> By the way, in a libertarian society, nothing would prevent people from >> forming and joining compacts designed to result in enforced >> Pareto-optimal outcomes among themselves. > >That's a valid point which Clarke discusses at some length. However, it >would not work for large-scale externality problems like air pollution, >national defense, research, and many others. Nor does it solve the N-body problem, nor tell us whether Fermat had the goods or was just spouting off, nor how to help the poor. Libertarian solutions to pollution, defense, research, and the rest (not Fermat's theorem nor the N-body problem) exist, but that THIS libertarian solution is not the solution to THOSE problems does not mean that it is not a good solution to the problem of satisfying those who wish not to worry that their lot in life could not be improved without harming anybody else.
nrh@inmet.UUCP (12/02/84)
>***** inmet:net.politics / dciem!mmt / 9:56 am Nov 29, 1984 >> > better. It could easily fulfill my "modified golden rule" criterion >> > that says that society is best which one would choose if one didn't know >> > which member of that society one was to be. >> >> Interesting concept. I would still choose a society with minimal government >> interference, because I feel that that would give me the best chance of >> improving my lot if I wound up on the bottom. I suspect you would choose >> something different - which just shows that "best society" varies from >> individual to individual under your criterion. >> >> <mike > >Libertarians keep making this point, but it seems to me that one of the >main functions of government is to increase the chance of someone at the >bottom making his/her way to the top. Indeed. Public schools may help with this, but the record is doubtful, given the gap between public ghetto schools and public suburban schools. On the other hand, the hand of the state tends to be used by the rich and powerful to maintain their position (not in some postulated libertarian society, but in OUR society). Consider a few examples: Licensure of over 100 professions (it's ILLEGAL to be a hairdresser in NY, or a social worker in Ohio unless you're licensed). Issuing medallions to taxi drivers -- in the 1920's it was possible for a poor person to buy a secondhand car and become a taxi driver. In New York, it now costs $60,000 to get the medallion required to do this. Minimum wage laws prohibit working for less than a certain amount per hour -- meaning that if you've no skills, no employment record, and no obvious talents, and if an employer therefore judges your potential economic contribution to be less than minimum wage, he will not offer you a job. Since you want the employment record so as to be able to get a better job, or a raise later, the government has screwed you. >Under "freedom" in the libertarian >sense, those who have the power are free to keep it, This is sort of silly. A conversion to a libertarian system would strip the president and congress of 95% of their power. It would remove enormous revenues from the Mafia (suddenly they must compete for those drug and prostitution markets). It would greatly weaken the bargaining position of those highly-paid automobile executives because the Japanese would suddenly be breathing down their necks. Beyond its short-term impact on these, most obviously state-supported, fortunes, it would begin a time of opportunity in this country unequalled since the 1920's (without the danger that the FED would zig, instead of zag, resulting in another Great Depression). This means that the poor suddenly have a chance -- suddenly over 100 professions, including taxi driving are open to them. Suddenly thousands or millions of jobs -- entry level jobs -- are economically feasible again, and the poor in skill can get trained because it is profitable to train them. >AND to ensure that >those who don't [have the power] can't get it without violence. If not economic power, what sort of power do you mean? If "political" power, then I agree -- NOBODY would have much political power in a libertarian society -- at least, not of the sort we're accustomed to seeing in (say) Bert Lance, or (my recollection of the spelling is poor) Bebe Rebozo (Nixon's well-off advisor). If you mean "economic" power, you're way off base. I invite you to tell us just how the rich would keep their power. Please avoid the "lump of labor" fallacy that led Marx to a similar conclusion. Remember, in a libertarian society, the government is defending the borders, and probably very little else (if even that). It is not controlling the local police -- it is NOT putting Sacco and Vanzetti in the electric chair. If you think it worse that some private agency might do this, fine, but remember: the GOVERNMENT did it that time. Hmmm.... I see here that Sacco and Vanzetti were both Anarchists.... >Libertarianism implies >liberty for few, not for all; good government implies less liberty for >the powerful, more for most of us. ... and direct intervention by God implies happiness for all! "Good" government, of the sort you hope for, seems impossible. Do you think we have it now? Why not? Does the state need even more power to have it? No thanks. I find WEAK government almost as likely to result in happiness, and infinitely more likely of accomplishment. So long as you insist on giving power to a few, a few will have power. This is the core of the problem of "Good" government. I can see why you think that a libertarian society would be like the capitalistic society the US had in the '20s, but there are a few important differences: the lack of a "fed" is one of them, the lack of a small body of people controlling the police is another. (It's harder to use bully-boys against union demonstrators if the demonstrators can hire police you don't control, and who, if you corrupt, can be fired in favor of yet another police force).
stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) (12/03/84)
> It often seems like those > arguing the ``pure'' libertarian position are committing the falacy > of asserting as an axiom the supreme moral goodness of personal freedom, > then using this axiom to ``prove'' the relative badness of all other > points of view. > ... > Here, as in many places, deciding ``who's right'' or ``who's wrong'' > depends upon ``whose rules'' are used... > Without realizing it, you've hit the (libertarian) nail on the head. This is precisely what libertarians are trying to say, not just about political arguments but about all parts of life. No viewpoint is universally right or wrong; each person should be able to run their own affairs. Now that's true freedom. The libertarian form of government is designed to let this become reality. Bob Stewart ihldt!stewart
edhall@randvax.UUCP (Ed Hall) (12/04/84)
> > It often seems like those > > arguing the ``pure'' libertarian position are committing the falacy > > of asserting as an axiom the supreme moral goodness of personal freedom, > > then using this axiom to ``prove'' the relative badness of all other > > points of view. > > ... > > Here, as in many places, deciding ``who's right'' or ``who's wrong'' > > depends upon ``whose rules'' are used... > > > > Without realizing it, you've hit the (libertarian) nail on the head. > This is precisely what libertarians are trying to say, not just about > political arguments but about all parts of life. No viewpoint is > universally right or wrong; each person should be able to run their own > affairs. > > Now that's true freedom. The libertarian form of government is designed > to let this become reality. > > Bob Stewart > ihldt!stewart Wow, I see what you mean. Without libertarian government it will be illegal for two people to hold different points of view, right? After all, you said that by arguing for the existance of different points of view, I was supporting libertarianism. (Do I need to put a smiley here?) Read again--my claim was that libertarians hold a world-view that is not necessarily shared by non-libertarians. Period. Perhaps you can extract a quote out of context, and claim that it ``supports'' the libertarian point of view, but that doesn't make it so. What I posted said nothing about the social, economic, artistic, military, scientific, or scatological implications of libertarianism vs. other points of view. Agreed, each person should be allowed to think and state whatever views they please. And that's about as far as you can reasonably go in extracting my political views from the posting you quoted. ``To a man with a hammer, all problems look like nails...'' -Ed Hall decvax!randvax!edhall
faustus@ucbcad.UUCP (12/05/84)
> > It often seems like those > > arguing the ``pure'' libertarian position are committing the falacy > > of asserting as an axiom the supreme moral goodness of personal freedom, > > then using this axiom to ``prove'' the relative badness of all other > > points of view. > > ... > > Here, as in many places, deciding ``who's right'' or ``who's wrong'' > > depends upon ``whose rules'' are used... > > Without realizing it, you've hit the (libertarian) nail on the head. > This is precisely what libertarians are trying to say, not just about > political arguments but about all parts of life. No viewpoint is > universally right or wrong; each person should be able to run their own > affairs. But what if running my affairs involves running your affairs too? You're out of luck then... > Now that's true freedom. The libertarian form of government is designed > to let this become reality. I'll agree, that's freedom, but to take the argument one stage further, I have the freedom to disagree with you that absolute freedom is the most important thing. The point of the article you quote is that people who have different axiom systems aren't ever going to argue each other to the other side, so we should just accept that there are different possible axioms. But just because people are all going to think differently you can't claim that they should all be allowed to act just as they feel. Wayne