tonjon@fluke.UUCP (Tony Johnson) (01/03/85)
> > > Assured destruction? For the US maybe, but for the russians? You call > > > a loss of 10% of population assured destruction? The number of > > > missiles isn't the question here. Its the accuracy and vulnerability > > > that's the concern here. I can have a million ICBM's but if > > > they all get wiped out in a first strike they won't do me a bit > > > of good... The US has to worry about a first strike, the Russians do not, > > > this means their forces can be tailored for very different scenarios > > > than ours so. I'm glad you said that Assured Destruction is mistakenly > > > called MAD, because there is nothing mutual about the 2 countries' > > > post attack status.... > > > > > > Milo > > > > One, ONE of our submarines can wipe out at least the 16 largest Soviet > > cities. The Soviets have more to fear from a first strike than we. > > Consider our significantly better figures for missle CEP's (accuracy). > > Also consider the following figures from the Center for Defense Information, > > Washington, DC. > > > > Of 7226 strategic nuclear weapons held by the Soviets, 5238 are land > > based ICBM's. Of 9775 strategic weapons held by the US, 2147 are land > > based ICBM's. > > > > 4960 strategic weapons are on US submarines. Nearly 3000 of these are > > at sea at any one moment. The Soviets have 1698 strategic weapons on subs, > > about 300 of which are at sea at an average moment. > > > > One Poseidon sub carries 16 missiles, each with 10 50KT warheads. > > > > And we haven't even chatted about the pleasant weather during "nuclear > > winter"! What are you so scared of, Milo? That the Russkies are so evil > > that they revel in gore and death on both sides of the Pacific? > > > > Because of the distribution of our nuclear forces and the unknown but > > probably extremely severe environmental effects of a nuclear war, it seems > > obvious that the Soviet first strike argument is wildly off base. > > I don't see you making any statements about whether Milo is correct or > not when he says that only 10% of the Soviet population will die in the > most likely nuclear scenarios. Even if we could wipe out their 16 most > populous cities, it might be that the structure of their population is > such that this wouldn't bother them as much as it would us (which is a > point Milo has made a few times). Remember, we are talking about a > government that killed more dissenters during Stalin's rule than Hitler > did during the 2nd World War. If the Soviet leaders could escape death, > you shouldn't bet on them having a lot of compassion for the rest of > their people. > > And as for the nuclear winter problem, the fact that many people in the > US defense community don't believe in it should suggest something about > what sorts of things the Soviets are likely to believe... > > Wayne Richard Pipes has suggested something that I think many people on the net fail to recognize: 'A country that since 1914 has lost, as a result of two world wars, a civil war, famine, and various "purges", perhaps up to 60 million citizens, must define "unacceptable damage" differently from the United States which has known no famines or purges, and whose deaths from all the wars waged since 1775 are estimated at 650,000- fewer casulties than Russia suffered in the 900-day siege of Leninigrad in World War II alone.' When folks talk about the Soviets having to follow our example because it's in their best interest, I have to ask, "how do the Soviets define what their best interests are?". We all freely admit that the CCCP is guilty of human rights violations, that it is a police state, that the military is not even remotely subject to the Soviet public opinion; yet, in postulating what is appropriate action for the US to take in the nuclear arms area, many seem to rely on their own intuition as to what the Soviets believe. I think the idea of two different countries with having two different ideas about what is appropriate in regards to arms control should be entertained on this net. How bout it? The above message expresses my own views and does not necessarily reflect those of my employer, John Fluke Mfg. Co. Inc. Tony Johnson, John Fluke Mfg. Co. Inc., Everett, WA.
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (01/07/85)
[Please skip to the last paragraph if you're not interested in
my opinion: there's a brief point I'd like to make.]
Tony Johnson rightly points out that the USSR's leadership would
likely "accept" a higher number of casualties than the US would.
However, the Soviet leaders will not find the destruction of their
state acceptable, and the Soviet state is far more fragile than ours.
The Soviet government maintains its centralized rule over its subject
nationalities by force. Even if a nuclear exchange were to kill an
"acceptable" number of Soviet citizens (say only 50-100 million), the
destruction of Soviet industry, centers of government, and
disproportionately high casualties among the one nationality (Russian)
which could be expected to show spontaneous loyalty to the regime,
would severly disrupt the Soviet state. In fact, the USSR would
certainly splinter if the surviving leadership did not apapt to the new
state of affairs by permitting local governments tremendous autonomy.
To destroy its foreign opponents at the price of losing control of its
own peoples would be for the Soviet leadership to win a battle but
lose a war. Yes, the Soviet leaders have different interests than we
do, but if they are not restrained by Biology, they will be by
Politics.
(last paragraph)
Proposition: If the Soviets are now capable of killing off 150-200
million Americans (which they are) AND they would only sustain
"acceptable" losses themselves AND they are not constrained by
humanistic considerations, then they would strike NOW. Thus at least
one of the assumptions must be incorrect, and, rather argue for the
goodness of Chernenko's heart, I presume they consider their likely
losses "unacceptable". Soviet inaction is the greatest testimonial to
the adequacy of American deterrence, and observation is more
trustworthy than theory.
David Rubin
{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!davidmedin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) (01/09/85)
Nonsense. The Russians haven't attacked because it is not in their best interest to attack. Why lose anything if you dont have to? Clearly the Russians have gotten their way with the US in the past without firing a shot, but by simply taking advantage of various elements in the US which have a sympathetic viewpoint, or by negotiating agreements which favor them, or various other means. BUT, if they were pushed against the wall, as in Cuba, what they would do is a different story entirely. They bgacked down then, whether or not they would back down now is not clear at all. Milo
david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) (01/10/85)
>Nonsense. The Russians haven't attacked because it is not in >their best interest to attack. Why lose anything if you dont >have to? Clearly the Russians have gotten their way with the >US in the past without firing a shot, but by simply taking advantage >of various elements in the US which have a sympathetic viewpoint, >or by negotiating agreements which favor them, or various >other means. BUT, if they were pushed against the wall, as in >Cuba, what they would do is a different story entirely. >They bgacked down then, whether or not they would back down >now is not clear at all. > Milo Really, Milo, even the hardest of hard-liners cannot seriously maintain that the Soviets can reasonably expect to gain "everything". Eastern Europe will grow more restive so long as a prosperous and free Western Europe continues to exist. While the Soviets may expect to continue to dominate Southeast Asia through their Vietnamese proxies, it is little compensation for the Chinese rapprochment with the US and Japan. Soviet influence in the Middle East is virtually nil, as it Syria that pulls the strings in the Soviet-Syrian "friendship". In Africa, the Soviet advance of the '70s (Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia) has left the USSR with no advantages to speak of and no prospects. Even the primarly negative attempts (i.e. intent to damage US interests rather than to advance Soviet ones) in Latin America remain unconsolidated and, with even minimal diplomatic acuity by the US, will follow the course of Soviet gains in southern Africa a decade ago. The only tangible geopolitical gain that the Soviets may have some hope of keeping is Afghanistan, but this is not so great as to satisfy Soviet leaders with the course of events, nor so cheap as to make a similar occupation of Iran a plausible prospect. Don't focus so intently on American setbacks that you forget the Soviet ones. In the ebb and flow of global competition, it would be surprising if BOTH sides did not suffer a major setback (or score a substantial success) every so often. We ought not to worry about temporary gains of little import by the Soviets. So long as there's an Egypt for every Iran, to claim the Soviets are "winning" is a gross overstatement. Also, do not forget that the Soviet Union is not immune to factionalism, either, though such internal divisions are naturally far less apparent. Just as any decent Soviet negotiator would seek to exploit differences of opinion in the American political body, an astute American negotiator would presumably seek to take advantage of struggles for power within the Kremlin's heirarchy. Milo, if the Soviets felt they had the capabilities you ascribe to them and the loss functions you imply for them, missiles would have been reinstalled in Cuba a week ago last Tuesday. Surely, even if they would prefer not to start a nuclear war, if they considered their probable losses acceptable, they would make that clear to the US now and reap the political profits of successful nuclear blackmail. If the Soviet advantage is real, they need not use it to enjoy it. David Rubin