carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (01/03/85)
Gary F. York, responding to my comments on the libertarian conception of freedom: > > Libertarians also seem to think that freedom is merely the absence of > > coercion. ... > >Correct! My dictionary thinks so too. > > > .... But it seems to me that freedom must include the means or power > > to effect one's will. ... > >I think the word you are looking for, Richard, unless of course you >INTEND to equivocate, is ability, not freedom. Cliff Matthews also posted an article quoting his dictionary on the definition of freedom. Here we have an interesting sample of the alleged libertarian thought process. Not only do libertarians seem to derive their political theory from dictionaries, they don't seem to read past the first definition given. The Oxford English Dictionary, generally regarded as the most authoritative and complete English dictionary, contains the following definition, among others, of freedom: "The quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity, the power of self-determination attributed to the will." --the sense I was referring to. Here is a quotation from the favorite classical political philosopher of libertarians: "In this then consists Freedom, (viz.) in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose, or will." [Locke, _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_] Here's another quote from Locke: "How can we think anyone freer than to have the power to do what he will?" (I don't have the source, but it is quoted in Dr. Johnson's dictionary under "Free".) Through centuries of political and moral philosophy from Plato to the present, "the power to do as one wills" has been one of the principal threads running through discussions of the complex notion of freedom. Libertarians, beginners in the study of political philosophy, and anyone who believes that "the absence of coercion" is the only meaning that may legitimately be attached to the term *freedom* (or *liberty*, which I am treating as synonymous), may wish to read the essay "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty (not that I am in complete agreement with Berlin). Berlin brilliantly delineates the concepts of "negative" and "positive" liberty and traces their history in political thought. It is the positive sense that I am bringing into the discussion and that is either ignored or dismissed by libertarian thought. All right--let's not argue about definitions. Since the terms "freedom" and "liberty" seem to be generating more heat than light, I will replace them with less ambiguous phrases. Thus when Bob Stewart writes, "The objective of libertarians is not to minimize government, but to maximize liberty," I will rephrase that to read, "The objective of libertarians is to minimize coercion, not government"--a statement I believe we can all agree with (as a statement about libertarian belief). Now I claim that it is obvious even to children that a poor man has less power to do as he wills, is more dependent on circumstances and external forces, has less freedom (excuse me) from the control of necessity, has less ability to realize goals of his own, is more dependent and has less individual autonomy, than a rich man. The reason is simple: the possession of goods and money expands one's power and one's range of choice. Why do you suppose it is, libertarians, that people DESIRE more goods and money than they already have? Isn't one of the chief reasons to expand their power of self-determination and range of choice? A trivial example: If I owned a car I could do many things more easily than I now can and many things that I cannot now do at all. For another example, if I possessed assets worth $10 million, my power to do as I wish and my range of choice would be expanded enormously. I could tell my boss to take this job and shove it, if I wished, and live off the income from my wealth. I could take long vacations, buy houses, or write books in support of libertarianism (as a wealthy man, I would be inclined to). My actual situation, however, practically forces me to keep working at my job, since I would quickly run into serious difficulties if I quit. How does my inability to leave my job differ in its effect from the Soviet citizen's inability to emigrate? The result in either case is the same: being confined in a relatively unpleasant situation. To return to Gary York's comments: >You may not achieve your own "freedom to" at the expense of another's >"freedom from". Why not? You are making an assertion, not an argument. >I can conceive of innumerable things worth doing which do not at all involve >coercing others. Can't you? Yes, and I can conceive of some worthwhile things that do involve coercion, such as the redistribution of wealth, if it increased the aggregate of individual autonomy, power, and happiness. As A. C. Pigou, the founder of welfare economics, wrote in _The Economics of Welfare_: "It is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfactions." Cliff Matthews had another comment on my discussion of freedom: > Rather than assuming I know what you mean by "true freedom implies > knowledge," I will let you explain it to me and the net. I have no need to explain this to libertarians, who make this assumption when they argue that a government may legitimately prevent fraud in the marketplace. Fraud means disinformation; a person who has been defrauded is one whose freedom has been abridged precisely because he was deprived of knowledge of the true state of affairs when he made the transaction. Or do libertarians have some other reason to oppose fraud? In any case, libertarians do not extend this principle beyond the marketplace. I am not the first person to claim that knowledge is power; I wish to extend power by extending knowledge. Back to Gary: >Libertarians, as libertarians, want this and only this: > A world where there is broad agreement that the only proper use > of force is in responding to those who initiate its use. Again, why should we agree that that is the only proper use of force? I think Robin Hood had an excellent idea about the use of force, contrary to the sheriff of Nottingham. Libertarians keep repeating that the best society is one in which coercion is minimized, and we keep asking them why without getting a response. Why is a libertarian society better than one in which the power of self-determination, individual autonomy, and freedom from control by external forces (fate, necessity) is maximized? Convince me--I'm listening. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) (01/03/85)
> Again, why should we agree that [response to coercion] is the only > proper use of force? I think Robin Hood had an excellent idea about > the use of force, contrary to the sheriff of Nottingham. Libertarians > keep repeating that the best society is one in which coercion is > minimized, and we keep asking them why without getting a response. > Why is a libertarian society better than one in which the power of > self-determination, individual autonomy, and freedom from control by > external forces (fate, necessity) is maximized? Convince me--I'm > listening. Actually, this has been explained on the net, but with the high volume in this newsgroup it may have been missed. The axiom that Libertarians believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in any objective way, than any other. Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their (rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Non-coercion follows from this reasoning, it does not drive it. Bob Stewart ihldt!stewart
cliff@unmvax.UUCP (01/07/85)
> Cliff Matthews also posted an article quoting his dictionary on the > definition of freedom. Here we have an interesting sample of the alleged > libertarian thought process. Not only do libertarians seem to derive their > political theory from dictionaries, they don't seem to read past the first > definition given. The Oxford English Dictionary, generally regarded as the > most authoritative and complete English dictionary, contains the following > definition, among others, of freedom: > > "The quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity, > the power of self-determination attributed to the will." > --the sense I was referring to. Let me refresh a few memories... here is a reproduction of the part of my article that mentioned the definition of freedom: You> True freedom also implies knowledge. In our society most You> people's political opinions are formed to a great extent through a process You> of indoctrination. Their beliefs, habits, and preferences are shaped by You> outside influences. The fact that people are not threatened by physical You> force does not make them free. Me> Yow! Remember all the spelling flames of years past? My next few statements Me> may evoke some more spontaneous combustion. Your diction is horrible. You Me> are deliberately misusing words. Again I quote Webster's: Me> Me> "freedom n. Me> 1. the state or quality of being free; especially, Me> (a) exemption or liberation from the control of some other person or Me> some arbitrary power; liberty; independence;" You said that not being threatened by physical force does not make people free. By Webster's, you are wrong. Why did I pick the first entry in the dictionary? because that is the one that fit. THE FACT THAT PEOPLE ARE NOT THREATENED BY PHYSICAL FORCE MAKES THEM FREE BY THE FIRST DEFINITION LISTED IN WEBSTER'S. I don't have an OED at home, but I am sure you will find a similar definition. If you had said that it didn't make them free by all definitions of the word then I wouldn't have quoted Webster's--1, in fact I would have agree with you. But that is not what you said. Examine this hypothetical dialogue: R: The color of a clear sky is not blue. C: Gee, that's funny, the first entry in Webster's (C also lacks quick access to an OED) says it is. "1. any color between green and violet in the spectrum; the color of the clear sky or deep sea." R: C is a cretin. Notice how he picks an inferior dictonary and then only looks at the first entry. Of course I meant "9. a sailor". So, is R correct? Is the color of a clear sky not blue? Is C really the inept fool that R makes him out to be because C picks a definition that shows R is incorrect? > Cliff Matthews had another comment on my discussion of freedom: > > Rather than assuming I know what you mean by "true freedom implies > > knowledge," I will let you explain it to me and the net. > > I have no need to explain this to libertarians, who make this assumption > when they argue that a government may legitimately prevent fraud in the > marketplace. Fraud means disinformation; a person who has been defrauded is > one whose freedom has been abridged precisely because he was deprived of > knowledge of the true state of affairs when he made the transaction. Or do > libertarians have some other reason to oppose fraud? In any case, > libertarians do not extend this principle beyond the marketplace. I am not > the first person to claim that knowledge is power; I wish to extend power by > extending knowledge. Thanks for not explicitly insulting me (or my thought processes) this time. Libertarians' opposition to fraud stems from their belief in property rights and the free market. It is hard to do business when fraud is allowed. A contract (oral or written) means nothing and either end of the transaction can alter the deal in anyway wanted. Note that it is fraud whether or not the person on the other end recognizes it as such. Is knowledge useful? You betcha. Does "true freedom" imply knowledge? Hard to say... it was hard enough discussing the meaning of freedom... Does true freedom imply "total knowledge?" I supppose it would, so maybe both concepts "true freedom" and "total knowledge" can be discussed on net.religion.zen or net.rec.drugs.acid... > Why is a libertarian society better than one in > which the power of self-determination, individual autonomy, and freedom from > control by external forces (fate, necessity) is maximized? Convince me--I'm > listening. > > Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes I believe it would be hard to generate convincing argument through this media for such a substantial shift of belief. Perhaps small events/laws can be discussed in depth. How about the legalization of prostitution? From there we can step up to legalization of drugs, etc. --Cliff [Matthews] {purdue, cmcl2, ihnp4}!lanl!unmvax!cliff {csu-cs, pur-ee, convex, gatech, ucbvax}!unmvax!cliff 4744 Trumbull S.E. - Albuquerque NM 87108 - (505) 265-9143
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) (01/07/85)
In article <2673@ihldt.UUCP> stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) writes: >Actually, this has been explained on the net, but with the high volume >in this newsgroup it may have been missed. The axiom that Libertarians >believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: > > There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are > people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in > any objective way, than any other. > >Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for >one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their >(rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Non-coercion follows >from this reasoning, it does not drive it. Granting, just for the sake of argument (I don't think it's true) that the indented statement is true, does the rest follow? Is the reasoning valid? It is not. (I can't wait 'til my next posting on this, when I'll be sure to have a quote that will rub it in...) --the romping iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, (moving to) wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
cjk@ccice2.UUCP (Chris Kreilick) (01/09/85)
> In article <2673@ihldt.UUCP> stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) writes: > >Actually, this has been explained on the net, but with the high volume > >in this newsgroup it may have been missed. The axiom that Libertarians > >believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: > > > > There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are > > people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in > > any objective way, than any other. > > > >Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for > >one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their > >(rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Non-coercion follows > >from this reasoning, it does not drive it. > > Granting, just for the sake of argument (I don't think it's true) that > the indented statement is true, does the rest follow? Is the reasoning > valid? It is not. (I can't wait 'til my next posting on this, when I'll > be sure to have a quote that will rub it in...) > > --the romping iconoclast, > Paul V. Torek, (moving to) wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Paul, I think I'm getting the hang of this. Does anything you write make sense? It does not. P.S. Perhaps a new pair of rompers. -- TBAKTM
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) (01/09/85)
[Summary: non sequitur detected] In article <2673@ihldt.UUCP> stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) writes: >Actually, this has been explained on the net, but with the high volume >in this newsgroup it may have been missed. The axiom that Libertarians >believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: > > There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are > people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in > any objective way, than any other. > >Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for >one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their >(rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Non-coercion follows >from this reasoning, it does not drive it. In order to show that the conclusions R. J. Stewart draws from this "axiom" don't follow, I thought the following quotation might be instructive. Benito Mussolini drew some very different conclusions from that relativistic axiom: If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic than Fascist attitudes and activity. ... From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.* * Benito Mussolini, _Diuturna_, pp. 347-77. Quoted from Helmut Kuhn, _Freedom Forgotten and Remembered_, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1943, pp. 17-18. --the aspiring iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, (moving to) wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
nrh@inmet.UUCP (01/14/85)
>***** inmet:net.politics / umcp-cs!flink / 9:13 pm Jan 10, 1985 >[Summary: non sequitur detected] > >In article <2673@ihldt.UUCP> stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) writes: >>Actually, this has been explained on the net, but with the high volume >>in this newsgroup it may have been missed. The axiom that Libertarians >>believe in (even more basic than the non-initiation of force), is: >> >> There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are >> people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in >> any objective way, than any other. >> >>Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for >>one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their >>(rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Non-coercion follows >>from this reasoning, it does not drive it. > >In order to show that the conclusions R. J. Stewart draws from this >"axiom" don't follow, I thought the following quotation might be >instructive. Benito Mussolini drew some very different conclusions >from that relativistic axiom: > > If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories > and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, > immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic > than Fascist attitudes and activity. ... From the fact > that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies > are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that > everybody has the right to create for himself his own > ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy > of which he is capable.* > >* Benito Mussolini, _Diuturna_, pp. 347-77. Quoted from Helmut Kuhn, >_Freedom Forgotten and Remembered_, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North >Carolina Press, 1943, pp. 17-18. > > --the aspiring iconoclast, > Paul V. Torek, (moving to) wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 >---------- > Goodness! That Mussolini draws such a conclusion from relativism doesn't impress me much. That it impresses YOU, on the other hand, is most interesting. Are you saying that Mussolini's logic was correct? It sure doesn't seem so to me, particularly the bit about "enforcing" one's ideology on others. While we're at it, I'd like to point out that your summary at the top: >[Summary: non sequitur detected] Is quite apt with regard to your own article. Your quote from Mussolini begins: > If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories > and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective, > immortal truth ... then there is nothing more relativistic.... I think it quite clear the the libertarian logic begins with a LACK of contempt for the beliefs of others (and, of course, an unwillingness to have others beliefs forced on one).
stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) (01/15/85)
>> There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are >> people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in >> any objective way, than any other. >> >> Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for >> one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their >> (rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. > Benito Mussolini drew some very different conclusions > from that relativistic axiom: > > ... From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all > ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that > everybody has the right to create for himself his own > ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy > of which he is capable. Certainly the free-for-all approach is consistent with the relativistic axiom. In fact, I claim that this precisely describes most of human history! All that is consistent is not moral, however, and this is where libertarians part ways with Mussolini. The proponent of the free-for-all approach is in the dubious position of claiming that: - No philosophy has special significance. - Nevertheless, MY philosophy SHOULD have special significance. I suppose that if you are a true nihilist, this sort of reasoning wouldn't bother you much. To a libertarian, however, the relativistic axiom suggests a principle, that goes something like: Since my philosophy has no special significance, I should not do things to promote it that I would not want other people to do in promoting *their* philosophy. I alluded to this principle in my original posting, but I probably should have been more explicit. I find that almost everyone believes in this principle when they are having a philosophy forced upon them, but that most people don't have the integrity to stand by it when they are applying the force. Bob Stewart ihldt!stewart
garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) (01/16/85)
> >> There are about as many views of "right" and "wrong" as there are > >> people in the world. None of these can be shown to be better, in > >> any objective way, than any other. > >> > >> Given that this is true, libertarians then reason that it is wrong for > >> one person, or a group of persons with similar views, to force their > >> (rather arbitrary) set of values on other people. Is the above view of right and wrong (that it is wrong to force a set of values on another person) better than other views (that sometimes it is right to force a person to accept some other values) ? Can this superiority be shown by any objective means? Then the above premise is contradicted. Libertarians seem to be saying, "There is no way to know what's right and what's wrong, and I know that it is wrong to say that there is." Gary Samuelson ittvax!bunker!garys